Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

TERRY WILSON, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-18-99-G

)

ANDREW SAUL, )

Commissioner of Social Security,1 )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Terry Wilson brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial

review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration

(“SSA”) denying Plaintiff’s application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) under

Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434, and supplemental security income

(“SSI”) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, id. §§ 1381-1383f. Upon review of the

administrative record (Doc. No. 10, hereinafter “R. _”),2 and the arguments and authorities

submitted by the parties, the Commissioner’s decision is affirmed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION

Plaintiff protectively filed her DIB and SSI applications on March 20, 2015, alleging

disability beginning February 18, 2015. R. 11, 174-90. The SSA denied Plaintiff’s

1 The current Commissioner is hereby substituted as Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 25(d).

2 With the exception of the administrative record, references to the parties’ filings use the

page numbers assigned by the Court’s electronic filing system.

application initially and on reconsideration. R. 56-97. At Plaintiff’s request, an

administrative law judge (“ALJ”) held a hearing on October 11, 2016. R. 33-55. The ALJ

issued an unfavorable decision on December 1, 2016. R. 8-20.

The ALJ followed the five-step sequential evaluation process in determining

Plaintiff was not entitled to disability benefits. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052

(10th Cir. 2009); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff

had worked since her disability-onset date, but her earnings had not constituted substantial

gainful activity for purposes of determining eligibility for DIB and SSI. R. 13. At step

two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has severe impairments consisting of obesity, spinal

stenosis, and dysfunction of major joints. R. 14.

At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination

of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any of the presumptively

disabling impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. R. 16-17.

The ALJ next assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) during the

relevant period, based on all her medically determinable impairments:

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that

the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work

as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except the claimant can

occasionally climb ramps or stairs, but can never climb ladders, ropes or

scaffolds. She can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl.

R. 17.

Based on the hearing testimony of the vocational expert, the ALJ determined at step

four that Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work as credit clerk and dispatcher both as

actually and generally performed, and her past relevant work as rental clerk as actually

performed. R. 19-20. Thus, the ALJ determined Plaintiff is not disabled within the

meaning of the Social Security Act. Id.; see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (f);

416.920(a)(4)(iv), (f).

The SSA Appeals Council denied review of the ALJ’s decision, R. 1-6, and the

unfavorable determination of the ALJ stands as the Commissioner’s final decision. See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court’s judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to

determining whether factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record

as a whole and whether correct legal standards were applied. Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d

1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Doyal v. Barnhart,

331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A decision is not

based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if

there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting it.” Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268,

1270 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court “meticulously

examine[s] the record as a whole,” including any evidence “that may undercut or detract

from the ALJ’s findings,” “to determine if the substantiality test has been met.” Wall, 561

F.3d at 1052 (internal quotation marks omitted). Though a reviewing court considers

whether the Commissioner followed applicable rules of law in weighing particular types

of evidence in disability cases, the court does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its

own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th

Cir. 2008).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the “intensity, persistence

and functionally limiting effects of [Plaintiff’s] symptoms.” Pl.’s Br. (Doc. No. 12) at 3-

7. She further alleges that the ALJ “improperly granted partial weight to an objective test

and improperly weighed the opinion.” Id. at 7-10.3

A. The ALJ’s Analysis of Plaintiff’s Symptoms

1. The Two-Step Process for Evaluating Symptoms

Social Security Ruling 16-3p prescribes that an ALJ will engage in a two-step analysis

in evaluating a claimant’s impairment-related symptoms. First, the ALJ must “consider

whether there is an underlying medically determinable . . . impairment(s) that could

reasonably be expected to produce an individual’s symptoms, such as pain.” SSR 16-3p,

2017 WL 5180304, at *3 (Oct. 25, 2017); see also id. at *1 (prescribing that the Ruling applies

to SSA decisions issued on or after March 28, 2016). Second, if such an impairment is

established, the ALJ must “evaluate the intensity and persistence” of the claimant’s symptoms

“to determine the extent to which the symptoms limit an individual’s ability to perform work-

related activities.” Id. at *3; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) (2016).

3 Plaintiff also contends the ALJ “never determines the weight to be granted to the

Consultative examiner who’s [sic] opinion conflicts with the ALJ’s finding.” Pl.’s Br. at

8. Plaintiff was not examined by a consultative examiner, however, and Plaintiff cites no

such opinion in the medical evidence of record.

2. The ALJ’s Consideration of the Medical Evidence

At the first step, the ALJ thoroughly discussed the medical evidence. Relevant to

Plaintiff’s obesity, the ALJ addressed Plaintiff’s body mass index, as well as the directives

of Social Security Ruling 02-1p, 2002 WL 34686281 (Sept. 12, 2002), and found that

Plaintiff’s “Level III obesity alone causes significant limitation in her ability to perform

basic work activities.” R. 18. Relevant to Plaintiff’s spinal stenosis and dysfunction of

major joints, the ALJ noted an x-ray taken in 2011, prior to the alleged onset date, that

demonstrated mild degeneration of the hip joints. R. 18, 333. An x-ray of her lumbar spine

in 2013 demonstrated degenerative changes at L2-L3 and L5-S1. R. 18, 389. The ALJ

also discussed: an April 2015 hip x-ray; treatment notes and medication prescriptions from

September 2015, April 2016, August 2016, and September 2016; and a July 2016 lumbar-

spine MRI “that revealed cord encroachment at T11-T12 and central spine stenosis.” R.

18, 451, 471-73, 491-92, 494-96, 497-98, 597-99. The ALJ additionally considered the

state-agency reviewing physicians’ opinions, which had found that Plaintiff could perform

light work, and gave them partial weight. R. 18-19, 62-64, 71-73, 83-85, 93-95.

Based on his review of the evidence, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “medically

determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms.”

R. 18. Plaintiff does not challenge this finding by the ALJ.

3. The ALJ’s Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Limitations

Relevant to the second step, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s allegations of

functional limitations resulting from her impairments:

The claimant makes the following allegations regarding the intensity,

persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms. The claimant alleged

disability due to a back impairment (Exhibit B3E/2). She testified that she

has back pain, stiffness, difficulty walking, and difficulty sitting. She

reported that her impairments affect her ability to lift, squat, bend, stand,

reach, walk, sit, kneel, climb stairs, complete tasks, concentrate and use her

hands.

R. 17.

The ALJ then found that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence,

and limiting effects of her symptoms were “not entirely consistent with the medical

evidence and other evidence in the record.” R. 18. Plaintiff challenges this second-step

assessment of Plaintiff’s symptoms, and the effect of those symptoms upon Plaintiff’s

ability to work, as failing to comport with the requirements of Social Security Ruling 16-

3p. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ placed too much import on Plaintiff’s ability

to perform activities of daily living and ignored the July 2016 lumbar-spine MRI. See Pl.’s

Br. at 3-7. The Court disagrees.

First, the ALJ relied upon Plaintiff’s own function report in noting that Plaintiff

reported that she is able to prepare meals, clean, vacuum, do laundry, go shopping, pay

bills, read, work on crossword puzzles, spend time with others, go to the library, and

perform other tasks. R. 17, 246-55. Plaintiff does not allege that the ALJ misstated any of

this evidence. And the ALJ could properly reference Plaintiff’s “[d]aily activities” in

considering “the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects” of Plaintiff’s symptoms. SSR

16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304, at *7; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i). It is true that a

claimant’s activities of daily living do not, by themselves, determine the claimant's ability

to work, as “sporadic performance of household tasks or work does not establish that a

person is capable of engaging in substantial gainful activity.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987

F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th Cir. 1993) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted); accord

Gossett v. Brown, 862 F.2d 802, 807 (10th Cir. 1988). But Plaintiff’s own characterization

of her activities shows that they were far from “sporadic.” The ALJ reasonably found that

Plaintiff “has described daily activities that are not limited to the extent one would expect,

given the complaints of disabling symptoms and limitations.” R. 17. There was no error

in the ALJ’s consideration of these self-reported “daily activities.” 20 C.F.R. §

404.1529(c)(3)(i); see Wilson v. Astrue, 602 F.3d 1136, 1146 (10th Cir. 2010); Rabon v.

Astrue, 464 F. App’x 732, 735 (10th Cir. 2012).

Further, the ALJ did expressly consider the July 2016 MRI results, both as noted

above and when weighing the state-agency reviewing physicians’ opinions. R. 18, 19. The

MRI report does not purport to address Plaintiff’s prognosis or functional limitations, R.

497-98, and Plaintiff’s argument that these MRI results mandate a certain RFC finding is

meritless. See Paulsen v. Colvin, 665 F. App’x 660, 666 (10th Cir. 2016) (“The mere

diagnosis of a condition does not establish its severity or any resulting work limitations.”).

4. Conclusion

In sum, the ALJ’s overall assessment of Plaintiff's subjective symptoms is “closely

and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence” in the record. Keyes-Zachary v. Astrue,

695 F.3d 1156, 1172 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). And Plaintiff

has not shown that the ALJ failed to comply with the directives of Social Security Ruling

16-3p or 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c) in any material manner. The Court, giving the requisite

“special deference” to the ALJ’s findings, therefore finds that the ALJ’s assessment of

Plaintiff's subjective symptoms does not undermine the RFC determination and that

remand on this basis is not warranted. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d 1080, 1089 (10th Cir. 2007).

B. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the MRI Test

As noted above, the ALJ discussed in the written decision a July 5, 2016 MRI. See

R. 18. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly granted partial weight to this MRI and

improperly failed to treat the reviewing physician’s MRI findings as a treating-physician

opinion.

Plaintiff here misconstrues the portion of the ALJ’s decision in which the ALJ

discusses why he had given only “partial weight” to the state-agency physicians who

reviewed the medical records and concluded that Plaintiff could perform light, as opposed

to only sedentary, work. The ALJ relied on the interpretation of the MRI and other medical

evidence in the record to find Plaintiff was actually “somewhat further limited” than these

reviewers had opined and to ultimately prescribe a sedentary RFC for Plaintiff:

As for the opinion evidence, Shelly Venters, M.D. and Luther Woodcock,

M.D., State agency medical consultants found that the claimant had a light

residual functional capacity, could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, never

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and

crawl (Exhibit B3A/5-7, B4A/5-7, B7A/6-8, and B8A/6-8). The undersigned

grants this opinion partial weight, as the claimant is somewhat further

limited. Imaging revealed hip degeneration (Exhibit B4F/61). Additionally,

her BMI is in the obese range (Exhibit B7F/5-7). Further, the claimant

complained of back pain and an MRI of her lumbar spine showed central

spinal stenosis (Exhibit B8F/17-18). Therefore, this opinion is granted

partial weight.

R. 18-19 (emphasis added). Therefore, it is clear from the written decision that Plaintiff

did not give partial weight to the MRI itself. Plaintiff offers no reason that the ALJ could

not properly assign partial weight to the state-agency examining physicians’ opinions.

In addition, Plaintiff offers no support for his proposition that the doctor who

reviewed the MRI scan was Plaintiffs treating physician and points to no evidence that

this doctor ever personally saw or examined Plaintiff or ever prescribed any functional

limitations relevant to Plaintiff.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's second assignment of error is without merit.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons outlined above, the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. A

separate judgment shall be entered.

IT ISSO ORDERED this 23rd day of September, 2019.

(Verhy B. Kabsi

□□ eaalad. eetn

United States District Judge