Stone v. Midwest City-Del City School District, The

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

KAREN AND SHELDON STONE, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-20-908-D

)

MIDWEST CITY-DEL CITY PUBLIC )

SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Independent School District No.

52 of Oklahoma County (“District”) [Doc. No. 10] and a Motion to Dismiss filed by Cindy

Anderson and Rodney Ray Strong [Doc. No. 11]. Both motions seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s

claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff has filed a Combined Response in

Opposition [Doc. No. 12] and Defendants have filed a combined Reply [Doc. No. 13]. The

matter is now at issue.

BACKGROUND

On May 3, 2018, Plaintiffs’ son, I.S., was operating a high-powered table saw in his

industrial arts class at Carl Albert Middle School when the spinning saw made contact with

his left hand. See First Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 10-13. The saw mutilated I.S.’s fingers, resulting

in amputation and a lifelong impairment. Id. at ¶ 13.

Mr. Strong was the industrial arts teacher at the school when I.S.’s injury occurred.

Plaintiffs allege that just prior to I.S.’s injury, Mr. Strong removed a blade guard from the

table saw in violation of the manufacturer’s safety rules. Id. at ¶ 12. They further allege

that after showing I.S. how to perform one cut, Mr. Strong walked away and failed to

properly supervise the use of the table saw. Id. According to Plaintiffs, this was not the first

time one of Mr. Strong’s students suffered an injury in class. They cite to six prior incidents

over the course of a five year period in which a student was injured by a saw, albeit not as

severely as I.S. Id. at ¶ 14.

Plaintiffs further allege that the Ms. Anderson, the school principal, and the District

received notice of these prior injuries, but failed to take remedial action or provide proper

training or supervision to Mr. Strong. Id. at ¶¶ 14-16, 22-23. This, Plaintiffs contend,

amounts to an official policy or custom of the District of inadequate training and

supervision. Id. at ¶¶ 16, 23.

Relying on these factual allegations, Plaintiffs bring a claim, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

for violations of their and their son's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process

rights, against Mr. Strong, Ms. Anderson, and the District. Plaintiffs assert that Mr.

Strong’s removal of the blade guard and Ms. Anderson’s and the District’s deliberate

indifference to the need for further supervision or training shocks the conscience. Id. at ¶¶

20, 25.

Defendants move for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending that

Plaintiffs have failed to sufficiently plead a substantive due process claim against either the

District or the individual defendants.

STANDARD OF DECISION

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain

enough facts that, when accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when

the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although a

pleading “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it does require “more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The burden is on the plaintiff to

plead factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

DISCUSSION

To plead a cognizable claim under § 1983, Plaintiffs must first plausibly allege the

deprivation of a constitutional right. Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991,

993 (10th Cir. 1994). Here, Plaintiffs invoke the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due

process protections and contend that the defendants deprived I.S. of his liberty interest in

being free from damage to his bodily integrity.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall

“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.

amend. XIV § 1. The clause “was intended to prevent government ‘from abusing [its]

power, or employing it as an instrument of oppression.’” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty.

Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Notably, it is

“phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act, not as a guarantee of certain minimal

levels of safety and security.” Id. at 195. The Supreme Court has “always been reluctant to

expand the concept of substantive due process” and has “rejected claims that the Due

Process Clause should be interpreted to impose federal duties that are analogous to those

traditionally imposed by state tort law.” Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S.

115, 125-128 (1992).

To prevail on a substantive due process claim, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the

state acted in a manner that ‘shock[s] the conscience.’” Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 571

(10th Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). To satisfy this standard, “a plaintiff must do

more than show that the government actor intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the

plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power.” Id. at 574. Instead, “the plaintiff must

demonstrate a degree of outrageousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is

truly conscience shocking.” Id. at 574. “[O]nly the most egregious official conduct” meets

this standard. Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). Further, the guarantee

of due process applies to “deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person

of life, liberty, or property.” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986). This guarantee

is “not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to

life, liberty, or property.” Id. at 328 (emphasis in original).

Here, taking Plaintiffs’ allegations as true, the Court is not persuaded that

Defendants’ conduct “can properly be characterized as arbitrary, or conscience shocking,

in a constitutional sense.” Collins, 503 U.S. at 128. Plaintiffs do not allege facts showing

that Mr. Strong deliberately deprived I.S. of a liberty interest or that he intended to cause

him harm. Instead, they present what appears to be a garden-variety negligence claim: Mr.

Strong failed to act with due care in removing the blade guard and permitting unsupervised

use of the saw. See id. These actions “simply do[] not approach the sort of abusive

government conduct that the Due Process Clause was designed to prevent.” Davidson v.

Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347–48 (1986). Mr. Strong’s conduct may have been risky or ill-

considered, and it may have led to a serious injury, but it cannot fairly be described as

conscience shocking.1 See Muskrat v. Deer Creek Pub. Sch., 715 F.3d 775, 787 (10th Cir.

2013) (finding that teacher’s unprovoked slap on disabled child’s cheek is not conscience

shocking); DeAnzona v. City & Cty. of Denver, 222 F.3d 1229, 1236 (10th Cir. 2000)

(finding that camp counselor’s failure to supervise child who wandered away and drowned

is not conscience shocking); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 733 (10th Cir. 1992)

(finding teacher’s failure to supervise child who choked to death in cloakroom did not

amount to a constitutional violation).

As for the District and Ms. Anderson, Plaintiffs claim they maintained a practice of

inadequate supervision and failed to implement remedial measures after receiving notice

of six prior injuries in Mr. Strong’s industrial arts class. However, even assuming such a

practice existed and was the cause of I.S.’s injury, “knowingly permitting unreasonable

1 In arguing otherwise, Plaintiffs cite to several cases that are entirely unpersuasive and

unhelpful. For example, Plaintiffs cite to Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), but fail

to note that Parrat was overruled “to the extent that it states that mere lack of due care by

a state official may ‘deprive’ an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth

Amendment.” Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330-31. Plaintiffs also relys on Flores v. Edinburg

Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 741 F.2d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 1984), a pre-Daniels case that,

although factually similar, does not address whether the conduct was sufficient to state a

due process claim under current law. The problems don’t stop there: the relevance of

Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1981) is questionable at best given that it

concerns an excessive force claim and was later abrogated by Valencia v. Wiggins, 981

F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993); Hovater v. Robinson, 1 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 1993) is factually

distinct and adds nothing to whether Plaintiffs have properly pled a substantive due process

claim; and, contrary to the parenthetical explanation Plaintiffs include in their brief,

Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir. 1992), actually held that the accidental

strangulation of an elementary student failed to establish a constitutional deprivation.

risks to continue does not necessarily rise to the level of conscience shocking.” DeAnzona

v. City & Cty. of Denver, 222 F.3d 1229, 1235 (10th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the failure

to sufficiently state a substantive due process claim as to Mr. Strong is dispositive of the

claims against the District and Ms. Anderson.2 Muskrat, 715 F.3d at 788 (holding that

school distrct could not be liable where the plaintiffs failed to show any school district

employee committed a constitutional violation); Gray v. Univ. of Colorado Hosp. Auth.,

672 F.3d 909, 930 n. 18 (10th Cir. 2012) (explaining that “[s]upervisory liability…simply

will not lie absent an underlying constitutional deprivation.”).

Finally, defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiffs intended to raise their due

process claim under the “danger creation theory,” it should be dismissed. The danger

creation theory is an exception to the general rule that “state actors may only be held liable

under § 1983 for their own acts, and not for the violent acts of third parties.” Ruiz v.

McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1182 (10th Cir. 2002). Under this theory, “a state actor may be

held liable for the violent acts of a third party if the state actor ‘created the danger’ that

caused the harm.” Id. (citation omitted). Plaintiffs failed to contest Defendants’ arguments

for dismissal of a claim brought under the danger creation theory, and Defendants’ Motion

in this regard has therefore been confessed. See LCvR7.1(g) (motion not opposed within

21 days may be deemed confessed). In any event, Plaintiffs’ failure to allege conscience

shocking conduct on the part of a state actor would be fatal to such a claim. See Ruiz, 299

2 Because Plaintiffs have failed to plead facts showing a constitutional violation, the

individual defendants would also be entitled to qualified immunity. Maldonado, 975 F.2d

at 733.

F.3d at 1182-83 (explaining that a prima facia case under the danger creation theory

requires conduct that shocks the conscience).

CONCLUSION

It is well established that “ta substantive due process violation must be more than an

ordinary tort to be actionable under § 1983.” Uhirig, 64 F.3d at 573. Although I.S. appears

to have suffered a serious, permanent injury, that is not enough to transform Plaintiffs’

apparent tort claim into a constitutional violation. Because they have not alleged facts

showing that a state actor engaged in conduct that shocks the conscience, Plaintiffs have

failed to state a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Independent

School District No. 52 of Oklahoma County [Doc. No. 10] and the Motion to Dismiss filed

by Ms. Anderson and Mr. Strong [Doc. No. 11] are GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ claim is

dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25" day of February, 2021.

\"

Q.Oyht

TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI

Chief United States District Judge