Thomas L Pearson and the Pearson Family Members Foundation, The v. University of Chicago, The

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

THE THOMAS L. PEARSON AND

PEARSON FAMILY FOUNDATION,

Plaintiff and Counterclaim

Defendant, Case No. 18-99-JWB

v.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,

Defendant and Counterclaim

Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the court on the University of Chicago’s supplemental motion for

partial summary judgment. (Doc. 401.) The motion is fully briefed. (Docs. 404, 413.) Plaintiff

moves to file a surreply (Doc. 414), which the University opposes. (Doc. 415.) The parties also

have multiple Daubert motions. (Docs. 375, 378, 379, 395, 402.) These motions are either fully

briefed or ripe for review because the time for responsive briefing has passed. Plaintiff also moves

to strike a supplemental brief filed by the University (Doc. 422), and that motion is fully briefed.

(Docs. 423, 424.)

The court GRANTS the motion for partial summary judgment (Doc. 401) and DENIES the

motion to file a surreply (Doc. 414) for the reasons stated herein. The court GRANTS IN PART

and DENIES IN PART the motions to exclude the testimony of Wazzan, Campbell, Lakin, and

Shamos (Docs. 378, 379, 402), and DENIES the motion to exclude the testimony of Shepard and

Shapiro (Docs. 375, 395.). Finally, the court GRANTS the motion to strike (Doc. 422) for failure

to comply with a court order.

I. Background

The court has set forth the factual background and early procedural history of this case in

detail in a prior order. (Doc. 110.) Hence the court recounts only the necessary facts for deciding

the current motions. The facts below come from either this court’s prior order or the parties’

updated submissions. Additional facts from these sources will also be included in the analysis.

Plaintiff and Counterclaim Defendant, The Thomas L. Pearson and The Pearson Family

Members Foundation (the “Foundation”) committed to donating $100 million to Defendant and

Counterclaim Plaintiff the University of Chicago in exchange for the University creating and

operating The Pearson Institute for the Study and Resolution of Global Conflicts (“TPI”) and an

annual conference called The Pearson Global Forum (the “Pearson Forum”). (Doc. 360 at 1–2.)

In establishing TPI, the University was to establish three named professorships. (Doc. 401 ¶ 1

(citing Doc. 6 § 3.4).)1 Plaintiff alleges that two professors hired were unqualified. (Doc. 110

¶¶31–35.)

In a prior order, the court denied in part the University’s motion for partial summary

judgment. (Id. at 62.) As relevant here, the court denied the University summary judgment on

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim for hiring two unqualified endowed faculty chairs. (Id. at 42–

44.) The University had moved for summary judgment on the claim because the Grant Agreement

contained a provision stating that Plaintiff had no “role or authority with respect to making

appointments (academic or professional) to the Pearson Institute or the Pearson Forum, setting the

research agenda of the Pearson Institute, or the selection of topics or presenters for the Pearson

Forum.” (Id. 43–44.) But the court held that, while the Grant Agreement was silent as to what

1 Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, but it does not explain its position. Plaintiff may be referring to the fact that

the Institute Director was to concurrently be a named professor, bringing the total named professorships to four.

See (Doc. 6 § 3.2.) This distinction does not matter for purposes of the present motion.

precise qualifications the faculty chairs must possess, Plaintiff could challenge as a breach of the

Grant Agreement faculty appointment that failed to advance TPI’s mission “to promote ongoing

discussion, understanding and resolution of global conflicts, and to contribute to the advancement

of a global society at peace.” (Id. at 44.) The court also denied without prejudice all the then-

pending Daubert motions because the court’s order made many potentially moot. (Id. at 1 n.1.)

The court later granted the University leave to move for summary judgment on the faculty

qualifications claim based on the standard articulated in the court’s order. (Doc. 394.) That motion

is now fully briefed. (Docs. 401, 404, 413.) The parties have also filed new Daubert motions, and

Plaintiff moves to strike the University’s supplemental authority briefing. (Docs. 375, 378, 379,

395, 402, 422.)

II. Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the record establishes that there is “no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party bears

the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of fact. Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to demonstrate that genuine issues

remain for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–87 (1986).

The inquiry turns on “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require

submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”

Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 251–52. In applying this standard, courts must view the evidence and

all reasonable inferences from it in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita, 475

U.S. at 587.

III. Analysis

The court first addresses the partial motion for summary judgment and motion for a

surreply.

A. Motion for Summary Judgment & Surreply—Faculty Qualifications

Plaintiff moves for leave to file a surreply. (Doc. 414.) The University opposes. (Doc.

415.) Plaintiff argues a surreply is necessary because the University claims (1) that Plaintiff is

trying to convert an express contract claim into a good faith claim, (2) that judicial estoppel

precludes Plaintiff from making a good faith claim, (3) that the faculty hiring claim can’t be based

on discovery disclosures and that the claim would be duplicative, and (4) that Plaintiff’s claim for

the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is futile. (Doc. 414 at 3.) Plaintiff also takes

issue with the University attaching four new exhibits to its reply. (Id.)

“Supplemental briefs are not encouraged and may be filed only upon motion and leave of

Court.” N.D. Okla. Civ. R. 7-1(f). “[W]hen a moving party uses their reply to present new

material—i.e., new evidence or new legal arguments—and if the court relies on that new material,

it should give the nonmoving party an opportunity to respond.” James v. Boyd Gaming Corp., 522

F. Supp. 3d 892, 903 (D. Kan. 2021). But “[a] reply which merely responds to matters placed in

issue by the response, and ‘does not spring upon the opposing party new reasons for the entry of

summary judgment’ is entirely proper.” Carter v. Spirit AeroSystems, Inc., No. 16-01350-EFM,

2019 WL 3732684, at *12 (D. Kan. Aug. 8, 2019) (alteration in original) (citation omitted), aff’d,

827 F. App’x 864 (10th Cir. 2020). For instance, pointing out in a reply that a response does not

conform to the rules of Civil Procedure is acceptable. Id.

Plaintiff’s argument is specious. The University moved for summary judgment on a breach

of contract claim, Plaintiff argued that the claim is better understood as a breach of the implied

duty of good faith and fair dealing (in tension with its previous summary judgment briefing), and

the University replied saying that construing the claim like that is futile and would violate

procedural rules and New York substantive law. The University also attached exhibits to its reply

in support of its responses to Plaintiff’s statements of additional facts. The University’s reply was

proper, and the court denies the motion for a sur-reply.

Defendant moves for summary judgment on the faculty qualifications breach of contract

claim by arguing, based on this court’s prior ruling, that the “[u]ndisputed facts establish that no

reasonable jury could find that the appointees, Professor Blattman and Professor Dube, were ‘so

unqualified that they fail to advance, or even frustrate, TPI’s stated mission[.]’” (Doc. 401 at 14

(citation omitted).) Plaintiff responds by arguing that Defendant is misconstruing its claim—that

discovery has shown that Plaintiff’s claim is a faculty-hiring claim regarding the University

violating its own procedures in hiring faculty for the chaired professorships. (Doc. 404 at 12–13.)

In sum, Plaintiff requests “that the Court deny [the University’s] motion for summary judgment

on the faculty-hiring portion of Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing.” (Id. at 20.) The University argues in reply, among other things, that Plaintiff is

inappropriately shifting its express breach of contract claim to one it never pleaded—an implied

good faith and fair dealing claim. (Doc. 413 at 4, 11.) Moreover, Plaintiff can’t make a good faith

and fair dealing claim based on the faculty-appointment process because it would contravene an

express provision of the agreement, which states that Plaintiff has no authority with respect to

making appointments. (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff alleged a breach of contract claim in its amended complaint. (Doc. 110 ¶¶ 31–

35.) Based on Plaintiff’s summary judgment briefing, the court grants the University summary

judgment because Plaintiff has abandoned its express breach of contract claim regarding faculty

qualifications. However, Plaintiff still has a good faith and fair dealing claim as to the faculty

selection process. The court analyzes why the good faith and fair dealing claim remains in more

detail in the context of the Daubert motions below, but in short, this claim was included in

Plaintiff’s amended complaint. See (Doc. 110 ¶¶ 31–35, 71.) The University never sought

summary judgment on that claim. And Plaintiff’s good faith claim attacks the process used to

select the professors in question, not the professors’ qualifications. The express contract provision

denying Plaintiff any role or authority respecting appointments precludes Plaintiff from deciding

who was selected to the named professorships, but the provision does not preclude Plaintiff’s

ability to challenge the process by which the University carried out its hiring obligations. The

good faith claim thus remains in the case.

B. Daubert Motions

Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which controls the admission of expert witness testimony,

provides:

A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:

(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the

trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;

(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;

(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the

case.

Fed. R. Evid. 702. The proponent of expert testimony bears the burden of showing the expert

testimony is admissible. Hampton v. Utah Dep’t of Corr., 87 F.4th 1183, 1201 (10th Cir. 2023).

After determining an expert is qualified, “the district court must satisfy itself that the testimony is

both reliable and relevant, in that it will assist the trier of fact, before permitting a jury to assess

such testimony.” Schulenberg v. BNSF Ry. Co., 911 F.3d 1276, 1282 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting

United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). “Expert testimony

which does not relate to any issue in the case is not relevant and, ergo, non-helpful.” Daubert v.

Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591 (1993) (citation omitted). “But the rejection of

expert testimony is the exception rather than the rule.” Laber v. Austin, 643 F. Supp. 3d 1242,

1246 (D. Kan. 2022).

“The court has discretion to determine how to perform its gatekeeping function under

Daubert.” In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & Antitrust Litig.,

No. 17-MD-2785-DDC-TJJ, 2020 WL 1164869, at *3 (D. Kan. Mar. 10, 2020) (citing Bill Barrett

Corp. v. YMC Royalty Co., LP, 918 F.3d 760, 770 (10th Cir. 2019)). The most common method

of fulfilling that role is by conducting a Daubert hearing, “although such a process is not

specifically mandated.” Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th

Cir. 2000). The district court may satisfy its gatekeeping role without a formal Daubert hearing

“so long as the court has sufficient evidence to perform ‘the task of ensuring that an expert’s

testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.’” Id. (quoting

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597). “[D]istrict courts are authorized by Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 to provide by

local rule for disposition of most motions without oral argument . . . .” Riddle v. Mondragon, 83

F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 1996). The Northern District of Oklahoma has such a rule. See N.D.

Okla. Civ. R. 78-1.

The parties have filed multiple motions to exclude opposing experts. In this instance, both

sides do not generally request a Daubert hearing, but Plaintiff has requested a hearing should the

court be inclined to not rule in its favor in some instances. (Docs. 387, 389.) The court evaluates

the motions without a Daubert hearing because the nature of the opinions expressed and the

materials cited in the briefs are sufficient for the court to determine admissibility. Ho v. Michelin

N. Am., Inc., 520 F. App’x 658, 664 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding district court permissibly exercised

its discretion in ruling without a formal Daubert hearing). The court addresses the motions in

reverse chronological order. Because the parties generally do not challenge the experts’

qualifications, the court primarily focuses on the reliability and relevance of the expert evidence.

1. Shamos

The University moves to exclude the expert testimony of Dr. Michael Shamos. (Doc. 402.)

Plaintiff did not file an opposition to this renewed motion to exclude.2 The University argues that

(1) Shamos’s testimony should be excluded because it is irrelevant if the court grants its renewed

motion for summary judgment on faculty qualifications; (2) Shamos does not opine on the faculty

qualifications standard previously announced by the court; (3) Shamos’s use of University

guidelines and standards from American academia is inconsistent with New York law; and (4)

Shamos’s interpretation of the Grant Agreement is inadmissible. (Id. at 7–11.)

“Under New York law, the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing inheres in every

contract.” Travellers Int’l, A.G. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 41 F.3d 1570, 1575 (2d Cir. 1994)

(citation omitted). “Even when a contract confers decision-making power on a single party, the

resulting discretion is nevertheless subject to an obligation that it be exercised in good faith.” Id.

And “[a] party certainly cannot succeed on claims for both breach of an express contract term and

breach of the implied covenant based on the same facts . . . .” Spinelli v. Nat’l Football League,

903 F.3d 185, 206 (2d Cir. 2018). But when “there is a dispute over the meaning of the contract’s

2 It is unclear to the court why Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the current motion when it had previously

opposed the motion filed prior to this court’s rulings on motions to seal. (Doc. 388.) The court proceeds to rule

on the current motion mindful of Plaintiff’s prior arguments.

express terms, there is no reason to bar a plaintiff from pursuing both types of claims in the

alternative.” Id.

Shamos’s testimony centers on whether the University violated its own policies and general

American academic standards in selecting Blattman and Dube as endowed full professors when

they ordinarily would be too junior for such positions. (Doc. 409 ¶¶ 15, 110.) Addressing the

University’s first argument, Shamos’s testimony is not necessarily irrelevant to the case because

Plaintiff pleaded a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing regarding faculty appointments

in the alternative to its breach of contract claim. See (Doc. 110 ¶¶ 31–35, 71 (“In carrying out its

obligations under the Grant Agreement, the [University] was, in many instances, charged with

discretion based upon its expertise as an academic institution. The [University] failed to exercise

that discretion in good faith in numerous instances.”).) The University oversimplifies the truism

that breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith claims are duplicative. As one court

explained it:

[A] complaint cannot allege that the defendant breached the contract by failing to

pay the $500 promised and breached the implied duty by failing to pay the $500.

It may, however, allege that the defendant breached the contract by breaching the

express term of payment of $500 or, alternatively, by acting with bad faith in paying

after the date on which the money was implicitly understood to be needed.

Hosp. Auth. of Rockdale Cnty. v. GS Cap. Partners V Fund, L.P., No. 09 CIV 8716 PAC, 2011

WL 182066, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2011). Plaintiff’s alternative allegations on this issue were

appropriate—granting summary judgment on the breach of contract claim does not remove the

breach of an implied duty of good faith for this claim.

Second, the University’s appeal to the standard articulated by the court in ruling on a

motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is of little relevance. The

process-related testimony is relevant to a good faith claim because it goes to whether the University

acted with proper motive. See Travellers Int’l, A.G., 41 F.3d at 1577 (affirming the district court’s

holding that the defendant had not acted in good faith but had instead been influenced by an

improper motive).

Turning to the University’s remaining arguments, the University argues that appeals to the

University’s own hiring guidelines and those in academia more generally are inappropriate

because the relationship between the parties is contractually defined. But that argument ignores

that the Grant Agreement is largely silent as to the faculty selection process. And in determining

whether the University selected faculty in good faith, references to standards outside the contract

may be necessary to show the reasonable expectations of the parties. And finally, the University

argues for exclusion of Shamos’s interpretation of the Grant Agreement. The court agrees in

part—it would be inappropriate for Shamos to give a bald legal conclusion that the University

violated express Grant Agreement provisions in making its faculty selections. The court has

granted summary judgment for the University on Plaintiff’s express breach of contract claim for

faculty selection. But Shamos is qualified to make statements about the appropriateness of outside

standards in the context of faculty selection and such opinions have a sufficient factual basis to be

reliable. The court therefore denies the motion to exclude Shamos’s expert testimony, except that

he may not opine that the faculty selection breached express contract provisions.

2. Shapiro

Dr. Shapiro’s report challenges Shamos’s contention that that there is a generalized

standard governing promotion to full professor. (Doc. 395-2 ¶ 11.) Plaintiff argues for exclusion

based on (1) Shapiro having an interest in the lawsuit—writing recommendation letters for Dube

and Blattman and being personally acquainted with them, (2) Shapiro having personal knowledge

of Plaintiff’s other claims, (3) Shapiro having been previously recruited to work at the University

of Chicago, (4) Shapiro’s father being a long-time University of Chicago faculty member, (5)

Shapiro having co-taught a class at TPI, and (6) Shapiro having received and hopes of continuing

to receive funds from TPI. (Doc. 395 at 2–4.) Plaintiff further argues that even if Shapiro’s

testimony is admissible under Rule 702, it is inadmissible under Rule 403 because hybrid fact-

expert witnesses have, inter alia, reduced reliability and a high risk of juror confusion. (Id. at 5–

8.)

“[A] witness may testify as both a fact and expert witness.” United States v. McGirr, 660

F. App’x 685, 690 (10th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). And expert witnesses much more intimately

involved with the underlying facts of the case have been permitted in the Tenth Circuit. See, e.g.,

Brownlee v. Gay & Taylor, Inc., 861 F.2d 1222, 1224–25 (10th Cir. 1988) (stating regional vice

president for the defendant was a qualified expert). Notably, Plaintiff relies on precious little in-

circuit authority on this procedural issue. And Plaintiff’s most on-point case merely notes that

“some circuits have encouraged district courts to take precautionary measures, including warning

the jury about the witness’s dual roles or bifurcating the questioning to clearly demarcate lay and

expert testimony offered by the same witness . . . .” United States v. Sandoval, 680 F. App’x 713,

718 (10th Cir. 2017). Should Shapiro need to give fact testimony, it appears that Plaintiff’s

concerns can be readily addressed with cross examination and precautions short of exclusion. The

University has met its burden for now. Plaintiff’s motion to exclude on the above grounds is

denied.

3. Wazzan and Campbell

The University moves to exclude expert testimony by Drs. C. Paul Wazzan and Thomas

Campbell. (Doc. 379.) Plaintiff opposes. (Doc. 387.) Because Campbell’s testimony will be

based on Wazzan’s, the court addresses Wazzan’s expert report first.

Wazzan’s expert report opines on three things:

a. Whether the original operating budget for TPI and [the Pearson Forum]

included as Exhibit D to the Grant Agreement dated April 3, 2015 provided

complete and accurate budget information; and

b. What would happen to the original $100 million grant if [the University]

“clawed back” the contributions made by The Harris School in order to fund

TPI and [the Pearson Forum], and what would happen to the original $100

million grant if The Harris School transferred costs to The Pearson Fund.

c. I have also been asked by counsel, for illustrative purposes, to project the

operating budget for TPI and [the Pearson Forum] out an additional 15 years

under certain reasonable assumptions to show what would likely happen to the

endowment under a scenario where the UC-funded costs are transferred to The

Pearson Fund.

(Doc. 379-1 ¶ 11.) The University argues that the opinion as to the 2015 operating budget should

be excluded because the court rejected at summary judgment that the University had to disclose

Harris School contributions. (Doc. 379 at 9.) Plaintiff responds by arguing that Wazzan’s opinion

that the budget was misleading is not dependent on contract interpretation and the opinion is

relevant to Plaintiff’s remaining claims for fraudulent inducement and breach of the duty of good

faith and fair dealing. (Doc. 387 at 5–7.)

Here, while the court did strike Plaintiff’s claim asserting there was a breach of contract

for failure to include all sources of funding in the preliminary operating budget, (Doc. 360 at 22–

32), it also denied the University summary judgment on Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim.

(Id. at 50–53.) In so holding, the court held that the fraudulent inducement claim was not

duplicative of a breach of contract claim because the University was not obligated under the

contract to provide the total costs necessary to run TPI. (Id. at 52.) Therefore, Wazzan’s opinion

about the original operating budget is not necessarily contrary to this court’s prior ruling, and the

opinion could be relevant to the fraudulent inducement claim in particular.

The University further argues that Wazzan’s 2015 budget opinions lack foundation in

certain instances because Wazzan concludes the 2015 budget is misleading due to discrepancies

between the 2015 and the 2017 budgets, but he does not analyze the reasons for the differences.

(Doc. 379 at 10.) The University asserts that there are “countless” reasons why amounts change

in preliminary budgets. (Id.) Maybe so. But what the University has identified is an avenue for

cross-examination rather than lack of sufficient factual basis under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.

Plaintiff has shown that sufficient facts support Wazzan’s opinion as to his first assigned task—

whether the 2015 operating budget provided complete information. The court denies the motion

to exclude Wazzan’s testimony on this point.

The University also moves to exclude Wazzan’s opinion as to his second and third tasks

by arguing that these opinions are based on an interpretation of a 2017 budget footnote that the

court rejected at summary judgment, hypothetical future University action, and speculative budget

forecasts. (Doc. 379 at 13.) Plaintiff acknowledges that the court has interpreted the footnote as

only allowing a reduction in University support for TPI if the Pearson Fund could adequately cover

additional future costs. (Doc. 387 at 10.) But Plaintiff argues that exclusion of this portion of

Wazzan’s opinion goes too far because the calculations still show that TPI is reliant on additional

University funding and this fact is relevant to its claims. (Id. at 10–13.)

An expert opinion must have sufficient factual underpinnings to help a jury. See Buckley

v. Deloitte & Touche USA LLP, 888 F. Supp. 2d 404, 413–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), aff’d, 541 F. App’x

62 (2d Cir. 2013). Here, the rejected “clawback” and cease-to-fund interpretations permeate the

second and third topics of Wazzan’s opinion. See, e.g., Doc. 379-1 ¶ 39 (“I have been asked by

counsel to assume that compensation, student support, and research support costs covered by the

Harris School as shown in the budget could be discontinued and even “clawed back” in any given

year.”); id. ¶ 48 (“I performed a series of calculations to determine what would happen to the

original $100 million grant if UC ‘clawed back’ the contributions made by The Harris School in

order to establish and operate TPI and [the Pearson Forum].”); id. ¶ 58 (“In this scenario, I assume

that the endowment yield generated is based on the adjusted endowment balance, which is lowered

by the claw backs, instead of relying on the original endowment yield figures as provided in the

April 2017 budget.”). Further, Plaintiff argues at length that, in general, experts can form opinions

off assumptions. (Doc. 381 at 12–13.) But Plaintiff fails to show that a rejected theory of liability

can form the basis of an expert opinion at trial. Nor does Plaintiff provide a basis for this court to

find that there is nevertheless a sufficient factual basis for Wazzan’s conclusions rather than mere

conjecture. The court grants the motion to exclude Wazzan’s testimony as to the second and third

topics in his report.

The University also moves to exclude Campbell’s expert opinion because it is based

entirely on the 2017 budget footnote interpretation that the University could withdraw support

from TPI or “claw back” support it had already given to TPI, and the conclusions and projections

Wazzan made based on that interpretation. (Doc. 379 at 16.) Plaintiff does not provide any reason

why Campbell’s testimony can stand independent of Wazzan’s testimony that is now excluded by

the court. The court thus grants the motion to exclude Campbell’s testimony.

4. Lakin

The University moves to exclude Phil Lakin Jr.’s expert opinion primarily because the

opinion is based on standards outside the Grant Agreement. (Doc. 378 at 8.) Plaintiff opposes

exclusion because Lakin’s opinion is relevant to its fraudulent inducement and good faith and fair

dealing claims. (Doc. 389 at 2–4.) Lakin’s report opines that the University’s alleged actions

violated the Donor Bill of Rights and the International Statement of Ethical Principles in

Fundraising. (Doc. 378-1 at 4–7.) Specifically, Lakin states that the following actions, along with

unspecified “misrepresentations and omissions to the donors” violated the Donor Bill of Rights

and the International Statement of Ethical Principles in Fundraising:

[1.] The University failed to name an Institute Director to perform the functions

described in the Grant Agreement, failed to name an Executive Director (consistent

with the parties’ subsequent agreement that the University would (a) hire a Faculty

Director and a separate Executive Director as co-leaders of The Pearson Institute

to fulfill the functions described for the Institute Director in the Grant Agreement,

and (b) the Executive Director would be someone with the qualifications to oversee

the administrative and management responsibilities associated with The Pearson

Institute);

[2.] In certain instances, the University failed to hire faculty with the experience

and qualifications customary for full professors in endowed named chairs;

[3] The University supplied inaccurate and misleading preliminary and annual

operating plan and budgets subsequently thereafter to the donor;

[4] The University failed to develop a new academic curriculum for The Pearson

Institute as required by the Grant Agreement;

[5] The University failed to appoint adequate devoted personnel to steward the

donors’ gift and ensure that the schedule as well as the annual operating plan and

budget set forth in the Grant Agreement would be accurately and timely

accomplished;

[6] The University failed to provide mutually agreed annual reports and other

information, and to meet with the donors, as required under the Grant Agreement;

[7] The University failed to invite the donors to certain events, as required under

the Grant Agreement;

[8] The University failed to launch a TPI website on the schedule promised in the

Grant Agreement;

[9] The University failed to self-report its breaches to the donors, as it had promised

to do in the Grant Agreement[.]

(Doc. 378-1 at 4–7.) Except for items 2, 3, and 5, it appears the issues identified by Lakin are all

express breach of contract allegations. Lakin testifies that these alleged express breaches (at least

some of which have been decided on summary judgment) violate the aforementioned donor

standards. An “[e]xpert opinion on a party’s compliance with an industry standard is irrelevant

when its obligations are contractually defined.” Luitpold Pharms., Inc. v. Ed. Geistlich Sohne A.G.

Fur Chemische Industrie, No. 11-CV-681 KBF, 2015 WL 5459662, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16,

2015). But a plaintiff must show that it “reasonably relied upon” a material misrepresentation to

show fraudulent inducement. See Capax Discovery, Inc. v. AEP RSD Invs., LLC, 285 F. Supp. 3d

579, 586 (W.D.N.Y. 2018).

Here, Plaintiff correctly points out that Lakin’s testimony goes to the fraudulent

inducement claim (in item three) because Lakin indicates that providing an inaccurate and

misleading preliminary budget would violate recognized general donor standards. This testimony

at least goes to the reasonable reliance of Plaintiff in deciding to enter the Grant Agreement. The

fraudulent inducement claim is not governed by the contract, and thus general standards are

appropriate. Lastly, it appears that items two and five are potentially relevant to good faith and

fair dealing claims. There too, it seems an express contract provision does not necessarily control.

But the University further argues that Lakin’s opinion testimony should be excluded

because his testimony does not address anything besides guidelines outside the contract. (Doc.

378 at 9.) But that does not provide a basis for excluding Lakin’s testimony regarding the

fraudulent inducement claim or good faith and fair dealing claims. Finally, the University argues

that Lakin’s opinion violates Rule 26 because it was substantially drafted by counsel. (Id. at 9–

11.)

Expert witnesses must generally submit a report that is “prepared and signed by the

witness.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (a)(2)(B). “Rule 26(a)(2)(B) does not preclude counsel from

providing assistance to experts in preparing the reports[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee’s

note to 1993 amendment. “A party’s attorney can reduce an expert’s oral opinion to writing so

long as the report reflects the actual views of the expert.” United States v. Kalymon, 541 F.3d 624,

638 (6th Cir. 2008).

Here, deposition testimony indicates Plaintiff’s counsel prepared the first draft of Lakin’s

opinion after conducting an interview with him. (Doc. 378-2 at 17–18.) Lakin and counsel went

back and forth editing the report two or three times. (Id. at 19.) Lakin spent between five and ten

hours drafting his report and approximately ten hours reviewing documents. (Id. at 22–23.) This

is sufficient preparation under Rule 26. Cases such as Mullen v. S. Denver Rehab., LLC, 18-CV-

01552-MEH, 2020 WL 6680358 (D. Colo. Nov. 12, 2020) do not change this result. There, the

court allowed expert testimony where counsel drafted the first version of the report after the

witness spent 21 hours reviewing documents, discussed her opinion with counsel for up to one

hour, and reviewed the report for approximately 2.5 hours before signing it. Id. at *1. The

University zones in on the fact that the expert in Mullen spent more time reviewing documents.

(Doc. 378 at 10.) But the primary deciding factor in Mullen was that counsel prepared the report

after a conversation with the expert. Id. at *3. That is the case here. And the hours spent by Lakin

are not as concerning as they appear at first glance because his opinion is relatively limited and

straightforward. And Lakin spent more time working on his report than the expert in Mullen. The

court declines to exclude the remainder of Lakin’s testimony based on a Rule 26 violation.

5. Shepard

Plaintiff seeks to exclude a subset of Paragraphs 12–15, 17–18, 20 and 21, 23–25, and 28–

34 of Dr. Robert Shepard’s opinion. (Doc. 375.) The University intends to call Shepard as a

rebuttal expert to Lakin. (Doc. 390 at 4.) Shepard has over 40 years of experience in higher

education fundraising, and he generally opines that the University acted consistently with general

donor relations principles. See (Doc. 375-1 ¶¶ 1, 11–15, 34.) Plaintiff provides several specific

arguments for excluding a subset of Shepard’s report: (1) Shepard is not qualified to opine on

budgets; (2) Shepard’s budgetary opinions are not reliable; and (3) Shepard draws several

conclusions without reference to specialized knowledge. (Doc. 375 at 2–3.)

In evaluating expert testimony, a court first determines “whether the expert is qualified by

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to render an opinion.” Schulenberg, 911 F.3d

at 1282 (quotation marks and citation omitted). The court next determines “whether the expert’s

opinion is reliable by assessing the underlying reasoning and methodology.” Id. at 1283 (citation

omitted). A court may conclude that an opinion is unreliable because the gap between the data

and the expert’s conclusion is too great. Id. (citation omitted). “Permissible testimony provides

the jury with the tools to evaluate an expert’s ultimate conclusion and focuses on questions of fact

that are amenable to the scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the expert’s

field.” United States v. Richter, 796 F.3d 1173, 1195 (10th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

Plaintiff first argues that Shepard is not qualified because he repeatedly disclaimed being

a budget expert in his deposition testimony. (Doc. 375 at 2.) But, in context, Shepard’s testimony

is not about budgets per se. Rather, his testimony is about the role of budgets in the context of

university donor relations. See, e.g., (Doc. 375-2 at 9 (“This format for sharing budgets with major

donors is fairly typical in higher education.”)). Given Shepard’s extensive experience in managing

large donations in higher education, see (id. at 2 (referencing experience including a $3.8 billion

fundraising campaign)), he is qualified to talk about budgets in that regard. The court declines to

exclude portions of Shepard’s testimony based on qualification.

Plaintiff further argues that Shepard’s opinions are not reliable because he stated that the

basis for a portion of his report was that he presumed the role of a preliminary budget. (Doc. 375

at 3.) However, while Shepard used the lightning rod word “presume” in his deposition testimony,

in context Shepard was merely saying that he believed the preliminary budget set forth how the

donation would be used to support the institute based on his review of the record. See, e.g., (Doc.

375-2 at 11 “I don’t see how you could look at the budget and come up with any other

explanation.”)) Shepard’s statements are thus fuel for cross examination rather than for exclusion.

The court finds that the expert testimony is not based on improper presumption and declines to

exclude portions of Shepard’s opinions on that basis.

Finally, Plaintiff argues that Shepard bases some of his testimony on everyday experience

rather than specialized knowledge and thus invades the province of the jury. (Doc. 375 at 3–5.)

But all the examples Plaintiff speaks to are Shepard’s conclusions when viewing the facts as an

expert in university fund raising. See, e.g., (Doc. 375-1 at 8 (“[T]he documents I have reviewed

suggest that the University—especially through Dr. Diermeier and Nicki Nabasny—maintained

an open line of communication with the donors.”).) The jury is free to give weight to Shepard’s

opinion or disregard it. The court declines to exclude Shepard’s expert testimony. The court notes

that Plaintiff’s passing argument that Shepard’s opinion is unreliable based on the limited

documents he reviewed is not developed or properly before the court. And if anything, this

argument would apply equally to Plaintiff’s expert Lakin. The motion is denied.

C. Motion to Strike Supplemental Authority Brief

Plaintiff moves to strike the University’s Submission Regarding Applicable Law. (Doc.

422.) Plaintiff argues that the brief violates the clear instructions of the court from the last pretrial

conference. (Id. at 1, 4.) The University argues that it was Plaintiff who violated this court’s

direction by including the donative intent subject-matter in its briefing, and that its additional brief

was merely to respond to Plaintiff. (Doc. 423 at 3.)

At the previous pretrial conference, this court directed the parties to submit further briefing

on the scope of the preserved claims and the effect of this court’s ruling regarding express breaches

of contract on any breach of the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing claims. The court also

separately requested that the parties send in some authorities on donative intent jurisprudence.

Plaintiff responded to the hearing with a brief addressing the two issues identified by the court and

including a five-page list of eight donative intent authorities with short summaries at the end of its

brief. While there was no need for Plaintiff to place the donation-related authorities in its formal

brief or provide summaries, the court finds that this approach was consistent with the court’s

request. The University filed a legal brief on the issues requested by the court. But then,

inconsistent with the court’s request, the University used Plaintiff’s caselaw list as justification to

file an entirely separate 18-page legal brief on the donative intent issue. The court understands the

inclination to get more briefing before the court, but that is not what the court requested on the

donative intent aspect of the case. The court will consider the authorities submitted by the

University, just as it will consider Plaintiff’s authorities. But the court strikes the University’s

supplemental brief (Doc. 421) from the record.3

IV. Conclusion

The University’s motion for summary judgment on the express breach of contract claim

regarding faculty qualifications (Doc. 401) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s motion to file a surreply

(Doc. 414) is DENIED. The University’s motions to exclude the testimony of Wazzan, Campbell,

Lakin, and Shamos (378, 379, 402), are GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Campbell’s testimony is excluded in its entirety. Wazzan may testify as to whether the operating

budget dated April 3, 2015, provided complete and accurate budget information. The rest of his

testimony is excluded. Lakin may testify as to how the standards identified in his report apply to

3 The University argues in passing that there is no basis under the federal rules to strike documents outside the

pleadings. (Doc. 423 at 4.) But the court retains the inherent authority to strike improper filings. See, e.g., Kirven

v. Curry Cnty. Det. Ctr., 407 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1185 (D.N.M. 2019) (collecting authorities); see also Mack v. J.M.

Smuckers Co., No. 22-3195, 2023 WL 5217705, at *2 (10th Cir. Aug. 15, 2023) (citing In re Young, 91 F.3d 1367,

1377 (10th Cir. 1996)) (“We likewise review a district court’s grant of a motion to strike a sur-reply for an abuse

of discretion.”), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 589 (2024).

the facts underlying Plaintiff’s fraudulent inducement claim and any remaining good faith and fair

dealing claims. The rest of his testimony is excluded. Shamos is excluded from opining on what

the express Grant Agreement provisions required, but his testimony is otherwise admissible.

Plaintiff’s motion to exclude Shepard’s and Shapiro’s testimony, (Docs. 375, 395), is DENIED.

Finally, Plaintiff’s motion to strike, (Doc. 422), is GRANTED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 5, 2024 /s/John W. Broomes_____________

JOHN W. BROOMES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE