Vanlandingham v. Oklahoma City City of

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

CHARLES KALEB VANLANDINGHAM, )

Administrator for the Estate of Charles )

Lamar Vanlandingham, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) Case No. CIV-22-209-D

v. )

)

CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

O R D E R

Before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended

Complaint [Doc. No. 32], filed by Kevin D. Rolke, Trevor Lewis, Shawn M. Morton, and

Zachary Osten under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The movants (collectively, “Firefighters”)

are employees of the Oklahoma City Fire Department who responded to a call for medical

assistance to Plaintiff’s decedent, Charles Lamar Vanlandingham (“Mr. Vanlandingham”).

Plaintiff brings claims against Firefighters under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations

of the decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights. Firefighters assert that the allegations of the

Second Amended Complaint fail to state a constitutional claim against them and,

alternatively, they are entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff has filed a timely Response

[Doc. No. 38], to which Firefighters have replied [Doc. No. 39].

Standard of Decision

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. In evaluating a complaint,

the Court first disregards conclusory allegations and “next consider[s] the factual

allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to

relief.” Id. at 681. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim is a

“context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience

and common sense.” Id. at 679; see Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F. 3d 1242, 1248 (10th

Cir. 2008). In § 1983 cases, it is particularly important for a complaint “to provide each

individual [defendant] with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.”

Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249-50 (emphasis omitted); see Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d

1090, 1104 (10th Cir. 2009).

Where a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff must overcome this

defense. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials from liability

for civil damages ‘unless a plaintiff pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a

statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was “clearly established” at the time

of the challenged conduct.’” Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757 (2014) (quoting Ashcroft v.

Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)). “Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly

established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the

clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as

the plaintiff maintains.” Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir. 2012). “The

relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether

it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001).

Plaintiff’s Allegations1

In the early morning hours of September 15, 2019, Mr. Vanlandingham experienced

a seizure, and a friend made a 9-1-1 emergency call for medical assistance. The first

responders to arrive were paramedics from an ambulance service (Defendant American

Medical Response Ambulance Service, Inc.), followed a short time later by Firefighters.

The paramedics took “charge of the scene because the call was for a medical emergency.”

See 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 18.

When the responders arrived, Mr. Vanlandingham’s seizure was subsiding, and “he

was in a postictal state.” Id. ¶ 21.2 As a result, “Mr. Vanlandingham was not aware of

his surroundings.” Id. ¶ 22. Contrary to “common medical procedures [and] protocol

standards,” the paramedics and Firefighters tackled Mr. Vanlandingham, and Firefighters

“proceeded to pin Mr. Vanlandingham to the ground facedown.” Id. ¶¶ 23-24. Acting

together while Mr. Vanlandingham was lying in this position with his hands behind his

back, Firefighters “held Mr. Vanlandingham’s legs, sat on his lower back while pushing

1 Consistent with the standard of decision, all factual allegations of Plaintiff’s pleading

are accepted as true.

2 This state “is characterized by disorienting symptoms such as confusion.” See Waleed

Abood & Susanta Bandyopadhyay, Postictal Seizure State, National Institute of Health (July 12,

2022), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK526004. As a practical matter, “the postictal

state [ends] when it is safe for the patient to return to activity without risking his/her or other’s

safety.” Id.

down on Mr. Vanlandingham’s upper back, placed a knee on Mr. Vanlandingham’s

shoulder and neck area, and used their hands to press down on the back of Mr.

Vanlandingham’s head.” Id. ¶¶ 25-26. After Mr. Vanlandingham was pinned down, a

police officer (Defendant Brandon Lee) arrived, and Firefighters asked the officer to

handcuff Mr. Vanlandingham, even though he was experiencing a medical emergency and

“had committed no crime.” Id. ¶¶ 27-28, 30. “Officer Lee proceeded to place handcuffs

on Mr. Vanlandingham, further restraining Mr. Vanlandingham’s movement.” Id. ¶ 29.

During the incident, “Mr. Vanlandingham repeatedly screamed out in pain and

yelled for help while he suffered under the weight of [Firefighters] as they continued to pin

down Mr. Vanlandingham’s legs, hips, back, and head,” and one of them responded by

yelling at Mr. Vanlandingham to “quit” and “hold still” and saying, “you’re not going to

buck me off.” Id. ¶¶ 32-33. Mr. Vanlandingham’s facedown position with hands cuffed

behind his back and Firefighters weighing him down lasted over ten minutes and restricted

Mr. Vanlandingham’s airflow. The paramedics did nothing to alleviate the airflow

restriction but, instead, made the situation more dangerous by administering a sedative drug

to Mr. Vanlandingham. The physical restrictions combined with the effect of the sedative

caused Mr. Vanlandingham to lose consciousness and stop breathing. He “died on the

floor of his friend’s home without ever being transported to a hospital.” Id. ¶ 44.

Firefighters “did not get off Mr. Vanlandingham’s back until after he stopped breathing”

and “did nothing to maintain or monitor Mr. Vanlandingham’s airway and breathing during

his facedown restraint.” Id. ¶¶ 46-47.

Plaintiff seeks to recover damages under § 1983 for Mr. Vanlandingham’s injuries

and loss of life based on allegations that Firefighters and Officer Lee “while operating

under color of law, violated Mr. Vanlandingham’s constitutional rights by unlawfully

seizing Mr. Vanlandingham and by using excessive force during his detention.” Id. ¶ 50.

As framed by the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s theories of § 1983 liability are

that Firefighters violated Mr. Vanlandingham’s Fourth Amendment rights in three ways:

1) effecting an unlawful and unreasonable seizure by restraining Mr. Vanlandingham

“without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,” id. ¶ 54 (First Claim); 2) using excessive

force against Mr. Vanlandingham by holding him “down with their body weight for over

ten (10) minutes while they slowly suffocated him and stopped his heart,” id. ¶ 62 (Second

Claim); and 3) conspiring to deprive Mr. Vanlandingham of his constitutional rights to be

free from unlawful arrest and excessive force, id. ¶¶ 65-67 (Third Claim). Plaintiff also

claims that “one or more of the Defendants,” who are not identified, failed to intervene

“during the constitutional violations described herein” to prevent the violation of

Mr. Vanlandingham’s constitutional rights by others. Id. ¶¶ 70-72 (Fourth Claim).

By their Motion, Firefighters challenge the sufficiency of the Second Amended

Complaint to state a claim against them. Further, if the Court finds a claim is stated,

Firefighters challenge Plaintiff’s ability to show that the right they allegedly violated was

clearly established under the circumstances.3

3 Firefighters also assert that no official-capacity suit can be brought against them.

Plaintiff disclaims any intention of suing Firefighters in their official capacities. See Pl.’s Resp.

Br. at 14. His pleading specifically states Firefighters are sued in their individual capacities. See

2d Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-9. Thus, the Court finds no official-capacity issue to be decided.

Discussion

A. Constitutional Violation

The Fourth Amendment protects individuals from unlawful seizures and, as

pertinent here, guarantees rights not to be detained without reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity and not to be subjected to excessive force. Plaintiff claims Firefighters lacked

any basis to restrain Mr. Vanlandingham and they used excessive force against him during

the restraint. In argument, Plaintiff seems to concede that the factual and legal premise

of these claims is that Firefighters acted in a law enforcement role during their encounter

with the decedent.4 Although he argues that “the finding of an unlawful seizure, or other

constitutional violation, does not turn on the employment of the state actor doing the

seizing,” Plaintiff relies on case law holding that the Fourth Amendment applies where the

state actor is acting in a law enforcement capacity. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 6 (citing

McKenna v. Edgell, 617 F.3d 432, 438-39 (6th Cir. 2010); Peete v. Metro. Gov’t of

Nashville Cnty., 486 F.3d 217, 221-22 (6th Cir. 2008); Judd v. City of Baxter, 780 F. App’x

345, 349 (6th Cir. 2019) (unpublished); Pena v. Givens, 637 F. App’x 775, 781 (5th Cir.

2015) (unpublished). The Court accepts Plaintiff’s position as stated in his brief that

4 Plaintiff contends “the facts alleged demonstrate that Defendant Firefighters were acting

in a law-enforcement capacity” and “Plaintiff has pled sufficient facts to establish Defendant

Firefighters were acting in a law-enforcement capacity.” See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 2. In his legal

argument regarding unlawful seizure, Plaintiff states: “In the context of a medical emergency, a

seizure occurs . . . when the state actor acted in a law-enforcement capacity rather than an

emergency-medical-response capacity.” Id. at 6. And regarding excessive force, Plaintiff

argues: “Paring [sic] this prone restraint excessive force analysis with the above cited cases

establishing that any state actor can be liable for constitutional violations when they are acting in

a law-enforcement capacity, it is clear that Plaintiff has alleged a cognizable claim for excessive

force against Defendant Firefighters.” Id. at 9.

conduct in “a law-enforcement capacity rather than an emergency-medical-response

capacity” is required to implicate the Fourth Amendment. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 6.

Upon consideration, the Court finds that the Second Amended Complaint lacks

sufficient factual allegations to state a plausible Fourth Amendment claim on this basis.

Plaintiff argues that, rather than rendering aid to Mr. Vanlandingham in a manner that

would be “reasonable actions of firefighters in an emergency-medical-response capacity,

Defendant Firefighters continued to sit on and restrain Mr. Vanlandingham in a prone

position waiting for law enforcement to arrive.” See id. at 7. Plaintiff makes this

argument without any citation to his pleading.

After examining the Second Amended Complaint, the Court finds no factual basis

for Plaintiff’s suggestion that Firefighters had any interaction or communication with a law

enforcement officer or agency before Officer Lee arrived on the scene. Even then, the

Second Amended Complaint states that Firefighters asked Officer Lee to assist them in

restraining Mr. Vanlandingham, not the other way around. See 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 28

(Firefighters “asked Officer Lee to handcuff Mr. Vanlandingham”). There is no factual

basis in the Second Amended Complaint to suggest Firefighters were reacting to or

investigating possible criminal activity. According to Plaintiff’s allegations, the

paramedics and Firefighters both arrived at the scene in response to an emergency call for

medical assistance, and the paramedics took charge of the situation as a medical matter

when they found Mr. Vanlandingham in a postictal seizure state, unaware of his

surroundings. Although Plaintiff alleges the medical responders acted incompetently or

negligently in restraining Mr. Vanlandingham, Plaintiff provides no facts from which to

conclude they assumed a law enforcement role. See Peete, 486 F.3d at 222 (paramedics

did not violate Fourth Amendment by restraining person when responding to medical

emergency call regarding epileptic seizure; “[t]hey were not acting to enforce the law, deter

or incarcerate”); see also McKenna, 617 F.3d at 439-40 (Fourth Amendment claim turned

on whether police officers “acted in a law-enforcement (e.g., investigative or prosecutorial)

capacity” or emergency-medical-response capacity).

Accepting the factual allegations of the Second Amended Complaint and viewing

them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege

sufficient facts to show a Fourth Amendment violation by Firefighters. Therefore, the

Court finds that the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a plausible § 1983 claim of

unlawful seizure or excessive force against Firefighters.

B. Qualified Immunity

If Plaintiff had alleged the violation of a constitutional right, the Court would also

find that Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to overcome Firefighters’ defense of

qualified immunity because the Fourth Amendment right asserted was not clearly

established in September 2019.

In assessing qualified immunity, a right can be clearly established through a

factually similar decision from binding precedent or the weight of authority from other

courts. Brown v. Flowers, 974 F.3d 1178, 1184 (10th Cir. 2020); Perry v. Durborow, 892

F.3d 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2018). “[A] case directly on point” is not required, but the

right must be “sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that

what he is doing violates that right.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11-12 (2015) (per

curiam); accord District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018) (“The precedent

must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish the

particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.”). “To determine whether a right is defined

with sufficient specificity, we consider the ‘specific context of the case.’” Brown, 974

F.3d at 1184 (quoting Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004)). “[S]pecificity is

especially important in the Fourth Amendment context.” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12. The

Supreme Court has “stressed the need to ‘identify a case where an officer acting under

similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.’” Wesby,

138 S. Ct. at 591 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017)).

Plaintiff identifies no Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit, or other federal court decision

that would have made clear to a reasonable person in Firefighters’ positions that their

conduct toward Mr. Vanlandingham violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court’s

survey of caselaw also reveals no decisional precedent from which Firefighters would have

known that the Fourth Amendment was implicated under the circumstances of responding

to an emergency medical call to assist Mr. Vanlandingham with his seizure. The Court

finds that here, as in Pena, Plaintiff “points to no controlling authority – or a robust

consensus of persuasive authority, suggesting that medical personnel ‘seize’ patients when

restraining them in the course of providing treatment.” See Pena, 637 F. App’x at 781

(internal quotation and citation omitted); see also Thompson v. Cope, 900 F.3d 414, 422

(7th Cir. 2018) (law was not clearly established “that a paramedic ‘seizes’ an arrestee and

is subject to Fourth Amendment limits on excessive force by sedating the arrestee”).

Plaintiff argues that the federal appellate decisions of the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh

Circuits cited above establish “that emergency responding state actors can be liable for

Fourth Amendment violations when acting in a law-enforcement capacity.” See Pl.’s

Resp. Br. at 12. Plaintiff contends these cases put Firefighters on notice that stepping into

a law-enforcement role to effectuate a seizure would violate the Fourth Amendment.5

However, as discussed supra, the Court finds insufficient factual allegations in the Second

Amended Complaint to support a reasonable inference that Firefighters were acting in a

law-enforcement role.

The Court therefore finds that Firefighters are entitled to qualified immunity from

individual liability for the § 1983 claims asserted against them for an unlawful detention

of, or use of unreasonable force against, Mr. Vanlandingham.

C. Conspiracy

Plaintiff claims that Firefighters through concerted activity engaged in a conspiracy

to violate Mr. Vanlandingham’s Fourth Amendment rights. However, the same qualified

immunity principles that bar Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims based on Firefighters’ alleged

violations of the Fourth Amendment require the dismissal of his § 1983 civil-conspiracy

claim as well. See Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1023-24 (10th Cir. 2021).

Specifically, where “there was no clearly established law that the alleged object of the

officers’ conspiracy was actually unconstitutional . . . , the officers are entitled to qualified

5 Specifically, Plaintiff argues that his allegations “demonstrate that by the end of the

encounter, [Firefighters] were acting in conjunction with Officer Lee to deter, punish, and

incarcerate Mr. Vanlandingham.” See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 13. This argument is unsupported by

any reference to the factual allegations of Plaintiff’s pleading.

immunity for any such conspiracy.” Id. at 1024 (citing Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.3d 673,

702 (10th Cir. 1990) and Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204,

1231 (10th Cir. 2020)). Under Frasier, 922 F.3d at 1024, where Firefighters are entitled

to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claims “based on the absence of

clearly established law, it necessarily follows that they are also entitled to qualified

immunity on his conspiracy claim insofar as it alleges a conspiracy” to violate the Fourth

Amendment.

Accordingly, for the reasons stated supra regarding Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment

claims, the Court finds that Firefighters are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s

§ 1983 conspiracy claim and, thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible civil conspiracy

claim against Firefighters.

D. Failure to Intervene

Finally, Plaintiff asserts that Firefighters have overlooked his Fourth Claim based

on a theory of § 1983 liability where state actors are present when excessive force is used

and have a reasonable opportunity to intervene but fail to prevent a constitutional violation

by other officers.6 It is true that Firefighters do not specifically address the Fourth Claim

in their Motion or briefs; they simply argue in a global fashion that they enjoy qualified

immunity from suit on all Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. The Court declines Plaintiff’s

invitation, however, to treat this approach as a waiver of Firefighters’ qualified immunity

6 This theory is well established in the Tenth Circuit. See Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127,

1136 (10th Cir. 1996).

defense to this claim. See Pl.’s Resp. Br. at 11 (urging denial of Motion due to

Firefighters’ failure to provide legal authority and argument).

The Tenth Circuit has held that an individualized analysis of qualified immunity is

not necessary in cases where a plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim on “aggregated officer

conduct” and liability could be based on either joint participation or a failure-to-intervene

theory. See Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 421-22 (10th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff

takes that approach in this case. He pleads alternative claims that each Firefighter either

participated in a use of force that collectively violated the Fourth Amendment or failed to

prevent other participants from using excessive force. Under either theory of § 1983

liability, Firefighters are entitled to qualified immunity based on Plaintiff’s failure to show

that the alleged conduct toward Mr. Vanlandingham violated clearly established law. See

id. at 423 (defendants enjoyed qualified immunity unless their aggregated use of force was

unconstitutional and violated clearly established law).

Accordingly, for the same reasons already stated regarding Plaintiff’s Fourth

Amendment and conspiracy claims, the Court finds that Firefighters are entitled to

qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s failure-to-intervene claim and that Plaintiff has not

stated a plausible § 1983 claim against Firefighters for failing to prevent unconstitutional

conduct.

Conclusion

For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible § 1983

claim against Firefighters based on the alleged unlawful detention or use of unreasonable

force against Mr. Vanlandingham, and that Plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing

to overcome Firefighters’ qualified immunity defense. The Court therefore finds that

Plaintiffs action against all Firefighters should be dismissed but that Plaintiff should have

an opportunity to amend his pleading upon a timely filed motion.’

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's

Second Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 32] is GRANTED. Plaintiffs action against

Defendants Kevin D. Rolke, Trevor Lewis, Shawn M. Morton, and Zachary Osten is

DISMISSED without prejudice to a motion to further amend his pleading within 14 days

from the date of this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 28" day of October, 2022.

□ ae

Q: ya

TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI

Chief United States District Judge

' A district court may properly require a plaintiff to file a motion that complies with Fed.

R. Civ. P. 15(a) and LCvR15.1 before considering whether to allow an amendment. See Brooks

v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d 1272, 1283 (10th Cir. 2021); see also Hall v. Witteman, 584

F.3d 859, 868 (10th Cir. 2009) (plaintiff “must give adequate notice to the district court and to the

opposing party of the basis of the proposed amendment”).

13