Saramosing v. Corbett

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

TINSLEY ARIANA TAYLOR M. )

SARAMOSING, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-21-1152-PRW

)

KEVIN CORBETT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 19). For the reasons that

follow, the Motion (Dkt. 19) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 8)

is DISMISSED.

Background

Plaintiff Tinsley Ariana Taylor M. Saramosing is “a female who is transgender and

has medically and socially transitioned.”1 Her Complaint raises a variety of claims

regarding the State of Oklahoma’s requirements for a legal gender marker and name change

on an individual’s government documents and the presence of notations on government

1 Am. Compl. (Dkt. 8), at 13. At this stage, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations

in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true and views those facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff.

See Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting David v.

City & Cnty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1352 (10th Cir. 1996)). And because Plaintiff is

proceeding pro se, the Court construes her filings liberally without serving as her advocate.

Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

documents signifying that amendments have been made.2 Plaintiff argues that these

requirements violate a variety of federal constitutional and statutory provisions and seeks

both equitable relief and monetary damages.3

Plaintiff has completed the requirements for a legal gender marker and name change

under Oklahoma law and has “had both legal name and gender marker changes made to

her driver’s license, passport, birth certificate and social security card.”4 She argues,

however, that she is entitled to seek relief for the past harm she experienced going through

those processes and future harm caused by the presence of notations on her birth certificate

signifying that amendments were made.

Plaintiff’s Complaint also discusses (at length) the experience of “others who are

transgender/non-binary, gender non-conforming, gender fluid, etc.,”5 and are allegedly

injured by the same requirements for a legal gender marker and name change under

Oklahoma law and the presence of notations on state government documents. She asks this

Court to allow her to pursue relief on behalf of these unidentified third parties as well.

Defendants, a variety of state officials sued in their official capacity, moved to

dismiss. They argue, among other things, that Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to assert

her various claims and seek relief on behalf of herself and others.

2 All references to the “Complaint” are to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Dkt. 8).

3 See Am. Compl. (Dkt. 8), at 101–105 (providing Plaintiff’s request for relief).

4 Id. at 13.

5 See, e.g., id. at 102.

Legal Standard

The federal judiciary’s power “begins and ends with the need to adjudge the rights

of an injured party who stands before” a court seeking redress for an injury that the court

is capable of redressing.6 That is because Article III of the federal Constitution limits the

federal judicial power to “Cases” and “Controversies” at “Law and Equity.”7 “For there to

be such a case or controversy, it is not enough that the party invoking the power of the

court have a keen interest in the issue.”8 Rather, “the plaintiff must have a ‘personal stake’

in the case—in other words, standing.”9 To establish standing, the plaintiff bears the burden

to show “(i) that [she] suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual

or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the defendant[s]; and (iii) that the

injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.”10 These three elements must be met

“for each claim” a plaintiff presses and “for each form of relief that they seek.”11

Standing is more than a technical, box checking requirement. It “is a crucial

component of the separation of powers between the co-equal branches of our government.

It is what keeps our non-political branch out of the business of resolving policy disputes.”12

6 United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 781 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

7 U.S. Const. art III, § 2, cl. 1.

8 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700 (2013).

9 TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2203 (2021).

10 Id.

11 Id. at 2208.

12 Hunsucker v. Fallin, 408 P.3d 599, 616, as modified (Okla. Dec. 20, 2017) (Wyrick, J.,

concurring in part & dissenting in part). See Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 700 (“[Standing]

is an essential limit on our power: It ensures that we act as judges, and do not engage in

Discussion

Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges two categories of harm allegedly caused by

Defendants that she argues give her standing to seek the relief she requests in this case: (1)

past and future harm to others and (2) past and future harm to herself. But these alleged

injuries are insufficient to establish Article III standing.

I. Alleged Harm to Third Parties.

Start with the past and future harm to third parties. It is “a fundamental restriction

on [a federal court’s] authority that in the ordinary course, a litigant must assert his or her

own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest a claim to relief on the legal rights or interests

of third parties.”13 To be sure, “[t]here are ‘certain, limited exceptions’ to that rule,”14 but

Plaintiff has provided no argument as to how those exceptions exist here, and the Court

sees none.15

Much of Plaintiff’s argument as to her ability to seek relief on behalf of third parties

boils down to her commitment to the cause she seeks to vindicate and its importance to

policymaking properly left to elected representatives.” (emphasis in original)); Antonin

Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17

Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881 (1983).

13 Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 708 (cleaned up).

14 Id. (quoting Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991)).

15 The Supreme Court has generally limited third-party standing to instances where the

litigant themselves also has suffered an injury on their own sufficient to confer Article III

standing. See Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 707–09. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,

734 (1972) (“[T]he ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest.

It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.”). But as explained

below, Plaintiff has not alleged facts sufficient to establish Article III standing on her own

behalf.

other persons who have been subjected to the state requirements at issue or will be in the

future. But “Article III standing is not to be placed in the hands of concerned bystanders,

who will use it simply as a vehicle for the vindication of value interests.”16 Neither deep

commitment to an issue nor zealous advocacy is sufficient to create “a particularized

interest sufficient to create a case or controversy under Article III.”17 Nor is it sufficient,

as Plaintiff suggests, that she has an interest in ensuring that Defendants act lawfully in

their dealings with third parties. The Supreme Court “has consistently made clear that an

abstract interest in the government’s ‘proper application of the Constitution and laws’

cannot alone justify Article III standing.”18

Plaintiff remains free to lobby and attempt to persuade the State’s political branches

on how the State should treat the third parties whose rights she seeks to vindicate. And

those third parties may very well have standing to pursue their own claims in an appropriate

case. But Article III prohibits Plaintiff from asserting claims on their behalf in this case.

II. Alleged Harm to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also claims that the state requirements at issue have inflicted and continue

to inflict a variety of harms on her that are sufficient to confer standing for the relief she

seeks.

16 Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 707 (cleaned up). See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (explaining that a plaintiff must show that they “would thereby be

directly affected apart from their special interest in the subject” (cleaned up)).

17 Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. at 707 (internal quotation marks omitted).

18 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal

System 126 (7th ed. 2015) (collecting cases & quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74).

A. Past Harm to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff first relies on past harm she personally experienced from having to fulfill

the requirements for a legal gender marker and name change under Oklahoma law. But this

past harm cannot confer standing because a dispute must “be capable of resolution through

the judicial process.”19 And the dispute over these past harms experienced by Plaintiff is

not capable of resolution through the judicial process because these injuries cannot “be

redressed by judicial relief.”20 That is because neither form of relief Plaintiff seeks—

injunctive relief and monetary relief—are available in this context.

Start with injunctive relief. Injunctive relief is a preventive remedy designed to

address future harm. It cannot provide relief for past harm that is not likely to reoccur in

the near future.21 And because Plaintiff has already completed the State’s process for both

legal name and gender marker changes to her state documents, the Court cannot afford

Plaintiff forward looking, injunctive relief.22 There is no allegation in the Complaint that

suggests there is “a real and immediate threat” that Plaintiff would again have to go through

19 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).

20 TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2203. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523

U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (explaining that to have standing, a plaintiff must seek “an acceptable

Article III remedy” that will “redress a cognizable Article III injury”).

21 See O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct

does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however,

if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”).

22 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).

the state requirements she alleges are unlawful.23 So, injunctive relief is therefore

unavailable.

Nor may the Court award monetary damages for these alleged past harms.24 That is

because official capacity suits, like this one, are in effect suits against the state entity

itself.25 So absent waiver by the State or congressional abrogation26—and Plaintiff makes

no argument that either exist here—sovereign immunity bars this Court from issuing

monetary relief against Defendants, each of whom is a state official sued in their official

capacity.27

B. Future Harm to Plaintiff.

Throughout her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a variety of hypothetical future harms

that she could incur that are allegedly traceable to Defendants’ conduct. She seeks

injunctive relief to remedy these harms, asking for a Court order requiring Defendants to

remove the notations of amendments from her birth certificate. But these alleged risks of

future harm are insufficient to create an injury to sustain a suit seeking injunctive relief.

It’s true that “a person exposed to a risk of future harm may pursue forward-looking,

injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring,” but only if “the risk of harm is

23 Id. at 105.

24 In her response, Plaintiff largely concedes that monetary relief is barred by sovereign

immunity. See Pl.’s Resp. (Dkt. 20), at 2.

25 See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).

26 This waiver can either be a function of current state law or the state’s consent to such

suits through adopting the federal Constitution. See Torres v. Texas Dep’t of Pub. Safety,

142 S. Ct. 2455, 2462 (2022).

27 Graham, 473 U.S. at 169.

sufficiently imminent and substantial.”28 This means that the harm cannot be conjectural

or hypothetical.29 And that is where Plaintiff’s claims about future injury to herself fail. 30

Consider a few examples.

Noting discriminatory policies by “many other countries” towards transgender

persons, Plaintiff speculates that “[i]f she went to many other countries and tried to get

married, they would ask for her birth certificate.”31 And upon showing it, Plaintiff suggests

that agents of the hypothetical country would discern from the notations on her birth

certificate that she was transgender, and as a result, “would deny her the right to get

married” and “would likely put her to death.”32 But Plaintiff alleges no plans to travel and

get married in any of these unnamed countries.33 And the Supreme Court has repeatedly

rejected standing in cases, like this hypothetical, where the future harm alleged is based on

a “speculative chain of possibilities” because such a harm is not “certainly impending.”34

28 TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2210.

29 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.

30 There, of course, would be other standing problems with the theories of injury discussed

below, including whether such harms inflicted by third parties would be fairly traceable to

the Defendants in this case. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Plaintiff, after all, “bear[s] the

burden of pleading . . . concrete facts showing that the defendant[s’] actual action has

caused the substantial risk of harm.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5

(2013). And she “cannot rely on speculation about the unfettered choices made by

independent actors not before the court.” Id. (cleaned up).

31 Am. Compl. (Dkt. 8), at 40.

32 Id.

33 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64.

34 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414.

The “attenuated chain of inferences” necessary to find the harm Plaintiff alleges makes

clear that such harm is not “clearly impending.”35

Several of Plaintiff’s other theories of injury suffer from the same defect. She

speculates that if she “ever wanted to go enroll in numerous private universities with

hateful, bigoted anti-transgender admissions policies, her birth certificate . . . will

automatically out her against her will.”36 And if she “wishe[d] to play sports” at one of

those universities after enrollment, the notations on her birth certificate may force her to

play on a men’s team.37 But again, Plaintiff has alleged no concrete plans to seek

enrollment in such a university, let alone play sports at one. And the fact that she may

possibly do so in the future is insufficient to confer an imminent injury.38 The same is true

for her claim that if she “were charged with a criminal act,” the notations on her birth

certificate “would probably” result in Plaintiff being “forcibly incarcerated in jail and

prison with men,”39 and her hypothetical regarding a hypothetical gym that “required she

show a birth certificate as a condition for admittance” and then took various adverse actions

against her because of the notations on the certificate.40 None of these are the type of

35 Id. at 414 n.5.

36 Am. Compl. (Dkt. 8), at 87.

37 Id. at 88.

38 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562–64.

39 Am. Compl. (Dkt. 8), at 84–85.

40 Id. at 90.

imminent risks of future harm that Plaintiff may pursue forward-looking, injunctive relief

to prevent from occurring.*!

Conclusion

Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 19) is GRANTED, and

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (Dkt. 8) is DISMISSED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 24th day of March 2023.

PATRICK R., WYRICK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

4! See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2210; Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414. Various aspects of

Plaintiff's Complaint also seem to suggest that the mere fact that she has notations on her

birth certificate creates some type of harm actionable in federal court. But Plaintiff has

provided no argument as to how that abstract stigmatic injury bears a “‘close relationship’

to a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”

TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204 (quoting Spokeo v. Robbins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016)).

And the Court has identified no “close historical or common-law analogue” for this type

of injury. /d.

10