Powell v. Oklahoma County of

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

HEATHER POWELL, individually and as )

mother, next friend and guardian of )

Elizabeth Kiley Eaton, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. CIV-18-294-D

)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS )

OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY, )

OKLAHOMA COUNTY DETENTION )

CENTER, )

SHERIFF JOHN WHETSEL, )

OKLAHOMA COUNTY SHERIFF’S )

DEPARTMENT, )

CORRECTIONAL HEALTHCARE )

MANAGEMENT, INC., )

ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH )

SERVICES, INC., and )

JOHN DOE 1-10, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by

Defendants Oklahoma County Detention Center (“OCDC”) and Oklahoma County

Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”) [Doc. No. 23]. Plaintiff filed a response in

opposition [Doc. No. 24]. The matter is fully briefed and at issue.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the suicide attempt of Elizabeth Kiley Eaton while she was a

pretrial detainee at the OCDC on June 29, 2016. Because of the suicide attempt, Ms. Eaton

was rendered comatose and remains in a vegetative state. Plaintiff Heather Powell – as

Eaton’s mother, next friend, and duly appointed guardian and as an individual – asserts

claims against the Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County (“BOCC”), the

OCDC, Sheriff John Whetsel (“Whetsel”), the Sheriff’s Department, Correctional

Healthcare Management, Inc. (“CHM”), Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc.

(“Armor”), and John Doe 1-10 for negligence and for alleged violations of Ms. Eaton’s

constitutional rights.

To summarize, the Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 18] alleges:

 Ms. Eaton was arrested on April 30, 2016, and taken to the OCDC, where she

remained until her suicide attempt on June 29, 2016. She was 21 years old and

charged with violating the terms and conditions of her deferred sentence for second-

degree burglary (felony) and two misdemeanor offenses.

 When Ms. Eaton was booked in, she showed signs of depression and despondency.

A mental evaluation was scheduled, but according to OCDC records, Ms. Eaton did

not show for her appointment. No follow-up attempts were made to diagnose and

treat her mental illness.

 Prior to Ms. Eaton’s jail stay, she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder and

borderline personality disorder. She had a long history of mental illness, and as an

adolescent had been a patient in several behavioral institutions. Ms. Eaton told

Plaintiff that the OCDC had “refused to put her back on Risperdal.” [Doc. No. 18

at ¶ 12].

 Ms. Eaton’s cellmate recalled Ms. Eaton waking up, crying, and saying she “wanted

to die.” Id. Ms. Eaton’s cellmate reported to jailers that Ms. Eaton was “hearing

voices” and had said she “couldn’t take it anymore.” Id. at ¶ 20. In a recorded jail

call from Ms. Eaton to her mother, Ms. Eaton said she was going to kill herself. Ms.

Eaton sent Plaintiff a letter from the jail in which she stated that she was crying and

was “emotional.” Id. at ¶ 12.

 Ms. Eaton’s arresting officer told Plaintiff that Ms. Eaton seemed as if she did not

care about anything.

 On June 29, 2016, Ms. Eaton attempted to kill herself by hanging. She tied a sheet

or pillow case to a grate above the sink in her jail cell and jumped off the sink.

Because of the suicide attempt, Ms. Eaton was rendered comatose and remains in a

vegetative state.

 The OCDC was aware of Ms. Eaton’s mental condition and did nothing to prevent

or prepare for a possible suicide attempt by Ms. Eaton. Medical personnel at the

jail never assessed Ms. Eaton to determine if she posed a danger to herself.

 Armor and CHM had a contract with Oklahoma County to provide medical services

to inmates at the OCDC. Alternatively, OCDC staff informed Armor or CHM

employees of Ms. Eaton’s mental condition, and Armor or CHM failed to provide

Ms. Eaton with proper medical care.

 Whetsel knew that the OCDC was understaffed and under-supervised. He had

requested multiple funding increases, which were rejected by the BOCC. This lack

of funding caused or contributed to the unconstitutional practices at the OCDC.

 At the time of Ms. Eaton’s admission, the OCDC had more than 2,000 detainees,

which was nearly double its rated capacity. The large number of detainees, coupled

with the awkward physical layout of the jail cells, made adequate supervision of

detainees “virtually non-existent.” Id. at ¶ 27. At the time of the incident, the OCDC

was not adequately staffed to maintain necessary supervision or to meet the basic

medical needs of inmates.

 Due to overcrowding, the OCDC did not have sufficient jail cells to match the

classification level of the detainees according to accepted standards of correctional

practice.

 The OCDC did not adequately screen detainees for serious medical problems, did

not adequately provide detainees access to medical care, and the medical care that

was provided was “superficial and meaningless.” Id. at ¶ 30.

 The United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) conducted inspections of the

OCDC in April 2007. In its letter to the BOCC, the DOJ noted that certain

conditions at the OCDC violated the constitutional rights of detainees. These

constitutional violations continued through 2016. In 2009, the BOCC entered a

memorandum of understanding with the DOJ. The BOCC agreed to implement

mental health policies and procedures and to maintain sufficient staff. The BOCC

agreed to screen all written requests for mental health care within 24 hours and to

see patients within the next 72 hours or sooner.

 Before Ms. Eaton’s suicide attempt, a male inmate had used a ventilation grill to

hang himself. The DOJ specifically criticized the OCDC concerning this safety

issue: “cells have ventilation grills and other fixtures that have not been modified to

minimize the risk that they may [be] used to facilitate a suicide attempt.” Id. at ¶

40.

STANDARD OF DECISION

“To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The “plausibility

standard” announced in Twombly and Iqbal is not a “heightened standard” of pleading, but

rather a “refined standard.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.

2012) (citing Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011)).

Under the “refined standard,” plausibility refers “to the scope of the allegations in the

complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it

innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable

to plausible.’” Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1191; see also Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242,

1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

Further, the Tenth Circuit has noted that “[t]he nature and specificity of the

allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on context.” Khalik, 671

F.3d at 1191 (quoting Kansas Penn Gaming, 656 F.3d at 1215). “Thus, [it has] concluded

the Twombly/Iqbal standard is ‘a middle ground between heightened fact pleading, which

is expressly rejected, and allowing complaints that are no more than labels and conclusions

or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, which the Court stated will

not do.’” Id. (quoting Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1247).

“In other words, Rule 8(a)(2) still lives. There is no indication the Supreme Court

intended a return to the more stringent pre-Rule 8 pleading requirements.” Id. It remains

true that “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give the defendant

fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also al-Kidd v.

Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 977 (9th Cir. 2009) (“Twombly and Iqbal do not require that the

complaint include all facts necessary to carry the plaintiff’s burden.”).

Finally, “[w]hile the 12(b)(6) standard does not require that Plaintiff establish a

prima facie case in [its] complaint, the elements of each alleged cause of action help to

determine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim.” Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1192

(citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002). “[A] well-pleaded

complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged]

facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” Sanchez v. Hartley,

810 F.3d 750, 756 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

DISCUSSION

The OCDC and the Sheriff’s Department move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended

Complaint asserting that neither entity has the legal capacity to be sued or has a legal

identity separate from Oklahoma County. Plaintiff does not address this argument in her

response brief.

A. Federal Constitutional Claims

Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a non-corporate

entity’s capacity to be sued is determined by the law of the state in which the district court

is located. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3). In Oklahoma, each organized county can sue and be

sued. OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 1(1). The authority of each county is exercised by its board

of county commissioners, and a lawsuit brought against a county must be filed against the

board of county commissioners of that relevant county. OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 3, 4.

Because the OCDC and the Sheriff’s Department do not have legal identities separate from

that of Oklahoma County, they are not suable entities and are not proper defendants in a

civil rights action. See Lindsey v. Thomson, 275 Fed. Appx. 744, 747 (10th Cir. Sept. 10,

2007) (unpublished)1 (affirming dismissal of § 1983 claims against police departments and

a county sheriff’s department, noting that defendants were “not legally suable entities”);

Reid v. Hamby, No. 95-7142, 1997 WL 537909, at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 2, 1997)

(unpublished)2 (holding that “an Oklahoma ‘sheriff’s department’ is not a proper entity for

purposes of a § 1983 action”); Aston v. Cunningham, No. 99-4156, 2000 WL 796086, at

*4 n. 3 (10th Cir. June 21, 2000) (unpublished)3 (affirming dismissal of a county detention

facility on the basis that “a detention facility is not a person or legally created entity capable

of being sued”).

1 Unpublished opinion cited pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) and 10TH CIR. R. 32.1.

2 Unpublished opinion cited pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) and 10TH CIR. R. 32.1.

3 Unpublished opinion cited pursuant to FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) and 10TH CIR. R. 32.1.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims against the OCDC and the

Sheriff’s Department should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may

be granted.

B. Negligence Claims

Plaintiff’s negligence claims are subject to the Oklahoma Governmental Tort

Claims Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, § 151 et seq. (“OGTCA”). The OGTCA “is the exclusive

remedy by which an injured plaintiff may recover against a governmental entity for its

negligence.” Speight v. Presley, 203 P.3d 173, 176 (Okla. 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 51, §

152.1(A) (all tort claims against the state or its political subdivisions must be brought

pursuant to the OGTCA). Neither a county detention center nor a sheriff’s department are

included in the Act’s statutory definition of a “political subdivision.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 51,

§ 152(11).

Independent of the OGTCA is the statute cited supra, OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 4, which

provides that “[i]n all suits or proceedings by or against a county, the name in which a

county shall be sued or be sued shall be, ‘Board of County Commissioners of the [relevant

county].’” This statute is a rule of general applicability and is not specific to the OGTCA.

Further, there is no ambiguity about the meaning of OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 4. “All suits”

cannot be construed as having any meaning other than the plain language indicates. See,

e.g., Green Constr. Co. v. Okla. County, 50 P.2d 625, 627 (Okla. 1935) (“This statute is

mandatory, and requires that all suits prosecuted by or against a county be prosecuted in

the name of the board of county commissioners of the county of interest.”); OKLA. STAT.

tit. 19, § 1 (explaining the powers of Oklahoma counties, including their ability to sue and

be sued).

Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot sue the OCDC or the Sheriff's Department under the

OGTCA.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint filed by

Defendants Oklahoma County Detention Center and Oklahoma County Sheriff's

Department [Doc. No. 23] is GRANTED. The Oklahoma County Detention Center and

the Oklahoma County Sheriffs Department are terminated as parties to this action, and

Plaintiff's claims against them are dismissed with prejudice.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 17" day of May 2019.

Nil ya

TIMOTHY D. DEGIUSTI

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE