The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
PRIMERICA LIFE INSURANCE )
COMPANY, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-20-366-G
)
SAFIYATOU BADOLO ISAMOTU )
BULLOCK, individually, as the )
Personal Representative of the Estate )
of Troy D. Bullock, and as the mother )
and next friend of CHILD A and )
CHILD B, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court are the Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendant
Safiyatou Bullock, individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Troy D.
Bullock and as the mother and next friend of Child A and Child B (“S.B. Mot.”), and of
Defendants Cynthia Bullock, Caleb Bullock, Levi Bullock, and Samuel Bullock (“C.B.
Mot.”). The Motions are fully briefed and at issue. See Doc. Nos. 18, 25, 33.
I. MATERIAL FACTS
On May 26, 1999, Troy Bullock submitted an Application for Life Insurance (the
“Application”) with Primerica Life Insurance Company (“Primerica”).1 See S.B. Mot. Ex.
2 (Doc. No. 18-2) at 1-3. At the time, Troy Bullock was married to Cynthia Bullock, with
1 Primerica initiated this interpleader action on April 21, 2020, pursuant to Rule 22 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Primerica subsequently interpled the life insurance
benefits due under the Policy upon the death of Troy Bullock and has been dismissed from
whom he had three children, Defendants Caleb Bullock, Levi Bullock, and Samuel
Bullock. Troy Bullock requested benefits in the amount of $200,000 and a spousal rider
in the amount of $240,000. See id. at 1. Both Troy Bullock and Cynthia Bullock signed
the Application. See id. at 3.
With respect to the designation of beneficiaries, the Application reflects the
following:
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Id. at 2. That is, for the primary beneficiary the Application names “Cynthia Bullock, if
living” and identifies the relationship to the insured as “wife.” For the contingent
beneficiaries the Application states, “otherwise any children born to marriage of the insured
and said wife, or surviving equally,” identifies the relationship to the insured as “children,”
and does not provide any social security number.
Primerica issued the requested life insurance policy on June 25, 1999. Troy Bullock
and Cynthia Bullock divorced in August 2011. See S.B. Mot. Ex. 3 (Doc. No. 18-3) at 1.
Troy Bullock subsequently married Safiyatou (“Safi”) Bullock in September 2012. See
S.B. Mot. Ex. 4 (Doc. No. 18-4) at 1. Troy and Safi Bullock had two children, identified
> The Court uses the words “or surviving equally” because the parties agree that is what is
stated. The writing is not clear, though, and it is possible that what is actually written is
“or survivors, equally.”
in this action as Child A and Child B.
On March 13, 2017, Troy Bullock requested through a signed, handwritten
document that Cynthia Bullock be removed from his policy after a spousal conversion (i.e.,
conversion of the spousal rider for the policy to a separate policy on the life of Cynthia
Bullock) was effected. See S.B. Mot. Ex. 12 (Doc. No. 18-12) at 1 (stating “Please remove
Cynthia Bullock from my policy once her spousal conversion has been processed.”).
Primerica reissued Troy Bullock’s policy on March 22, 2017. See S.B. Mot. Ex. 1 (Doc.
No. 18-1) at 3.
The policy defines “Beneficiary” as: “The person(s) to whom the Policy proceeds
are payable at the death of the Insured. This is the person(s) named in the application as
the Beneficiary, unless later changed (see Part 3).” Id. at 7. The policy further provides,
at Part 3, as follows:
BENEFICIARY - The Beneficiary’s interest will end if the Beneficiary dies
before the Insured. If no primary Beneficiary is living at the Insured’s death,
the death proceeds will be paid to any contingent Beneficiary. The proceeds
will be paid to the Owner if the Insured dies and there is no primary or
contingent Beneficiary. Proceeds will be paid to the Insured’s estate if there
is no living Beneficiary or Owner.
We may rely on a sworn statement by any responsible person to discover the
identity or nonexistence of any Beneficiary not identified by name. . . . .
CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY – You can change a Beneficiary by Notice to
Us. You can only change a Beneficiary while the Insured is alive. . . . . A
Beneficiary change will take effect on the date You signed the Notice to Us.
If the Insured died before We receive this Notice, the change is effective,
subject to any prior payment of proceeds.
S.B. Mot. Ex. 1, at 8.3
Troy Bullock died on July 11, 2019. S.B. Mot. Ex. 5 (Doc. No. 18-5) at 1.
II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is a means of testing in advance of trial whether the available
evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of the party asserting a claim. The
Court must grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A party that moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that the
undisputed material facts require judgment as a matter of law in its favor. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant need
not convince the Court that it will prevail at trial, but it must cite sufficient evidence
admissible at trial to allow a reasonable jury to find in the nonmovant’s favor—i.e., to show
that there is a question of material fact that must be resolved by the jury. See Garrison v.
Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005). The Court must then determine
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
3 As evidence of the policy, both sides present the policy agreement as it existed when
reissued in 2017. See Exhibit 1 to Safi Bullock’s Motion (Doc. No. 18-1) and Exhibit 1 to
Cynthia Bullock’s Response and Cross-Motion (Doc. No. 25-1). The parties have not
presented the Court with a separate document showing the policy agreement as it existed
when issued in 1999. To the extent there is any difference between the terms of the original
1999 agreement and the terms in the reissued 2017 agreement, no party contends that any
Parties may establish the existence or nonexistence of a material disputed fact by:
• citing to “depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits
or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials” in the record; or
• demonstrating “that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence
of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible
evidence to support the fact.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). While the Court views the evidence and the inferences
drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005), “[t]he
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
[nonmovant].” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
With respect to the determination of cross-motions for summary judgment, the
Tenth Circuit has summarized that:
“The filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not necessarily
concede the absence of a material issue of fact. This must be so because by
the filing of a motion a party concedes that no issue of fact exists under the
theory he is advancing, but he does not thereby so concede that no issues
remain in the event his adversary’s theory is adopted.” Nafco Oil & Gas,
Inc. v. Appleman, 380 F.2d 323, 324-25 (10th Cir. 1967). Accordingly,
“cross motions for summary judgment are to be treated separately; the denial
of one does not require the grant of another.” Christian Heritage Acad. v.
Okla. Secondary Sch. Activities Ass’n, 483 F.3d 1025, 1030 (10th Cir. 2007).
“Even where the parties file cross motions pursuant to Rule 56, summary
judgment is inappropriate if disputes remain as to material facts.’” Id.
Brown v. Perez, 835 F.3d 1223, 1230 n.3 (10th Cir. 2016) (alteration and citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Safi Bullock argues that undisputed facts impel the following legal conclusions: (1)
title 15, section 178 of the Oklahoma Statutes precludes Cynthia, Caleb, Levi, and Samuel
Bullock from taking under the policy; (2) Caleb, Levi, and Samuel Bullock were not
properly designated as contingent beneficiaries because they were not identified in the
Application by name and social security number; and (3) Troy Bullock submitted a new
application at the time the Policy was reissued and, though the application was not
discovered, the Court should give effect to Troy Bullock’s intent to name new beneficiaries
under the policy. Cynthia, Caleb, Levi, and Samuel Bullock argue that they are entitled to
summary judgment, and that Caleb, Levi, and Samuel should receive the Policy proceeds,
because the undisputed facts reflect that Troy Bullock never changed, or attempted to
change, the contingent beneficiaries designated on his original Application. See C.B. Mot.
at 13.
Effect of Title 15, Section 178 of the Oklahoma Statutes
Safi Bullock contends that title 15, section 178 of the Oklahoma Statutes precludes
Cynthia, Caleb, Levi, and Samuel Bullock from taking under the policy.4 This section
governs the effect of a divorce on contracts designating the former spouse as the beneficiary
of death benefits. Section 178 provides, in pertinent part, “In the event of either divorce or
annulment, the decedent’s former spouse shall be treated for all purposes under the contract
as having predeceased the decedent.” Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 178(A).
1. Cynthia Bullock as Beneficiary
The parties agree that—whether as a result of Troy Bullock’s direction in 2017 that
Primerica “remove Cynthia Bullock from my policy” or, failing that, by application of
section 178—Cynthia Bullock was not a beneficiary under the policy at the time of Troy
Bullock’s death. See S.B. Mot. (Doc. No. 18) at 7-9; C.B. Mot. (Doc. No. 25) at 12.
2. Effect of Section 178 on Caleb, Levi, and Samuel
Safi Bullock contends that there can be no “children born to [the] marriage” of Troy
Bullock and Cynthia Bullock if—by application of section 178—Cynthia Bullock is treated
as having predeceased Troy Bullock. This is incorrect for several obvious reasons. First,
the statute’s mandated finding that Cynthia Bullock predeceased Troy Bullock—that is,
the legal fiction that Cynthia Bullock died prior to Troy Bullock’s death on July 11, 2019—
would not equate to a finding that there was no marriage between Troy Bullock and Cynthia
Bullock or that there could be no children born of the marriage. Second, the statute
addresses “provisions in the contract in favor of the decedent’s former spouse,” not
provisions to the benefit of children born of the marriage ending in divorce. Okla. Stat. tit.
15, § 178. Section 178 has no effect on Caleb, Levi, and Samuel’s status as contingent
beneficiaries.
Validity of the Original Designation of Contingent Beneficiaries
Safi Bullock next argues that the designation of contingent beneficiaries in the 1999
Application is a nullity because, in stating that the contingent beneficiaries were “otherwise
any children born to marriage of the insured and said wife, or surviving equally,” the
Application fails to provide contractually required information. Specifically, Safi Bullock
points to the fact that none of Caleb, Levi, or Samuel was identified by name in the “List
Contingent Beneficiaries” section of the Application and no social security number for any
of them was provided in the “Social Security No.” section. According to Safi Bullock,
these omissions rendered the Application “insufficient as a matter of law” as to the
identification of contingent beneficiaries because there was “nothing ambiguous” about the
Application’s request for this information and parties “‘are bound by [the] terms of the
contract.’” S.B. Mot. at 11-12 (quoting Porter v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 330
P.3d 511, 515 (Okla. 2014)).
The authorities Safi Bullock relies upon do not support the premise of her
argument—that the omission of information from form fields seeking identifying details
can invalidate a beneficiary designation even when the beneficiary’s identity is nonetheless
ascertainable from the information provided. To the contrary, “[i]n Oklahoma, the cardinal
rule in contract interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the parties.”
Porter, 330 P.3d at 515 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Okla. Stat. tit. 15, §§ 152,
155. “A contract must receive such an interpretation as will make it lawful, operative,
definite, reasonable and capable of being carried into effect, if it can be done without
violating the intention of the parties.” Okla. Stat. tit. 15, § 159. In this case, the identity
of the contingent beneficiaries was clearly articulated in the Application despite the
omission of names and social security numbers, and there is no question that Troy Bullock
intended to designate his children with Cynthia Bullock—that is, Caleb, Levi, and
Samuel—as contingent beneficiaries. The Application’s identification of persons by
category rather than name was not contrary to the terms of the policy, but expressly
contemplated by it. See S.B. Mot. Ex. 1, at 8 (“We may rely on a sworn statement by any
responsible person to discover the identity or nonexistence of any Beneficiary not
identified by name.”). The Court rejects Safi Bullock’s contention that, under the
undisputed material facts, the information provided in the 1999 Application was
insufficient to effectively designate Caleb, Levi, and Samuel as contingent beneficiaries.
Effect of 2017 Request to Separate Policy and Remove Cynthia Bullock as
Primary Beneficiary
The policy provides that “[i]f no primary Beneficiary is living at the Insured’s death,
the death proceeds will be paid to any contingent Beneficiary.” Id. Because the original
designation of Cynthia Bullock as the policy’s primary beneficiary was inoperative at the
time of Troy Bullock’s death, the terms of the policy dictate that—absent proof that a
subsequent change in designation of beneficiaries was received (or at least submitted)—
the policy proceeds are to be paid to Caleb, Levi, and Samuel as contingent beneficiaries.
Presenting documents that were produced by Primerica, as well as some that were
found in Troy Bullock’s files after his death, Safi Bullock argues that the Court should
conclude from these documents that Troy Bullock attempted to change the beneficiaries on
the policy and give effect to his intent to name new beneficiaries. See S.B. Mot. at 4-5, 14-
15. Cynthia, Caleb, Levi, and Samuel Bullock argue that because the evidence
demonstrates that Troy Bullock removed Cynthia Bullock as the primary beneficiary but
did not change or attempt to change the designation of Caleb, Levi, and Samuel as the sole
contingent beneficiaries, the Court should conclude as a matter of law that Caleb, Levi, and
Samuel are entitled to the policy proceeds. See C.B. Mot. at 13.
Safi Bullock’s cited documents include: (1) a page dated March 13, 2017, and
signed by Troy Bullock, which states, “Please remove Cynthia Bullock from my policy
once her spousal conversion has been processed”; (2) a page in a Primerica “Policy Owner
Services” document containing a policy number and the statement, “A NEW
APPLICATION WAS SUBMITTED WITH THIS POLICY CHANGE FORM ON
3/17/17”; and (3) the notes of a Primerica agent, stating that “Troy recently got divorced
from Cynthia Bullock and he wants to do a spouse conversion to split their policies” and
that Troy Bullock has “3 boys” and “2 new steps.” S.B. Mot. Ex. 12 (Doc. No. 18-12) at
1-3; S.B. Mot. Ex. 11 (Doc. No. 18-11) at 1.5 Safi Bullock acknowledges that no new
application form, relevant to the 2017 reissuance of the policy, has been found by Primerica
or the parties. She also acknowledges that Primerica denies that any new application form
was submitted to it.
Safi Bullock argues that, although a new application form was never found, the
existence of the page stating “A NEW APPLICATION WAS SUBMITTED WITH THIS
POLICY CHANGE FORM ON 3/17/17” reflects that Troy Bullock submitted a new
application to Primerica in March 2017 just prior to the reissuance of his policy. Safi
Bullock cites Shaw v. Loeffler, 796 P.2d 633 (Okla. 1990), for the proposition that if “the
insured has done all in his power to comply with the policy’s requirements, but has failed
to finalize the change due to the non-occurrence of some ministerial act,” “the courts may
regard that as done which ought to be done, i.e. recognize the change in beneficiary.”
Shaw, 796 P.2d at 635. Citing the notes of the Primerica agent that Troy Bullock has “3
boys” and “2 new steps,”6 Safi Bullock argues that “[t]he instructions to the agent show
that the Insured listed who the Insured wanted as his new beneficiaries” and that “the
5 The Court assumes without deciding that these documents are admissible. See C.B. Mot.
at 8-9 (broadly arguing that the documents lack foundation and constitute hearsay).
6 The parties do not dispute that this note is inaccurate in its description of Child A and
Insured did . . . all within his power to complete a change of beneficiary form and under
the law, that is sufficient.” S.B. Mot. at 14, 15.
The Court agrees with Cynthia Bullock that these documents are insufficient to
create a genuine question of fact as to whether Troy Bullock changed, attempted to change,
or intended to change the beneficiaries listed on his original Application beyond his
removal of Cynthia Bullock as the primary beneficiary. As noted, the original Application
designated Cynthia Bullock as the primary beneficiary of the policy and the children of the
marriage of Troy and Cynthia Bullock—that is, Caleb, Levi, and Samuel—as the
contingent beneficiaries. On March 13, 2017, Troy Bullock sent Primerica a signed
document directing that Cynthia Bullock be removed as a beneficiary of the policy but
saying nothing about adding a new primary beneficiary or changing the contingent
beneficiaries. The agent’s notes likewise reference a spousal conversion, and the existence
of Child A and Child B, but do not record any suggestion of an intent to add a new primary
beneficiary or change the contingent beneficiaries. And even if the documents cited by
Safi Bullock were sufficient to allow a reasonable inference that a new application form
was completed and/or submitted, there is no evidentiary material in the summary judgment
record that would support a finding that this undiscovered document listed new
beneficiaries—much less, that it designated any of Safi Bullock, Child A, or Child B as
beneficiaries. Accordingly, summary judgment must be entered in favor of Cynthia, Caleb,
Levi, and Samuel Bullock, directing that Caleb, Levi, and Samuel are entitled to the
proceeds of the policy.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS that:
1) The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Safiyatou Bullock,
individually and as the personal representative of the estate of Troy D. Bullock
and as the mother and next friend of Child A and Child B (Doc. No. 18), is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is granted as to the
request for summary judgment against Cynthia Bullock and denied in all other
respects.
2) The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendants Cynthia Bullock,
Caleb Bullock, Levi Bullock, and Samuel Bullock (Doc. No. 25) is GRANTED.
3) A separate judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendants Caleb Bullock, Levi
Bullock, and Samuel Bullock. The interpled funds deposited by Plaintiff
Primerica Life Insurance Company into the registry of this Court, plus all
accrued interest, shall be paid to Defendants Caleb Bullock, Levi Bullock, and
Samuel Bullock in accordance with Local Civil Rule 67.2 (W.D. Okla.).
IT IS SO ORDERED this 30th day of September, 2021.
(Barba B. Kadota
United States District Judge
12