The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JAMES J. WOODFORK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. ) Case No. CIV-20-942-HE
)
RICK WHITTEN, et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Plaintiff Woodfork, a state prisoner appearing pro se and in forma pauperis, filed
this case alleging that defendants violated his constitutional rights by terminating his ability
to correspond with his brother, an inmate at another state prison facility. Defendant
Whitten is the warden of the James Crabtree Correctional Center where plaintiff is
incarcerated. Defendant Adams is apparently a mail room official at the facility. Both are
sued in their official and individual capacities.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), the matter was referred to Magistrate
Judge Shon T. Erwin for initial proceedings. In the course of those proceedings, plaintiff
moved for summary judgment and the defendants moved to dismiss the claims against
them. Judge Erwin has issued a Report and Recommendation (the “Report”)
recommending that both motions be denied.
Plaintiff has not objected to the report, thereby waiving his right to appellate review
of the factual and legal issues it addressed. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123
(10th Cir. 2010). As a result, the Report will be adopted as to his summary judgment
motion. Defendants have objected to the Report, which triggers de novo review of the
matters to which objection has been made.
According to the parties’ submissions, plaintiff sought and was granted permission
to correspond with his brother, who is an inmate at another Oklahoma correctional facility.1
After his brother sent him a letter saying “I really need a Dott” and referring to a “G.D.”,
plaintiff was informed that his correspondence privileges with his brother were being
terminated and would not be reinstated. Defendants apparently interpreted the references
to “Dott” and “G.D.” as being to a “green dot” card, a form of debit card that is viewed as
contraband by DOC officials.
Plaintiff contends the termination violated his First Amendment right to free speech
and that his due process rights were violated because he did not receive a disciplinary
hearing before the termination. Further, he challenges the “permanent” termination of his
correspondence privileges on the basis that the applicable rule provides only for a 90-day
suspension for infractions of the rule.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss contends the complaint failed to state a claim against
them. They suggest the Report, in rejecting their motion, failed to acknowledge the
deference owed to prison officials in maintaining security. It is, of course, true that
substantial deference is owed to prison officials, but that does not mean that all actions by
prison officials are shielded from judicial review. When a prison regulation or practice is
1 Applicable DOC policy states: “There will be no correspondence between inmates except as
approved in writing by the appropriate facility heads. Such correspondence will be limited to
immediate family members.”
challenged, a federal court must discharge its duty to determine whether constitutional
rights have been violated. Jacklovich v. Simmons, 392 F.3d 420, 426 (10th Cir. 2004). In
making that determination, a court must determine whether the challenged rule or practice
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, applying the factors discussed in
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). Here, defendants would have the court weigh those
factors and reach a conclusion in the context of a motion to dismiss. Like the Magistrate
Judge, the court concludes it is premature to determine now whether plaintiff can make out
a constitutional violation by reason of the “permanent” revocation of his correspondence
privileges with his brother. The rule and practice apparently involved here is more
restrictive of plaintiff’s rights than the correspondence limitations upheld in Turner, and
plaintiff’s allegations are at least sufficient to create a plausible claim.
Defendants also object that the Report failed to address their assertion of the
qualified immunity defense. That is true, but it is not altogether clear that plaintiff is even
asserting a claim to which the defense would apply. His complaint appears to seek only
injunctive relief — reinstatement of correspondence privileges with his brother — and if
relief of that sort is ultimately warranted, it would presumably result in an order directed
to the defendants in their official capacities. Qualified immunity is not a defense against
claims for injunctive relief against officials in their official capacities. Meiners v. Univ. of
Kansas, 359 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2004).
Qualified immunity is, however, a potential defense against claims for monetary
damages against officials in their individual capacities. Here, plaintiff purports to sue
defendants in their individual, as well as official, capacities. If his request for copying
costs is viewed as a request for monetary damages, or if plaintiff’s position somehow
morphs into a request for monetary damages as defendants appear to assume, the qualified
immunity defense would be applicable. Further, the court concludes defendants have
established the defense here as to any claim for monetary relief against them.
When qualified immunity is raised in a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
motion, the plaintiff must carry the burden of establishing that
the defendant violated clearly established law. Thus, the
plaintiff must identify a clearly established statutory or
constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have
known, and then allege facts to show that the defendant’s
conduct violated that right.
Lybrook v. Members of Farmington Mun. Schs. Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d 1334, 1337 (10th
Cir. 2000) (quotations and citation omitted).
Here, plaintiff has not identified a clearly established constitutional right of which
defendants would have known. As noted above, regulations limiting the rights of prisoners
to send and receive mail are permissible if they are “reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). Further, the court must
afford “considerable deference to the determinations of prison administrators who, in the
interest of security, regulate the relations between prisoners and the outside world.”
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 408 (1989). Even if, as against these deferential
standards, plaintiff can ultimately establish that permanent deprivation of correspondence
privileges with his brother violated his rights, that does not translate into meeting the
“clearly established” element. Plaintiff has not cited any case which suggests that
terminating privileges in these circumstances — where correspondence arguably relates to
matters viewed by the prison as contraband — is plainly illegal. As a result, the qualified
immunity defense applies and precludes any claim against the defendants in their
individual capacities.
Accordingly, the Report is ADOPTED as modified here. Plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment [Doc. #21] is DENIED. Defendant’s motion to dismiss [Doc. #20] is
GRANTED insofar as plaintiff seeks money damages or other relief against defendants in
their individual capacities but is otherwise DENIED. Left for resolution is plaintiffs
request for injunctive relief reinstating his right to communicate with his brother. This
matter is re-referred to Judge Erwin for further proceedings consistent with this order.
IT ISSO ORDERED.
Dated this 8" day of June, 2021.
Olle
□ STATES DISTRICT JUDGE