Claudio v. Snyder

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JONATHAN CLAUDIO, )

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Case No. 23-CV-0397-CVE-SH

MICHAEL SNYDER et al., )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Now before the Court are plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. # 1) and plaintiff's motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. #2). On September 14, 2023, plaintiff Jonathan Claudio filed a pro

se complaint and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. In reliance upon the representations and

information set forth in plaintiffs motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court finds that

the motion should be granted. Plaintiff is permitted to file and maintain this action to conclusion

without prepayment of fees and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). However, because authorization to

proceed in forma pauperis excuses only prepayment of the fee, plaintiff remains obligated to pay the

full $350 filing fee when he is able to do so. See Brown v. Eppler, 725 F.3d 1221, 1230-31 (10th

Cir. 2013) (noting that obligation to pay full amount of filing fee extends to all litigants who proceed

in forma pauperis because “all § 1915(a) does for a litigant is excuse pre-payment of fees”). Because

the Court authorizes plaintiff to proceed without prepayment, he is not required to pay the $52

administrative fee.

Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and he alleges that he was arrested without probable cause in

an incident that took place on November 27, 2018. Dkt. # 1, at 8-9. He also claims that he was

beaten by detention officers after was he was arrested, and he claims that he suffered physical and

mental injuries as a result of the incident. Id. at 10-11. Plaintiff has previously filed two other cases

which have been dismissed. In the first case, plaintiff claims that he was placed in administrative

segregation at the David L. Moss Criminal Justice Center after he was arrested on November 27,

2018. Jonathan Claudio v. FNU LNU et al., 20-CV-640-CVE-JFJ (N.D. Okla.). The case was

dismissed for lack of prosecution. Plaintiff filed a second case in which he asserted that he had been

arrested without probable cause on November 27, 2018. Jonathan Claudio v. Destiny Wilkinson et

al,, 23-CV-084-GKF-JFJ (N.D. Okla.). The second case was also dismissed for lack of prosecution.

Plaintiff alleges the same claims in this case, and has simply re-filed his complaints from his

previous cases as a single complaint. Plaintiff seeks $10 million in damages from each defendant

named in the complaint.

Plaintiff has obtained leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the requirements of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915 are applicable. See Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309 (10th Cir. 2005). Section

1915(e)(2) requires a district court to dismiss a case if at any time the court determines that “the

action . . .(i) is frivolous or malicious [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.”

A court reviewing a pro se plaintiff's complaint must broadly construe the allegations of the

complaint to determine if the plaintiff can state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The generous

construction to be given a pro se litigant’s allegations “does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden

of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935

F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Notwithstanding a pro se plaintiffs various mistakes or

misunderstandings of legal doctrines or procedural requirements, “if a court can reasonably read the

pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so....” Id. A

reviewing court need not accept “mere conclusions characterizing pleaded facts.” Bryson v. City of

Edmond, 905 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 555 (2007) (“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need

detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’ s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief

requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action will not do”). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a

plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiffs behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico,

113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997).

The Court has reviewed plaintiff's complaint and he is attempting to allege claims against

defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims is borrowed from

state law. Lawson v. Okmulgee Cty. Criminal Justice Auth., 726 Fed. App’x 685, 690 (10th Cir.

2018) (“Because there is no applicable federal statute of limitations relating to civil nights actions

brought under section 1983, we borrow the limitations period for such claims from the state where

the cause of action arose”).' The Tenth Circuit has held that a two-year statute of limitations applies

under Oklahoma law. See id. Plaintiff alleges that his injury occurred on November 27, 2018. Dkt.

#1, at 8. He filed his complaint on September 14, 2023, well outside the two-year statute of

limitations period, and plaintiff's allegations do not suggest any basis under Oklahoma law for

tolling the statute of limitations. See Weathers v. Fulgenzi, 884 P.2d 538, 541 (Okla. 1994) (statute

of limitations begins to run under Oklahoma law on the date a reasonable person would have known

of his injuries and that he could bring a claim against the responsible parties); Baker v. Ward, 2020

! Unpublished decisions are not precedential, but they may be cited for their persuasive value.

See Fed. R. App. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1

WL 4756781 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 17, 2020) (applying Oklahoma law to determine start date and

possible tolling of the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim). Plaintiff was plainly aware as of

November 27, 2018 that he had allegedly suffered injuries that would give rise to a claim against the

defendants, and he has not alleged that there was any legal impediment preventing him from bringing

his claims within two years. The Court finds that plaintiff's claims are clearly barred by the statute

of limitations and his complaint (Dkt. # 1) should be dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e).

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's complaint (Dkt. # 1) is dismissed for

failure to state a claim. A separate judgment is entered herewith.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff’ s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

(Dkt. # 2) is granted.

DATED this 13th day of October, 2023.

Cerin ¥ bafpl—

CLAIRE V.EAGAN \—

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE