Thomsen v. Armfield

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

WILLIAM C. THOMSEN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-24-226-D

)

CORY ARMFIELD and CITY OF )

NEW CORDELL, )

)

Defendants. )

O R D E R

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 8] under Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff, who appears pro se, has made no response, even though he was

granted additional time and given notice of LCvR7.1(g). Under the circumstances, the

Court finds in the exercise of its discretion under LCvR7.1(g) that Defendants’ Motion

should be deemed confessed. Further, for the reasons fully stated in the Motion, the Court

finds that the Complaint fails to state plausible claim and should be dismissed.

Plaintiff brings claims against Cory Armfield in his individual capacity and the City

of New Cordell under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Armfield, a city police officer, unreasonably impounded

his pickup truck for lack of insurance and that the City’s procedures violate the Fourth

Amendment. See Compl. [Doc. No. 1] at 5 (ECF page numbering). Defendants assert

that the Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts to establish a Fourth Amendment violation

or to support municipal liability and that Officer Armfield is entitled to qualified immunity.

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. In § 1983 cases involving

qualified immunity, “plaintiffs must allege facts sufficient to show (assuming they are true)

that the defendants plausibly violated their constitutional rights, and that those rights were

clearly established at the time. This requires enough allegations to give the defendants

notice of the theory under which their claim is made.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F. 3d

1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008).1

Accepting the factual allegations of the Complaint, Plaintiff was stopped by Officer

Armfield on March 2, 2024, while driving his pickup in New Cordell, Oklahoma. Officer

Armfield approached the vehicle when Plaintiff stopped at a convenience store, and

directed Plaintiff to exit the vehicle and call for a ride because it was being impounded.

Office Armfield told Plaintiff that a check of his vehicle license plate showed the vehicle

was uninsured. Officer Armfield did not allow Plaintiff to remove personal belongings

from the vehicle before it was impounded. Plaintiff alleges that impounding his vehicle for

1 “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability for civil

damages ‘unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or

constitutional right, and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time of the challenged

conduct.’” Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,

735 (2011)).

lack of insurance was an unreasonable seizure of his property, and the City’s “policy

making procedures” violate the Fourth Amendment, “because you can get insurance over

the phone anytime day or night in less time then [sic] it takes for them to have your vehicle

impounded.” See Compl. at 5. Plaintiff also states that Officer Armfield “has harassed

me and abused his power of authority.” Id.

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unlawful seizures of personal

property, including automobiles, but the authority of police officers to impound vehicles

that violate public safety laws is well established. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Opperman,

428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). Plaintiff’s allegations do not show an unlawful impoundment

of his vehicle because Oklahoma law expressly authorizes a police officer “to cause to be

towed any vehicle found upon public roads, highways, streets, turnpikes, [or] private

parking lots accessible to the public . . . when: . . . [t]he officer has probable cause that the

vehicle is not insured as required by the Compulsory Insurance Law of this state.” See

Okla. Stat. tit. 47, § 955(A)(7); see id. § 7-606(A)(1)(a) (same as to vehicle being operated

by a person without insurance); see also State v. Feeken, 371 P.3d 1124, 1126 (Okla. Crim.

App. 2016) (officer lawfully impounded uninsured vehicle under these statutes). Further,

because Officer Armfield’s conduct was not unconstitutional, the City cannot be held liable

for a constitutional violation. See Harmon v. City of Norman, 61 F.4th 779, 794 (10th Cir.

2023) (“A municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying constitutional

violation by any of its officers.”) (quoting Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 782

(10th Cir. 1993)). Therefore, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a plausible

§ 1983 claim against Officer Armfield or the City.

For these reasons, the Court finds that the Complaint should be dismissed but that

Plaintiff should have an opportunity to amend his pleading. See Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d

1178, 1195 (10th Cir. 2010).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss [Doc.

No. 8] is GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice to amendment.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff is authorized to file an amended

complaint within 14 days from the date of this Order. If no timely amendment is made, this

action will be dismissed with prejudice to refiling.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 7" day of May, 2024.

Aly 0.O,Pit

TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI

Chief United States District Judge