Wallace v. Choctaw Nicoma Park School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CHASITY WALLACE; RAYMOND )

WALLACE; and CHASITY WALLACE )

and RAYMOND WALLACE, )

on behalf of K.R.W., a minor, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) No. CIV-21-0077-R

)

CHOCTAW NICOMA PARK SCHOOL )

DISTRICT, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Choctaw Nicoma Park School District’s Motion for

Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 37), Plaintiffs’ Response (Doc. No. 42), and Defendant’s

Reply (Doc. No. 43). Upon consideration of the parties’ filings, the Court GRANTS the

Motion for Summary Judgment and REMANDS Plaintiffs’ negligence claim arising under

Oklahoma law to the District Court of Oklahoma County.

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed, a party must either

cite “to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, . . .

affidavits, . . . admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials,” or show that those

materials “do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact

exists. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The Court resolves all factual disputes and

draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Macon v. United Parcel

Serv., Inc., 743 F.3d 708, 712–13 (10th Cir. 2014). Still, the non-moving party must rely

on more than “[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of [its position];

there must be evidence on which the [trier of fact] could reasonably find for the [non-

moving party].” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986); see also

Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323-33 (1986) (explaining that the opposing party must make a

showing sufficient to establish the existence of the elements essential to that party’s case).

On or about September 16, 2019, Megan Gassaway, a special education

paraprofessional and substitute teacher at the Nicoma Park Elementary School, contacted

the Oklahoma Department of Human Services (“DHS”) regarding suspected child abuse.

The suspected victim, K.R.W., was a six-year-old child in Ms. Gassaway’s special

education class. K.R.W. has “autism spectrum disorder” and was considered “non-verbal”

at the time. (Doc. No. 37, at 7, ¶ 2; Doc. No. 42, at 8, ¶ 2). After her parents—Plaintiffs

Chasity and Raymond Wallace—visited with a DHS employee regarding Ms. Gassaway’s

referral, K.R.W. was taken to the University of Oklahoma Children’s Hospital to be

examined by a medical professional. On the way to the hospital, Chasity Wallace spoke

with Britney Chiles, an applied behavior analysis (“ABA”) therapist who “assist[ed]

K.R.W. with her school work and life skills” at school. (Doc. No. 37, at 9, ¶ 7; Doc. No.

42, at 10, ¶ 7). Chiles told Ms. Wallace that the bruises observed on K.R.W. which led to

the DHS referral were “probably from the chair that [the paraprofessionals were] tying her

into.” (Doc. No. 37, at 11, ¶ 14; Doc. No. 42, at 11, ¶ 14). After the examination revealed

no signs of parental abuse, the Wallaces requested an emergency meeting with Defendant

Choctaw Nicoma Park School District (the “District”) to discuss K.R.W.’s Individualized

Education Program (“IEP”). (Doc. No. 37, at 11, ¶ 16; Doc. No. 42, at 11, ¶ 16).

The next morning, September 17, 2019, Britney Chiles informed Ms. Wallace that

Amanda Duke, another ABA therapist, had observed K.R.W. buckled into a special chair

while in class. (Doc. No. 37, 11-12, ¶ 17; Doc. No. 42, 11, ¶ 17). During the emergency

IEP meeting held later that day, a note was entered into K.R.W.’s IEP, at Plaintiffs’ request,

stating that “a chair with a seatbelt [would] not be used in the classroom,” and that K.R.W.

would not be subject to restraint “unless she [was] a danger to herself or others.” (Doc. No.

42-3, at 9). Plaintiffs do not allege that K.R.W. was ever restrained after September 16,

2019.

The District contends that the “special chair” referenced by Ms. Chiles was a Rifton

“Compass Chair” designed for children with special needs. (Doc. No. 37-3, at 2, ¶¶ 3-6;

Doc. No. 37-4). Compass Chairs are built to accommodate an optional cloth seatbelt that

buckles when needed for safety or postural support.1 (See Doc. No. 37-4). Although they

never “witnessed K.R.W. buckled into any chair” (Doc. No. 37, at 13, ¶ 22; Doc. No. 42,

at 12, ¶ 22), K.R.W.’s parents allege that she was “routinely placed . . . in a restraint chair.”

(Doc. No. 42, at 5). While Plaintiffs do not contend that K.R.W. was restrained after

September 16, 2019, they claim that “there is evidence of other students being improperly

1 Rifton Compass Chair Brochure, https://riftoncdn.azureedge.net/-/media/files/rifton/

product-brochures/compass-chair-brochure (last visited Dec. 8, 2022).

restrained.” (Doc. No. 42, at 11, ¶ 19). K.R.W. continued to attend school at Nicoma Park

Elementary for two years after this incident. She transferred to another school district in

Fall 2021. (Doc. No. 37-1, at 3).

Plaintiffs assert three claims: (1) a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

violation of K.R.W.’s substantive due process rights; (2) a state law negligence claim; and

(3) a claim in which they argue—for the first time in the Response to this Motion—that

K.R.W. was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant denies that K.R.W.

was ever restrained, however, they argue that even if she was, “the School District is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law on both claims.” 2 (Doc. No. 37, at 14).

I. Substantive Due Process Claim

When a claim is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a municipality—or in this

instance, a school district—two separate issues must be analyzed: (1) whether the plaintiff's

injuries were caused by a constitutional violation, and if so, (2) whether the municipality

is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120

(1992); see also Nation v. Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. 21-6123, 2022 WL

4075595, at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 6, 2022) (“Because [d]efendant is a public-school district,

the municipal-liability framework applies.”). A school district may be responsible

“where—and only where—a deliberate choice to follow a course of action [was] made

from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing

final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.” Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,

2 The District assumes for purposes of this Motion that K.R.W. was restrained in a chair.

(Doc. No. 37, at 14; Doc. No. 43, at 5, ¶ 1).

475 U.S. 469, 483 (1986). In short, a school district “cannot be held vicariously liable for

the acts of its employees; it is liable only for its own acts—that is, ‘when the execution of

[its] policy or custom inflicts the injury.’” Nation, 2022 WL 4075595, at *4 (quoting City

of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989)); see also Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.

Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (Section 1983 “cannot be easily read

to impose liability vicariously on governing bodies solely on the basis of the existence of

an employer-employee relationship with a tortfeasor.”).

A municipal policy or custom may take the form of (1) “a formal regulation

or policy statement”; (2) an informal custom “amoun[ting] to a widespread

practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal

policy, is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage

with the force of law”; (3) “the decisions of employees with final

policymaking authority”; (4) “the ratification by such final policymakers of

the decisions—and the basis for them—of subordinates to whom authority

was delegated subject to these policymakers' review and approval”; or (5) the

“failure to adequately train or supervise employees, so long as that failure

results from deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be caused.”

Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Brammer–

Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602 F.3d 1175, 1189–90 (10th Cir.2010)) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Once a municipal policy or custom has been

established, the plaintiff must show “a direct causal link between the municipal action and

the deprivation of federal rights.” Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). The policy or custom must be the “moving force of the

constitutional deprivation” before liability may attach. Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,

326 (10th Cir. 1981) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). “Where a plaintiff claims that the

municipality has not directly inflicted an injury, but nonetheless has caused an employee

to do so, rigorous standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the

municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.” Brown, 520 U.S. at

405.

Defendant contends that it is not liable under § 1983 because “there is no evidence

that any alleged injury to K.R.W. was caused by an official policy or established custom

of the School District.” (Doc. No. 37, at 15). In response, Plaintiffs argue that the practice

of restraining children with special needs in chairs was “in accordance with the School

District’s custom, policy, and/or practice,” and that the “chairs were placed in special

education classrooms” without “training,” “supervision,” “guidelines,” or “monitoring of

their use.” (Doc. No. 42, at 6). Although the chairs may be used to support a child’s posture,

Plaintiffs assert that they were used to restrain children—like K.R.W.—who do not have

postural issues. (Doc. No. 42, at 6). To determine whether a District policy or custom led

to K.R.W.’s injuries, the Court must evaluate the evidence in light of the various forms that

a municipal policy or custom may take. See Bryson, 627 F.3d at 788.

At the outset, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that “a formal

regulation or policy statement” was issued by the District endorsing the practice of

restraining children in chairs. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Moreover, Plaintiffs have not presented evidence sufficient to establish that anyone “with

final policy making authority” approved of improperly restraining children in chairs; nor

have Plaintiffs shown that final policymakers ratified the decisions of subordinates to

confine children in such a manner.3 Id. The Tenth Circuit has acknowledged that

“[w]hether a school administrator is considered a policymaker (a final decisionmaker on

relevant matters) depends on the specific circumstances of the case.” Nation, 2022 WL

4075595, at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 6, 2022). Plaintiffs have provided no evidence that any

administrator was aware of any allegations of improper restraint prior to K.R.W.’s

emergency IEP meeting held on September 17, 2019. Plaintiffs do not contend that K.R.W.

was ever restrained after this meeting, and they provide no evidence to demonstrate that

other children were improperly restrained thereafter. The mere presence of chairs which

can be used to provide postural support, or temporarily restrain a child in danger of harming

herself or others, is insufficient to establish that staff members were authorized by those

with final policy-making authority “to restrain children at their own personal whim.” (Doc.

No. 42, at 17).

As to the claim that the District maintained a “practice” of restraining children in

chairs, Plaintiffs rely on Brittany Chiles’ affidavit in which she avers that she witnessed

K.R.W. “strapped in a chair at least once,” and that the practice of seat-restraint was “used

[on] more than one occasion.”4 (Doc. No. 42, at 20; Doc. No. 42-1, at 2, ¶¶ 4, 7). Plaintiffs,

however, never asked Ms. Chiles how many times K.R.W. was buckled into the chair.

3 Under Oklahoma law, each school district has a board of education responsible for

creating “a complete and comprehensive set of written policies.” Okla. Admin. Code

210:10-1-7. Superintendents have “a duty to implement the written policies of the board of

education.” I. T. K. v. Mounds Pub. Sch., 451 P.3d 125, 140 (Okla. 2019).

4 Although Plaintiffs and Brittany Chiles claim that another ABA therapist, Amanda Duke,

told them about her own concerns regarding the restraint of children in chairs at the school,

the Court has not been provided any evidence to support these claims.

(Doc. No. 37-1, at 17; Doc. No. 37-2, at 13). Although Ms. Chiles claims that she

“witnessed K.R.W. [seated] in a special chair multiple times,” the allegation that K.R.W.

merely sat in the chair—unbuckled—is insufficient to establish an informal custom of

improper restraint in violation of the Constitution.5 (Doc. No. 42-1, at 2, ¶ 4). Plaintiffs do

not offer any other deposition, document, affidavit, or other material as evidentiary support

for the assertion that K.R.W., or other children, were routinely restrained in chairs at the

school. Thus, a reasonable jury could not find that the District improperly restrained

children in chairs as part of a widespread practice “so permanent and well settled as to

constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.” Bryson, 627 F.3d at 788.

Finally, Plaintiffs claim that the District failed to train and supervise its employees

regarding the use of the chairs due to a “deliberate indifference to the injuries that may be

caused.” Bryson, 627 F.3d at 788 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality

has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially

certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or

deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm. In most instances, notice

can be established by proving the existence of a pattern of tortious conduct.

In a narrow range of circumstances, however, deliberate indifference may be

found absent a pattern of unconstitutional behavior if a violation of federal

rights is a highly predictable or plainly obvious consequence of a

municipality’s action or inaction, such as when a municipality fails to train

5 There is some ambiguity as to whether Brittany Chiles saw K.R.W. buckled into a chair

more than once. (Compare Doc. No. 42-1, at 2, ¶ 4 (“I . . . witnessed K.R.W. in a special

chair multiple times and strapped in a chair at least once”) with id., at ¶ 7 (“I . . . believe

based on my eye witness accounts . . . that the restraints used by Nicoma Elementary were

a common custom and practice when K.R.W. was roaming. This is based on my eye

witness account of the chair and restraint being used [on] more than one occasion.”).

Regardless of whether K.R.W. was restrained once, or more than once, Plaintiffs have

failed to present evidence establishing that a practice of restraining children was

widespread, or that anyone with final policymaking authority was aware of such a practice.

an employee in specific skills needed to handle recurring situations, thus

presenting an obvious potential for constitutional violations.

Barney v. City of Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). The District’s “culpability for a deprivation of rights is at its

most tenuous where a claim turns on a failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,

61 (2011).

Although they contend that chairs with attached seatbelts were utilized by District

staff members without prior training, Plaintiffs provide no evidence to back their claim.

(See Doc. No. 42, at 6, 13, 17, 20, and 25). Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he Disputed Facts

section of this response clearly show[s] a long-standing custom of permitting untrained . . .

use of restraint in . . . [the] District’s special education classrooms. This is verified by the

Affidavits of Denise Lamb, Megan Gassaway and ABA therapist Brittany Johnson Chiles.”

(Doc. No. 42, at 20). After reviewing the referenced affidavits, however, the Court finds

the opposite. Denise Lamb and Brittany Chiles make no mention of whether school staff

members received training related to the physical restraint of students in their respective

affidavits (Doc. No. 37-3; Doc. No. 42-1). Furthermore, Megan Gassaway avers that:

During my employment with the School District, and prior to the 2019-2020

school year, myself and other employees who work with special education

students have been provided with training regarding the physical restraint of

special education students. This training took place during annual in-service

trainings at the beginning of each school year and various other training

sessions [were] held periodically throughout the school year. The content of

the training I was provided is consistent with the guidelines set forth in the

Oklahoma State Department of Education Special Education Process Guide.

(Doc. No. 37-5, at 2, ¶ 9). Plaintiffs’ assertion that Ms. Gassaway’s affidavit verifies that

the District permitted untrained use of restraint in special education classrooms is false.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have not offered evidence to establish that any school administrator

acted with deliberate indifference by allowing teachers to improperly restrain children in

chairs after the Wallaces notified the District of their concerns on September 17, 2019.

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to cite evidence establishing a

“failure to adequately train or supervise employees” in the proper use of chairs with

seatbelts in classrooms.

Having determined—based on the evidence—that a reasonable jury could not find

that the District had a municipal policy or custom for restraining children in classrooms,

the Court finds that Defendant has shown that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.6 The Court need not decide

whether K.R.W.’s injuries were caused by a constitutional violation—or whether she was

seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment—as the District is not subject to municipal

liability.

II. State Law Negligence Claim

Plaintiffs have also brought a state-law negligence claim in which they assert that

Defendant breached its duty to care for K.R.W. by restraining her and, therefore, “failing

6 Plaintiffs state in the Response that Defendant’s Motion is “premature at best” as

“discovery is ongoing and many issues of fact and disputes are still being investigated.”

(Doc. No. 42, at 26). However, the Court has granted two separate motions to extend

deadlines in this case. (See Doc. Nos. 28, 34). In the Court’s last Order, the Parties were

informed that “no further extensions will be granted.” (Doc. No. 34, at 1). Discovery was

to be completed by November 30, 2022. Plaintiffs have not shown by affidavit or

declaration that they “cannot present facts essential to justify [their] opposition” to the

Motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d), nor has Plaintiffs’ counsel provided the Court an

explanation as to why discovery has not been completed. Id.

to provide appropriate care and follow the IEP guidelines as previously established.” (Doc.

No. 11, at 10; Doc. No. 42, at 19-26). When a district court dismisses all federal claims,

“the court may, and usually should decline to exercise jurisdiction over any remaining state

claims.” Smith vy. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Nation v.

Piedmont Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 22, No. 21-6123, 2022 WL 4075595, at *8 (10th Cir. Sept.

6, 2022) (concluding that after granting summary judgment in an action brought under 42

U.S.C. § 1983 against a school district, the district court should have dismissed the

remaining state-law negligence claim without prejudice). Thus, the Court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state-law negligence claim pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ state-law negligence claim is remanded to

the District Court of Oklahoma County.

Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is

GRANTED as to Plaintiffs’ substantive due process claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiffs’ state-law negligence claim is REMANDED to the District Court of Oklahoma

County. Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 21“ day of December 2022.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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