Yoakum v. Yukon Public Works

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

KURTIS YOAKUM, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-19-585-R

)

CITY OF YUKON, ARNOLD ADAMS )

individually and in his official capacity, and )

JAY DOE individually and in his official )

capacity, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 7) filed by Defendants City of

Yukon and Arnold Adams pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff

Mr. Yoakum responded in opposition to the motion (Doc. No. 11) and Defendants replied

(Doc. No. 12). Upon review, the Court finds as follows.

I. Background

On July 28, 2017, Plaintiff was assigned to a prisoner public work’s crew

responsible for the City of Yukon’s roadside vegetation management. On that date,

Plaintiff was without safety equipment and operating a weed-eater in the median of a

divided highway when a vehicle driven by a third party hit Plaintiff, causing significant

injury. In response, Plaintiff filed this action against the City of Yukon, the director of the

City’s prison work program, Arnold Adams, and supervisor Jay Doe. The Complaint

alleges seven claims arising from Plaintiff’s injuries. In his first two claims, Plaintiff

alleges that the City of Yukon was negligent in violation of state law pursuant to the

Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (OGTCA). His remaining claims are made

pursuant to federal law—28 U.S.C. § 1983. In his third claim, he alleges that Defendants

are liable for violating his Fourteenth Amendment rights. In his fourth and fifth claims, he

alleges that Defendants are liable for their failure to train and supervise. In his sixth claim,

he alleges that Defendant Jay Doe is liable for failure to protect. Finally, in his seventh

claim, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants are liable for a state-created danger.

Defendants City and Mr. Adams move for dismissal of all claims, except Plaintiff’s

sixth claim, which was pleaded only against Defendant Jay Doe.1 First, Defendants assert

that dismissal is warranted under Local Civil Rule 7.1(g) because Plaintiff’s response was

untimely. They also argue that all claims made against Defendant Adams in his official

capacity should be dismissed as duplicative of the claims against the City. As to Plaintiff’s

state law claims against the City of Yukon, Defendants argue that the City is entitled to

immunity under both 57 O.S. § 228 and 51 O.S. § 155(23). As to Plaintiff’s federal law

claims against both Defendant City and Mr. Adams, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has

failed to sufficiently plead his claims and that dismissal is warranted pursuant to Federal

1 To the extent Plaintiff wishes to proceed against Defendant Jay Doe, his claims against the unnamed defendant are

time barred. Under Federal Rule 15(c), a proposed amendment to substitute a named party for a John Doe defendant

does not relate back to the date of the original complaint. Garrett v. Fleming, 362 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir. 2004).

Thus, if a plaintiff fails to substitute a named party for a John Doe defendant within the relevant statute of limitations,

a plaintiff’s claims against that defendant will be time barred. See Farhat v. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs of Stephens Cty., No.

CIV-06-468-R, 2008 WL 441684, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 14, 2008). Here, Plaintiff was injured on July 28, 2017. The

applicable statute of limitations period in Oklahoma is two years for a § 1983 action. See 12 O.S. , § 95; see also Hunt

v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1265 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[Section] 1983 claims are best characterized as personal injury

actions and [thus courts are to] apply the relevant state statute of limitations applicable to such actions.” (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s time to substitute a named party for Jay Doe expired on

July 28, 2019. As of the date of this order, Plaintiff has not substituted a named party for Jay Doe; his claims against

Jay Doe are thus time barred.

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff objects to each of Defendants’ arguments.

Having considered the parties’ arguments, the Court grants Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.

II. Standard of Review

In considering Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must

determine whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. The

motion is properly granted when the Complaint provides no “more than labels and

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Plaintiff’s Complaint must contain enough “facts

to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and the factual allegations “must be

enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. (citations omitted). The

Court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the Complaint as true and must

construe the allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;

Alvarado v. KOB–TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). But the Court need

not accept as true those allegations that are conclusory in nature. Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty.

Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154–55 (10th Cir. 2001). “[C]onclusory allegations

without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can

be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109–10 (10th Cir. 1991).

The Court has original jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims, and supplemental

jurisdiction over his state claims. The Court thus reviews Plaintiff’s federal claims first,

and then proceeds to his state law claims. See Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228,

1248 (10th Cir. 2011) (suggesting that district courts ought to determine the validity of

federal claims before exercising supplemental jurisdiction over any state claims).

III. Procedural Issues

As a preliminary matter, the Court must address Defendants’ request for dismissal

pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7.1(g). In reply, Defendants assert that dismissal is warranted

pursuant to this rule because Plaintiff’s response was untimely. (Doc. No. 12, pp. 1–2).

Dismissal is not permitted under this rule. Though Plaintiff did not file his response within

21 days of Defendants’ motion, he was granted an extension (Doc. No. 9) and subsequently

filed his response on the date the Court ordered (Doc. No. 11).

IV. Federal Claims

Defendants initially argue that all federal claims asserted against Defendant Adams

in his official capacity should be dismissed as duplicative of the claims filed against the

City. (Doc. No. 7, p. 9 n. 2). Plaintiff does not respond. Official-capacity suits are treated

as suits against the entity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Cross

Continent Dev., LLC v. Town of Akron, Colo., 548 F. App'x 524, 531 (10th Cir. 2013).

Plaintiff’s claims against Mr. Adams in his official capacity are thus duplicative of his

claims against the City. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Mr. Adams in his official

capacity are dismissed. See, e.g., Dungee v. Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma

County, 2014 WL 1878762 (W.D. Okla. 2014) (dismissing official-capacity claims against

officer as duplicative and unnecessary where Plaintiff had also sued the county).

Defendants further argue that each of Plaintiff’s four federal claims—against the

City and Mr. Adams in his individual capacity—should be dismissed pursuant to Rule

12(b)(6). The Court addresses each of Defendants’ arguments in turn.

A. Conditions of Confinement

Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s first federal claim—his third cause of action—

alleging deliberate indifference to his conditions of confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1983, is properly reviewed under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. No. 7, pp. 10–11). They

then seek dismissal arguing that Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts to state a § 1983

claim for relief under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 11–12. In response, Plaintiff asserts

that his pleadings are sufficient. He argues that, at the very least, the Complaint pleads

sufficient facts to support the inference that Defendants acted recklessly, satisfying the

pleading requirements under the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. No. 11, pp. 13–14). The Court

finds dismissal appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiff has failed to allege

sufficient facts to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under the Eighth

Amendment.

To recover under 28 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must establish “the violation of a

right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . .” Dodds v. Richardson,

614 F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Though Plaintiff alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights, as a convicted

prisoner complaining of conditions related to prison work, his conditions-of-confinement

claim is properly brought under the Eighth Amendment. Franklin v. Kansas Dep’t of Corr.,

160 F. App’x 730, 736 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Prison workplaces, like other conditions of

confinement, are covered by the Eighth Amendment.”) cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1219 (2007).2

2 The Fourteenth Amendment would be the proper basis for such a claim if Plaintiff were a pretrial detainee. See

Berry v. City of Muskogee, 900 F.2d 1489, 1493 (10th Cir.1990). He is not.

Under the Eighth Amendment, “[t]o hold a jailer personally liable for violating an

inmate’s right to humane conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must satisfy two

requirements, consisting of an objective and subjective component.” Moore v. Little, No.

19-1041, 2019 WL 4803330, at *3 (10th Cir. Oct. 1, 2019) (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). “The objective component requires that the alleged deprivation be

sufficiently serious.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The subjective component

requires the jail official to have a sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Id. Assuming without

deciding that Plaintiff’s complaint is sufficiently serious to satisfy the objective

component, the Court focuses on the subjective component. See Franklin, 160 F. App'x at

736 (assuming the objective prong met and affirming dismissal after discussion of the

subjective prong).

The subjective component requires that officials have a “sufficiently culpable state

of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991). In the context of prison-condition

claims, the required state of mind is one of “ ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health and

safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302–

03). An official is liable only if he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to

inmate health and safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference

could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the

inference.” Id. at 837. “It is not enough to establish that the official should have known of

the risk of harm.” Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1310 (10th Cir.1998); see also Craig

v. Eberly, 164 F.3d 490, 495–96 (10th Cir. 1998) (describing further the requirements for

the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment claim). In the work assignment context,

prison officials are deliberately indifferent when they knowingly compel prisoners to

perform physical labor which is beyond their strength, or which constitutes a danger to

their health, or which is unduly painful. Franklin, 160 F. App’x at 736.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knew of the relevant safety regulations, and

appreciated the dangers associated with Plaintiff’s prison work, yet failed to provide him

with proper supervision or any safety equipment. But Plaintiff does not plead facts

implicating Defendants’ actual knowledge of the risk of harm. Rather, Plaintiff appears to

plead that Defendants should have known of the risk of harm because of the existence of

safety regulations and because of Mr. Adams’s position as the director of Yukon Public

Works. (Doc. No. 5, ¶¶ 3, 44, 48). Plaintiff does not even cite to his Complaint to support

his contention that his Complaint sufficiently alleges Defendants’ awareness of facts from

which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of harm existed and that the

Defendants did in fact draw that inference. Instead, Plaintiff cites to exhibits not referenced

in his Complaint. (Doc. No. 11, pp. 13–14). The Court cannot consider Plaintiff’s exhibits.

See Jackson v. Integra, Inc., 952 F.2d 1260, 1261 (10th Cir. 1991). Nor will the Court

credit Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations concerning Defendants’ actual knowledge, (Doc.

No. 5, ¶¶ 6, 45–47). See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1109–10.

Under Tenth Circuit law, Plaintiff’s allegation—that Defendants should have

known of the risk of harm—might state a claim for negligence, but it does not reach the

level of deliberate indifference required to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment. See

Franklin, 160 F. App’x at 736 (finding that defendant’s failure to provide any safety

training or safety measures in connection with plaintiff’s prison work might show

negligence but did not reach the level of deliberate indifference required to establish an

Eighth Amendment violation).

This conclusion also finds support in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Stephens v.

Johnson, 83 F.3d 198, 200-01 (8th Cir.1996) (holding that a lack of safety training and

equipment, including no steel-toed boots and no safety straps on moving dollies in a

warehouse, as well as allegations of a pattern of injuries, shows, at most, negligence for

not taking better safety precautions); Brown v. Richmond County Corr. Inst., No. CV 105-

118, 2006 WL 1431488, at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint alleging

failure to provide safety helmet on work detail involving cutting trees where tree branch

broke and struck inmate-plaintiff on the head); Sutton v. Kansas Dep’t of Corr., No. 12-

3238-SAC-DJW, 2015 WL 5692069, at *10 (D. Kan. Sept. 28, 2015) (collecting cases).

To be sure, in some cases, a risk’s obviousness can satisfy the actual knowledge

requirement under the subjective component. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. Even under this

lower standard, however, Plaintiff fails to state a claim. In alleging the risk’s obviousness,

Plaintiff could have provided facts supporting the allegation that a substantial risk of harm

was “longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or expressly noted by prison officials in

the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-official being sued had been

exposed to the relevant information concerning the risk and thus must have known about

[the risk].” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But Plaintiff has not

provided facts to support any of these potential allegations. Instead, Plaintiff lists safety

requirements relevant to public works projects (Doc. No. 5, ¶¶ 25–29), and then baldly

states the risk of harm was “so obvious and longstanding that no reasonable person could

deny it.” (Doc. No. 5, ¶ 46). This type of conclusory allegation is insufficient to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1109–10.

Additionally, Plaintiff’s claim is subject to dismissal to the extent it is based upon

Defendants’ mere violation of safety regulations. See Franklin, 160 F. App’x at 736 (“The

Eighth Amendment generally does not constitutionally embrace workplace safety

regulations.”); see also French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that

the “Eighth Amendment does not . . . require complete compliance with the numerous

OSHA regulations”); Brown, 2006 WL 1431488, at *2 (collecting cases).

At bottom, Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead the elements necessary to state a

claim under the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim pursuant to that amendment

is therefore subject to dismissal.

B. Failure to Train and Supervise

Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s fourth and fifth claims pursuant to § 1983

for failure to train and supervise must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because they too

are insufficiently pleaded. (Doc. No. 7, pp. 12–18). In response, Plaintiff argues that

enough facts are provided to allow his claims to proceed. (Doc. No. 11, pp. 14–16). The

Court finds dismissal appropriate. Due to Plaintiff’s failure to plead sufficient facts to state

a violation of the Eighth Amendment, his claims for failure to train and supervise cannot

stand. See Dopp v. Honaker, No. CIV-16-1164-D, 2018 WL 3301526, at *13 (W.D. Okla.

Jan. 24, 2018) (holding that Plaintiff did not plausibly allege a claim for failure to train or

supervise because the underlying Eighth Amendment violation was insufficiently pleaded);

Saenz v. Lovington Mun. Sch. Dist., 105 F. Supp. 3d 1271, 1314–15 (D.N.M. 2015) (citing

City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989) and Rivera v. Rhode Island, 402 F.3d

27, 38–39 (1st Cir.2005) in asserting that “a failure-to-train or failure-to-supervise claim

cannot stand without an underlying constitutional violation.”).3

C. State Created Danger

As to Plaintiff’s seventh claim for state-created danger, Defendants seek dismissal

arguing that the six elements necessary to establish liability have not been sufficiently

pleaded. (Doc. No. 7, pp. 19–20). Plaintiff responds arguing that Defendants’ contention

is vague and conclusory. (Doc. No. 11, pp. 16–17). The Court need not address either

argument. Plaintiff’s state-created danger claim is properly dismissed for failure to plead

an underlying constitutional violation.

“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as

the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard

appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”

United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997).4 An analysis of the six elements

needed to establish liability under a state-created danger theory pursuant to the Fourteenth

Amendment is therefore unnecessary if Plaintiff’s claim is covered by the Eighth

3 In addition to pleading facts sufficient to state a constitutional violation, a plaintiff asserting a claim for failure to

train and supervise against a municipality must plead facts concerning an official policy or custom, causation, and

state of mind. See Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769–71 (10th Cir. 2013). To state

a claim for failure to train and supervise against an official, a plaintiff must plead facts concerning the official’s

personal involvement, causation, and state of mind. Id. at 767–69. While the Court need not fully address the matter,

it appears that, in addition to failing to plead a constitutional violation, Plaintiff has also failed to plead sufficient facts

concerning any of these other elements necessary to state a claim against either Defendant.

4 Though Plaintiff does not identify it as such, the Court construes his state-created danger claim pursuant to the

Fourteenth Amendment as asserting a violation of Plaintiff’s substantive—not his procedural—due process rights. See

Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (affirming district court’s decision to construe Fourteenth Amendment

claim as asserting a violation of respondent’s substantive rather than procedural due process rights).

Amendment. See Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 843 (1998). Plaintiff’s claim

concerns the conditions of his prison workplace. The Tenth Circuit has deemed such claims

covered by the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Franklin, 160 F. App’x at 736. Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s § 1983 state-created danger claim is properly analyzed under the Eighth

Amendment. The claim is therefore subject to dismissal in accordance with the Court’s

Eighth Amendment analysis above.

V. State Claims

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over a claim” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” Moreover, according to the Tenth Circuit, “[w]hen all federal claims have

been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any

remaining state claims.” Koch v. Del City, 660 F.3d at 1248 (quoting Smith v. City of Enid

ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998)). The Court has dismissed

all of Plaintiff’s federal claims over which it has original jurisdiction; only Plaintiff’s state

law claims remain. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the Court declines to

exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s first and second causes of action under state law and

remands them to the District Court of Canadian County, Oklahoma.

VI. Qualified Immunity

At the close of their motion, Defendants argue that Mr. Adams is entitled to qualified

immunity on all claims asserted against him in his individual capacity. (Doc. No. 7, pp.

20–22). The Court determines that the issue need not be resolved at this time because

Plaintiff does not allege facts sufficient to establish an Eighth Amendment violation in the

first instance. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1217 n. 15 (10th Cir. 2003); Preece

v. Cooke, No. 13-CV-03265-REB-KLM, 2014 WL 6440406, at *11 (D. Colo. Nov. 17,

2014) (finding no need to reach the issue of qualified immunity because Plaintiff did not

allege sufficient facts to establish Eighth Amendment violation).

VII. Conclusion

For the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Court also remands Plaintiffs first and second causes of

action against the City of Yukon to the District Court of Canadian County, Oklahoma.

Finally, the Court dismisses as time barred Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Jay Doe.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 25" day of November 2019.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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