Opinion

Sherman v. Kendall

Court
District Court, W.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Nov 24, 2021
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.6%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JERMELL SHERMAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

-vs- ) Case No. CIV-21-484-F

)

FRANK KENDALL, SECRETARY, )

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR )

FORCE, in his official capacity,1 )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

Defendant Frank Kendall, Secretary of the United States Department of the

Air Force (Kendall), moves for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6),

Fed. R. Civ. P., or in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56(a),

Fed. R. Civ. P. Doc. no. 9. Plaintiff Jermell Sherman (Sherman) has responded in

opposition to the motion and Kendall has replied. Doc. nos. 12 and 13. The matter

is at issue.

I.

Sherman was formerly employed as a Logistics Management Specialist at

Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. He brings this action alleging

employment discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

42 U.S.C. § 2000, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701,

1 Frank Kendall is substituted as defendant for Honorable Barbara Barrett, former Secretary of the

United States Department of the Air Force, pursuant to Rule 25(d), Fed. R. Civ. P.

et seq.2 Sherman also alleges a claim under Oklahoma law for intentional infliction

of emotional distress.

Kendall seeks to dismiss the state law claim under Rule 12(b)(1) on the basis

that Sherman fails to plead any waiver of federal sovereign immunity as to that

claim. He also seeks to dismiss the state law claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure

to state a plausible claim. Additionally, Kendall seeks to dismiss the federal law

claims under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds of failure to state a plausible claim of

relief and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. In the alternative, Kendall

requests summary judgment in his favor on Sherman’s claims.

II.

At the outset, the court agrees with Kendall that Sherman fails to plead a

waiver of federal sovereign immunity with respect to the intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim. Sherman relies upon 28 U.S.C. § 1367 in his pleading.

Doc. no. 1, ¶ 2. Section 1367, however, does not waive federal sovereign immunity.

See, San Juan County, Utah v. U.S., 503 F.3d 1163, 1181 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).

Consequently, the court concludes the intentional infliction of emotional distress

claim should be dismissed without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

under Rule 12(b)(1).3

2 In his complaint, Sherman also relies upon 42 U.S.C. § 1981 as a basis for his employment

discrimination claims. A § 1981 claim, however, is foreclosed under established precedent. See,

Brown v. General Services Administration, 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976); Belhomme v. Widnall, 127

F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 1997). Any such claim will be dismissed with prejudice under Rule

12(b)(6).

3 The court notes the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) provides a limited waiver of federal

sovereign immunity for certain tort claims. See, United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813

(1976). However, “Title VII preempts FTCA claims that are based on facts related to the plaintiff’s

Title VII case.” Mobley v. Donahue, 498 Fed. Appx. 793, 797 (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished

decision cited as persuasive pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A)). Sherman’s intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim is based on the same facts as his Title VII claim. Therefore, even if

Sherman relied upon FTCA for a waiver of federal sovereign immunity, the claim, as pled, would

be subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).

III.

With respect to his Title VII claims, Sherman is not required to specifically

allege all the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination. See, Swierkiewicz v.

Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). Nevertheless, “the elements of each alleged

cause of action help to determine whether [p]laintiff has set forth a plausible claim.”

Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012). “[G]eneral

assertions of discrimination . . . without any details whatsoever of events . . . are

insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. While specific facts are not necessary,

some facts are.” Id. at 1193.

“Although Title VII does not explicitly mention hostile work environment, a

victim of a racially hostile work environment may nevertheless bring a cause of

action under Title VII.” Tademy v. Union Pac. Corp., 614 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th

Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). The elements of a hostile work environment claim

are: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2) the plaintiff was subjected

to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on race; and (4) the

harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive that it “‘“altered a term, condition,

or privilege of the plaintiff’s employment and created an abusive working

environment.”’” Lounds v. Lincare, Inc., 812 F.3d 1208, 1222 (10th Cir. 2015)

(quoting Harsco Corp. v. Renner, 475 F.3d 1179, 1186 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Dick

v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 2005)).

While plaintiff alleges that he is a member of a protected group – African-

American – and he was subjected to unwelcomed harassment from the Logistics

Workforce Manager Specialist who was white, he fails to allege facts sufficient to

support his contention that the unwelcome harassment was based on race. “Hostile

work environment ‘harassment must be racial or stem from racial animus.’”

Hernandez v. Valley View Hosp. Ass’n, 684 F.3d 950, 960 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting

Tademy, 614 F.3d at 1139). The complaint provides no facts supporting a

reasonable inference that the unwelcome harassment was based on race. Also,

Sherman fails to plead facts sufficient to support a reasonable inference that the work

environment was “‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult

that [was] sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s

employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Brown v. LaFerry’s LP

Gas Co., Inc., 708 Fed Appx. 518, 520 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Harris v. Forklift

Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). The court therefore concludes that Sherman fails

to allege a plausible hostile work environment claim based upon race. As it is not

clear an amendment would be futile, the court will dismiss the Title VII claim

without prejudice, with leave to amend.

Sherman also alleges a constructive discharge claim based on a race-based

hostile work environment. To state a constructive discharge claim on such basis,

Sherman “must allege facts sufficient to show both that a hostile work environment

existed and that this environment was ‘so intolerable that a reasonable person would

have felt compelled to resign.’” Brown, 708 Fed Appx. at 523 (quoting Penn. State

Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 146-47 (2004)). Because Sherman fails to allege

facts sufficient to establish a hostile work environment based upon race, the court

concludes that he necessarily fails to state a plausible constructive discharge claim.

Id. As it is not clear an amendment would be futile, the court will dismiss the Title

VII claim without prejudice, with leave to amend.

IV.

As to the Rehabilitation Act hostile work environment claim,4 the court

concludes that Sherman fails to allege a plausible claim. A hostile work environment

claim under the Rehabilitation Act requires a plaintiff to show that he is a “‘qualified

4 It appears the Tenth Circuit recognizes such a claim. See, Clancy v. Miller, 837 Fed. Appx. 630

(10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished case cited as persuasive pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A)).

individual with a disability.’” Clancy v. Miller, 837 Fed Appx. 630, 635 (10th Cir.

2020) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). “‘When the claim for discrimination is based

on actual disability, the plaintiff must show a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities.’” Id. “Major life activities

include, for example, brain function, sleeping, reading, concentrating, thinking,

communicating, and working.” Id. (quotation omitted). In the complaint, Sherman

fails to allege any facts to reasonably support an inference that he has a physical or

mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.

Further, Sherman fails to plead facts sufficient to reasonably support an

inference that the workplace was “permeated with discriminatory intimidation,

ridicule, and insult that [was] sufficiently sever or pervasive to alter the conditions

of employment and create an abusive working environment.” Dye v. Moniz, 672

Fed. Appx. 836, 839 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted).5

Because Sherman fails to allege facts to establish a hostile work environment

based upon disability, the court likewise concludes he fails to allege a plausible

constructive discharge claim. As it is not clear an amendment would be futile, the

court will dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim without prejudice, with leave to

amend.

V.

Based upon the foregoing, Frank Kendall, Secretary of the United States

Department of Air Force, is substituted as defendant for Honorable Barbara Barrett,

former Secretary of the United States Department of Air Force, pursuant to Rule

25(d), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Secretary Kendall’s Motion to Dismiss (doc. no. 9) is GRANTED and the

alternative Motion for Summary Judgment (doc. no. 9) is DENIED as MOOT.

5 Unpublished case cited as persuasive pursuant to 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).

The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim is DISMISSED

WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Any claim alleged under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.

The Title VII claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.

The Rehabilitation Act claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.

Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint within 14 days

from the date of this order to cure the deficiencies of his Title VII and Rehabilitation

Act claims. Failure to comply will result in a judgment dismissing plaintiff's claims

in accordance with this order.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 24" day of November, 2021.

AL put

STEPHEN P. FRIOT —

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

21-0484p006.docx

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