Washington v. Oklahoma City City of

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

MICHAEL C. WASHINGTON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-20-266-D

)

CITY OF OKLAHOMA CITY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant Mitchell McCoy’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s

Supplemental Petition and Brief in Support [Doc. No. 130]. Plaintiff filed a response [Doc.

No. 135], to which Defendant replied [Doc. No. 137].

BACKGROUND

This case centers around two separate incidents. Relevant here is an incident that

occurred on Oklahoma City Public School (“OKCPS”) grounds in August 2019. Plaintiff

was cited on August 23, 2019, for violating an order not to appear on school property.

The events that led up to that date are not entirely clear, but it appears that Plaintiff

was protesting outside of an Oklahoma City school on August 12, 2019. While protesting,

Plaintiff was approached by a security guard who informed Plaintiff that he was banned

from all OKCPS campuses and Board of Education meetings for six months. That same

evening, Plaintiff attempted to attend a school board meeting, and he was escorted out by

a security officer.

Plaintiff subsequently notified the Superintendent, Sean McDaniel, of his intent to

appeal the suspensions. McDaniel, along with OKCPS General Counsel Jessica Sherrill,

held a hearing with Plaintiff, and they ultimately decided to uphold both suspensions.

Plaintiff was notified by letter on August 20, 2019 of their decision, and just three days

later, Plaintiff received a citation for trespassing on school property. Plaintiff alleges that

Defendant Mitchell McCoy, an Oklahoma City Police Department officer, wrote the

August 23, 2019 trespass citation.

Although Plaintiff was charged with trespassing on school property, the charges

were eventually dismissed. Plaintiff filed a lawsuit in state court on March 2, 2020. The

suit was removed to federal court on March 23, 2020. On May 11, 2020, Plaintiff sought

leave to file an amended complaint, which the Court granted. See Order [Doc. No. 36]. On

June 12, 2020, the Court allowed Plaintiff to file a supplemental complaint to include an

additional cause of action and information as to damages. See Order [Doc. No. 59].

In his sixth cause of action, Plaintiff seeks to hold McCoy liable for malicious

prosecution, libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, public humiliation,

a violation of due process, and conspiracy to file false criminal charges. McCoy filed a

motion to dismiss [Doc. No. 130] for failure to state claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

STANDARD OF DECISION

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement . . . showing that the pleader

is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The statement must be sufficient to “give the

defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The court will accept as true all well-pled

factual allegations and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Peterson

v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2010).

A complaint “attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed

factual allegations,” but it does need “more than labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556

U.S. at 678.

“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the

complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. See also Twombly,

550 U.S. at 558 (“[O]n a motion to dismiss, courts ‘are not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’”) (citation omitted). Courts may “disregard

conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly

suggest the defendant is liable.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.

2012). In § 1983 cases, it is particularly important “that the complaint make clear

exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair

notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her.” See Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249–50

(emphasis in original); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1104 (10th Cir.

2009).

DISCUSSION

All of Plaintiff’s claims against McCoy are based on the trespass citation McCoy

issued Plaintiff. McCoy argues the claims should be dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6).

I. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

a. Official Capacity Claims

Although individual capacity suits seek to impose personal liability on a government

actor for actions taken under color of law, official capacity suits “generally represent only

another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.”

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (citation and quotations omitted). “[A]n

official capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the

entity.” Id. at 166; see also Watson v. City of Kansas City, 857 F.2d 690, 695 (10th Cir.

1988) (“A suit against a municipality and a suit against a municipal official acting in his or

her official capacity are the same.”).

Where a plaintiff sues both a person in his official capacity and the entity, courts

have dismissed the official capacity claims as redundant. See French v. City of Cortez, 361

F. Supp. 3d 1011, 1042 (D. Colo. Jan. 9, 2019) (dismissing official capacity claims against

police officers because they were “duplicative” of the claims against the city); Cutter v.

Metro Fugitive Squad, Case No. CIV-06-115-GKF, 2008 WL 4068188, at *5 (W.D. Okla.

Aug. 29, 2008) (dismissing official capacity claims as “simply redundant” because the

plaintiffs had sued the government entities); Doe v. Douglas Cnty. School Dist. RE-1, 775

F. Supp. 1414, 1416 (D. Colo. Oct. 17, 1991) (dismissing the “redundant” official capacity

claims as a matter of “judicial economy and efficiency”).

The City of Oklahoma City is a named defendant and has filed its own motions

[Doc. Nos. 65 and 140] to dismiss. Suing McCoy in his official capacity is redundant, and

the official capacity claims against him are dismissed.

b. Individual Capacity Claims: Conspiracy and Malicious Prosecution

When a plaintiff names an official in his individual capacity, the plaintiff is seeking

“to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of

state law.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985). “To state a claim under § 1983,

a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the

United States and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting

under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Fourteenth

Amendment provides that a State shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,

without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Plaintiff alleges McCoy

conspired with an OKCPS official to issue a citation for trespass on school property against

him in violation of his due process rights.

Plaintiff’s allegations do not show a deprivation of constitutional rights. “Several

federal courts have concluded that there is no protected interest in entering school

property.” Hirt v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 287, No. 2:17-CV-02279-HLT, 2019 WL

1866321, at *10 (D. Kan. Apr. 24, 2019) (citing McCook v. Spriner Sch. Dist., 44 F. App’x

896, 910 (10th Cir. 2002); Cole v. Montage Bd. of Educ., 145 F. App’x 760, 762 (3d Cir.

2005); Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655–56 (4th Cir. 1999); Silano v. Sag Harbor

Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 724 (2d Cir. 1994); Henley v. Octorara

Area Sch. Dist., 701 F. Supp. 545, 551 (E.D. Pa. 1988); Warkevicz v. Berwick Area Sch.

Dist., 2016 WL 3753108, at *4 (M.D. Pa. July 14, 2016); Cyr v. Addison Rutland

Supervisory Union, 60 F. Supp. 536, 546 (D. Vt. 2014)). Further, under Okla. Stat. tit. 21,

§ 1376, school superintendents may exclude an individual from school property for

disruptive behavior. Prior to receiving the citation for trespass, the OKCPS Superintendent

barred Plaintiff from school property for six months.1 McCoy, thus, was authorized to cite

Plaintiff for trespass when he appeared on OKCPS property. See Okla. Stat. tit. 21, §

1376(B). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege a deprivation of his constitutional

rights. Accordingly, his conspiracy claim against McCoy must be dismissed.

Plaintiff alleges that McCoy subjected him to malicious prosecution by issuing the

trespass citation. To establish a malicious prosecution claim, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the

defendant caused the plaintiff's continued confinement or prosecution; (2) the original

action terminated in favor of the plaintiff; (3) no probable cause supported the original

arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) the defendant acted with malice; and (5)

the plaintiff sustained damages.” Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008).

McCoy argues Plaintiff cannot show this termination was favorable to Plaintiff.

“The plaintiff has the burden of proving a favorable termination.” Id. at 803 (quotations

omitted). Formal abandonment of a criminal charge by a prosecutor is, by itself,

insufficient to show a favorable termination. Id. at 803–04. A favorable termination is one

1 The Court has taken judicial notice of the Journal Entry of Judgment entered by the District Court

of Oklahoma County upholding the superintendent’s 6-month ban. [Doc. No. 130-2].

that, “in some way ‘indicate[s] the innocence of the accused.’” Cordova v. City of

Albuquerque, 816 F.3d 645, 651 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Wilkins, 528 F.3d at 803).

Plaintiff alleges the trespass action against him was dismissed by a municipal judge upon

recommendation of the prosecution; he does not allege the reasons for the prosecution’s

recommendation or the judge’s dismissal. Plaintiff thus fails to allege a termination of the

trespass action that indicates his innocence. Therefore, his malicious prosecution claim

against McCoy fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. Accordingly, it must

be dismissed.

II. State Law Claims

Plaintiff asserts several state law claims against McCoy. The Court, however,

declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Thus,

the Court dismisses the state law claims without prejudice. See Gobert v. Newton-Embry,

820 F. App’x 783, 787–88 (10th Cir. 2020) (determining the district court had the option

of dismissing remaining state law claims or remanding them and finding it was not

inappropriate to dismiss them); accord Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden &

Nelson, P.C., 956 F.3d 1228, 1232 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting the “regular practice in this

circuit of dismissing without prejudice state-law claims for which the district court has only

supplemental, rather than original, jurisdiction when the federal-law claims to which they

are supplemental are dismissed early in the litigation”); Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of

Regents, Univ. of Kansas, 254 F.3d 941, 945 (10th Cir. 2001) (stating that 28 U.S.C. §

1367 grants the court discretion to dismiss supplemental state law claims when the court

dismisses the federal claims over which it had original jurisdiction).

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Mitchell McCoy’s Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff's Supplemental Petition [Doc. No. 130] is GRANTED, and the claims against

McCoy are dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 16" day of March, 2022.

Md Q.Oyhit

TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI

Chief United States District Judge