The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
STACY WILLIS, as personal )
representative of the Estate of )
MITCHELL EVERETT WILLIS, )
deceased, )
) Case No. CIV-18-323-D
Plaintiff, )
)
v. )
)
JONATHAN JOHNSON, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Revisit and Reconsider the Court’s May
20, 2021 Order [ECF No. 141] Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint [ECF No. 82] [Doc. No. 194]. The Board of County Commissioners for
Oklahoma County (the “Board”) responded to Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider [Doc. No.
196], to which Plaintiff replied [Doc. No. 199]. The matter is fully briefed and at issue.
Background
This case arises out of Mitchell Everett Willis’s tragic death at the Oklahoma County
Detention Center. On the morning of August 18, 2017, officers escorted Mr. Willis into the
detention center after he was arrested for public drunkenness and disorderly conduct. Less
than twelve hours later, a detention center nurse found Mr. Willis in his cell unresponsive,
lying face-down in a prone position.
Earlier in his detention, Mr. Willis started a physical altercation outside a receiving
cell while officers attempted to provide him lunch. It took several officers to subdue him;
ultimately, officers placed Mr. Willis in handcuffs and ankle shackles. The officers then
escorted Mr. Willis to be seen by detention center medical staff, who cleared him to be
taken to cell 13C-03. Mr. Willis walked to the cell under his own power.
Three officers, including Jonathan Johnson and Bryan Cornelius, escorted Mr.
Willis into cell 13C-03. Once inside the cell, the officers ordered Mr. Willis to lower
himself to his knees, and Mr. Willis complied. Officers Johnson and Cornelius then assisted
Mr. Willis to his stomach. At this point, Mr. Willis was face-down in a prone position
restrained by handcuffs and ankle shackles.
The officers surrounded Mr. Willis to remove the handcuffs and shackles. To keep
Mr. Willis on the floor, Officer Johnson utilized a three-point stabilization technique, which
involves an officer placing his foot on the floor between a detainee’s neck and shoulder
and lowering his shin across a detainee’s shoulder blade. During the uncuffing, Officer
Cornelius thought Officer Johnson’s knee was in an incorrect position on Mr. Willis’s back,
so he directed Officer Johnson to reposition his knee. The officers removed the handcuffs
and shackles, and they exited the cell.
Over the following six hours, officers conducted 15-minute sight-checks. The sight-
check log sheet mostly documents Mr. Willis as “laying” or “sleeping,” although two
entries state Mr. Willis was in a sitting position. In the early evening, the officer on sight-
check duty requested that a detention center nurse check on Mr. Willis. The nurse found
him unresponsive, and resuscitation measures proved unsuccessful. Shortly thereafter, Mr.
Willis was pronounced dead in cell 13C-03.
An autopsy performed by Dr. Edana Stroberg, a forensic pathologist at the Office of
the Chief Medical Examiner in Oklahoma City, revealed a significant injury to Mr. Willis’s
back. Dr. Stroberg concluded that Mr. Willis’s cause of death was blunt force trauma to his
thoracic spine.
Plaintiff Stacy Willis, as representative of Mr. Willis’s estate, sued multiple
defendants alleging violations of Mr. Willis’s rights under the United States Constitution.
Plaintiff brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with a request for attorney fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
On September 13, 2019, the Court dismissed the Board for failure to state a claim
pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). See 9/13/2019 Order [Doc. No. 68]. On September
11, 2020, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint [Doc. No.
82], which sought to add the Board back into the lawsuit. Plaintiff argued that discovery
conducted since the Court dismissed the Board allowed Plaintiff to cure perceived
deficiencies in her claim against the Board. On May 20, 2021, the Court denied Plaintiff’s
motion for leave, concluding that allowing Plaintiff to amend would be futile. See
5/20/2021 Order [Doc. No. 141].1
On May 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion to Reconsider [Doc. No. 194],
asking the Court to reconsider its prior order denying Plaintiff leave to amend her
complaint. The Board has responded in opposition [Doc. No. 196] and argues that Plaintiff
1 As part of its order denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave, the Court also denied Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to File a Response to Defendant’s Supplemental Brief in Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 98].
fails to carry her burden in showing that the Court should alter or reconsider its prior order.
Plaintiff has replied in further support of her Motion [Doc. No. 199].
Related to the instant Motion, the Board also filed a Motion to Intervene [Doc. No.
200], in which it argues that, should the Court deem it necessary, the Board should be
allowed to intervene in the case for the sole purpose of having its response to Plaintiff’s
Motion to Reconsider heard. Plaintiff filed a response [Doc. No. 201], arguing that the
Board’s motion is untimely and the Board fails to meet its burden in showing that
intervention is warranted. The Board replied in further support of its motion [Doc. No.
202].
Standard of Decision
“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not recognize a ‘motion to reconsider.’”
Van Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991). However, “a district
court always has the inherent power to reconsider its interlocutory rulings.” Warren v. Am.
Bankers Ins. of Fla., 507 F.3d 1239, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007). “Grounds warranting a motion
to reconsider include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence
previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Servants of Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations
omitted). A motion to reconsider, however, “has dubious parameters,” and “[m]any district
courts vigorously disfavor these motions.” United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1123 (10th
Cir. 2007) (quoting Judge Wayne Alley’s letter, in which he notes the “alarming practice
and regularity with which motions to reconsider are filed after a decision unfavorable to a
party's case”).
Discussion
I. The Court will consider the Board’s response to Plaintiff’s Motion to
Reconsider.
As an initial matter, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s argument raised in her reply that
the Board, as a non-party, has no standing to object to her Motion to Reconsider. See Pl.’s
Reply at 2-3.2 Plaintiff argues that the Board should be permitted to respond to the matters
raised in the Motion to Reconsider if, and only if, the Court grants Plaintiff the relief she
seeks and the Board once again becomes a named party in the case. See id. at 3.
Because Plaintiff raised this argument in her reply, the Board did not have the chance
to respond. The Board did, however, file its Motion to Intervene for the limited purpose of
having its response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider heard by the Court. See Board’s
Mot. to Intervene. The Board argues that it meets the standard for both intervention as of
right and permissive intervention. See id. at 6-15. Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that
the Board fails to meet either standard. See Pl.’s Resp. to Mot. to Intervene.
The Court need not fully delve into the parties’ arguments on intervention, as it finds
that, given the unique circumstances present here, the Board properly responded to
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider. Specifically, the Court finds persuasive the line of cases
cited in the Board’s Motion to Intervene, each involving a non-party responding to a party’s
attempt to amend their complaint and add the non-party to the case. See Board’s Mot. to
Intervene at 11-12 (citing cases).
2 All citations to electronically filed pleadings in this case reference the ECF page number
at the top of each page.
The Court’s conclusion is also supported by commonsense considerations and
judicial economy. Here, the Court dismissed the Board from the case without prejudice.
After conducting more discovery in the case, Plaintiff moved for leave to amend her
complaint and again add the Board as a defendant. The Court denied that motion. Now, in
a request for the Court to reconsider its prior order denying leave to amend, Plaintiff argues
that the Board should have no say in the matter until she secures the relief she seeks. Then,
and only then, is the Board allowed to refute Plaintiff’s arguments, presumably in a motion
to dismiss or other motion practice. This course of action would not promote judicial
economy, especially where the Board could—and, indeed, did—seek to intervene in the
case for the limited purpose of having its response considered by the Court, and the Court
must determine whether amendment would be futile. See Martins v. Cnty. of Nassau, No.
15-cv-5120(ADS)(AKT), 2017 WL 1458770, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2017) (“In this case,
even assuming that Heuschneider lacks standing to oppose the relief sought, the Court
would nevertheless be inclined to consider the points and authorities raised in his
submission and, to that end, would make use of the variety of rules and rationales that are
available for doing so. After all, [e]ven in the absence of an opposition, . . . the Court must
consider whether the proposed amendment is futile, and the only conceivable end that
might be served by disregarding Heuschneider's relevant arguments at this juncture would
be to prolong the inevitable filing of a substantially similar motion to dismiss after service
of the amended complaint.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court, therefore, rejects Plaintiff’s argument that the Board lacks standing to
respond and will next address the merits of Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider.
II. Plaintiff fails to carry her burden in showing that the Court should alter its
prior order denying Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend her complaint.
Having decided to consider the Board’s response, the Court now moves to the merits
of Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider. Plaintiff argues that new evidence, which was
discovered after the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to amend and add the Board as a
defendant, “supports Plaintiff’s allegations that the Board’s actions and omissions
contributed to cause the paralysis and death” of Mr. Willis. Pl.’s Mot. to Reconsider at 9.
Specifically, Plaintiff focuses on three pieces of evidence:
(1) Defendant Johnson believed, based on his training, that the proper
application of the three-point technique involved placing his knee
diagonally over the spine of a detainee and applying pressure to the
detainee’s back;
(2) Defendant Johnson’s trainer, Officer Austin [Slaten], trained Defendant
Johnson to position his knee diagonally over the spine of a detainee and
apply pressure to a detainee’s back; and
(3) [T]he Oklahoma County Sheriff testified that Defendant Johnson
performed the three-point technique in accordance with Defendant
Johnson’s training. This training, however, as demonstrated by the newly
discovered evidence, was incorrect, contrary to sound correctional
practices, and caused Mr. Willis’s death.
Id. at 19. Plaintiff sets forth a lengthy set of “material facts” she claims warrants the Court’s
reconsideration of its prior order denying her leave to amend. See id. at 9-15. Plaintiff also
argues that the Court should alter its prior order to correct clear error and prevent manifest
injustice. See id. at 22-24.
In response, the Board first argues that Plaintiff’s recitation of “material facts” is
misleading, if not inaccurate, due to Plaintiff misstating or, at times, “intentionally”
omitting other relevant deposition testimony. See Board’s Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider at
13-21. The Board then argues that, even considering the newly submitted evidence,
amendment would be futile. See id. at 23-30. Last, the Board argues that the Court did not
commit clear error in denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend, and, likewise, the order did not
result in manifest injustice. See id. at 30-33.
A. Even considering Plaintiff’s newly submitted evidence, amendment
would be futile.
Plaintiff relies on myriad “material facts” she claims are relevant to deciding
whether the Court should alter its prior order denying Plaintiff leave to amend her
complaint. See Pl.’s Mot. to Reconsider at 9-15. Plaintiff first argues that this new evidence
was “not available at the time of the September 11, 2020 filing of Plaintiff’s motion to
amend to rejoin the Board to this litigation and was developed after that filing.” Id. at 19
(emphasis in original). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the new evidence shows:
Defendant Johnson believed, based on his training, that the proper
application of the three-point technique involved placing his knee diagonally
over the spine of a detainee and applying pressure to the detainee’s back. The
new evidence also shows that Defendant Johnson’s trainer, Officer Austin
[Slaten], trained Defendant Johnson to position his knee diagonally over the
spine of a detainee and apply pressure to a detainee’s back. Finally, the new
evidence shows that even the Oklahoma County Sheriff testified that
Defendant Johnson performed the three-point technique in accordance with
Defendant Johnson’s training. This training, however, as demonstrated by the
newly discovered evidence, was incorrect, contrary to sound correctional
practices, and caused Mr. Willis’s death.
Id.
In response, the Board first argues that the Court should disregard Plaintiff’s new
evidence, “as most all the testimony was clearly available in advance of the decision being
challenged and [Plaintiff] did not seriously attempt to bring it to the Court’s attention.”
Board’s Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 23. However, even if the Court does consider the
new evidence, the Board argues that amendment is futile because the evidence fails to show
the “existence of a County policy on using the three-point stance technique in a manner
that would cause injury.” Id. at 24-25. Further, the Board argues, the new evidence “fails
to show . . . the County acted with deliberate indifference toward Mr. Willis’s rights in the
conducting of its jail-officer training.” Id. at 29.
After careful consideration of the parties’ positions, and Plaintiff’s newly submitted
evidence, the Court finds no reason to alter its prior order denying Plaintiff leave to again
add the Board as a defendant. As the Court explained in its prior order, a “plaintiff seeking
to impose liability on a municipality must establish (1) the existence of a municipal policy
or custom; and, (2) a direct causal connection between the policy or custom and the injury
alleged.” 5/20/2021 Order [Doc. No. 141] at 6.
Here, contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions, the full context of relevant deposition
testimony does not show the existence of a policy or custom regarding improper placement
of an officer’s knee across a detainee’s neck or spine, or a direct causal connection between
such a policy or custom and Mr. Willis’s injuries. Instead, as thoroughly addressed in the
Board’s Response, the full picture of various witnesses’ deposition testimony fails to show
that the Board maintained any policy or training with deliberate indifference. The following
deposition excerpts demonstrate this point:
Officer Johnson testified that, in applying the three-point restraint, he was trained to
“make sure that when you lean forward to apply the pressure to the inmate to not
put it on their spine, making sure that you're at a proper stance in the three-point, so
that way your weight is not thrown off and making it to where the inmate can easily
push you away.” Board’s Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider, Ex. 1 [Doc. No. 196-1] at 3.
Officer Johnson further testified that he was taught to “apply pressure into the side
of the inmate typically with the length of the leg on an average officer, you know,
between the shoulder and down.” Id. at 4. Crucially, Officer Johnson testified that,
when being trained by Officer Slaten, he was taught to place his knee “into the side
of the inmate in the backside, anywhere except for the spine.” Id. at 6-7; 8. Officer
Johnson further agreed that, “if someone that is an officer at the Oklahoma County
Jail used such force on an inmate in the position of Mr. Willis that they snapped his
spine in half causing his death, that wouldn’t be part of the training from the jail.”
Id. at 11.
Jack Herron, former Jail Administrator, testified that he believed that Officer
Johnson was properly trained on how to use the three-point restraint, but that he did
not use it properly on Mr. Willis. Board’s Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider, Ex. 2 [Doc.
No. 196-2] at 4. Mr. Herron further testified that the Jail hired an “outside consultant
that basically reviewed all operations” from either 2009 or 2010 through 2016 or
2017, and that the consultant was never critical of the Jail’s use-of-force training.
Id. at 5-6.
Austin Slaten, a defensive-tactics instructor for Oklahoma County, testified that
officers are told “numerous times” to stay off the detainee’s neck and spine while
applying the three-point restraint. Board’s Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider, Ex. 5 [Doc.
No. 196-5] at 3; 4-5. Mr. Slaten testified that this is reinforced with officers because
placing the knee on a detainee’s neck or spine could break their “neck or vertebrae”
and/or prevent the detainee from breathing. Id. at 5. Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion,
Mr. Slaten testified that officers are not trained to “move their weight forward” if
the officer finds himself in a bad position while applying the three-point restraint.
Id. at 6. Mr. Slaten further testified that, before leaving his position in 2017, he never
had a discussion about the three-point restraint “causing problems with inmates.”
Id. at 7.
Officer Cornelius testified that, based on his CLEET training, officers were to
“avoid[] the neck and spinal area” when applying the three-point restraint. Board’s
Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider, Ex. 6 [Doc. No. 196-6] at 2. Officer Cornelius further
testified that he would never “apply any weight or pressure to an inmate’s spine”
when applying the three-point restraint because he “was taught that . . . it can cause
an injury to the neck and the back.” Id. at 3.
Jason Ruegge, who trained Oklahoma County jail officers in the 2017 timeframe,
testified that the three-point restraint is safe “[a]s long as you do it the way you’re
trained to do it.” Board’s Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider, Ex. 7 [Doc. No. 196-7] at 3-
4. Mr. Ruegge further testified that “no part” of Officer Johnson’s training would
have “caused an injury of the spine.” Id. at 5. Mr. Ruegge testified at length on the
proper application of the three-point restraint and testified that, when officers are
trained on the proper application, no weight is put onto the spine. Id. at 7-9; 10-11.
Last, Mr. Ruegge testified that he was not aware of Sheriff Taylor ever becoming
aware “that the three-point stabilization technique resulted in somebody suffering a
spinal cord injury.” Id. at 14.
In short, and as supported by the above-cited testimony, nothing in Plaintiff’s new
evidence shows that the County “had a well-settled practice of failing to train its officers
to avoid placing weight on a detainee’s spine” or that “anyone at the County knew of past
problems with the three-point stance.” Board’s Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 29-30. To
the contrary, the testimony suggests that officers were properly trained on how to use the
three-point restraint, but that Officer Johnson applied the restraint improperly.
B. Plaintiff fails to show the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.
Plaintiff argues that “officer Johnson will point to the County and blame it for failing
to properly train the officer and use this empty chair to his advantage to avoid
responsibility.” Pl.’s Mot. to Reconsider at 23. This, Plaintiff claims, “is inherently unfair
where the Plaintiff has consistently attempted to bring the County into this lawsuit and
account for its actions that contributed to the wrongful death of an arrestee, who has been
arrested without a warrant and prior to any probably [sic] cause hearing.” Id. Plaintiff urges
the Court to “remedy the clear error in its prior order and prevent manifest injustice” by
allowing Plaintiff to amend her complaint and add the Board back to this lawsuit. Id. at 23-
24.
The Board, on the other hand, argues that Plaintiff fails to establish that the Court
committed clear error because Plaintiff does not show “how the Court’s conclusion that no
County training caused the injury, or that the County did not train its officers with deliberate
indifference to the risk of a spinal transection, was ‘arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or
manifestly unreasonable.’” Def.’s Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider at 32 (quoting Wright ex rel.
Tr. Co. of Kan. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 259 F.3d 1226, 1235 (10th Cir. 2001)). The Board
further argues that Plaintiff fails to establish that the Court’s order was manifestly unjust
because Plaintiff does not show the order was a “direct, obvious, and observable error.” Id.
at 32-33 (quoting Hadley v. Hays Med. Ctr., No. 14-1055-KHV, 2017 WL 748129, at *2
(D. Kan. Feb. 27, 2017)).
After careful consideration of the parties’ positions, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to show that the Court committed clear error in denying her leave to amend her
complaint, or that the Court’s order resulted in manifest injustice. The burden to show clear
error is a high one: Plaintiff must show that the Court’s decision was “arbitrary, capricious,
whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Wright ex rel. Tr. Co. of Kan., 259 F.3d at 1235.
Plaintiff fails to show that the “Court’s conclusion that no County training caused [Mr.
Willis’s] injury, or that the County did not train its officers with deliberate indifference to
the risk of a spinal transection” was clear error. See Def.’s Resp. to Mot. to Reconsider at
32. Further, Plaintiff fails to show that the Court’s conclusion was “direct, obvious, and
observable error,” amounting to manifest injustice. See Hadley, 2017 WL 748129, at *2.
Conclusion
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider [Doc. No. 194] is DENIED.
Further, the Board’s Motion to Intervene [Doc. No. 200] is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within 21 days of this Order, the parties shall
meet-and-confer and submit a proposed case schedule setting deadlines consistent with the
Scheduling Order entered November 21, 2019 [Doc. No. 72].
IT IS SO ORDERED this 16" day of November, 2023.
\ ty Q
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge
13