Walker v. Anderson

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

JUSTIN WALKER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-CV-0008-CVE-JFJ

)

JUSTIN ANDERSON, )

in his individual capacity, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

On January 6, 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendants Vic Regalado, in his

official capacity as Tulsa County Sheriff, and Justin Anderson, in his individual capacity as an

officer/employee of the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office. The complaint alleges six claims for relief:

a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Anderson for excessive force in violation of the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution (count one); a municipal liability claim against

Regalado arising from Anderson’s alleged actions (count two); a municipal liability claim against

Regalado for failure to train or supervise (count three); punitive damages against Anderson arising

from alleged excessive use of force (count four); an Oklahoma state law claim for negligence against

Regalado and Anderson (count five); and a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Anderson for unlawful

arrest in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (count

six). Dkt. # 2, at 3-9.

Defendants Regalado and Anderson filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 12) the state law

negligence claim (count five) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1); to dismiss the two counts against Regalado in his official capacity, which

are claims for municipal liability (counts two and three), to dismiss the § 1983 unlawful arrest claim

against Anderson (count six) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant

to Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. # 12. Defendants did not move to dismiss the § 1983 excessive force claim

(count one) or the corresponding claim for punitive damages against Anderson (count four). While

punitive damages is pleaded as a separate claim (count four), the Court notes that punitive damages

is a remedy for count one, not a separate claim for relief. Therefore, because punitive damages are

included in plaintiff’s prayer for relief, the Court deems count one to seek punitive damages as a

remedy against Anderson, and will dismiss count four for failure to state a separate claim under Rule

12(b)(6).

Prior to responding to defendants’ motion, plaintiff filed a “Notice of Dismissal Without

Prejudice of Defendant Vic Regalado in his Official Capacity As Tulsa County Sheriff,” (Dkt. # 14),

which dismissed all claims against Regalado and the municipality and terminated Regalado as a

party defendant. Plaintiff also “concedes that his state law [negligence claim (count five)] against

[] Anderson should be dismissed.”1 Dkt. # 15, n. 1. Thus, the motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 12) is moot

as to the claims against Regalado (counts two, three, and five), and granted without objection as to

the negligence claim against Anderson (count five). Plaintiff responded to the arguments regarding

the only remaining claim addressed in the motion to dismiss, whether plaintiff has plausibly alleged

a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest, and, if so, whether Anderson is entitled to qualified

immunity at this stage of the litigation. See Dkt. # 15. Anderson has filed a reply (Dkt. # 17).

I.

1 As a preliminary matter, the parties are correct that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

to hear plaintiff’s state law tort claim, as it is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity

and the requirements of the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. Okla. Stat. tit. 51,

§§ 152.1 et seq. Therefore, plaintiff’s fifth claim should be dismissed without prejudice.

2

Plaintiff alleges the following facts in his complaint: on or about November 25, 2021,

plaintiff “was attending a family gathering.” Dkt. # 2, at 2. After “a report of a disturbance, officers

from the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office were dispatched to the location of the gathering.” Id. Then,

Anderson “detained [plaintiff] and handcuffed [plaintiff].” Id. While plaintiff was handcuffed,

Anderson “picked [plaintiff] up and slammed [him] to the ground.” Id. Plaintiff “was compliant”

with Anderson, “did not physically resist arrest,” did not attempt to flee, and “was unarmed and did

not, at any point, physically or verbally threaten.” Id. Plaintiff also alleges that Anderson “had no

knowledge of any information to reasonably believe that [plaintiff] was armed, violent, or potentially

dangerous,” and there was “no objective reason . . . that justified the level of force used.” Id. at 2-3.

Anderson “made the decision to pick up [plaintiff] and slam [him] to the ground,” knowing that the

use of force “would severely injure” plaintiff. Id. As a result, plaintiff “suffered fractures to his ribs,

hemothorax, and a collapsed lung.” Id. at 3.

The complaint states that Anderson was acting “under the color of state law” and “pursuant

to a custom or policy” of the Sheriff’s Office. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also alleges that the Sheriff’s Office

“failed to train, supervise, and/or run a background check” on Anderson prior to the incident. Id.

Finally, plaintiff alleges that after reviewing Anderson’s actions, the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office

“determined that [] Anderson’s actions were in accord with the Tulsa County Sheriff’s Office

policies and/or customs.” Id.

II.

In considering a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must determine

whether the claimant has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss is

properly granted when a complaint provides no “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic

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recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007). A complaint must contain enough “facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face”

and the factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”

Id. (citations omitted). “Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing

any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 562. Although decided

within an antitrust context, Twombly “expounded the pleading standard for all civil actions.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009). For the purpose of making the dismissal determination,

a court must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact,

and must construe the allegations in the light most favorable to the claimant. Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555; Alvarado v. KOB-TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10" Cir. 2007); Moffett v. Halliburton

Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10" Cir. 2002). However, a court need not accept as true

those allegations that are conclusory in nature. Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, 263

1151, 1154-55 (10" Cir. 2001). “[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments

are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,

1109-10 (10" Cir. 1991).

Ii.

Anderson argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity from plaintiff's § 1983 claim for

unlawful arrest because plaintiff failed to allege facts that demonstrate that his constitutional rights

were violated . Dkt. # 12, at 3-4; Dkt. #17, at 2-3. Defendant also argues that plaintiff's factual

allegations “are insufficient to determine the specific right at issue,” and therefore, “it would be

impossible for a court to determine whether [] Anderson’s alleged conduct violated clearly-

established law.” Dkt. #17, at 3. Plaintiff responds that the facts alleged do not support a finding

that Anderson had probable cause for his arrest, and so he adequately pleaded the violation of his

constitutional right, and Anderson is not entitled to qualified immunity. Dkt. # 15.

Section 1983 provides a cause of action against any “person who, under color of statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States . . . thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and law” of the United States. “The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state

actors from using the badge of authority to deprive individuals of their federally guaranteed rights

and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.” Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992).

The Supreme Court has held that “government officials performing discretionary functions generally

are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity shields public officials from

facing the burdens of litigation and is an immunity from suit, not simply a defense to a plaintiff’s

claims. Serna v. Colorado Dept. of Corrections, 455 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir. 2006). The Tenth

Circuit applies a two-step analysis to determine if a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. A

plaintiff must show that the defendant’s actions violated a specific constitutional right and, if the

plaintiff has shown that a constitutional violation occurred, the plaintiff must show that the

constitutional right was clearly established when the conduct occurred. Toevs. v. Reid, 685 F.3d

903, 909 (10th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff bears the burden to prove that his constitutional rights were

violated and that the law giving rise to his claim was clearly established at the time the acts occurred.

Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d 1231, 1246 (10th Cir. 2015); Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th

Cir. 2001).

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Plaintiff claims that he was unlawfully arrested in violation of the Fourth Amendment (sixth

claim for relief). The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure... . against

unreasonable searches and seizures ....” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In the context of a false arrest

claim, “an arrestee’s constitutional rights were violated if the arresting officer acted in the absence

of probable cause that the person had committed a crime.” Kaufman v. Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1300

(10th Cir. 2012). Probable cause exists when a police officer has sufficient information “to warrant

a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck

v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). This is an objective standard and a court must consider the totality

of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable officer would have believed there was

probable cause to make an arrest. Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011).

Probable cause “is measured at the moment the arrest occurs and must derive from facts and

circumstances based on reasonably trustworthy information.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108,

1121 (10th Cir. 2007). Once probable cause is established, a police officer is not required to search

for exculpatory evidence before arresting a suspect. Id. A defendant is entitled to qualified

immunity from a false arrest claim if there was “arguable probable cause” to make an arrest.

Kaufman, 697 F.3d at 1300. “Arguable probable cause is another way of saying that the officers’

conclusions rest on an objectively reasonable, even if mistaken, belief that probable cause exists.”

Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2014). “The proper inquiry ina § 1983 claim

based on false arrest is not whether the person arrested actually committed an offense, but whether

the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that he had.” Crawford ex. rel. Crawford v.

Kansas City, Kansas, 952 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (D. Kan. 1997) (citing Dowling v. City of

Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988)).

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest will fail if Anderson arguably had probable cause

to arrest plaintiff for any crime, even if the Anderson was allegedly mistaken about certain facts.

A.M. v. Holmes, 830 F.3d 1123, 1139-40 (10th Cir. 2016) (qualified immunity determination is

governed by a standard of arguable probable cause, and officer will be entitled to qualified immunity

even if mistaken about the existence of actual probable cause). Therefore, plaintiff will not be able

to show that his constitutional rights were violated if the facts alleged in his complaint support a

finding that Anderson had probable cause to arrest him for any crime at the time of the alleged

incident.

Plaintiff alleges that he was “attending a family gathering” when, “[d]ue to a report of a

disturbance,” Tulsa County Sheriff’s officers were dispatched to the gathering, and Anderson

“detained [plaintiff] and handcuffed [plaintiff].” Dkt. 2, at 2. Based on these facts, the complaint

alleges, Anderson “unlawfully ordered [plaintiff] to be placed under arrest without any articulable

probable cause of an offense which unlawfully seized [plaintiff].” Id. at 9. Accepting these alleged

facts as true and construing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Court finds that

plaintiff has failed to allege facts that support a finding that his constitutional rights were violated

by his arrest. Plaintiff claims that he was arrested without probable cause. He has alleged facts that

support that he was arrested, but has not alleged facts that support that it was done without probable

cause. As is it plaintiff’s burden to allege facts that support a finding that Anderson violated

plaintiff’s constitutional right, which in this case includes the element that Anderson did not have

probable cause, his § 1983 claim for unlawful arrest should be dismissed.

Defendant asks the Court to find that Anderson is entitled to qualified immunity and to

dismiss plaintiff’s claim with prejudice. Dkt. # 12, at 4; Dkt. # 17. While plaintiff failed to allege

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facts to support that he was unlawfully arrested, the Court makes no finding as to whether there was

probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Just as plaintiffs complaint fails to state sufficient facts to allege

claim of unlawful arrest, it also lacks facts necessary for the Court to determine whether Anderson

is entitled to qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation. Instead, the Court’s finding 1s that

plaintiff's complaint is simply devoid of the facts necessary to make any conclusion as to whether

there was probable cause to arrest plaintiff. Therefore, count six should be dismissed without

prejudice, and plaintiff should have an opportunity to amend his complaint with additional facts in

support of his unlawful arrest claim, specifically as they relate to whether Anderson had probable

cause to arrest plaintiff.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 12) is moot

in part, granted in part, and denied in part as follows: moot as to all claims against Regalado

(counts two, three, and five); granted without objection as to count five against Anderson, and count

five is dismissed without prejudice; and granted in part’ as to plaintiffs 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim

for unlawful arrest (count six), which is dismissed without prejudice and plaintiff is granted leave

to amend his complaint.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's separate claim for punitive damages (count

four) against defendant Anderson is dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Count

one, including a request for punitive damages, is plaintiff's only claim remaining at this time.

DATED this 26th day of April, 2023. YD

CLAIRE V.EAGAN \—

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

> Defendant’s motion is granted in part as to count six because Anderson asked the Court to

dismiss the claim with prejudice, but the Court is dismissing it without prejudice.