Carter v. Littlefield

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

THOMAS JEREMIAH CARTER,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-cv-365-JFH-JFJ

ALICIA LITTLEFIED, KENNETH

WRIGHT, RANDALL YATES,

CAROLINE M. WEAVER, ADRIANO

CORONEL, and GLEN MULREADY,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Now before the Court are two separate motions seeking dismissal of Plaintiff Thomas

Jeremiah Carter’s Second Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 40; Dkt. No. 49. For the reasons set

forth herein, the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Adriano Coronel (“Coronel”), Alicia

Littlefield (“Littlefield”), Glenn Mulready (“Mulready”), Kenneth Wright (“Wright”), and Randall

Yates (“Yates”) [Dkt. No. 40] and the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Caroline Weaver

(“Weaver”) [Dkt. No. 49] are GRANTED.

Procedural History

On July 27, 2020, Plaintiff Thomas Jeremiah Carter (“Plaintiff”) filed his original

Complaint in this matter. Dkt. No. 2. Shortly thereafter, several defendants filed a motion to

dismiss. Dkt. No. 8. Plaintiff obtained leave to amend his original and subsequent pleading,1 and

his Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”) is now the operative pleading in this matter. Dkt.

No. 34. Because the original motion to dismiss was rendered moot by the amendment of the

1 Dkt. Nos. 25, 28, 30, 32.

original complaint, the Court has not yet addressed the merits of any challenges to Plaintiff’s

claims. See Dkt. No. 36.

Factual Background

Plaintiff alleges that, while that he was working as an after-hours security guard and check-

in manager at Pine Island RV Resort (“Pine Island”) in May of 2016, he became involved in a

dispute with Elizabeth Sheply (“Sheply”), a resident and employee of Pine Island. Dkt. No. 34 at

⁋⁋ 20-22. Sheply called the Delaware County Sheriff’s Department, and the Sheriff dispatched a

deputy to investigate. Id. at ⁋⁋ 20-25. An information was filed concerning the altercation and a

warrant was issued for Plaintiff’s arrest. See id. at pp. 74-79 (Exs. 9-11). Plaintiff claims he was

not aware of the warrant until early 2019. Id. at ⁋ 81.

Two Petitions for Protective Order were filed following the dispute between Plaintiff and

Sheply. The first, filed by Sheply, was dismissed soon after filing. Id. at pp. 37-44 (Ex. 2). The

second was filed by another individual associated with Pine Island, Boyd Stover (“Stover”). Id. at

55-71 (Exs. 5-7).2 It is not clear when Plaintiff first became aware of the Petition filed by Sheply,

but it is evident from the Complaint that Plaintiff did know about, and hired counsel to represent

him in connection with, the Petition filed by Stover. Id. at ⁋⁋ 28-29.

Nearly three years later, in February 2019, Plaintiff received a letter from an employment

firm informing him—apparently for the first time—that a warrant had been issued for his arrest.

Id. at ⁋⁋ 18, 81. Soon after receiving that letter, Plaintiff filed a Freedom of Information Act

(“FOIA”) request with Delaware County Clerk Caroline Weaver. The FOIA request sought

information concerning Judge Alicia Littlefield, District Attorney Kenneth Wright, former

2 Although the Petition uses a different middle name, it appears from the exhibits that this Petition

refers to Plaintiff.

Oklahoma District Attorney Randall Yates, and Sheriff Harlan Moore, all of whom were identified

in the documents associated with the 2016 criminal proceedings. Id. at ⁋ 32; id. at p. 74

(Information by Wright with a signature block bearing the name Randall Yates); id. at p. 78

(Finding of Probable Cause executed by Judge Littlefield).3 Additional FOIA requests and other

requests were sent to Oklahoma Insurance Commissioner Glen Mulready and the Oklahoma Risk

Management Office (“ORM”), where Adriano Coronel is employed. Id. at ⁋⁋ 33-35, 37-41.

Plaintiff claims none of the Defendants provided any substantive responses to his various FOIA

and discovery requests. Id. at ⁋⁋ 32-38.4

Analysis

Broadly speaking, Plaintiff claims that the Defendants engaged in tortious conduct during

the proceedings that gave rise to the warrant, which Plaintiff suggests was improperly obtained,

was issued without affording Plaintiff due process, and was improperly made public. E.g., id. at

⁋⁋ 46-49. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendants violated his rights by enforcing, or

threatening to enforce, the Protective Orders filed against him, e.g., id. at ⁋⁋ 54-55, by failing to

respond to discovery and other requests, e.g., id. at ⁋⁋ 90-91, and by initiating, failing to retract,

and refusing to provide additional time to gather evidence concerning an ORM tort claim

proceeding, id. at ⁋⁋ 80-81. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ behavior constitutes a violation of

3 Although Plaintiff does not specifically discuss how Littlefield, Wright, or Yates were involved

in these proceedings, their names appear on the Information and Finding of Probable Cause. These

documents, which are attached to the Complaint as exhibits, are “considered part of the complaint

and may be considered in a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1112 (10th

Cir. 1991); see Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c).

4 It appears that one of Plaintiff’s inquiries was construed as an attempt to file a claim pursuant to

the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. The ORM, through Coronel, informed Plaintiff

that a claim had been initiated on his behalf and asked Plaintiff to submit evidence in connection

with that claim. Dkt. No. 43 at ⁋⁋ 39-41; id. at pp. 95-110 (Exs. 15-20). The claim was ultimately

denied.

42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

(“RICO”), and various other state and federal laws.

The Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not stated a claim for relief under any cognizable

legal theory, that Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred, and that all Defendants are entitled to qualified

and statutory immunity. Dkt. No. 40 at 6-10; Dkt. No. 49 at 3-14. In addition, Defendants

Littlefield, Wright, Yates, Coronel, and Mulready argue that any claims brought against them in

their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Dkt. No.

40 at 8-10. Finally, Defendants Littlefield, Wright, and Yates submit that they are entitled to

absolute immunity, as the allegations against them concern actions taken in their official capacities.

Dkt. No. 40 at 4-5. Having reviewed the Parties’ briefing, the Complaint, and the exhibits thereto,

the Court will address each of these arguments in turn.

A. Plaintiff’s Claims Against Littlefield, Wright, Yates, Coronel, and Mulready in

their Official Capacities are Dismissed with Prejudice

The question of whether Defendants Littlefield, Wright, Yates, Coronel, and Mulready (the

“State Defendants”) are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment is a threshold one

addressed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Davis v.

California, No. 17-2125-JAR-JPO, 2017 WL 4758928, at *1 (D. Kan. Oct. 20, 2017). Generally

speaking, the Eleventh Amendment shields states from, and deprives this Court of jurisdiction

over, claims in which private citizens seeks money damages from a sovereign state. See Robbins

v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 438 F.3d 1074, 1080 (10th Cir. 2006); Opala v. Watt, 454 F.3d

1154, 1157 (10th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that “[n]onconsenting States may not be sued by private

individuals in federal court” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). This shield extends to claims

against state officers, like the State Defendants, to the extent those officers are sued in their official

capacities. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985). Such claims are, in effect, claims

against the state itself, and the Eleventh Amendment does not permit a plaintiff to accomplish

indirectly what it cannot do by suing a state directly. Id.

There are exceptions to the general rule, two of which may apply in the context of claims

for damages against state employees.5 The State may expressly waive its sovereign immunity, or

Congress may override it. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 169. “[A]bsent waiver by the State or valid

congressional override, the Eleventh Amendment bars a damages action against a State in federal

court.” Id.

None of the exceptions to sovereign immunity apply here. Oklahoma has not waived its

Eleventh Amendment immunity. Instead, Oklahoma has expressed its intent to maintain sovereign

immunity for itself, its political subdivisions, and its employees acting within the scope of their

employment, except as specifically set forth in the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act

(“OGTCA”). See 51 Okla. Stat. §§ 151 et seq.; Gradle v. Oklahoma, 203 F. App’x 179, 183 (10th

Cir. 2006). Furthermore, Congress has not abrogated Oklahoma’s sovereign immunity with

respect to any of the claims set forth in the Complaint. See, e.g., Patillo v. Larned State Hosp.,

462 F. App’x 780, 783 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming dismissal of claims against state entities on the

grounds that the state entities’ immunity “had not been abrogated or waived in connection with §§

1981, 1983, 1985, or 1986”); Ash v. Buttigieg, No. CIV-22-371-R, 2022 WL 17225732, at *2

(W.D. Okla. Oct. 24, 2022) (recognizing that “claims brought under RICO and 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)

for damages against government officials require a waiver of sovereign immunity”). Because there

5 Claims against individuals acting in their official capacities may also be asserted where the

plaintiff is seeking prospective relief pursuant to Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Opala,

454 F.3d at 1157. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not seek prospective relief, so this exception is

inapplicable. See Reyes v. First Jud. Dist. Attorney’s Off., 497 F. Supp. 3d 994, 1001 (D.N.M.

2020) (recognizing that “for the Ex parte Young exception to apply, Plaintiffs must show that they

are: (1) suing state officials rather than the state itself, (2) alleging an ongoing violation of federal

law, and (3) seeking prospective relief”).

has been no waiver and no Congressional abrogation of Oklahoma’s sovereign immunity, this

Court is without jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims against the State Defendants in their official

capacities.6 Those claims are dismissed with prejudice.

B. Dismissal of the Remaining Claims is not Currently Warranted on Statute of

Limitations Grounds

The Defendants argue that this action is time-barred. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff

specifically alleged that he was unaware of the warrant for his arrest until thirty months after it

issued. See Dkt. No. 34 at ⁋ 81. Given this allegation—which must be accepted as true at this

stage7—it simply cannot be said that the statute of limitations began to run in June of 2016.

Instead, the time period for filing an action began to run approximately thirty months later, around

February 2019. Smith v. City of Enid, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a §

1983 claim accrues “when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her constitutional rights

have been violated” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). There is currently no basis for

dismissing Plaintiff’s claims on statute of limitations grounds.

6 Weaver did not assert an Eleventh Amendment defense in her Motion. See Dkt. No. 49. The

Court presumes that Weaver considers herself a county employee who is not entitled to sovereign

immunity. See Couser v. Gay, 959 F.3d 1018, 1023 (10th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that “county

officers sued for damages in their official capacity are generally not entitled to Eleventh

Amendment immunity”). In certain circumstances, however, a county officer will be immune if

the claim against her will be paid out of the state’s treasury. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp.

v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123 n.34 (1984) (recognizing that the Supreme Court has granted

immunity to county officials where judgment against the county official would have the same

effect as judgment against the state). The Court need not address Weaver’s immunity at this time

in view of the disposition of Weaver’s Motion and the absence of factual allegations suggesting

that the Court’s jurisdiction over Weaver’s claims is in question. See Hennessey v. Univ. of Kansas

Hosp. Auth., 53 F. 4th 516, 531 (10th Cir. 2022) (recognizing that a district court may raise the

issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity sua sponte).

7 See Brooks v. Mentor Worldwide LLC, 985 F.3d 1272, 1281 (10th Cir. 2021).

C. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims are Dismissed Without Prejudice for Failure to State

a Claim for Which Relief may be Granted

Having determined that the Court is without jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims against

the State Defendants in their official capacities, the Court now turns to the question of whether

Plaintiff has satisfied his pleading obligations with respect to his remaining claims. The Court

holds that he has not.

At the pleading stage, it is Plaintiff’s obligation to set forth a “short and plain statement”

showing he is entitled to the relief he seeks. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2). Plaintiff

must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (alteration in original) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). In addition, Plaintiff must demonstrate that his claim for relief is plausible; in other

words, he must allege facts that, if true, would permit a factfinder to conclude that he is entitled to

the relief sought. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Christy Sports, LLC v.

Deer Valley Resort Company, 555 F.3d 1188, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2009). While the Plaintiff need

not recite “detailed factual allegations,” his allegations must amount to more than labels,

conclusions, or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements” of his cause of action. Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

Because Plaintiff challenges the behavior of multiple government actors who allegedly

participated in a conspiracy, it is particularly important that the Complaint “make clear exactly

who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the

basis of the claims against him or her.” Wilson v. Montano, 715 F.3d 847, 852 (10th Cir. 2013)

(alteration in original) (citation and quotation marks omitted). General allegations that a group of

people conspired together to engage in wrongdoing will not pass muster; instead, Plaintiff must

link each alleged wrongdoer to the actions he or she took or the agreements he or she entered. See

Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 996 F. Supp. 1299, 1307-08 (D. Kan. 1998) (noting that the

plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy must establish both the conspirators’ agreement and the

actions taken in pursuit thereof, and concluding the plaintiff’s claims allegations the desk clerk,

which were at most consistent with the alleged conspiracy, failed to meet this standard).

Plaintiff’s pro se status does not lessen his obligation. Although the Court will liberally

construe Plaintiff’s allegations and arguments, the Court cannot “supply additional factual

allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.”

Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1175 (10th Cir. 1997). See also Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110

(recognizing a “broad reading of the plaintiff’s complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of the

burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based”). “[A] pro

se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury,

and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which

relief can be granted.” Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. Bearing these guiding principles in mind, the

Court will address each of Plaintiff’s claims in turn.

1. Conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 241)

Plaintiff first alleges that Defendants Wright, Mulready, Coronel, Littlefield, and Yates

engaged in conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241. But § 241 is a criminal statute that does

not provide for a private right of action. Henry v. Albuquerque Police Dep’t, 49 F. App’x 272,

273 (10th Cir. 2002) (“First, with respect to the claims arising under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 . . . these

criminal statutes, like other such statutes, do not provide for a private civil cause of action. This

holding rests on settled law from this and other circuits.”). The Complaint does not—and cannot—

state a claim for relief under this provision. See McKinney v. Okla. Dep’t of Human Servs., 925

F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991). This claim is dismissed with prejudice.

2. Deprivation of Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants Littlefield, Wright, Yates, Weaver, and Coronel

deprived him of his rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.8 To state a claim under § 1983, a

Plaintiff must allege facts showing that Defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived him

of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Buck v. Rhoades, 598 F. Supp.

3d 1181, 1189 (N.D. Okla. 2022).

Broadly construed, Plaintiff’s Complaint suggests that Defendants deprived him of his

Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process. A procedural due process violation occurs

when a party is deprived of a protected interest without an appropriate level of process. See

Hennigh v. City of Shawnee, 155 F.3d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998). The term “protected” is

significant; not every deprivation of liberty gives rise to a due process violation, as procedural due

process guarantees “apply only to those liberty and property interests encompassed by the

fourteenth amendment.” Brown v. Eppler, 725 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Jacobs,

Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 1991)).

Plaintiff generally asserts that he was deprived of his right to due process with respect to

(a) the warrant issued against him, and (b) the filing of the Petition for Protective Order. See Dkt.

No. 34 at ⁋⁋ 45-48. These allegations are nothing more than formulaic conclusions, which fail to

describe how the Defendants’ conduct deprived Plaintiff of any protected interest. Plaintiff cannot

simply point to the existence of a warrant and a protective order and say his interests were

impaired; he must, at a minimum, allege facts demonstrating how those documents, by either their

8 Plaintiff suggests that 333 U.S. §§ 266-273 & 278 [sic] and 21 Okla. Stat. § 21-142.8 were also

violated by these Defendants. There is no Title 333 of the U.S. Code, and Title 33, which concerns

Navigation and Navigable waters, is inapplicable here. Oklahoma’s Crime Victims Compensation

Act, 21 Okla. Stat. § 142.1 et seq., which provides a method of compensating those who suffer

injury or death due to criminally injurious conduct, is likewise inapplicable.

enforcement or their existence, impacted his liberty. Cf. McDonald v. New Mexico Parole Bd.,

955 F.2d 631, 633-34 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that the petitioner would not be deprived of a

liberty interest by state action, and was not entitled to the corresponding procedural safeguards,

until the warrant was executed, and the petitioner was taken into custody). Because Plaintiff has

not alleged facts demonstrating how the warrant and protective order impaired his liberty or

another protected interest, his Complaint fails to state a viable due process claim. See United

States v. Gomez-Diaz, 415 F. App’x 890, 895 (10th Cir. 2011) (concluding the appellant had “not

been deprived of a liberty interest, nor [was] he otherwise entitled to due process safeguards,

because the federal arrest warrant has not been executed and he has not been taken into federal

custody”).

Even if Plaintiff had alleged a protected interest that was impaired by the warrant or

protective order, he has failed to allege facts that, if true, would support the conclusion that the

process giving rise to either the warrant or the protective order was constitutionally deficient. At

most, Plaintiff suggests he should have been afforded a right to be heard and face his accusers.

See Dkt. No. 34 at ⁋⁋ 46-47. But the constitution does not afford a right to be heard or a right of

confrontation prior to the issuance of an arrest warrant. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,

142–43 (1979) (recognizing that, while the states must “provide a fair and reliable determination

of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty,” an “adversary

hearing is not required”). And it appears that Plaintiff was afforded the opportunity to participate

in the proceedings associated with the only protective order that was not immediately dismissed.

See Dkt. No. 34 at ⁋⁋ 27-29. Plaintiff’s Complaint therefore fails to identify how the Defendants

deprived him of the process he claims was owed to him. Absent such allegations, he cannot state

a claim for relief.

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim fails for the additional reason that he has not described how each

Defendant contributed to the alleged deprivation of his rights. Duckett v. Ross, No. CV-13-312-

W, 2014 WL 12817753, at *11 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 28, 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 680 (2009)) (stating that, to be facially plausible, a plaintiff must allege facts that would

permit a finding of liability with respect to the defendant under consideration). Section 1983

imposes liability on a defendant for his or her own participation in the constitutional violation. Id.

at *4. Plaintiff cannot simply assert that a group of Defendants are collectively liable for a

constitutional violation as a general matter. Brashear v. Bd. of Cnty. Commissioners of Oklahoma

Cnty., 402 F. Supp. 3d 1279, 1285. Instead, Plaintiff must describe the action or actions by each

Defendant that gave rise to the alleged deprivation. Duckett, 2014 WL 12817753, at *11. Plaintiff

has failed to provide such a description here. Accordingly, his § 1983 claim must be dismissed.

3. Conspiracy to Interfere with Civil Rights (42 U.S.C. § 1985)(3))

Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants Littlefield, Wright, Yates, and Weaver conspired to

interfere with Plaintiff’s civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).9 To state a claim for

relief under this theory, Plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would establish (a) the existence of

a conspiracy (b) with the object of depriving Plaintiff of his rights based on Plaintiff’s race or class,

(c) an action taken in furtherance of that conspiracy, and (d) harm to the Plaintiff. See Tilton v.

Richardson, 6 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to set forth facts

supporting the existence of these elements.

9 Count 3 of Plaintiff’s Complaint purports to state a claim under both 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(1) and

(3). But § 1985(1) concerns conspiracies to prevent individuals from “holding office, trust, or

place of confidence,” from discharging the duties thereof, or interfering with the performance of

an officer’s duties. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts that would state a claim

under that provision.

Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege the existence of a conspiracy because he has failed

to set forth “specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action amongst the defendants.”

Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Stewart v.

Coffey, No. CIV-09-780-W., 2009 WL 10695065, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 5, 2009) (dismissing §

1985(3) claim where the plaintiff failed to allege facts tending to show the existence of an

agreement among the defendants or concerted action). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges, at most, that

a conspiracy existed. See Dkt. No. 34 at ⁋ 52. But conclusory statements that certain individuals

conspired together are insufficient to state a valid conspiracy claim. Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263,

1266 (10th Cir. 1994). See Yancey v. Crow, 450 F. App’x 766, 768 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming

dismissal of claims where the plaintiff failed to allege any communication among the defendants

in support of his conspiracy claim, and failed to explain how the judge allegedly manipulated the

outcome of his cases). Plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would demonstrate the existence of

a plan that was known and agreed to by each Defendant that is charged with responsibility for its

consequences. No such allegations are present in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

In addition, Plaintiff’s claim fails to allege that the purported conspiracy at issue was

“motivated by some racial or other class based invidious discriminatory animus.” Timo v.

Associated Indem. Corp., 412 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (W.D. Okla. 1976). This is an essential element

of any § 1985(3) claim. See Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1447 (10th Cir. 1990)

(recognizing that a § 1985(3) claim “requires proof that a conspirator’s action was motivated by a

class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus”). Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting

that Defendants’ actions were the result of race-based or class-based animus. Cf. Stewart, 2009

WL 10695065, at *4 (holding that, without supporting factual allegations, conclusory assertion

that the defendant’s acts were due to racial animus were insufficient to state a claim for relief).

Given the absence of any such allegations, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1985(3).

Timo, 412 F. Supp. at 1058.

4. Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights

Count 4 of Plaintiff’s Complaint is styled as a Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights. With

respect to Judge Littlefield, this claim appears to be duplicative of Plaintiff’s claims in Counts 3

and 4, and the additional allegations fail to cure the pleading defects identified discussed in

Sections C.2 and C.3, supra. With respect to Coronel, the new allegations consist primarily of

labels and conclusions that fail to demonstrate how Coronel deprived Plaintiff of a protected right,

failed to correct a criminal violation, or knowingly participated in a conspiracy to achieve an

improper purpose. Absent factual allegations concerning the actions taken by Littlefield and

Coronel and the consequences those actions had on Plaintiff’s protected rights, Plaintiff cannot

state a viable claim for relief. See Wilson, 715 F.3d at 852 (10th Cir. 2013).

5. RICO Racketeering and Extortion

In Count 5, Defendant asserts that Defendants Littlefield, Wright, and Yates willfully used

the arm of the state to extort money from Plaintiff in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act.10 Dkt No. 34 at ⁋ 58. To successfully state a RICO claim, a Complaint

“must allege a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, which consists of four elements: ‘(1) conduct (2) of

an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’” Gillmor v. Thomas, 490 F.3d 791,

10 To the extent Plaintiff is alleging a state-law claim for extortion, that claim is dismissed with

prejudice. Oklahoma does not recognize a civil cause of action for extortion. Chapman v. Chase

Manhattan Mortgage Corp., No. 04–CV–0859, 2007 WL 2815426, at * 7 (N.D. Okla. September

24, 2007).

797 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985)).11

Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain any facts that would tend to support the existence of any of

these elements; to the contrary, Plaintiff’s primary contention is that Sheply should have taken her

Petition for Protective Order—which was voluntarily dismissed—to civil court. Plaintiff provides

no facts demonstrating that Littlefield, Wright, and, Yates contributed to Sheply’s decision or

otherwise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. Absent such allegations, Plaintiff cannot

state a RICO claim against those Defendants.

6. Trespass on the Case

At common law, an action for trespass on the case was a means to recover damages that

were not “the immediate result of a wrongful act but rather a later consequence.” TRESPASS,

Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). This cause of action was a precursor to modern-day tort

claims, such as claims for negligence. Id. This cause of action has been supplanted by other legal

remedies and is not an independent basis for relief.

7. Acts of Vindictiveness, 22 Okla. Stat. § 982

Title 22, Section 982 of the Oklahoma Statutes concerns presentence investigations of

individuals convicted of felonies. See 22 Okla. Stat. § 982. It does not expressly provide a private

right of action, and Plaintiff does not allege any facts that would support a claim for relief even if

§ 982 did afford a private remedy. Count 7 of Plaintiff’s Complaint is therefore dismissed.

8. Fraud

Plaintiff’s claim for fraud, which is set forth in Count 8 of the Complaint, likewise fails to

state a claim for relief. To state a claim for fraud, Plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would

11 The requisite “pattern” of racketeering activity can be established only by pointing to at least

two predicate acts. Gillmor, 490 F.3d at 798.

establish that (a) a Defendant made a false, material misrepresentation; (b) he made that

misrepresentation either knowingly or with reckless disregard as to the truth; (c) the Defendant

intended Plaintiff to act on the misrepresentation, and (d) Plaintiff relied on the misrepresentation

to his detriment. Bowman v. Presley, 2009 OK 48, ¶ 13, 212 P.3d 1210, 1218. In addition,

Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the fraudulent misrepresentation must be alleged with

particularity. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b); see also Jensen v. Am.’s Wholesale Lender,

425 F. App’x 761, 763 (10th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal where the complaint failed to identify

the culpable defendants or their wrongful conduct). This means that Plaintiff must “set forth the

time, place and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party making the false

statements and the consequences thereof.” Lawrence Nat’l Bank v. Edmonds, 924 F.2d 176, 180

(10th Cir. 1991).

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to satisfy the heightened pleading standards applicable to a fraud

claim. Plaintiff’s primary allegation is that Defendants Wright and Coronel were informed that

they had made false written conclusions, but refused to correct those statements. Dkt. No. 34 at ⁋

30. This brief assertion fails to provide either the substance of allegedly false statements or the

time and place those statements were made. Cf. Lawrence, 924 F. 2d at 180. The Complaint does

not state whether Wright and Coronel knew their statements to be false, nor does it explain how

those statements impacted Plaintiff. Plaintiff cannot make out a claim for fraud by saying

“Defendants said false and damaging things”; he must describe the details of the alleged fraud.

Because he has not done so here, his fraud claim must be dismissed. See Koch v. Koch Indus.,

Inc., 203 F.3d 1202, 1237 (10th Cir. 2000) (dismissing complaint that failed to specify the precise

time frame of the alleged fraud, the place where the misrepresentations were made, or the contents

thereof).

9. Abuse of Process

In Count 9, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Littlefield, Wright, Yates, and Coronel are

liable for abuse of process. Under Oklahoma law, an abuse-of-process claim requires the plaintiff

to establish “(1) the improper use of the court’s process (2) primarily for an ulterior or improper

purpose (3) with resulting damage to the plaintiff asserting the misuse.” Greenberg v. Wolfberg,

890 P.2d 895, 905 (Okla. 1994). Plaintiff does assert that Littlefield, Wright, Yates, and Coronel

used the legal process improperly, but his allegations—while serious—are conclusory.12 Plaintiff

simply allege that Defendants violated his rights and engaged in wrongdoing. He must, instead,

“give the court reason to believe that [he] has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support

for [his] claims.” Ridge at Red Hawk, LLC v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174 (10th Cir.2007). Because

none of Plaintiff’s allegations “recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury,” Plaintiff has failed

to state a claim for relief for abuse of process. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110, 1113-14 (affirming dismissal

because the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations that the defendants acted with malice were

insufficient, without supporting factual averments, to support the conclusion that the defendants

intentionally destroyed his religious items).

10. Assumption of Duty

In Count 10, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Wright failed to maintain an oath of office,

and that both Wright and Coronel failed to provide an unspecified corrective action. See Dkt. No.

34 at ⁋⁋ 84-85. None of the statutes cited by Plaintiff apply to Wright or Coronel. Furthermore,

12 See Dkt. No. 34 at ⁋⁋ 71-82 (asserting that the Defendants filed a frivolous case for monetary

gain, acted arbitrarily and capriciously in connection with evidence, failed to investigate facts and

allegations against Plaintiff, failed to adhere to evidentiary rules, misrepresented or fabricated

evidence, initiated a tort claim without Plaintiff’s consent, failed to provide Plaintiff time to

provide documents in connection with a tort claim, and failed to notify Plaintiff that a warrant had

issued).

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to specify how Wright failed to maintain an oath of office, why that

failure caused harm to Plaintiff, and the details of the corrective action that Wright and Coronel

were required—but failed—to take. Absent such factual details, Plaintiff’s allegations cannot state

a claim for relief. Count 10 is therefore dismissed.

11. Invasion of Privacy

Count 11 of Plaintiff’s Complaint broadly asserts that Defendants Littlefield, Wright, and

Yates invaded Plaintiff’s privacy by reporting an illegal warrant to credit and background agencies,

resulting in economic damages to Plaintiff. Oklahoma recognizes that an individual’s right to

privacy is invaded by (a) the “unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another,” (b) the

“appropriation of [another’s]name or likeness,” (c) giving “unreasonable publicity” to another’s

private life, and (d) engaging in publicity that “unreasonably places the other in a false light before

the public.” McCormack v. Oklahoma Pub. Co., 1980 OK 98, ¶¶ 3, 8 613 P.2d 737, 739-40.

It appears that Plaintiff is proceeding under the fourth category. To state a claim for false-

light invasion of privacy, Plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, would permit a jury to conclude

that “(1) the defendant gave publicity to a matter concerning the plaintiff that placed the plaintiff

before the public in a false light, (2) the false light in which the Plaintiff was placed would be

highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (3) the defendant had knowledge of or acted in

reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other

would be placed.” Tanique, Inc. v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous

Drugs, 2004 OK CIV APP 73, ¶ 31, 99 P.3d 1209, 1217 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s false-light invasion of privacy claim fails to pass muster. As a preliminary

matter, Plaintiff fails to allege that Littlefield, Wright, and Yates placed Plaintiff in a false light by

publicizing something about Plaintiff that was either false or misleading, which he must do to state

a viable claim. See Talley v. Time, Inc., 923 F.3d 878, 894 (10th Cir. 2019 (recognizing that “[t]rue

statements are not actionable under Oklahoma's false light tort”). The publication referenced by

Plaintiff is a bench warrant allegedly reported by Littlefield, Wright, and Yates. Dkt. No. 34 at ⁋

87. But Plaintiff does not allege that the reporting of the existence of the warrant was false or

misleading; indeed it appears from Plaintiff’s exhibits that the bench warrant did exist, and that

any reports about its existence were accurate. See Dkt. No. 34 at p. 76 (Ex. 10). Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s allegations fail to demonstrate that the Defendants made a false and misleading report

concerning Plaintiff, let alone that they did so knowingly or with reckless regard to the falsity of

the disclosure. Cf. Talley, 923 F.3d at 899 (10th Cir. 2019) (denying relief where there was ample

evidence to support the truth of the challenged statements). Plaintiff’s claim for invasion of

privacy is, therefore, dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.

12. Negligence

Plaintiff’s claim of negligence likewise fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted. Plaintiff generally asserts the parties accepted improper evidence, failed to respond to

requests, failed to drop charges, failed to act in accordance with their duties, failed to provide aid

to the victim of a crime, and otherwise failed to exercise reasonable care and breached duties of

care owed to Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 34 at ⁋⁋ 88-94. These allegations are conclusions, not facts.

To state a claim for relief, Plaintiff must identify the specific facts which, if true, would permit a

finding that Defendants owed a duty to Plaintiff and that, by breaching that duty, Defendants

caused harm to Plaintiff. Because Plaintiff’s current allegations amount to nothing more than

conclusory statements, Plaintiff’s negligence claim is dismissed without prejudice.

D. Whether Defendants are Immune from Suit

Each Defendant argues that either absolute or qualified immunity operates to bar Plaintiff’s

claims against them. See Dkt. No. 40 at 4-6 (asserting Littlefield, Wright, and Yates are entitled

to absolute immunity); id. at 6-7 (asserting all State Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity);

Dkt. No. 49 at 9 (asserting Weaver is immune from suit on Plaintiff’s state-law claims under the

immunity afforded by the OGTCA); id. at 13-14 (asserting Weaver is entitled to qualified

immunity). Based on the facts currently alleged, the Court agrees that Defendants are immune

from Plaintiff’s claims.

1. Judicial and Prosecutorial Immunity

At present, the specific allegations against Littlefield, Wright, and Yates concern the

issuance of a warrant, the sealing of court records, the admission and presentation of evidence

during court proceedings, and the notification and reporting of the results of court proceedings.

See Dkt. No. 38 at ⁋⁋ 19, 30, 46-47, 51-52, 67, 76, 89. These activities are precisely the types of

activities that are clothed with judicial and prosecutorial immunity. See Hunt, 17 F.3d at 1266-67

(recognizing that even unconstitutional and conspiratorial actions taken by judges while

performing their judicial functions are clothed with absolute judicial immunity); id. at 1267

(holding that a prosecutor’s actions taken in his role as an advocate for the state entitled to the

protection of absolute immunity).13 Dismissal of Plaintiff’s current claims against Littlefield,

Wright, and Yates is therefore warranted on the alternative grounds of prosecutorial immunity.

2. Immunity under the OGTCA

The OGTCA, which provides the exclusive means of pursuing a tort claim against the state

of Oklahoma, its political subdivisions, and its employees, “generally immunizes individual state

13 See also, e.g., Chilcoat v. San Juan Cnty., 41 F.4th 1196, 1210 (10th Cir. 2022) (recognizing

that prosecutorial immunity applies to even false statements made to support a finding of probable

cause); Quintana v. Adair, No. CIV-15-63-FHS, 2015 WL 13203405, at *2 (E.D. Okla. May 6,

2015) (concluding that the plaintiff’s allegations concerning improper issuance of a bench warrant,

failure to give notice, improper assessment of a bond, and unlawful confinement all “deal[t]

directly with [the defendant’s] acts a Judge in a criminal case”).

employees from liability for torts committed within the scope of their employment.” Melton v.

Oklahoma ex rel. Univ. of Oklahoma, 532 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1092 (W.D. Okla. 2021) (citations

and quotation marks omitted). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is seeking relief for actions committed

by Defendants while they were acting within the scope of their employment, those claims are

barred. See Allen v. Yates, No. CIV. 08-215-FHS, 2008 WL 5244871, at *2 (E.D. Okla. Dec. 15,

2008) (recognizing that the OGTCA provides immunity to employees of political subdivisions

who commit torts while acting within the scope of their employment); 15 Okla. Stat. §§ 156-157

(providing that a plaintiff may not pursue claims covered by the OGTCA in court without first

filing a claim, and must bring any civil action within 180 days of the denial of such a claim).14

But it is not clear that Defendants were acting within the scope of their employment at the

time of the challenged misconduct. Acts taken maliciously or in bad faith do not qualify as acts

taken within the scope of employment for purposes of the OGTCA. See 51 Okla. Stat. § 152(12);

Melton, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 1092. Because Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendants acted

intentionally, maliciously, and in bad faith, the Court cannot conclude that the conduct challenged

here is subject to OGTCA immunity. See Melton, 532 F. Supp. 3d at 1092 (denying motion to

dismiss where “different conclusions could be drawn as to whether each Individual Defendant

14 It appears that, whether intentionally or otherwise, Plaintiff did file an OGTCA claim, which

was rejected on January 19, 2020. See Dkt. No. 34 at p. 110 (denying claim pursuant to the

OGTCA as of January 19, 2020). The 180-day filing deadline for filing an action expired on July

17, 2020, ten days before Plaintiff filed his Original Complaint.

acted in good faith”). Accordingly, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the

alternative ground of OGTCA immunity.

3. Qualified Immunity

All Defendants assert they are entitled to qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified

immunity will preclude a party from maintaining an action against a state officer unless the officer

has violated the opposing party’s clearly established rights. See Perez v. Unified Gov’t of

Wyandotte County, 432 F.3d 1163, 1165 (10th Cir. 2005). It is Plaintiff’s burden to establish that

the Defendants’ conduct violated a right that was protected by the United States Constitution or

federal law, and that the right was so well-established at the time of the violation that “every

reasonable official would have understood” that the challenged conduct violated the law. Perea

v. Baca, 817 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)).

The Court concludes that, for the previously discussed, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts

that, if true, would support the inference that Defendants violated his rights, let alone rights that

had been clearly established. See Sections C.2 and C.3, supra. Absent such a showing, dismissal

of Plaintiff’s claims is warranted on qualified immunity grounds. Hill v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. &

CSE Agency, No. 20-CV-25-TCK-JFJ, 2020 WL 4677302, at *4 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 12, 2020)

(granting motion to dismiss where the complaint “fail[ed] Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to allege that

Defendants violated any clearly established constitutional right”).

Conclusion

Although Plaintiff appears pro se, he is qualified to set forth—and is required to set forth—

the facts that give rise to his claim to relief. Plaintiff has failed to do so here. Accordingly, the

Court grants Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Except as specifically discussed herein, the

dismissal shall be without prejudice to refiling.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Coronel,

Littlefield, Mulready, Wright, and Yates [Dkt. No. 40] and the Motion to Dismiss filed by

Defendant Weaver [Dkt. No. 49] are GRANTED.

Dated this 16th day of May 2023.

dete Lew

JOHN F/HEIL, II

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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