The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DUSTIN BODKIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-23-543-D
)
COFFEYVILLE RESOURCES CRUDE )
TRANSPORTATION, LLC; and CVR )
ENERGY, INC., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 12]. Plaintiff seeks to
dismiss this action without prejudice, pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). Defendants
Coffeyville Resources Crude Transportation, LLC (Coffeyville) and CVR Energy, Inc.
(CVR) oppose Plaintiff’s motion [Doc. No. 13] and request that the Court either dismiss
Plaintiff’s action with prejudice or impose conditions on any subsequent refiling of
Plaintiff’s action.
“Dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is within the sound discretion of the court.” Clark
v. Tansy, 13 F.3d 1407, 1411 (10th Cir. 1993); see Brown v. Baeke, 413 F.3d 1121, 1123
(10th Cir. 2005). A district court may allow a plaintiff to dismiss an action “on terms that
the court considers proper.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a)(2). “When considering a motion to
dismiss without prejudice, the important aspect is whether the opposing party will suffer
prejudice in the light of the valid interests of the parties.” Clark, 13 F.3d at 1411 (internal
quotation and citation omitted). Relevant factors “include: the opposing party’s effort and
expense in preparing for trial; excessive delay and lack of diligence on the part of the
movant; insufficient explanation of the need for a dismissal; and the present stage of
litigation.” Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1537 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal because, after filing this action, Plaintiff was
notified by his employer that the employer may be liable for some or all of Plaintiff’s claims
against Defendants pursuant to an indemnification agreement. Plaintiff has a good
relationship with his employer and requests dismissal of this action to maintain that
relationship. The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently explained his request for a
dismissal.
Defendants claim that they would be prejudiced if the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s
action without prejudice. Defendants first argue that the one-year savings statute, 12 Okla.
Stat. § 100, would essentially extend the relevant statute of limitations from two to three
years due to Plaintiff’s “delay” in not filing this action until three days before the statute
of limitations had expired. The Court disagrees. There is no prejudice in filing an action
near the end of a limitations period, and the savings statute’s explicit purpose is to allow a
party one year to refile after a dismissal without prejudice.
Although Defendants also argue that counsel has spent time and incurred expense
on removing this action, preparing Coffeyville’s Answer [Doc. No. 10], and drafting
CVR’s pending Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11], there is no indication that defense
counsel has expended significant time and effort preparing for trial. At this early stage of
litigation, Defendants will not be unduly prejudiced by a dismissal without prejudice to
refiling.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’'s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 12]
is GRANTED, and Plaintiffs causes of action are dismissed without prejudice. Defendant
CVR Energy, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 11] is DENIED as MOOT. A separate
judgment will be entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 11" day of September] 1th , 2023.
\ ty Q □□□
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge