Opinion

Bond v. Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority

Court
District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Apr 10, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.6%

finding that a jail trust “is a governmental entity for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because it was created under Oklahoma law as a public trust”

How later courts described this case

  • finding that a jail trust “is a governmental entity for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because it was created under Oklahoma law as a public trust”
  • finding that the jail trust was the appropriate defendant for a § 1983 municipal liability claim
  • “The official’s knowledge of the risk need not be knowledge of a substantial risk to a particular inmate, or knowledge of the particular manner in which injury might occur.”
  • “The failure to remedy ongoing constitutional violations may be evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of a municipality.”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AUSTIN BOND, as Personal Representative of )

the Estate of BRAD LANE, Deceased, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-23-05-D

)

OKLAHOMA COUNTY CRIMINAL )

JUSTICE AUTHORITY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Defendant Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority brings before the Court a

Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 10] contending it should be dismissed from this action

pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) because it is not an entity capable of being sued and

the allegations fail to state a plausible claim. Plaintiff has filed a Response in Opposition

[Doc. No. 13] and the matter is now at issue.

BACKGROUND

Brad Lane was beaten to death by his cellmate while housed at the Oklahoma

Detention Center as a pretrial detainee. The beating lasted approximately forty minutes.

Compl. [Doc. No. 1] ¶ 40. Although Mr. Lane repeatedly screamed for help, there were no

detention officers on the floor to come to his aid. Id. at ¶¶ 13-21. Another inmate who heard

Mr. Lane’s screams used a phone in his cell to call the jail medical staff, but no one

answered. Id. Mr. Lane was unresponsive by the time a detention officer finally arrived on

the scene. Id. at ¶ 21. He was subsequently pronounced dead. Id. at ¶ 24.

The Complaint, brought by Mr. Lane’s estate, maintains that the detention officer

failed to protect Mr. Lane by leaving his section of the jail unsupervised for an extended

period and attributes those actions to a long-standing custom of understaffing and

inadequately supervising the jail. Id. at ¶¶ 31, 32, 38 50. Defendant Oklahoma County

Criminal Justice Authority (“OCCJA”), a public trust created by the Board of County

Commissioners to assist Oklahoma County in operating the jail, has allegedly been aware

of serious deficiencies at the jail since at least 2008 when the U.S. Department of Justice

generated a report finding that the jail had inadequate supervision, inadequate staffing, and

excessive inmate violence due to overcrowding. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 39-44. The Complaint further

alleges that the OCCJA failed to remedy these problems. Id. at ¶¶ 46-51, 57-60, 64.

Relying on these allegations, Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming

the OCCJA, the Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners, and an individual

detention officer failed to protect Mr. Lane from harm in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment. The OCCJA seeks dismissal of this claim on two grounds: first, it contends

that it is not an entity capable of being sued. Second, it argues that Plaintiff has failed to

plead a plausible claim for relief.

STANDARD OF DECISION

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement...showing that the pleader is

entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). The statement must be sufficient to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Under this standard, a complaint needs “more

than labels and conclusions,” but it “does not need detailed factual allegations.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted). Rather, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Id. At the pleading stage, the Court must “accept as true all

well-pleaded factual allegations in a complaint and view these allegations in the light most

favorable to the plaintiff.” Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009).

DISCUSSION

A. Capacity to be Sued

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17(b)(3) provides that a defendant’s capacity to sue

or be sued is determined “by the law of the state where the court is located.” Under

Oklahoma law, “any person, corporation, partnership, or unincorporated association shall

have capacity to sue or be sued in this state.” Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 2017(B). Relying on this

statute, the OCCJA argues that it lacks the capacity to be sued because it is not a person,

corporation, partnership, or unincorporated association. Rather, as a public trust created by

the Board of County Commissioners, the OCCJA contends that it is an agency of Oklahoma

County (at least for the purposes of liability) and the County is therefore the proper

defendant.1

1 The County, however, argues the claim should be brought against the OCCJA. See

Defendant Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County’s Answer to Complaint

[Doc. No. 6] ¶¶ 12, 23, 25, 28 and Additional Defenses ¶¶ 1, 4. This mutual finger-pointing

Although § 2017(B) identifies certain entities that have the capacity to be sued, the

OCCJA cites no conclusive authority establishing that a public trust does not also have the

capacity to be sued. Numerous courts have entertained claims by and against a public trust,

including § 1983 claims against a jail trust. See Rife v. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety, 854

F.3d 637, 641 (10th Cir. 2017) (resolving a § 1983 municipal liability claim against a jail

trust); Folts v. Grady Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners, No. CIV-15-00996-JD, 2021 WL

1224915, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 31, 2021) (resolving a § 1983 municipal liability claim

against both the Board of County Commissioners and the jail trust); Taylor v. Comanche

Cnty. Facilities Auth., No. CIV-18-55-G, 2020 WL 6991010, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 25,

2020) (resolving § 1983 claims against a jail trust); Hill v. Okmulgee Cnty. Crim. Just.

Auth., No. CIV-18-394-SPS, 2019 WL 11000375, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 18, 2019) (finding

that the Board of County Commissioners could be separately liable for § 1983 claims

brought against Board and jail trust); Chichakli v. Samuels, No. CIV-15-687-D, 2016 WL

2743542, at *4 (W.D. Okla. May 11, 2016) (declining to dismiss § 1983 claim against the

County where the jail trust was also a defendant);2 Myers v. Leflore Cnty. Det. Ctr. Pub.

Tr., No. CIV. 07-223-FHS, 2009 WL 87599, at *7 (E.D. Okla. Jan. 12, 2009), aff'd sub

further suggests that it would be inappropriate at this stage to rule as a matter of law that

the OCCJA is not a proper defendant.

2 The OCCJA is mistaken in its belief that Chichakli involves an analogous situation that

supports its argument. Chichakli involved official capacity claims against the director of

the Grady County Criminal Justice Authority and a Grady County Commissioner.

Chichakli, 2016 WL 2743542, at *1. The County moved for dismissal of the § 1983 claims,

arguing that it could not be held liable because the jail trust was responsible for operating

the jail. Id. at * 4. Recognizing that the jail trust is a distinct legal entity, this Court declined

to dismiss the County. Id. Thus, both the County and the jail trust remained as defendants.

Id.

nom. Myers v. James, 344 F. App'x 457 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the jail trust was the

appropriate defendant for a § 1983 municipal liability claim); Lee v. Wyatt, No. CIV-07-

773-W, 2009 WL 3401277, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 21, 2009), aff'd, 382 F. App'x 697 (10th

Cir. 2010) (finding that a jail trust “is a governmental entity for purposes of a 42 U.S.C. §

1983 action because it was created under Oklahoma law as a public trust”); see also

Oklahoma City Zoological Tr. v. State ex rel. Pub. Emps. Rels. Bd., 158 P.3d 461, 463

(Okla. 2007); Lawson v. Sequoyah Cnty. 911 Tr. Auth., 521 P.3d 827, 828 (Okla. Civ. App.

2022). Further, as even the OCCJA concedes, a public trust is presumed to be a separate

and distinct legal entity under Oklahoma law. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, § 176.1(A)(2); Def.’s

Br. at 4 (“…the OCCJA is a distinct legal entity from Oklahoma County…”).

Accordingly, the Court is not persuaded that it would be appropriate to dismiss the

OCCJA at this stage of the proceedings.

B. Failure to State a Claim

The Complaint asserts a single cause of action contending that the OCCJA (and the

other defendants) violated Mr. Lane’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by failing

to protect him from harm or provide adequate conditions of confinement. The OCCJA

contends the allegations fail to state a plausible municipal liability claim under the

Fourteenth Amendment.3

3 As a pretrial detainee, Mr. Lane’s constitutional rights were protected under the Due

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Turner v. Oklahoma Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.

Commissioners, 804 F. App'x 921, 925 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished). In evaluating this

claim, “an analysis identical to that applied in Eighth Amendment cases” is applied. Id.

(quotation omitted).

The Constitution imposes a duty on prison officials “to protect prisoners from

violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)

(quotation omitted). Indeed, “[h]aving incarcerated persons [with] demonstrated

proclivit[ies] for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct, having stripped them of

virtually every means of self-protection and foreclosed their access to outside aid, the

government and its officials are not free to let the state of nature take its course.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alterations in original).

Of course, the mere fact that a prisoner suffered injury at the hands of another

prisoner does not “translate[] into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for

the victim’s safety.” Id. at 824. Rather, to prevail on a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff

must show “that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious

harm,” and the defendant acted with deliberate indifference, meaning the defendant “was

aware of and disregarded an excessive risk to inmate health or safety by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate the risk.” Lopez v. LeMaster, 172 F.3d 756, 760 (10th Cir.

1999) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Turner, 804 F. App'x 921, 925.

And where (as here) a plaintiff seeks to hold a local governmental entity liable under §

1983, he must also show that a municipal policy or custom “was the ‘moving force’ behind

the injury alleged.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okl. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404

(1997). Deliberate indifference in the municipal liability context “may be satisfied when

the [defendant] has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is

substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately

chooses to disregard the risk of harm.” Layton v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Oklahoma Cnty.,

512 F. App'x 861, 871 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished).

With those standards in mind, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated a

plausible claim for relief. The Complaint alleges that Mr. Lane was locked in a cell with a

known violent offender and housed on a floor where the staffing and supervision was so

inadequate that a brutal beating was allowed go on for forty minutes before a detention

officer took note, let alone did something to intervene. Taking these allegations as true and

drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff’s favor, these facts are sufficient to show that

Mr. Lane was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. See

Pendleton v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners for Oklahoma Cnty., No. CIV-18-707-G, 2019

WL 4752269, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 30, 2019) (allegations of “inadequate staffing,

insufficient monitoring of inmates, and failure to segregate or otherwise restrain inmates

with known violent tendencies” was sufficient to state a failure to protect claim); Morgan

v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Oklahoma Cnty., No. CIV-08-1317-R, 2010 WL

11508854, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 11, 2010) (finding that pretrial detainee housed with

violent offender was held under conditions that posed a substantial risk of serious harm).

The Complaint also contains adequate facts to state a claim for municipal liability

against the OCCJA and to show that the OCCJA acted with deliberate indifference.

Plaintiff alleges the jail has been understaffed and inadequately supervised virtually since

its inception, the OCCJA was made aware of these deficiencies and the risks they pose to

inmate safety following a 2008 report by the Department of Justice,4 and the OCCJA has

not remedied these deficiencies. See Layton, 512 Fed. Appx. at 871 (“The failure to remedy

ongoing constitutional violations may be evidence of deliberate indifference on the part of

a municipality.”). Plaintiff also alleges that inmate-on-inmate assaults are common at the

jail and two other inmates suffered similar assaults in the month preceding Mr. Lane’s

death. Assuming the truth of these allegations, Plaintiff has satisfied his burden to plead

facts showing that the OCCJA maintained a custom of understaffing and inadequately

supervising the jail, was on notice that these deficiencies posed significant risks to inmate

safety, and consciously disregarded those risks.

The OCCJA raises a number of arguments in seeking to undermine the plausibility

of Plaintiff’s claim, but none are persuasive. It argues the claim is deficient because there

are no allegations showing that Mr. Lane complained of safety concerns or that previous

threats were made. This argument misses the mark in two ways. First, it misconstrues

Plaintiff’s claim, which is premised on an absence of supervision in parts of the jail, not on

the jail ignoring specific threats to Mr. Lane. Second, it ignores relevant case law, which

provides that knowledge of specific threats or an inmate’s individual risk is not necessarily

required. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 843 (“[I]t does not matter whether the risk comes from

4 This Court has previously dismissed claims or denied summary judgment where the

plaintiff relied on the DOJ report to show an unconstitutional policy or custom of the

County. See Willis v. Oklahoma Cty. Det. Ctr., No. 18-CV-00323-D, 2019 WL 4409219

(W.D. Okla. Sept. 13, 2019); O'Carroll v. Oklahoma Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, No. CIV-10-

232-D, 2012 WL 1072240 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 30, 2012). Here, however, Plaintiff does not

rely solely on the DOJ report to state a claim but also makes other allegations that support

his claim.

a single source or multiple sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an

excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all prisoners in his situation

face such a risk.”); Tafoya v. Salazar, 516 F.3d 912, 916 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The official’s

knowledge of the risk need not be knowledge of a substantial risk to a particular inmate, or

knowledge of the particular manner in which injury might occur.”).

The OCCJA further contends that dismissal is required because the detention officer

who eventually arrived on the scene responded reasonably by calling for help. Once again,

the OCCJA fails to appreciate that Plaintiff’s claim is primarily premised on the OCCJA’s

purported custom of leaving prisoners unsupervised for extended periods. The OCCJA then

argues the claim fails because the lack of supervision on Mr. Lane’s floor was, at worst,

the result of a mistake by a detention officer. On the contrary, the Complaint sufficiently

alleges that the lack of supervision was the result of a long-standing custom at the jail –

one which the OCCJA knew about and failed to remedy. The OCCJA also argues that the

Complaint includes numerous statements that are “conclusory and without merit.” Def.’s

Br. at 6. Although some of the complained of statements can fairly be described as

conclusory, most are actually factual allegations that must be assumed true at this stage.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-556.

Last, the OCCJA argues that Plaintiff’s allegation identifying two previous inmate

assaults is lacking in specifics. The Court does not agree with this characterization – the

Complaint identifies the month and year when the attacks occurred, the names of the

victims, and describes circumstances surrounding the attack that are similar to those

involved here. In any event, the pleading standard does “not require heightened fact

pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Considering the allegations as a whole, Plaintiff has

alleged a plausible claim for relief.

Accordingly, for the reasons explained above, the Special Appearance and Motion

to Dismiss by Proposed Defendant Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority [Doc.

No. 10] is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 10" day of April, 2023.

Q. OsPiat

TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI

Chief United States District Judge

10

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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