Moore v. Amazon.Com Inc

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AUSTIN MOORE, Individually, and )

TIFFANY MOORE, Individually, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-21-836-D

)

ELECTRONIC MARKETING, LLC, )

and SAMSUNG SDI CO., LTD, a )

Foreign Company, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction [Doc. No.

51] filed by Defendant Samsung SDI Co., Ltd (“Samsung”). Plaintiffs Austin and Tiffany

Moore responded in opposition [Doc. No. 62], and Samsung replied [Doc. No. 63]. The

matter is fully briefed and at issue.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs initiated this action after an e-cigarette’s 18650 lithium-ion battery

allegedly exploded in Plaintiff Austin Moore’s pocket, causing him to suffer burns to his

right hand and leg. He purchased the e-cigarette from Amazon and alleges that Samsung

manufactured the device’s lithium-ion battery. Samsung is a South Korean corporation

with its principal place of business and headquarters in South Korea.

Samsung seeks dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal

jurisdiction. It claims that, because it has not “marketed, sold, shipped, or distributed”

18650 lithium-ion batteries to customers in Oklahoma, “there is no basis for exercising

specific jurisdiction” over it in this case. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss at 1, 20. Plaintiffs counter

that, “[r]egardless of whether Samsung itself sold products in Oklahoma, it knew or should

have known that its batteries would be incorporated into products sold in Oklahoma—

making it subject to jurisdiction here if or when its batteries failed.” Pls.’ Resp. at 14.

STANDARD OF DECISION

A plaintiff bears the burden to establish personal jurisdiction over each defendant

named in the action. Rockwood Select Asset Fund XI (6)–1, LLC v. Devine, Millimet &

Branch, 750 F.3d 1178, 1179-80 (10th Cir. 2014). This burden is light in the preliminary

stages of litigation. AST Sports Science, Inc. v. CLF Distrib. Ltd., 514 F.3d 1054, 1056

(10th Cir. 2008). When there has been no evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff must only present

competent proof in the form of affidavits and other written materials that, if true, would

establish a prima facie showing that jurisdiction is proper. Id. at 1057. “In order to defeat

a plaintiff’s prima facie showing of jurisdiction, a defendant must present a compelling

case demonstrating ‘that the presence of some other considerations would render

jurisdiction unreasonable.’” OMI Holdings v. Royal Ins. Co. of Can., 149 F.3d 1086, 1091

(10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).

DISCUSSION

I. Specific Jurisdiction

To establish personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, “a plaintiff must

show that jurisdiction is legitimate under the laws of the forum state and that the exercise

of jurisdiction does not offend the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”

Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Bartile Roofs, 618 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal

quotation omitted). Under Oklahoma law, the personal jurisdiction inquiry is simply a due

process analysis. See Shrader v. Biddinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011). The

familiar due process standard requires “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the

forum state, and a finding that the exercise of jurisdiction comports with “traditional

notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476.

Minimum contacts may be established under doctrines of general jurisdiction or

specific jurisdiction. See OMI Holdings, Inc., 149 F.3d at 1090-91. Because Plaintiffs do

not argue that Samsung is subject to general jurisdiction in Oklahoma, the Court limits its

analysis to the issue of specific jurisdiction.

The specific jurisdiction analysis is two-fold. First, the Court must determine

whether a defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum state such that the

defendant “should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). Within this inquiry, the Court

must determine whether the “defendant has purposefully directed [its] activities at residents

of the forum . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to

those activities.” Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-Und Freizeitgerate AG, 102 F.3d 453, 455 (10th

Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). If the defendant’s actions create sufficient

minimum contacts, the Court must next consider whether exercising personal jurisdiction

over the defendant offends “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Asahi

Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (internal quotations

omitted).

a. Stream of Commerce Framework

Plaintiffs allege that Samsung sells lithium-ion batteries to companies which then

incorporate those batteries into consumer products. They maintain that, because those

consumer products are available for sale nationwide—including in Oklahoma—Samsung

“has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Oklahoma—

regardless of whether it made direct sales in Oklahoma or marketed its batteries” in

Oklahoma. Pls.’ Resp. at 10.

This argument implicates the “stream of commerce” theory of personal jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court first addressed this theory in World-Wide Volkswagen, stating that a

“forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal

jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with

the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.” 444 U.S. at

297-98. It later addressed “whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign defendant

that the components it manufactured, sold, and delivered outside the United States would

reach the forum State in the stream of commerce constitutes minimum contacts between

the defendant and the forum State such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend

traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at

105.

Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality of the Court, concluded that “[t]he

placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the

defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id. at 112. Rather, some

“additional conduct” indicating the defendant’s “intent or purpose to serve the market in

the forum State” is necessary before personal jurisdiction may be exercised. Id. Such

additional conduct may include “designing the product for the [forum State’s] market. . . .

advertising in the forum State, establishing channels for providing regular advice to

customers in the forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor who has

agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.” Id. Although the plurality did not

conclusively limit “additional conduct” to the foregoing examples, it excluded a

defendant’s mere awareness “that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product

into the forum State.” Id. Such knowledge simply “does not convert the mere act of placing

the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State.” Id.

Justice Brennan—joined by three other justices—filed an opinion concurring in the

judgment but disagreeing with Justice O’Connor’s stream of commerce analysis. He

concluded that it was not necessary for plaintiffs to show “additional conduct directed

toward the forum before finding the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant to be

consistent with the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 117. He reasoned that “[a]s long as a

participant in this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum

State, the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.” Id. Thus, under the

concurring opinion, “jurisdiction premised on the placement of a product into the stream

of commerce is consistent with the Due Process Clause,” without any requirement of “a

showing of additional conduct.” Id.

The Court revisited the stream of commerce theory in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd.

v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011). Nicastro involved a products liability suit where the

manufacturer of a metal-shearing machine contested personal jurisdiction. It argued that it

lacked minimum contacts because (1) it did not sell its machines to buyers in the United

States beyond its American distributor; (2) its employees never attended any scrap metal

conventions in the forum state; and (3) no more than four of its machines ultimately

reached the forum state. Id. at 878.

Again, the Court remained splintered. Writing for a four-justice plurality, Justice

Kennedy acknowledged that, in the stream of commerce context, “[t]he defendant’s

transmission of goods permits the exercise of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be

said to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not enough that the defendant might

have predicted that its goods will reach the forum state.” Id at 882. The plurality also noted

that, although the defendant may have had “an intent to serve the U.S. market,” it had not

“purposefully availed itself of the [forum state’s] market.” Id. at 884. Thus, “a defendant

[could] in principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not

of any particular state.” Id. at 884.

Two justices, led by Justice Breyer, concurred in the result, finding that “[n]one of

our precedents find that a single isolated sale . . . is sufficient” to establish the required

minimum contacts. Id. at 888 (concurring opinion). Notably, the concurrence disagreed

with the approach articulated by Justice Brennan in Asahi, explaining that “[i]t would

ordinarily rest jurisdiction instead upon no more than the occurrence of a product-based

accident in the forum State,” a concept that is at odds with the Court’s precedent. See

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 296 (rejecting the notion that a defendant’s

amenability to suit “travel[s] with the chattel”).

Although the Tenth Circuit has not definitively determined the proper framework

for a stream of commerce analysis, it has recognized that, under Nicastro, “six Justices

emphasized that personal jurisdiction did not exist simply because of a defendant’s

awareness that its products could, through stream of commerce, end up in the forum State.”

XMission, L.C. v. Fluent LLC, 955 F.3d 833, 843 (10th Cir. 2020). It also noted that the

Tenth Circuit “has followed the Supreme Court in requiring a particular focus by the

defendant on the forum State to satisfy the purposeful [availment] requirement.” Id.

In addition, numerous “district courts in this circuit have held that ‘something more

than merely placing a product into the stream of commerce is required to establish

minimum contacts for jurisdictional purposes.’” Cagle v. Rexon Indus. Corp., Ltd., No.

CIV-18-1209-R, 2019 WL 1960360, at *8 (W.D. Okla. May 2, 2019) (quoting Fischer v.

BMW of N. Am., LLC, 376 F.Supp.3d 1178, 1184 (D. Colo. 2019)); see also Lynch v.

Olympus Am., Inc., No. CIV-18-512-NYW, 2018 WL 5619327, at *4 n.5 (D. Colo. Oct.

30, 2018) (failing to “find a single court in the Tenth Circuit that applied the most

permissive [stream of commerce] test, which only requires a defendant to put the offending

product into the stream of commerce without any action specifically directed at the forum

itself”); FITn40, LLC v. Glanbia Nutritionals (Ireland) Ltd., No. CIV-20-871-JNP, 2022

WL 79910, at *7 (D. Utah Jan. 7, 2022) (“Simply placing a product, which a third-party

retailer fortuitously elects to sell in [the forum state], into the stream of commerce does not

rise to the level of purposeful availment.”); Lacebark, Inc. v. Sakata Seed Am., Inc., No.

CIV-12-746-D, 2013 WL 12086778, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 16, 2013) (“The Tenth Circuit

has not held that simply placing a product into a stream of commerce that ends in a forum

state is sufficient, by itself, to permit suit within the state.”); Ortiz v. Alfa Laval India Pvt.

Ltd., No. CIV-20-869-J, 2020 WL 6531946, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2020) (“It appears

that Justice O’Connor’s opinion carries weight in the Tenth Circuit.”).

i. Purposeful Availment

Turning to the present set of facts, Samsung asserts that it “has never marketed, sold,

shipped, or distributed 18650 lithium-ion batteries to Oklahoma.” Def’s. Mot. to Dismiss

at 1. It claims that it is a “business to business company,” as it “does not sell 18650 [lithium-

ion batteries] to individual consumers anywhere in the world.” Id. at 4. Rather, it sells these

batteries “in bulk to sophisticated purchasers involved in the manufacture of battery packs”

because these batteries are not “designed or intended to be handled by consumers in any

capacity.” Id.

Further, Samsung states that it has no employees, agents, or representatives located

in Oklahoma, and it is not registered to conduct business in Oklahoma. It has no bank

account, mailing address, or telephone number in Oklahoma and does not own or control

any property in the state. It does not have an officer or place of business in Oklahoma, nor

does it pay Oklahoma taxes. Accordingly, Samsung argues that “[n]o stream-of-commerce

or other purposeful availment test can allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a

defendant like SDI Co. who played no intentional role in the path its product took to the

forum State.” Id. at 19.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that Samsung only sells these batteries to businesses. Yet

they maintain that Samsung “has made deliberate, purposeful, and considerable efforts to

increase its share of the lithium-ion market throughout the United States (and, of course,

in Oklahoma) by selling its batteries (singularly and in packs) to companies for

incorporation into consumer products.” Pls.’ Resp. at 10. Thus, Plaintiffs argue, Samsung

has “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities in Oklahoma—

regardless of whether it made direct sales in Oklahoma or marketed its batteries (singularly

or in packs) in Oklahoma.” Id.

To support their argument, Plaintiffs primarily focus on Samsung’s activities

throughout the United States. For instance, Plaintiffs point out that Samsung participated

in auto shows located in Detroit, Michigan from 2015 to 2018. They also note that Samsung

currently operates a battery assembly plant in Michigan and intends to build another battery

plant in Indiana. In addition, Plaintiffs suggest that Samsung maintains “sales and

marketing arms” in “Los Angeles, Chicago, Austin, and Houston.” Id. at 6. Further, they

allege that Samsung’s batteries are “used in a variety of consumer products marketed and

sold in the United States . . . which may be purchased through a variety of U.S.-based

retailers,” including Dell and Harley-Davidson, which each have a presence in Oklahoma.

Id. at 6-7.

Plaintiffs also contend that because Samsung is a “global” company and “its

business is everywhere,” it is subject to suit in Oklahoma based on the Supreme Court’s

recent decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017

(2021). Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Samsung is a “unified brand” responsible for selling

a variety of consumer goods, including phones, tablets, and home appliances throughout

Oklahoma. Pls.’ Resp. at 14. Thus, they argue, Samsung has purposefully availed itself of

Oklahoma’s market because it “deliberately uses its shared brand identity with other

companies that very clearly target and serve the Oklahoma market.” Id. at 15.

The Court first addresses Samsung’s alleged activities in Michigan, Indiana,

California, Illinois, and Texas. Although Plaintiffs dispute that “a showing of additional

conduct”—as discussed by Justice O’Connor in Asahi—is required to satisfy minimum

contacts, they nonetheless argue that Samsung “engaged in more than placing the product

in the stream of commerce in several ways—for example, by actively seeking to increase

its American market share.” Id. at 13. However, the “additional conduct” that Plaintiffs

point to does not establish that Samsung has purposeful contacts with Oklahoma. See

Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 886 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t is petitioner’s purposeful contacts with

[the forum state], not with the United States, that alone are relevant” to the jurisdictional

analysis.); see also id. at 891 (Breyer, J., concurring) (rejecting the view that jurisdiction

may be established based solely on the existence of a nationwide distribution system). As

these alleged activities occurred in other jurisdictions, they do not demonstrate that

Samsung purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma’s market. See XMission, L.C., 955 F.3d

at 843 (The Tenth Circuit “has followed the Supreme Court in requiring a particular focus

by defendant on the forum State to satisfy the purposeful [availment] requirement.”).

Next, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’ second argument. Alleging that Samsung’s

batteries are incorporated into consumer products that are available for sale in Oklahoma

through Dell and Harley-Davidson, Plaintiffs claim that, “[r]egardless of whether Samsung

itself sold products in Oklahoma, it knew or should have known that its batteries would be

incorporated into products sold in Oklahoma—making it subject to jurisdiction here if or

when its batteries failed.” Pls.’ Resp. at 14. In short, Plaintiffs’ theory is that Samsung

purposefully availed itself of the Oklahoma market vis-à-vis its relationships with Dell and

Harley-Davidson, which each have a physical presence in the state.

Plaintiffs’ tenuous theory is unconvincing, as “specific jurisdiction must be based

on actions by the defendant and not on events that are the result of unilateral actions taken

by someone else.” Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc. v. Heliqwest Intern., Ltd., 385 F.3d 1291,

1296 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing OMI Holdings, 149 F.3d at 1092). Under Plaintiffs’ theory,

Samsung has met the purposeful availment requirement in each jurisdiction that houses

one of the more than 1,400 Harley-Davidson dealerships.1 But this is not the law; the

purposeful availment requirement ensures that jurisdiction will not attach “solely as a result

of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts” but rather “where the contacts proximately

result from actions by the defendant [itself] that create a substantial connection with the

forum State.” Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see

also Daniels v. Exal Corp., No. CIV-16-1085-HE, 2017 WL 696130, at *3 (W.D. Okla.

Jan. 5, 2017) (A defendant’s “ability to foresee that [a distributor] would purchase [its]

product and then use it in a finished product that would reach the state of Oklahoma is not

enough to establish personal jurisdiction.”).

The Court next considers Plaintiffs’ argument that Ford Motor Co. requires a

finding that Samsung has purposefully availed itself of the Oklahoma market. Plaintiffs

assert that Samsung “deliberately sought to increase its market share in the United States,”

and that “[s]imply because Samsung designed, manufactured, or sold these batteries

elsewhere is of no consequence—in the face of their global reach—as the Ford case

indicates.” Pls.’ Resp. at 11.

Ford Motor Co. centered on two separate accidents involving Ford vehicles in

Montana and Minnesota. After suits were brought against Ford in those states, Ford moved

to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on nearly identical grounds: it argued that the

respective state courts “had jurisdiction only if the company’s conduct in the State had

1 Locations, Harley-Davidson, https://www.harley-davidson.com/us/en/about-

us/careers/locations.html (last visited Nov. 21, 2022).

given rise to the plaintiff’s claims.” Ford Motor Co., 141 S. Ct. at 1023. Ford’s argument,

labeled as a “causation-only approach,” was that specific jurisdiction could only be located

“in the State where Ford sold the car in question, or else the States where Ford designed

and manufactured the vehicle.” Id. at 1026. Thus, because the cars at issue were sold

outside of the forum states, Ford claimed that “the courts of those States could not decide

the suits.” Id. at 1023.

The Court’s analysis centered on whether the claims “relate[d] to the defendants

contacts with the forum”—whether Ford purposefully availed itself of either forum state’s

market was not an issue squarely presented to the Court. Id. at 1026. Nonetheless, the Court

did dedicate a portion of its discussion to Ford’s activities within the forum states.

However, this discussion does not support Plaintiffs’ argument—it undermines it.

Ford—unlike Samsung here—did not contest “that it actively [sought] to serve the

market for automobiles and related products” in Montana and Minnesota. Id. at 1026. In

other words, it conceded that it “purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting

activities in both places.” Id. at 1026 (internal quotation and alteration omitted). Indeed,

there was “[s]mall wonder” why Ford “conceded purposeful availment of the two States’

markets . . . [b]y every means imaginable—among them, billboards, TV and radio spots,

print ads, direct mail—Ford urge[d] Montanans and Minnesotans to buy its vehicles.” Id.

at 1028. These vehicles were “available for sale, whether new or used, throughout the

States, at 36 dealerships in Montana and 84 in Minnesota.” Id. Sales aside, Ford “foster[ed]

ongoing connections to its cars’ owners” and “distribute[d] replacement parts” in the two

forum states, while its dealers “regularly maintain[ed] and repair[ed] Ford cars.” Id.

Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Samsung directly markets, sells, or distributes

18650 lithium-ion batteries in Oklahoma. In fact, Plaintiffs do not identify any Oklahoma-

based activities undertaken by Samsung, from advertisements to distributions to repairs.

The present set of facts stand in stark contrast to those in Ford Motor Co., where there was

little question that Ford purposefully availed itself of the respective forum states’ markets.

Accordingly, the Court is unpersuaded by Plaintiffs’ claim that Ford Motor Co. compels a

finding that Samsung has purposefully availed itself of the Oklahoma market.

Finally, the Court addresses Plaintiffs’ claim that “Samsung is a global brand that

uses a consistent logo worldwide” and that this “unified brand . . . is well-known for a

variety of consumer goods, which are available and sold in Oklahoma.” Pls.’ Resp. at 14.

This in mind, Plaintiffs maintain that Samsung purposefully availed itself of Oklahoma’s

market even if it “was not the ultimate manufacturer or marketer of such goods [because]

it deliberately used the same branding, which seeks to portray the modern image of the

leading company.” Id.

Even assuming that Samsung’s parent corporation2 is subject to personal

jurisdiction in Oklahoma due to its efforts to market and sell phones, tablets, and home

appliances, “jurisdiction over a parent corporation [does not] automatically establish

2 To be sure, the parties’ briefs do not conclusively establish that Samsung SDI Co., Ltd.

is organized under a parent corporation, and the Court makes no such determination here.

jurisdiction over a wholly owned subsidiary.” Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S.

770, 781 n.13 (1984); see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564

U.S. 915 (2011) (recognizing that the defendant’s foreign subsidiaries were not subject to

personal jurisdiction in the forum state despite their parent corporation being subject to

personal jurisdiction in the state); accord Good v. Fuji Fire & Marine, Ins. Co., Ltd., 271

F. App’x. 756, 759 (10th Cir. 2008) (“For purposes of personal jurisdiction, ‘a holding or

parent company has a separate corporate existence and is treated separately from the

subsidiary.’”) (quoting Quarles v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 504 F.2d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir.

1974)).

As there are no factual allegations indicating that Samsung “has purposefully

directed [its] activities at residents of the forum” the Court is unable to conclude that it has

specific jurisdiction over Samsung. Kuenzle, 102 F.3d at 455 (internal quotation omitted).

Accordingly, the Court will not address the issue of whether the exercise of jurisdiction

would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Soma Med. Int’l v.

Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1299 n.1 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Because we

conclude that [the plaintiff] has failed to establish that [the defendant] has minimum

contacts with the [forum state], we need not proceed to the next step of the due process

analysis—i.e., whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] could

offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”) (quoting Asahi Metal

Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 113).

II. Jurisdictional Discovery

In lieu of dismissal, Plaintiffs alternatively request permission to engage in

jurisdictional discovery, claiming they “have not yet had a chance to develop the record.”

Pls.’ Resp. at 21. “District courts are endowed with broad discretion over discovery,

including whether to grant discovery requests with respect to jurisdictional issues.” Dental

Dynamics, LLC v. Jolly Dental Grp., LLC, 946 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing

Budde v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 511 F.2d 1033, 1035 (10th Cir. 1975)). Under Tenth

Circuit precedent, “a refusal to grant jurisdictional discovery constitutes an abuse of

discretion if the denial results in prejudice to a litigant and that prejudice is present where

pertinent facts bearing on the question of jurisdiction are controverted.” Breakthrough

Mgmt. Grp, Inc. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1189-90 (10th Cir.

2010) (internal alterations and quotations omitted). As Plaintiffs seek discovery, they bear

the burden of demonstrating an entitlement to jurisdictional discovery and the resulting

prejudice from its denial. See id. at 1189 n.11; Dutcher v. Matheson, 840 F.3d 1183, 1195

(10th Cir. 2016).

Plaintiffs’ primary assertion in support of jurisdictional discovery is that such

discovery is necessary to “explore Samsung’s distribution to its so-called ‘sophisticated

companies’—particularly those to whom Samsung shipped in bulk without a battery pack

such that it can determine if the distribution was, in fact, unauthorized.” Pls.’ Resp. at 22.

In short, Plaintiffs contend that if the “sophisticated companies” to which Samsung ships

its batteries are located in Oklahoma, it is likely subject to personal jurisdiction in the state.

Samsung notes that its interaction with the battery “ends at the point of sale from [it] to the

particular sophisticated, qualified customer.” Def.’s Decl. [Doc. No. 52] at 5. It contends

that, after the battery is sold, it “does not have the right or ability to control the customer’s

subsequent use or sale of assembled battery packs.” Id.

As noted, the Tenth Circuit recently remarked that “six Justices emphasized that

personal jurisdiction [does] not exist simply because of a defendant’s awareness that its

product could, through stream of commerce, end up in the forum state.” XMission, L.C.,

955 F.3d at 843. Rather, there must be a “particular focus by the defendant on the forum

State to satisfy the purposeful [availment] requirement.” Id. As detailed above, Plaintiffs

have failed to identify any “additional conduct” that Samsung has directed toward the

forum state. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., 480 U.S. at 112 (“[A] defendant’s awareness that

the stream of commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not

convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed

toward the forum State.”). Thus, even assuming that, after engaging in jurisdictional

discovery, it is determined that these “sophisticated companies” are located in Oklahoma,

there does not appear to be any additional conduct directed at the state sufficient to exercise

personal jurisdiction over Samsung.

Many of Plaintiffs’ remaining arguments supporting its request mirror its arguments

surrounding whether Samsung purposefully availed itself of the Oklahoma market. See

generally Pls.’ Resp. at 22-23 (Seeking “documents demonstrating that Samsung sought to

increase its share of the lithium-ion battery market in the United States, . . . documents

demonstrating that Samsung knew that products containing its [batteries] were available

for purchase by consumers at various retailers throughout the United States and that those

retailers have a presence in Oklahoma, . . . [and] documents demonstrating Samsung

benefit[s] from a uniform brand across its companies.’’). As discussed, these activities are

not bases upon which personal jurisdiction may rest. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to

demonstrate that jurisdictional discovery is appropriate, and the Court must deny their

request.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal

Jurisdiction [Doc. No. 51] 1s GRANTED. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims against

Defendant Samsung SDI Co., Ltd. are DISMISSED, as the Court lacks personal

jurisdiction over Samsung.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 27" day of December, 2022.

LA

yO. QyPsE

TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI

Chief United States District Judge

18