The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CTC, INC., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
-vs- ) Case No. CIV-20-1235-F
)
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL INC.1 and )
SCHNEIDER NATIONAL )
CARRIERS, INC., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Plaintiff CTC, Inc. has moved for partial summary judgment under Rule
56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. Doc. no. 35. Defendant, Schneider National Carriers, Inc.,
has responded, opposing entry of partial summary judgment. Doc. no. 40.
Defendant has also moved for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) with respect to
plaintiff’s claims against it. Doc. no. 36. Plaintiff has responded, opposing entry of
summary judgment in favor of defendant. Doc. no. 39.
I.
Introduction
Plaintiff brings this negligence action against defendant to recover damages
arising from a vehicular collision. Plaintiff claims defendant’s employee lost control
of the tractor-trailer he was driving and collided with plaintiff’s tractor-trailer which
had become disabled and was legally parked on the shoulder of the interstate.
1 Defendant Schneider National Inc. was previously dismissed from this action by plaintiff. Doc.
no. 15.
Plaintiff alleges negligence and negligence per se theories of liability against
defendant.2 It seeks entry of partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for
its claims, leaving the issue of damages for trial. Defendant seeks summary
judgment as to plaintiff’s claims on two grounds – lack of standing to recover
property damages and failure to identify statutes/ordinances allegedly violated by its
driver for the negligence per se claim.
II.
Standard of Review
Rule 56(a) provides that “[a] party may move for summary judgment,
identifying each claim or defense—or part of each claim or defense—on which
summary judgment is sought.” Rule 56(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. Summary judgment is
appropriate if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. In applying this
standard, the court views the factual record and draws all reasonable inferences most
favorably to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). An issue is “genuine” if there is sufficient evidence
on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of fact is
“material” if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the
claim. Id. “‘If a party that would bear the burden of persuasion at trial does not
come forward with sufficient evidence on an essential element of its prima facie
case, all issues concerning all other elements of the claim and any defenses become
immaterial.’” Miller ex rel. S.M. v. Board of Educ. of Albuquerque Public Schools,
2 Defendant has admitted respondeat superior liability for any proven negligence of its employee
in relation to the subject accident. Doc. no. 16, ECF p. 8, n. 1.
565 F.3d 1232, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144
F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998)).
III.
Plaintiff’s Motion
“A federal court sitting in diversity applies the substantive law, including
choice of law rules, of the forum state.” Barrett v. Tallon, 30 F.3d 1296, 1300 (10th
Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Here, the forum state is Oklahoma, which in tort cases,
such as this, requires application of the law of the state with the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and to the parties. Id. It appears from the record, and
the parties do not challenge, that Oklahoma is the state with the most significant
relationship to the occurrence and the parties. The court therefore applies Oklahoma
substantive law with respect to plaintiff’s negligence claims.
Under Oklahoma law, “[t]he elements of negligence are (1) the existence of a
duty on the part of a defendant to protect the plaintiff from injury; (2) a violation of
that duty; and (3) injury proximately resulting from the violation.” Dirickson v.
Mings, 910 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Okla. 1996) (citation omitted). “Concerning duty of
care, a driver of a motor vehicle must, at all times, use that degree of care which is
reasonable and prudent under the circumstances.” Id. (citation omitted). “Therefore,
a failure to exercise that degree of care which results in injury to another is actionable
negligence.” Id.
Upon review, the court concludes that plaintiff, who bears the burden of
persuasion at trial, has failed to come forward with sufficient evidence that
defendant’s employee violated the duty of care. In its briefing, plaintiff alleges the
subject collision occurred because defendant’s employee fell asleep. Plaintiff,
however, presents no evidence to support that allegation. With its motion, plaintiff
has submitted the Oklahoma Highway Patrol’s “Official Oklahoma Traffic Collision
Report.” Doc. no. 35-2. Assuming, without deciding, the report may be relied upon
for purposes of summary judgment,3 the report only indicates that defendant’s
tractor-trailer departed the roadway, but no reason is given for the departure. The
“Unsafe/Unlawful Contributing Factors” are “Other/Unknown.” Id. Plaintiff also
submits, in support of its motion, the declaration of its vice-president, but that
declaration does not establish defendant’s employee violated the duty of care.4
Further, the “2018 Annual Average Daily Traffic Oklahoma Highway System
Garvin County” does not establish that defendant’s employee violated the duty of
care. Because plaintiff has not come forward with sufficient evidence to establish
one of the essential elements of its negligence claim,5 the court concludes that partial
summary judgment is not appropriate.
Plaintiff additionally asserts a negligence per se claim against defendant. “If
a statute delineates the defendant’s obligations, a court may adopt the required
conduct in place of the common-law duty as the appropriate basis for establishing
civil liability.” Burgin v. Leach, 320 P.3d 33, 38-39 (Okla. Civ. App. 2014) (citing
Mansfield v. Circle K Corporation, 877 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Okla. 1994)). “When
courts accept a statutory requirement as the legal duty for actionable negligence, the
violation of that statute is said to be negligence per se.” Id. “To establish negligence
per se on the basis of a statutory violation [the plaintiff] must establish that: [(1)] the
injury was caused by the violation; [(2)] the injury was of a type intended to be
prevented by the statute; and [(3)] the injured party was of the class meant to be
3 Defendant objects to plaintiff’s reliance upon the report for summary judgment purposes.
4 Defendant objects to the declaration because the information provided is not based upon personal
knowledge of the vice-president but rather received from other sources. The court need not address
defendant’s objection as the declaration, as stated, is insufficient to establish defendant’s employee
violated the duty of care.
5 Although pled in its Second Amended Complaint, plaintiff, in its motion, has not invoked the
application of res ipsa loquitor. In any event, plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence of
each of the foundation facts for its application. Harder v. F.C. Clinton, Inc., 948 P.2d 298, 303 n.
12 (Okla. 1997).
protected by the statute.” Mansfield, 877 P.2d at 1132-33. Plaintiff’s motion does
not address any of the elements for establishing a negligence per se claim.
Consequently, the court concludes that partial summary judgment is not appropriate
on the negligence per se claim.
For the reasons stated, the court concludes that plaintiff’s motion for partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability for its negligence claims should be
denied.
IV.
Defendant’s Motion
Initially, defendant seeks summary judgment with respect to plaintiff’s
negligence claims on the ground that plaintiff lacks standing to pursue recovery of
property damages. Defendant asserts that plaintiff did not own the tractor-trailer. In
support of its assertion, defendant submits certificates of title for the tractor and the
trailer, showing the owner as Southwestern Express, Inc. Because another entity is
the titled owner of the subject tractor-trailer, defendant contends that plaintiff has no
standing to recover property damages, including the cost of repairs or replacement
of the tractor-trailer, and the loss of use related to the tractor-trailer.
Plaintiff, in response, submits a declaration of its accounting/leasing manager
who states the tractor and trailer were operating under the authority of plaintiff and
were insured by plaintiff’s carrier, Great West Casualty Company. The driver of the
tractor-trailer was “leased on” to plaintiff, and he was also lease purchasing the
tractor-trailer from Southwestern Express, Inc. Doc. no. 39-1, ¶ 5. The manager
states that plaintiff was contractually obligated to maintain insurance coverage on
the equipment and has authority to settle all claims associated with the loss. She
also states that plaintiff and Southwestern Express, Inc. are sister companies.
Viewing the factual record in a light most favorable to plaintiff, the court finds
that summary judgment is not appropriate on the issue of standing as to the recovery
of property damages to the tractor and trailer. In addition, the court notes that
plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint is not limited to recovery of damages to the
tractor and trailer themselves. It also seeks cleanup costs, cargo loss, towing costs,
and loss of income and profits. Defendant’s motion does not specifically address
the issue of standing as to any of these requested damages
Next, defendant contends that the court should enter summary judgment on
the negligence per se claim because plaintiff has failed to identify any
statutes/ordinances upon which the claim is based. Without identification of such
statutes/ordinances, defendant maintains that plaintiff cannot establish that a
statute/ordinance was violated by its driver.
In response, plaintiff asserts that it pled in its complaint that defendant’s driver
failed to devote full time and attention, which is found at 47 O.S. 2021 § 11-901b.6
Plaintiff also asserts that it pled defendant’s driver failed to stay in his lane of travel
and committed other violations, thereby giving defendant notice of the statutes
violated.
Upon review, the court finds that defendant is not entitled to summary
judgment on the negligence per se claim. Plaintiff has identified at least one statute,
47 O.S. 2011§ 11-901b, which it contends defendant’s driver violated.
For the reasons stated, the court concludes defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, on the ground of lack of standing to recover property damages and on the
ground of failure to identify statutes/ordinances allegedly violated by its driver for
the negligence per se claim, should be denied.
6 Section 11-901b provides in pertinent part:
The operator of every vehicle, while driving, shall devote their full
time and attention to such driving.
V.
Conclusion
Accordingly, Plaintiff CTC, Inc.’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
Against Defendant Schneider National Carriers, Inc., filed November 1, 2021 (doc.
no. 35), is DENIED. Defendant Schneider National Carriers, Inc.’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, filed November 1, 2021 (doc. no. 36), is also DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 7" day of December, 2021.
STEPHEN P. [_ pridt
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
20-1235p011.docx