Feenstra v. Sigler

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

AMANDA FEENSTRA and SHARONICA

CARTER,

Plaintiffs,

v. Case No. 4:19-cv-00234-JAR-CDL

JARED SIGLER, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Jane A. Restani, Judge*:

This case involves the procedures used in Washington County, Oklahoma, to

collect costs, fines, and fess related to criminal proceedings. Plaintiffs Amanda

Feenstra (“Feenstra”) and Sharonica Carter (“Carter”) seek declaratory and

injunctive relief against three judges of the District Court of Washington County

(“State Judges”) for violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United

States Constitution, the Oklahoma Constitution, and Oklahoma law. Specifically,

plaintiffs allege that Judge Linda Thomas, Associate Judge Russell Vaclaw, and

Special Judge Jared Sigler engaged in misconduct while administering costs, fines,

and fees associated with prior criminal convictions.1 Before the court are cross-

* Jane A. Restani, Judge for the United States Court of International Trade, sitting

by designation.

1 Plaintiffs also brought their initial action against former Judge Curtis DeLapp,

but terminated Judge DeLapp from this action on January 31, 2020, after plaintiffs

filed the amended complaint. Am. Compl., ECF No. 66 (Jan. 31, 2020) (“Compl.”).

motions for summary judgment. Def. Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 102 (Feb. 22, 2021)

(“Def. Br.”); Pl. Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 104 (Feb. 23, 2021) (“Pl. Br.”).

JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiffs seek relief for violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343. Compl. at ¶ 21.

Plaintiffs also assert the court’s supplemental jurisdiction over the related state court

claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Compl. at ¶ 21.

The court shall grant summary judgment if there is no genuine dispute of

material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a). When considering summary judgment, the court must view all facts

and inferences drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving

party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v.

S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)). Only disputes over material facts,

however, preclude summary judgment. Id. at 248.

Parties may dispute facts using any evidentiary materials listed in Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), except the pleadings themselves. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). While the form of the evidence need not be

admissible, the content or substance of the evidence must be admissible. Thomas v.

Int’l Bus. Machines, 48 F.3d 478, 485 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex Corp., 477 U.S.

at 324). If a party fails to properly support an asserted fact or dispute an opposing

party’s asserted fact, the court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the

motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2).

Article III of the Constitution, however, necessitates that courts decline to

exercise jurisdiction “where the award of any requested relief would be moot—i.e.,

where the controversy is no longer live and ongoing.” Cox v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 43

F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S.

472, 477–78 (1990)). A court must decide whether a case is moot as to “each form of

relief sought.” Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1314 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing

Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006)). A claim will be deemed moot

unless a “proper judicial resolution” settles “some dispute which affects the behavior

of the defendant towards the plaintiff.” Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987).

As the Supreme Court explained in O’Shea v. Littleton, “[p]ast exposure to illegal

conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive

relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing present adverse effects.” 414 U.S. 488,

495–96 (1974). The crucial question is whether granting a present determination of

the issues offered will have some effect in the real world. Smith v. Becerra, 44 F.4th

1238, 1247 (10th Cir. 2022) (citing Citizens for Responsible Gov't State Political

Action Comm. v. Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000)).

UNDISPUTED FACTS

The court draws the following undisputed material facts from the record.

I. Plaintiff Amanda Feenstra

On April 29, 2015, Feenstra2 pled guilty to three criminal counts and agreed

to pay costs, fines, and fees as part of the plea agreement. Pl. Br. at ¶ 68–70; Def. Br.

2 At the time, Feenstra was known by her maiden name Ackerson.

at ¶ 1. After leaving custody in January 2017, Feenstra reported to the District Court

of Washington County for a costs and fines review and signed an installment plan

agreement requiring that she pay $50 every month. Pl. Br. at ¶ 82–85; Def. Br. at ¶

2. Feenstra did not appear before any judge prior to the signing and imposition of

the initial installment plan. Id. On May 12, 2017, Feenstra appeared before Judge

Sigler for a cost docket proceeding. Pl. Br. at ¶ 86; Def. Br. at ¶ 3. At this proceeding,

although the court lowered Feenstra’s payments from $50 per month to $40 per

month, Judge Sigler noted that if Feenstra “couldn’t pay it, then [she] would go to

jail.” Pl. Br. at ¶ 87–88 (citing Pl. Br., Ex. 5 at 52:12-53:2); Def. Br. at ¶ 3.

A year later, on May 4, 2018, Feenstra failed to appear at a cost docket

proceeding. Pl. Br. at ¶ 91; Def. Br. at ¶ 5. In response, the District Court of

Washington County issued a bench warrant with the words “FAILURE TO PAY”

listed in bold at the top of the order. Pl. Br. at ¶ 91; Def. Br., Ex. 9. The warrant set

a cash bond of $330. Id. On or about May 9, 2018, Feenstra contacted Judge Sigler’s

clerk and became aware of the missed proceeding and warrant, and asked what she

should do to resolve the matter. Pl. Br. at ¶ 93; Def. Resp. Br. at ¶ 93, ECF No. 112

(Mar. 29, 2021) (“Def. Resp. Br.”). Judge Sigler’s clerk informed Feenstra that she

either needed to pay the warrant or come to the court to speak to Judge Sigler about

the matter. Pl. Br. at ¶ 92–94; Def. Resp. Br. at ¶ 92–94. Feenstra and her husband

immediately went to the courthouse, and while waiting to speak to Judge Sigler, a

police officer arrested her and explained that Judge Sigler did not “have time to talk

to [her].” Pl. Br. at ¶ 95; Def. Resp. Br. ¶ 95. Unable to pay the $330 bond, Feenstra

was held overnight in jail and spoke to Judge Sigler the following day. Pl. Br. at ¶

96; Def. Resp. Br. ¶ 96. Feenstra then informed Judge Sigler that she was unable to

pay; Judge Sigler, however, responded that “it wasn’t his problem” and remanded

Feenstra to jail “for failure to pay fines and costs.” Pl. Br. at ¶ 97 (citing Pl. Br., Ex.

5 at 73:24–74:19); Def. Resp. Br. ¶ 97; Def. Br. at ¶ 6; Def. Br., Ex. 10. One day later,

Feenstra’s husband secured $330, paid the bond, and Feenstra was released. Pl. Br.

at ¶ 98; Def. Br. at ¶ 6.

After May 2018, Feenstra either appeared at or rescheduled all fines and cost

reviews, until December 11, 2020, when she appeared seeking relief from financial

obligations. Pl. Br. at ¶ 106; Def. Br. at ¶ 7–10. The case was assigned to Judge

Gibson in Nowata County and Judge Gibson vacated Feenstra’s outstanding amounts

of fines, fees, and costs owed under 22 O.S. § 983(a) on December 16, 2020. Pl. Br. at

¶ 106; Def. Br. at ¶ 10–11; Def. Br., Ex. 15. Feenstra has no outstanding debt before

the District Court of Washington County. Id.

II. Plaintiff Sharonica Carter

On September 22, 2011, Carter pled no contest to a youthful offender charge of

attempted robbery. Pl. Br. at ¶ 34; Def. Br. at ¶ 12–13. As part of her plea, Carter

agreed to pay fines and costs associated with the charge. Pl. Br. at ¶ 35; Def. Resp.

Br. ¶ 35. Carter was released from custody on October 31, 2013, and signed an

installment payment plan on November 20, 2013. Pl. Br. at ¶ 41–43; Def. Br. at ¶

14–15. After failing to make two payments, Carter appeared at a cost docket

proceeding before Judge DeLapp on January 9, 2014. Pl. Br. at ¶ 46; Def. Resp. Br.

at ¶ 46. Despite Carter’s explanation that she could not pay because she did not have

any money and could not find a job, Judge DeLapp ordered Carter incarcerated and

set a bond for her release in the amount of $150. Pl. Br. at ¶ 47–50; Def. Resp. Br. at

¶ 47–50. Carter was released shortly after incarceration once her mother paid the

bond amount. Pl. Br. at ¶ 51; Def. Resp. Br. at ¶ 51.

Carter signed a new installment plan on October 17, 2017, for $75 per month

despite explaining at the time of signing that she “couldn’t pay $75.” Pl. Br. at ¶ 54;

Def. Br. at ¶ 19. On March 2, 2018, the District Court of Washington County issued

a bench warrant with a $250 bond for Carter after she failed to appear for a fines and

costs review. Def. Br. at ¶ 21; Pl. Resp. Br. at ¶ 21, ECF No. 110 (Mar. 29, 2021) (“Pl.

Resp. Br.”). On April 4, 2018, the District Court of Washington County recalled the

bench warrant after Carter contacted the court and received a new fines and costs

review. Def. Br. at ¶ 24; Pl. Resp. Br. at ¶ 22.

As of June 22, 2023, all outstanding bench warrants issued by the District

Court of Washington County against Carter have been recalled. Def. Supp. Br. Reply.

at 1–2, ECF No. 150 (July 21, 2023); Court Docket, State v. Carter, Docket No. YO-

2011-01 (Okla. Dist. Ct. July 5, 2023). Additionally, Judge Guten has issued an order

granting the waiver of Carter’s outstanding financial obligations and Carter has no

remaining debt. Order Discharging Debt, State v. Carter, Docket No. YO-2011-01

(Okla. Dist. Ct. July 19, 2023).

III. Standard Court Procedures Regarding the “Cost Docket”

From 2007 to 2017 Judge DeLapp presided over thousands of fines and costs

hearings against criminal defendants in the District Court of Washington County.

Pl. Br., Ex. 1 at 24:19–25:1 (“Delapp Depo”); Pl. Br. at ¶ 1–2. Def. Resp. Br. at ¶ 1–2.

Judge DeLapp had the practice of setting a bond for any overdue amount and

remanding an individual to jail if he or she did not pay the bond amount upfront. Pl.

Br. at ¶ 21–22; Def. Resp. Br. at ¶ 21–22. Judge Sigler, upon joining the District

Court of Washington County January 2017, jailed some individuals for failure to pay

fines and costs, but reevaluated the practice after Judge DeLapp’s retirement in

August 2018. Pl. Br. at ¶ 29; Def. Resp. Br. at ¶ 29.

Judge Linda Thomas was sworn into office in January 2019 and began

reviewing the fines and costs procedures at the court. Def. Br. at ¶ 35–36; Pl. Resp.

Br. at ¶ 35–36. Since then, no person has been remanded to jail for failure to pay

fines, fees, or costs. Def. Br. at ¶ 39; Pl. Resp. Br. at ¶ 39. Under the court’s current

procedures, as advised by Judge Thomas’s review, if a defendant fails to make his or

her monthly payment and fails to appear for the fines and costs review hearing as

previously ordered, the Costs Administrator sends a one-time courtesy letter

reminding the defendant of their duty to pay and instructing them to contact the

court. Def. Br. at ¶ 37(g), Ex. 44 at ¶ 5; Pl. Resp. Br. at ¶ 37(g). If the defendant does

not call the court as directed or fails to appear at the subsequent hearing, a

“FAILURE TO APPEAR” warrant is issued with a bond amount of $50. Id. If a

defendant is incarcerated for failure to appear and the bond amount is not paid, the

defendant receives a $25 credit per day served and is released after two days in jail.

Id. Finally, the defendant receives a $50 credit towards satisfaction of the remaining

balance of fines, fees, and costs. Id.

Additionally, the Oklahoma Legislature passed an amendment to 22 O.S. § 983

and the amendment goes into effect November 1, 2023. See COURT FINANCIAL

OBLIGATIONS, 2023 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 247 (H.B. 2259) (WEST) (amending

22 O.S. § 983). Section 983(J) of the amended law allows a court to impose a jail

sentence only after a cost hearing is conducted on the record pursuant to the rules

promulgated by the Court of Criminal Appeals, and the defendant is represented by

counsel or expressly waives his or her right to counsel. Id.; 22 O.S. § 983(J)(3)

(effective Nov. 1, 2023).

DISCUSSION

I. Federal Law Claims

In their complaint, the plaintiffs allege the following claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983: Count 1 alleges a violation of Feenstra’s right to due process by the State

Judges’ failure to provide notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to arrest and

detention; Count 2 alleges a violation of Feenstra and Carter’s right to due process

by punishing them solely on the basis of poverty.3 Compl. at ¶¶ 60–71. For relief,

plaintiffs request: a judgment in favor of plaintiffs; permanent injunctive relief to

prevent defendants from engaging in the unlawful and unconstitutional acts alleged;

declaratory judgment that defendants’ conduct as alleged is unlawful; vacatur of all

3 Defendants argue that Carter’s claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Def.

Br. at 16–18. In view of the jurisdictional ruling, the court does not address this

anew.

outstanding fines, fees and costs currently outstanding; plaintiffs’ reasonable

attorney’s fees; all costs of this action; and any such other relief the court deems just

and proper. As stated in the court’s prior opinion and order on the motion to dismiss,

plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief with respect to the federal claims fails.4 See

Opinion and Order at 22, ECF No. 47 (Nov. 13, 2019); see also, Knox v. Bland, 632

F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011).

Plaintiffs’ claim for a declaratory judgment, however, is not barred.5 The

Tenth Circuit has continued to recognize that judicial immunity is not a bar to

declaratory relief under § 1983. Lawrence v. Kuenhold, 271 Fed. Appx. 763, 766 (10th

Cir. 2008) (citing Schepp v. Fremont County, 900 F.2d 1448, 1452 (10th Cir. 1990)).

Defendants, however, argue that plaintiffs’ request for a declaratory judgment is

moot. Def. Br. at 18–23. Accordingly, the court examines whether it has jurisdiction

to address the claim for declaratory relief.

4 Under the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, injunctive relief against judges

“shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief

was unavailable.” Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996), codified

at 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Here, no declaratory decree was violated and plaintiffs have not

argued that, assuming jurisdiction, declaratory relief would not be available.

Injunctive relief is not available here under § 1983.

5 Defendants wrongly assert that state judges in their official capacities are not

persons under § 1983. While it is true that the state court itself is not a “person”

under § 1983 as the court is an arm of the state, the plaintiffs are not suing the court

itself. Harris v. Champion, 51 F.3d 901, 906 (10th Cir. 1995). Rather, this action is

against the defendants in their official capacity, and “official capacity actions for

prospective relief are not treated as actions against the state.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t

of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.10 (1989) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.

159, 167 n.14 (1985)). Accordingly, the defendants are “persons” for the purposes of

prospective relief under § 1983.

A. Declaratory Relief

The defendants hinge their mootness argument on two points: first, defendants

argue that under the doctrine of constitutional mootness the action is moot because

there is no live controversy; second defendants argue that under the doctrine of

prudential mootness the action is moot because the District Court of Washington

County willingly updated its procedures to prevent potential future constitutional

violations. Id. at 21, 23. Plaintiffs contend that the processes implemented by

defendants are “easily-undone” and that the processes may still result in

constitutional violations. Pl. Resp. Br. at 17–18. Additionally, plaintiffs argue both

Feenstra and Carter continue to suffer from unredressed injuries such as “extant

public records that portray them falsely as willful violators of valid court orders.” Id.

at 26.6

The Declaratory Judgment Act states in the pertinent part that, “[i]n a case of

actual controversy within its jurisdiction . . . , any court of the United States, upon

the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations

of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or

could be sought.” 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The Tenth Circuit has observed that this text

presents two separate hurdles for parties seeking a declaratory judgment to

6 Plaintiffs did not assert in their complaint a claim for expungement of state

records, which is in the nature of injunctive relief and not available under § 1983.

Further, this action is not against the state and to the extent any such relief is

within the judicial power of this court with respect to the named defendants, comity

considerations also apply and weigh against taking jurisdiction. See infra

Discussion § II.

overcome. Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir. 2008)

(citing Kunkel v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 866 F.2d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 1989)). First, a

declaratory judgment plaintiff must present the court with a suit based on an “actual

controversy,” a requirement the Supreme Court has repeatedly equated to the

Constitution’s case-or-controversy requirement. Id. (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. of

Hartford, Conn. V. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–40 (1937)). This first hurdle is often

referred to as “constitutional mootness.” See e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v.

Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1121–22 (10th Cir. 2010). Second, even where

a constitutionally cognizable controversy exists, the Act stipulates only that “district

courts ‘may’—not ‘must’—make a declaration on the merits of the controversy,”

granting district courts the discretion to consider a number of case-specific factors in

deciding whether or not to exercise their statutory declaratory judgment authority.

Surefoot, 531 F.3d at 1240 (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979,

982–83 (10th Cir. 1994)). This second hurdle is often referred to as “prudential

mootness.” See e.g., Rio Grande, 601 F.3d at 1121–22.

The court first addresses constitutional mootness. A declaratory judgment suit

“must be ‘definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse

legal interests,’ must be ‘real and substantial and admit of specific relief through a

decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from having an opinion advising

what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.’” Surefoot, 531 F.3d at 1244

(quoting MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)). Simply put,

a declaratory judgement action is not constitutionally moot when it results in the

“settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the

plaintiff.” Rio Grande, 601 F.3d at 1109–10 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Cox v. Phelps

Dodge Corp, 43 F.3d 1345, 1348 (10th Cir. 1994)). Here, however, there is no ongoing

behavior by defendants that will affect these plaintiffs.

Without speculating, the court has no reason to believe Feenstra or Carter will

appear before the defendants in the future. Both parties agree that Feenstra has no

outstanding debt before the District Court of Washington County, and plaintiffs do

not argue that Feenstra will appear before the defendants for another reason. Supra

at Undisputed Facts § I. Similarly, as of July 19, 2023, Carter has no outstanding

debt before the District Court of Washington County, and plaintiffs do not argue that

Carter will appear before the defendants for another reason. Supra at Undisputed

Facts § II. While plaintiffs argue that they maintain an interest in the litigation,

plaintiffs do not assert that the defendants will interact with the plaintiffs in the

future absent outstanding warrants or debt. Pl. Supp. Br. Resp. at 9–10. Absent any

likelihood of ongoing behavior, no constitutionally cognizable controversy exists here.

Assuming arguendo that Article III of the constitution is satisfied, the doctrine

of prudential mootness gives the court discretion not to grant relief when

considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counsel

the court to stay its hand. Rio Grande, 601 F.3d at 1121 (citing Fletcher v. U.S., 116

F.3d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir. 1997)). Specifically, the court may consider factors such

as:

[1] whether a declaratory action would settle the controversy; [2]

whether it would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations

at issue; [3] whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the

purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to provide an arena for a race to res

judicata ”; [4] whether use of a declaratory action would increase friction

between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach upon

state jurisdiction; and [5] whether there is an alternative remedy which

is better or more effective.

Surefoot, 531 f.3d at 1248 (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979,

983 (10th Cir. 1994)). As the Tenth Circuit explained, even if a case is not

constitutionally moot, “any party invoking the equitable remedial powers of the

federal courts must still ‘satisfy the court that relief is needed,’ and when it comes to

assessing that question, a remedial promise always qualifies as ‘one of the factors to

be considered.’” Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1211–12

(10th Cir. 2012) (quoting U.S. v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632–33 (1953)). Here,

a declaratory judgment is not necessary to prevent future constitutional violations.

The changes defendants have implemented, as well as the passage of the

amendment to 22 O.S. § 983, indicate a constitutional violation is unlikely to recur.

Although plaintiffs speculate as to ways that the current procedures may result in

the deprivation of rights, either through lack of sufficient notice or through

punishment on the basis of poverty, defendants have provided undisputed evidence

that in the past four years no person has been remanded to jail for failure to pay fines,

fees, or costs. Pl. Opp. To Def. Supp. Br. at 7–9, ECF No. 149 (July 7, 2023) (“Pl.

Supp. Br. Resp.”); supra at Undisputed Facts § III. The amendment 22 O.S. § 983

takes additional steps to ensure this practice continues by outlawing the imposition

of jail sentences without a hearing where the defendant has the opportunity to be

represented by counsel. 22 O.S. § 983(J) (2023). Thus, it is clear that both the District

Court of Washington County and the Oklahoma Legislature have taken steps to

address the risk of constitutional violations. Considering these actions, the

controversy here is prudentially moot.

The evidence before the court at this stage indicates that Feenstra and Carter

were likely punished for poverty.7 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that Feenstra or Carter

will appear before the defendants again, and the state has taken apparently

successful steps to prevent future constitutional violations. In consideration of these

factors, plaintiffs’ request for declaratory relief is moot as judicially resolving this

dispute is unlikely to have a real-world impact and is likely unnecessary considering

the actions of coordinate branches of government.8 Accordingly, the federal claims

are dismissed.

II. State Law Claims

In addition to their § 1983 claim, plaintiffs have also alleged various state law

claims. The court, however, has disposed of all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), a federal district court may decline

7 The Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause prohibit incarceration for

nonpayment of court debt absent a finding that nonpayment was willful and not due

to poverty. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671–73 (1983). Here, Feenstra and

Carter were each incarcerated despite attempts to inform the court of their poverty,

and in neither case did the court undertake efforts to investigate Feenstra or Carter’s

poverty and potential inability to pay, nor did it explore any alternatives to

incarceration. Def. Br. at ¶¶ 1, 16; Pl. Resp. Br. at ¶¶ 1, 16. Although the order itself

utilized standard language that the nonpayment was willful, there is no evidence that

the defendants undertook efforts to establish that fact. See e.g., Def. Br. at Ex. 10;

see generally supra Undisputed Facts §1, 2.

8 The court does not imply that there is no type of relief that would have a real-world

impact. That relief, however, is not available under § 1983.

supplemental jurisdiction when it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original

jurisdiction.” Although the court recognizes that it has discretion to retain

jurisdiction over supplemental state law claims in some circumstances,

“[supplemental] jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiffs’ right.” United

Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

A federal district court should consider at every stage of the litigation “the

values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity” in order to determine

the appropriateness of maintaining jurisdiction. Carnegie-Mellon University v.

Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988) (superseded on other grounds by statute as

recognized in Fent v. Okla. Water. Res. Bd., 235 F.3d 533, 557 (10th Cir. 2000). The

Tenth Circuit has stated that “a district court should normally dismiss supplemental

state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed, particularly when the

federal claims are dismissed before trial.” Foxfield Villa Assocs., LLC v. Robben, 967

F.3d 1082, 1103 (10th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 209 L.Ed. 2d 128, 141 S. Ct. 1385 (2021)

(quoting United States v. Botefuhr, 309 F.3d 1263, 1273 (10th Cir. 2002)).

Here, the court does not have original jurisdiction over any of the surviving

causes of action under the Oklahoma Constitution and Oklahoma law. The parties

dispute, however, whether the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Rules provide a

separate or private cause of action. Def. Br. at 32; Pl. Resp. Br. at 36. Additionally,

the parties dispute the availability of relief under the Oklahoma state appeals

process. Def. Br. at 30–31; Pl. Resp. Br. at 28 n.7. Lastly, this court is already

laboring under the administrative strain on its docket following the Supreme Court

decision McGirt v. Oklahoma, 207 L.Ed. 2d 985, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020). Because of

the administrative demands on this court, the important state-law issues that are

best resolved by the Oklahoma courts, and the general disfavor for retaining

supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims prior to trial, the court finds that

declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is appropriate in this case.

This case was removed from the District Court of Washington County, State of

Oklahoma, thus the court may dismiss plaintiffs’ remaining claims or remand the

case to the state court for further proceedings. Robles v. City of Fort Wayne, 113 F.3d

732, 738 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is clear that a district court retains the discretion to

dismiss as well as to remand such claims.”) (citing Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill,

484 U.S. 343, 353–54 (1988)); Thompson v. City of Shawnee, 464 F. App'x 720, 726

(10th Cir. 2012) (“The district court had discretion either to remand the claims to the

state court or to dismiss them.”). As the court cannot readily determine that the state

law claims have no merit, remand is appropriate in this case.

CONCLUSION

Based on the summary judgment record, plaintiffs’ federal claims are

dismissed as moot. Only state law claims remain, and because the court declines to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over those claims, the case is remanded to the

District Court of Washington County, Oklahoma. The court is neither unmindful nor

unsympathetic to the injuries experienced by the plaintiffs. The fact remains,

however, that any remaining injury is not redressable under § 1983. In the light of

the foregoing, it is

ORDERED that defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. # 102) is

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is granted to the extent that

the court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiffs federal claims; and denied to the extent

that the court does not reach the state law claims; and it is further

ORDERED that plaintiffs’ state law claims are REMANDED to the District

Court of Washington County, State of Oklahoma, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).

The Clerk of the Court is directed to take all necessary actions required to remand

the remaining portion of this case to the District Court of Washington County, State

of Oklahoma.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 7th day of September 2023.

/s/ Jane A. Restani

Jane A. Restani, Judge

Dated: September 7, 2023

New York, New York