The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
TONYA PARKS, et al., )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. CIV-23-41-R
)
AIG, an insurance company, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
The following Motions [Docs. 75, 76, 83, 93] are fully briefed and pending before
the Court. Defendants seek to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint [Doc. 69] in
its entirety. Plaintiffs separately responded to each motion [Docs. 84, 85, 91, 109], and the
Court addresses all pending Motions in this Order.1 As discussed in further detail below,
the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motions and DISMISSES the entirety of Plaintiffs’
claims on a variety of grounds.2
I. BACKGROUND
This collection of Plaintiffs is brought together by their shared allegations of
corruption and misconduct in the Oklahoma County Courthouse. The Defendant at the
center of Plaintiffs’ allegations is a former Oklahoma County judge, Tim Henderson. Each
1 Additionally, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend/Correct [Doc. 90] and the
associated Responses and Reply [Docs. 104, 107, 108] regarding the improperly named Defendant
Chicago Title Company with this Order.
2 Plaintiffs moved for a hearing on Defendants’ various Motions to Dismiss. Because this Order
resolves those Motions, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Hearing on Pending Motions [Doc. 111] is
DENIED.
Plaintiff claims he or she suffered harm stemming from acts that Henderson carried out
himself, Henderson directed others to do, or retaliation by other Defendants for reporting
Henderson’s misconduct. Plaintiffs’ allegations implicate a slew of people and entities
beyond Henderson: David Prater, the former Oklahoma County District Attorney; Mike
Hunter, the former Attorney General of the State of Oklahoma; Melissa Abernathy and
Brett Slimp, Oklahoma County Sherriff’s Deputies; Oklahoma County; Chicago Title
Company; and AIG, an insurance provider for the State.
Given the disparate parties in this case, it comes as no surprise that disentangling
each Plaintiff’s distinct claims against each Defendant poses a challenge. This difficulty is
exacerbated by the Complaint’s liberal use of footnotes, disorganization, argumentative
nature, and lack of focus.3 Despite this, the Court proceeds to rule on Defendants’ motions
in an effort to move the case forward.4
Plaintiff Tonya Parks is the daughter of fellow Plaintiffs, Frances and Bennie
Gibson. The Parks/Gibson family, residents of Texas, encountered Defendants because Ms.
Gibson’s mother’s estate was the subject of a probate action in Oklahoma County that
began in 2016.5 Ms. Parks held power of attorney in the probate case and interacted with
3 The Court previously dismissed, sua sponte, Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint for
noncompliance with FED. R. CIV. P. 8 and directed Plaintiffs to clearly and cogently state their
claims in a short and plain statement against each Defendant. The Amended Complaint before the
Court makes minimal progress on that front. It continues to be unclear, in part, due to Plaintiffs
devoting a substantial amount of space to allegations of misconduct by Defendants’ counsel, even
though the attorney is not a Defendant in the case. The Complaint was not the proper avenue to
raise these allegations. Subsequently, Plaintiffs filed a proper Motion [Doc. 72] to disqualify
Defendants’ counsel. The Court denied the Motion [Doc. 87].
4 The synopses of Plaintiffs’ claims that follow are the claims as the Court can construe them with
a liberal construction normally only afforded to pro se litigants.
5 In re Estate of Lenox, No. PB-2016-721. The case is sealed per court order.
the Oklahoma County court system as a result. Throughout the probate action, Parks alleges
various Defendants acted improperly by: influencing the judges overseeing the case; falsely
imprisoning her; placing her on a “watchlist” at the Courthouse; undertaking a sham sale
of the Estate’s house; undertaking a sham investigation into misconduct of which Parks
complained; and retaliating against her for complaining of misconduct. She brings causes
of action under 42 U.S. § 1983 for violations of her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment
rights, and she alleges a civil conspiracy by Defendants. She also alleges false
imprisonment, breach of fiduciary duty, and asks for declaratory relief against Defendant
AIG.
Bennie and Frances Gibson, the parents of Plaintiff Parks, allege their own causes
of action stemming from the purported misconduct surrounding the Lenox probate. Ms.
Gibson, as heir to her mother’s Estate, alleges much of the same misconduct and retaliation
as Ms. Parks does. She brings several causes of action, including: violations of her Fourth,
Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights; a conspiracy to violate said rights; a Fifth
Amendment taking of property to which she was the heir; breaches of fiduciary duty; and
a declaratory judgment that the AIG insurance policy was triggered by the misconduct.
Mr. Gibson alleges he complained of the misconduct in the Lenox probate to several
authorities, and as a result, Defendants retaliated against him. This retaliation took the form
of an allegedly false arrest that Mr. Gibson was subjected to at the Oklahoma County
Courthouse. Mr. Gibson brings several causes of action, including: First, Fourth, Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment violations; a conspiracy to violate the same; a declaratory
judgment that the AIG policy is triggered by his claim; and a declaratory judgment that his
private speech to the probate attorney was protected speech. He also seeks a variety of
injunctions against Defendants.
Plaintiff Nyanza Cook complains of Defendant Henderson’s misconduct in an
unrelated criminal case in which her son, who is not a plaintiff, was arrested. Cook alleges
her son’s initial arrest warrant was unsigned and invalid before Henderson improperly
signed and backdated it. She further alleges Henderson raised her son’s bond without a
proper hearing. Additionally, she seems to accuse the Oklahoma County District
Attorney’s Office of communicating falsities to Child Protective Services in Texas and
affecting her grandparent rights. Plaintiff Cook brings a First Amendment retaliation claim
and a breach of fiduciary duty claim. She further seeks declaratory judgments regarding
her son’s bond proceedings and Defendant AIG’s insurance policy. Finally, she seeks
additional injunctive relief.
Plaintiff Alex Bednar accuses Defendants of a conspiracy to discredit and harm him
by eliminating his ability to practice law and meddling in his bankruptcy and divorce cases.
Judge Henderson and District Attorney Prater are at the center of Bednar’s claims. Plaintiff
Bednar brings causes of action for violations of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, a conspiracy to violate the same, false imprisonment, and breach of
fiduciary duty. He also seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendant AIG’s 2018-19 policy
is triggered by the events of this case.
Defendants can be grouped into four categories. Defendants Henderson, Hunter, and
Prater (“State Defendants”) are all former State officials represented by the Oklahoma
Attorney General’s office. Defendants Slimp, Abernathy, and Oklahoma County (“County
Defendants”) are represented by the Oklahoma County District Attorney’s office.
Defendant AIG and Defendant Chicago Title Company are represented separately by their
respective counsel. Between them all, Defendants dispute the entirety of Plaintiffs’
allegations and move to dismiss on a variety of grounds, including sovereign immunity,
judicial immunity, prosecutorial immunity, qualified immunity, the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine, res judicata, Oklahoma’s statute of limitations, lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
failure to state a claim, and noncompliance with FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6), the Court must
determine whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion
to dismiss is properly granted when a complaint provides no “more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint must contain enough “facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. The factual allegations “must be
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 555. (citations omitted).
In making its dismissal determination, the Court must accept all the well-pleaded
allegations of the complaint as true and construe the allegations in the light most favorable
to the claimant. Alvarado v. KOB–TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).
Determining whether a claim is plausible varies based on context and requires the
Court to draw on judicial experience and common sense. Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671
F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012). To satisfy the plausibility standard of federal pleading,
Plaintiffs must offer this Court reason to believe they have a reasonable likelihood of
mustering factual support for their claims. Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493
F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007).
Underpinning Rule 12(b)(6) is Rule 8’s requirement that a pleading provide a
“comprehensible, ‘short and plain’ statement of the claim(s) sufficient to give the opposing
party reasonable and fair notice of the basis of the complaint.” Abdelsamed v. Colorado, 6
F. App'x 771 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)). Additionally, “it [is] not
the district court’s job to stitch together cognizable claims for relief” from a litigant’s
deficient pleading. Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir. 2007). “[F]ailure to
satisfy Rule 8 can supply a basis for dismissal[.]” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E.
Agents, at Arapahoe Cnty. Just. Ctr., 492 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 2007). Moreover, this
Court has “inherent authority to manage [its] dockets and courtrooms with a view toward
the efficient and expedient resolution of cases.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 47 (2016).
III. DISCUSSION
At the outset, the Court observes that Plaintiffs’ Complaint is a form of “shotgun
pleading.” Plaintiffs allege a plethora of facts, attach several exhibits to the pleading, and
state numerous claims by unrelated Plaintiffs against various Defendants. These claims are
not effectively organized, and because of the morass of information Plaintiffs have
provided, the facts underpinning each claim are not specified. Pleading in this way “places
an inordinate burden” on the parties responding to Plaintiffs’ allegations and the Court in
analyzing their claims. Jacobs v. Credit Suisse First Bos., 11-CV-00042, 2011 WL
4537007, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2011). “Essentially, the shotgun pleader foists off one
of the pleading lawyer's critical tasks—sifting a mountain of facts down to a handful of
those that are relevant to a given claim—onto the reader.” Id.
Plaintiffs state that the alleged “widespread wrongdoing in this multi-plaintiff,
multi-defendant action justifies the length” of their Complaint. Doc. 85 at 9. But the
“widespread wrongdoing” alleged by the various Plaintiffs against several Defendants does
not justify the Complaint’s lack of clarity. Quite the opposite. The nature of this case
demands that counsel meticulously clarify the claims of each Plaintiff so that the Court and
Defendants may reasonably comprehend the nature of and alleged factual basis for each
and every claim. It is neither the Court nor the Defendants’ job to distill Plaintiffs’ tangled
allegations into a workable pleading; it is the Plaintiffs’.
A. STATE AND COUNTY DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS
Because Plaintiffs have failed, yet again, to provide a short and plain statement of
their claims as required by FED. R. CIV. P. 8, the claims asserted against State & County
Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.6 Although the parameters of Plaintiffs’
various claims are often unclear, Defendants have raised defenses that seem to bar at least
some aspects of Plaintiffs’ claims. So, while dismissal of the instant Complaint is pursuant
to Rule 8, Plaintiffs should bear in mind that dismissal of their claims on the following
grounds is plausible in a subsequent Complaint. Dismissing the Complaint in this manner,
while discussing the defenses Defendants have already raised, will aid the Court and all
litigants in achieving a more expeditious resolution to this dispute.
6 Defendants AIG and Chicago Title’s arguments will be addressed infra at section III B.
i. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
This doctrine prohibits federal district courts from reviewing state court judgments.
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 460 (2006). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the
lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’
challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced.’” Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S.
280, 284 (2005)). The Tenth Circuit has emphasized that the “essential point” of the
doctrine is that it bars claims that complain of injuries arising from state court judgments.
Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d 1278, 1283 (10th Cir. 2012). “In other words, an
element of the claim must be that the state court wrongfully entered its judgment.” Id.
The precise facts, claims, and remedies Plaintiffs put forward are often unclear.
However, it is apparent that much of Plaintiffs Parks, Gibson, and Bednar’s allegations
revolve around previous state court judgments rendered against them. To the extent
Plaintiffs challenge the state court judgments against them, the Court would lack
jurisdiction to entertain their claims.
ii. Judicial Immunity
Our legal system cloaks judges in a broad and absolute immunity for their judicial
acts; accordingly, Plaintiffs must clear a high bar to hold Defendant Henderson liable for
his alleged wrongdoing. Each Plaintiff appears to allege one or multiple claims against
Defendant Henderson arising out of his conduct in cases they had before him. For example,
they accuse Judge Henderson of backdating documents, improperly increasing a bail
amount, taking property without just compensation, and generally depriving them of due
process. Each of these acts seems to implicate Henerson’s judicial immunity, even if they
were undertaken wrongfully.
“A judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error,
was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather he will be subject to liability
only when he has acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435
U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978) (internal quotation omitted). Moreover, “the commission of grave
procedural errors” is still within the ambit of judicial immunity. Id. at 359. In effect,
Plaintiffs must show Judge Henderson acted in a nonjudicial capacity or undertook judicial
acts without any conceivable jurisdiction to do so. From what the Court can discern from
the Complaint, however, much of the alleged wrongdoing by Defendant Henderson fails
to meet this exacting standard.
Additionally, Plaintiffs should note that “judicial immunity may extend to persons
other than a judge where performance of judicial acts or activity as an official aide of the
judge is involved.” Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 1981).
Consequently, Plaintiffs’ allegations against nonjudicial defendants, such as Abernathy
and Slimp, may even be barred by judicial immunity.
iii. Prosecutorial Immunity
Defendant Prater enjoys similar immunity under the law that Defendant Henderson
does, as “[t]he common-law immunity of a prosecutor is based upon the same
considerations that underlie the common-law immunities of judges . . . acting within the
scope of their duties.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23 (1976). “A prosecutor is
duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to bring and in
conducting them in court.” Id. at 424. Here, Plaintiffs allege Prater limited investigations
into Henderson, wrongfully brought prosecutions against Bennie Gibson and Alex Bednar,
and generally retaliated against Plaintiffs’ exercise of their rights. Again, it is uncertain to
what extent prosecutorial immunity would shield Defendant Prater from Plaintiffs’ claims
because their claims are not clear. However, at least some of the conduct Plaintiffs describe
appears to be protected by prosecutorial immunity.
iv. Sovereign Immunity
The sovereign immunity afforded states by the Eleventh Amendment is implicated
by Plaintiffs’ claims against the State Defendants in their official capacities.7 Because
Plaintiffs allege violations of their Constitutional rights by State officials, their claims are
necessarily based in 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[A] suit against a state official in his or her official
capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office. As
such, it is no different from a suit against the state itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). A State is not a proper defendant in a § 1983 action. Id.
Thus, this Court cannot provide recourse for Plaintiffs against State Defendants in their
official capacities. Eleventh Amendment immunity is jurisdictional in nature, so dismissal
on its basis is to be without prejudice. Colby v. Herrick, 849 F.3d 1273, 1278 (10th Cir.
2017). Consequently, all claims against Defendants Henderson, Prater, and Hunter, in their
official capacities, are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE on this basis.
7 It is unclear whether Plaintiffs intended to bring suit against Defendant Henderson in his official
capacity, but they do expressly lodge claims against Defendants Prater and Hunter in their official
capacities. The Court presumes Plaintiffs attempt to do so against Defendant Henderson, too.
v. Qualified Immunity
Plaintiffs’ claims against all County and State Defendants raise the specter of
qualified immunity. Apart from the previously discussed absolute immunity, “[m]ost
public officials are entitled to only qualified immunity.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S.
259, 268 (1993). Under its shield, “government officials are not subject to damages liability
for the performance of their discretionary functions when ‘their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.’” Id. (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1993)). Prosecutors,
while receiving absolute immunity for prosecutorial functions, can also be entitled to
qualified immunity for non-prosecutorial functions. Id. at 273.
The Court need not rehash the well-trodden jurisprudence of qualified immunity for
litigants at this time. It suffices to remind Plaintiffs of its potential application to claims
against State Defendants, Abernathy, and Slimp. If Plaintiffs move forward with their
claims, they must allege sufficient facts to plausibly demonstrate that the official has
exceeded his or her qualified immunity. Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th
Cir. 2019). If they fail to do so, qualified immunity will shield Defendants from suit.
B. DISCUSSION OF AIG AND CHICAGO TITLE’S MOTIONS
As with the County and State Defendants, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants AIG
and Chicago Title are often inscrutable. However, there are certain claims which the Court
finds legally deficient. In the interest of expeditiously resolving this case for litigants, the
Court DISMISSES claims against AIG with prejudice. Claims against Chicago Title are
DISMISSED without prejudice.
i. AIG
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment against AIG that the insurance policy it
allegedly issued to the State of Oklahoma is implicated by the alleged events of this case.
AIG points to the traditional direct-action prohibition in Oklahoma to defend itself.8
Plaintiffs’ claims against AIG directly cannot persist because the familiar limitation
on direct actions against insurers in Oklahoma is applicable in this case. Plaintiffs
acknowledge the traditional limits within Oklahoma on suing insurers directly:
It is true that, ordinarily, an injured party does not have a direct right of action
against a liability insurer. This, in turn, means that indemnity claims are
ordinarily not ripe until the tortfeasor’s liability is determined. It also means
that, ordinarily, the insurer owes no duty of good faith to plaintiffs that are
harmed by their insureds’ conduct.
Doc. 109: Plaintiffs’ Response at 4; see, e.g., McWhirter v. Fire Ins. Exch., Inc., 878 P.2d
1056, 1059 (Okla. 1994); Watson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 23 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1347 (N.D.
Okla. 2014). The Supreme Court of Oklahoma has consistently reaffirmed these limits.
“We have never before recognized the right of a plaintiff to bring a direct action against
the insurer of an alleged tortfeasor absent statutory edict. We do not recognize this right
now.” Daigle v. Hamilton, 782 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Okla. 1989) (emphasis in original).
To overcome the direct-action prohibition, Plaintiffs must demonstrate a contractual
or statutory relationship with AIG. Townsend v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 860 P.2d
8 The Court does not find AIG to currently be in default. It is unnecessary to parse the tortured
procedural history of the case to determine if or when AIG should have been deemed in default.
Even if the Court were to find the Clerk of Court should have entered a default against AIG in
2023, the Court would set it aside for good cause. See Pinson v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., Inc.,
316 F. App’x 744, 750 (10th Cir. 2009). Specifically, the Court finds AIG did not willfully default,
AIG’s defenses have merit, and Plaintiffs have demonstrated no prejudice.
236, 237 (Okla. 1993). In this situation, however, Plaintiffs are “third-party claimants who
are mere strangers to the contract of insurance.” Id. Despite this, Plaintiffs attempt to evade
the prohibition by analogizing their situation—as alleged victims of civil rights abuses by
government actors—to Oklahoma’s uninsured motorist (UM) scheme. Such an analogy is
unavailing.
In the UM context, unlike here, contractual privity exists. There, the insured
motorist has contracted with his or her insurer for certain benefits in the event of incurring
damages in excess of another driver’s liability policy. Id. at 238; see, e.g., Brown v. Patel,
157 P.3d 117 (Okla. 2007). Plaintiffs, on the other hand, wish to sue the State of
Oklahoma’s insurer because of Oklahoma officials’ alleged liability. No privity exists.
Plaintiffs also cannot be considered third-party beneficiaries to the contract between AIG
and Oklahoma because the contract was not “made expressly for [their] benefit, which
means . . . in direct or unmistakable terms[.]” Colony Ins. Co. v. Burke, 698 F.3d 1222,
1230 (10th Cir. 2012). Thus, Plaintiffs’ attempt to demonstrate a contractual relationship
with AIG fails.
Plaintiffs then point to the Oklahoma Government Tort Claims Act as forming a
statutory relationship between them and AIG. In Plaintiffs’ telling, the Act creates a
statutory relationship between Plaintiffs and AIG because:
if a policy or contract of liability insurance covering the state . . . is
applicable, the terms of the policy govern the rights and obligations of the
state or political subdivision and the insurer with respect to the investigation,
settlement, payment and defense of claims or suits against the state or
political subdivision or its employees covered by the policy.
OKLA STAT., tit. 51, § 158(C). Plaintiffs read the statutory text as imposing an obligation
on AIG to investigate a claimant’s allegations against the State. Plaintiffs, as strangers to
the insurance contract between AIG and the State, however, cannot enforce the “terms of
the policy” that “govern the rights and obligations of the state . . . and the insurer.” Id. Thus,
the statutory text only defines the relationship between AIG and the State, not Plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs then point to two cases to support the notion that they have a statutory
relationship with AIG. In the first, Plaintiffs cite a quote referring to an insurance policy
held by a political subdivision as “a fund independent of the agency’s assets upon which
the injured plaintiff may draw.” Herweg, By and Through Stanard v. Board of Educ. of
Lawton Public Schools, 673 P.2d 154, 156 (Okla. 1983). Evidently, Plaintiffs read this as
eliminating the direct-action prohibition and allowing them to pursue “the fund” directly.
Doc. 109 at 5. However, all that the Supreme Court of Oklahoma conveyed with that
statement is that “a political subdivision . . . waives its [sovereign] immunity to the extent
of [the insurance] coverage.” Id. Second, Plaintiffs cite to portions of Colony for support.
However, the Tenth Circuit ultimately rejected the plaintiff’s claim of a statutory
relationship in that case, finding the insurance policy was a third-party liability policy—
just as the State’s policy with AIG is here. Colony, 698 F.3d at 1232.
In a last-ditch effort at finding a method to sue the insurer directly, Plaintiffs note
that Plaintiff Bednar qualifies as an insured person under the AIG policy, thereby placing
all Plaintiffs in a contractual relationship with AIG. It is unnecessary to determine whether
Bednar actually qualifies as an insured party under the policy. Because Bednar is acting as
a Plaintiff in this case, AIG’s duty to him is defined by his status as a claimant, not as an
insured. Id. at 1230. He cannot bring suit against AIG directly as a result.
There is no plausible set of facts Plaintiffs could present which would give them the
right to pursue an action against AIG (or the properly identified insurer) directly.
Consequently, amendment with respect to AIG is futile and dismissal with prejudice is
appropriate. Knight v. Mooring Cap. Fund, LLC, 749 F.3d 1180, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014).
All claims against AIG are DISMISSED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) with prejudice.
ii. Chicago Title Company
Defendant Chicago Title Company seeks to dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty and
civil conspiracy claims lodged against it by Plaintiffs Parks and Gibson on the grounds that
it is not the proper entity to be sued. Chicago Title Company is a California corporation
that has not conducted any activity directed towards Plaintiffs in the state of Oklahoma.
Doc. 83 at 13; Doc. 83-3. Rather, Defendant suggests the properly named target of
Plaintiff’s claims is Chicago Title Oklahoma Co. Doc. 83-2. Plaintiffs accede to this
representation [Doc. 91] and wish to amend their Complaint to name the proper Defendant
[Doc. 90].9 Given the cursory nature of the allegations against Chicago Title, however, it
is questionable whether Plaintiffs could have properly stated claims for breach of fiduciary
duty or civil conspiracy against the properly named defendant. 10
9 The Court has considered this Motion to Amend and the associated briefing by parties [Docs. 90,
104, 107, 108] in issuing this Order.
10 Plaintiffs are reminded of their requirement to plead claims that are facially plausible. See
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). Rule 11 sanctions are available to a court if it finds
the litigant has burdened the court with baseless filings. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384, 398 (1990).
The Court GRANTS Chicago Title Company’s Motion to Dismiss and DISMISSES
without prejudice all claims against the entity Chicago Title Company pursuant to FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(b)(2). Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to Amend is DENIED. Plaintiffs may file a
new motion to amend their Complaint, including naming the proper entity of Chicago Title
Oklahoma Co.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is dismissed in its entirety. Claims against
AIG are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). All other claims
against all other Defendants are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule
8(a)(2) and the Court’s inherent power to manage its docket to expeditiously resolve cases.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is not close to complying with Rule 8(a)(2). Once
more, the Court underscores the Rule’s mandate that a pleading “must contain . . . a short
and plain statement of the claim[.]” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Plaintiffs may file a Motion to Amend their Complaint that complies with LCvR
15.1 and Rule 8(a)(2) within twenty-one days of the date of this Order. The Court will not
be inclined to dismiss claims without prejudice next time unless it is evident that Plaintiffs
have heeded this Court’s repeated admonishments. Plaintiffs will not be entitled to freely
seek bite after bite at the proverbial apple. Defendants’ Motions [Docs. 75, 76, 83, 93] are
GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 20th day of June 2024.
DAVID L. RUSSELL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
17