Hayes v. Owen

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ANITA JEAN HAYES, )

SALINDA EVE HAYES, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

v. ) Case No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH

) BASE FILE

SCOTT OWEN, )

individual capacity and official capacity, ) Consolidated with:

JON COPELAND, official capacity, ) Case No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH

MICHAEL KITCHENS, ) Case No. 22-CV-0274-CVE-SH

individual capacity and official capacity, ) Case No. 22-CV-0275-CVE-SH

B. UNDERWOOD, )

individual capacity and official capacity, )

KRISTEN DAVIS, official capacity, )

J. CUTLER, )

individual capacity and official capacity, )

J. INMAN, )

individual capacity and official capacity, )

B. BERENS, )

individual capacity and official capacity, )

R. BLACKARD, )

individual capacity and official capacity, )

W. JACOBS, )

individual capacity and official capacity, )

B. WANO, )

individual capacity and official capacity, )

A. WITT, )

individual capacity and official capacity, )

A. GALANIS, )

individual capacity and official capacity, )

WASHINGTON COUNTY SHERIFF’S )

OFFICE, )

WASHINGTON COUNTY BOARD OF )

COMMISSIONERS, )

JEFF PRENTICE, official capacity, )

SUMMER SONG DAVIS, )

individual and official capacity, )

PATRICK JOSEPH BALLARD, )

individual capacity and official capacity, )

)

Defendants/Consolidated )

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs Anita Jean Hayes and Salinda Eve Hayes (collectively, “plaintiffs”), appearing

pro se, bring this action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to vindicate the alleged violation of their civil

rights arising from their arrests and subsequent detention at the Washington County Jail. Before

the Court are four motions: a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Board of County

Commissioners of the County of Washington (“the Board”) on August 15, 2022 (Dkt. # 14); a

motion to dismiss filed by defendants Washington County Sheriff Scott Owen and the Washington

County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”) on August 15, 2022 (Dkt. # 15); a motion to dismiss filed by

defendants Jon Copeland, Kristin Davis, Jared Cutler, Jordan Inman, Brooks Berens, Reed

Blackard, Williams Jacobs, Braden Wano, Aaron Witt, and Andrew Galanis (collectively, “jail

defendants”)1 on August 15, 2022 (Dkt. # 16) and a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Jeff

Prentice on August 22, 2022 (Dkt. # 22). Plaintiffs did not respond to any of these dismissal

motions.

I. Procedural background

On May 25, 2022, plaintiffs filed two separate complaints for violation of civil rights in

federal court. Compare Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH (N.D. Okla.), with

Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH (N.D. Okla.). The complaint filed in Case

No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH (“jail complaint”) alleges violations of plaintiffs’ Fourth, Eighth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-

1 As further discussed below, all but one of these defendants are identified only in plaintiffs’

complaint regarding their detention at the Washington County Jail. For ease of discussion, the

Court thus refers to these defendants, collectively, as the “jail defendants.”

0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1.2 The named plaintiffs are Anita Jean Hayes and Salinda Eve Hayes, and

plaintiffs name as defendants Washington County Sheriff Scott Owen, Undersheriff Jon Copeland,

Michael Kitchens, B. Underwood, Kristen Davis, J. Cutler, J. Inman, B. Berens, R. Blackard, W.

Jacobs, B. Wano, A. Witt, A. Galanis, the WCSO, and the Board. The complaint filed in Case No.

22-CV-0231-CVE-SH (“arrest complaint”) alleges violations of plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendment rights under § 1983. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-

CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1. The named plaintiffs are Anita Jean Hayes and Salinda Eve Hayes, and

plaintiffs name as defendants Washington County Sheriff Scott Owen, Undersheriff Jon Copeland,

Lieutenant Jeff Prentice, Deputy Summer Song Davis, Deputy Patrick Joseph Ballard, the WCSO,

and the Board.

On May 31, 2022, plaintiffs filed two separate petitions in the District Court of Washington

County, Oklahoma. Compare Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. CV-2022-0047, with Hayes et al. v.

Owen et al., No. CV-2022-0048. The named parties and facts underlying the petition filed in Case

No. CV-2022-0047 (“jail petition”) are identical to the May 25, 2022, jail complaint, and the

named parties and facts underlying the petition filed in Case No. CV-2022-0048 (“arrest petition”)

are identical to the May 25, 2022, arrest complaint. 3 On June 24, 2022, defendants in both state

court cases properly removed to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The jail petition was

subsequently assigned federal Case No. 22-CV-0274-CVE-SH, and the arrest petition was

2 For consistency, the Court refers to the CM/ECF header pagination when citing the

record.

3 As previously stated, plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, and presumably filed the arrest

complaint and arrest petition on behalf of M.D.H., who is a minor child. But this Court previously

dismissed M.D.H. as a party plaintiff because “a minor child cannot bring suit through a parent

acting as next friend if the parent is not represented by an attorney.” See Hayes et al. v. Owen et

al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 11, at 3 n.1 (quoting Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154

(10th Cir. 1986)); Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 24, at 1-2.

assigned federal Case No. 22-CV-0275-CVE-SH. Defendants in all four proceedings are

represented by the same counsel. On June 27, 2022, the named defendants in the jail complaint

filed a motion in Case No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, asking the Court to consolidate all four cases.

Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 6, at 5. By order filed August 1,

2022 (Dkt. # 11), the Court granted the motion and consolidated the cases. Citing Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), several defendants now move to dismiss the arrest

complaint and the jail complaint.

II. Plaintiffs’ allegations4

A. Arrest complaint

On January 17, 2021, defendants Deputy Patrick Ballard and Deputy Summer Davis, both

of whom are employed by the WCSO, responded to a 9-1-1 call about an apparent landlord-tenant

dispute at a rural property in Dewey, Oklahoma. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-

CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 7. Deputy Ballard “removed the front window and allowed the previous

occupant to gain entry,” despite plaintiffs’ belief that the previous occupant had legally abandoned

the residence and any personal property therein. Id. Plaintiffs went “to the property to secure the

window that Deputy Ballard had removed.” Id. During plaintiffs’ interaction with Deputy Ballard

and Deputy Davis, there was a young child, M.D.H., in the backseat of plaintiffs’ vehicle, and

Salinda was wearing a medical boot for a broken foot. Id. at 8. Salinda stood near the plaintiffs’

vehicle, recording the interaction with her cell phone. Id. Deputy Ballard became “irritated with”

4 Because the arrest complaint (Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt.

# 1) and arrest petition (Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0275-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 2-2) are

virtually identical, the Court will cite the arrest complaint only for the relevant factual background.

Similarly, because the jail complaint (Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt.

# 1) and jail petition (Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0274-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 2-2) are

virtually identical, the Court will cite the jail complaint only for the pertinent factual allegations.

plaintiffs when they asked him to socially distance so plaintiffs could put on their face masks.

Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 7. Deputy Ballard asked

plaintiffs for identification, and plaintiffs refused to provide it because they believed they are not

legally required to identify themselves unless they have committed a crime. Id. at 8. Deputy

Ballard argued with Salinda about whether a road leading to the property was a private road or

county road. Id. Deputy Davis told plaintiffs to “shut up” and gave “two thumbs up when asked

if she just said shut up,” then told plaintiffs they needed to leave. Id.

Shortly thereafter, the encounter with the deputies became physical. Deputy Ballard

arrested Salinda “for obstruction for failing to identify by yanking her left arm and throwing her

into Deputy Davis.” Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 8. Deputy

Davis said, “you f***ing b***h, you hit me,” “punch[ed] Salinda in the gut,” then punched Salinda

in the face seven times. Id. Deputy Ballard tackled Salinda, forcing her on top of Deputy Davis

and “sandwich[ing]” Salinda between Davis, who was on the ground face up, and Ballard, who

was pushing down on Salinda’s back and “forcing [Salinda’s] head down into Deputy Davis’s

chest.” Id. Deputy Davis falsely stated, “do something,” “she’s got my gun.” Id. at 9. Deputy

Davis drew her gun, placed the barrel against Salinda’s head, and then pointed her gun at Anita

and M.D.H. Id. Davis’s body camera was activated when she drew her gun. Id. M.D.H. screamed

and ducked down into the floorboard of the backseat. Id. Deputy Ballard gave Salinda conflicting

commands to get up and to sit down, then tasered her. Id. Deputy Ballard became sexually aroused

and ejaculated in his pants while he was pressing against Salinda’s back. Id. Deputy Davis kicked

Salinda in her left side and told Anita, “You’re next.” Id. Deputy Ballard used his body weight

to force his left knee into the center of Salinda’s back and forced her face into the ground. Id.

Salinda told the deputies she could not breathe and asked them to handcuff her quickly. Id. Deputy

Davis “wrench[ed] Salinda’s thumbs back” while Deputy Ballard handcuffed Salinda. Hayes et

al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 9. Deputy Davis “stomped on Salinda’s

cell phone twice, ending the livestream.” Id. Deputy Davis then turned her attention to Anita.

Deputy Davis attempted to grab Anita’s cell phone and threw a punch, then grabbed Anita’s

cell phone and threw it on the ground where “a witness” picked it up. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al.,

No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 9. Deputy Davis grabbed Anita’s jacket, Anita

immediately went “down to the ground,” and Davis jumped on Anita’s back and straddled Anita’s

hips. Id. Deputy Davis tasered Anita for nine seconds, and Deputy Ballard pulled Anita’s arms

behind her. Id. Deputy Davis told Deputy Ballard that she tasered Anita “because she was ‘fed

up with her.” Id. Deputy Davis wrenched Anita’s thumbs back while handcuffing her. Id. at 10.

Anita shouted that she was having a panic attack. Id. Both deputies yanked Anita’s handcuffed

arms above her head and told her to get up. Id. Deputy Davis suggested that they drag Anita to

Davis’s patrol car. Id. Deputy Ballard and a Dewey police officer grabbed Anita by her elbow

and ankles as Deputy Davis laced her fingers into Anita’s fingers and Davis twisted Anita’s wrists

“the entire way to the” patrol car. Id.

After both plaintiffs were placed in separate patrol cars, Deputy Davis “deliberately left

the heat on” in her patrol car, with all four windows rolled up, said she was offering Anita air

conditioning, and told Deputy Ballard to “let [plaintiffs] sit.” Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-

CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 10. Plaintiffs sat in the patrol cars for over an hour while Deputy

Davis searched plaintiffs’ car. Id. Deputy Davis called Lieutenant Prentice and told him, “[T]his

was not your typical call.” Id. Plaintiffs asked to speak to a supervisor, and Deputy Ballard stated

that Deputy Davis was the supervisor. Id. Anita asked for medical attention, and Deputy Davis

told her that “the nurse was waiting at the jail.” Id. Deputy Ballard told Deputy Davis that “they

should let Anita go because while she was a ‘pain in the ass, she hasn’t done anything.’” Hayes

et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 10. In response, Deputy Davis said,

“[W]e don’t tase and let go, we have to charge her with something.” Id. When Deputy Davis

transported Anita to the jail, Davis turned “the volume of her music exceedingly loud” and stated

she was offering Anita “some music to accompany [her] ac.” Id. As they approached the jail,

Anita again asked Deputy Davis for medical attention. Id. Deputy Davis responded by saying

“this ain’t no f***ing hotel service.” Id. When they arrived at the sallyport entrance of the jail,

Deputy Davis told “jail staff” to drag Anita out of the patrol car and complained that Anita “stunk

up [Davis’s] car.” Id. Later, when Anita was in the booking area of the jail, Deputy Davis made

“several sexual comments referring to the incident with Salinda.” Id. at 11.

Sheriff Scott Owen “was aware” that plaintiffs’ arrests “had been recorded and broadcasted

live to Facebook.” Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 11.

Washington County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Scott Owen, Undersheriff Jon

Copeland, Lieutenant Prentice, Deputies Summer Song Davis, Patrick Joseph

Ballard, and Washington County Board of Commissioners were all aware that

Salinda and Anita’s arrests were illegal, the search of their vehicle illegal, and the

use of force was extremely excessive and unnecessary.

Id. Plaintiffs filed complaints with the WCSO, Sheriff Owen, and the Board, regarding their

arrests, search of the vehicle, and the excessive force used against them but “all” complaints “went

ignored.” Id. The WCSO and Undersheriff Copeland “intentionally ignored Open Records

requests made by the plaintiffs and denied them access to body camera footage, sallyport videos,

use of force and incident reports, and jail videos with inculpatory evidence of misconduct.” Id.

Based on these facts, plaintiffs assert violations of their constitutional rights under the First,

Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-

SH, Dkt. # 1, at 5. Plaintiffs allege they both suffered physical injuries and mental trauma resulting

from their arrests. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief, specifically they request “improve[d]

de-escalation training for WCSO employees” and better “transparency in Washington County.”

Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 12. Plaintiffs also seek $90

million in compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

B. Jail complaint

Plaintiffs were booked into the Washington County Jail on January 17, 2021. Hayes et al.

v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 30, at 4. Upon her arrival at the jail, Anita, who

was handcuffed and not resisting, “was dragged and forcefully removed from” Deputy Davis’s

patrol car. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 9. After she was

booked into the jail, Anita “was put on the floor of a cell face down with her pelvis over a drain

hole while Michael Kitchens with all of his bodyweight forced his knee into the center of [Anita’s]

back.” Id. Anita was not resisting, and her handcuffs were removed. Id. “Several corrections

officers including B. Underwood proceeded to stand on Anita’s ankles and wrists while Defendant

Kitchens remained forcibly on [Anita’s] back.” Id. Anita told “corrections officers that her

wedding ring does not come off.” Id. “The male corrections officer on Anita’s left side ben[t] her

pinky finger and force[d] it out and backwards.” Id. Anita told “corrections officers that they are

breaking her finger and her back, she can’t breathe with all of their weight on her, and they are

killing her.” Id. Salinda, who was in a jail cell two cells away from Anita, heard “a male officer”

tell Anita he would break her finger off. Id. Salinda heard Anita say that she needed medical

attention and that the officers were “killing her.” Id. Salinda also heard “the corrections officers

laughing about causing Anita pain,” and a “male correction officer” said “that his ‘three year old

acts better than this.’” Id. at 9-10. “All officers continued to use force until they [were] able to

remove Anita’s ring then they all [left]” Anita’s cell. Id. at 10. Anita requested medical attention

and a face mask, but those requests were denied. Id.

At some point, “officers ordered Anita to come out of the cell.” Hayes et al. v. Owen et

al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 10. Anita refused, explaining that she could not leave

the cell “because they had broken her back.” Id. “Officers finally brought what they described as

a ‘party wagon’ to remove Anita from the cell.” Id. “Corrections officers forced Anita’s injured

hands and wrists to fingerprint her” then “wheel[ed] Anita back to the cell in the party wagon.”

Id.

Salinda was asked to provide Anita’s name, but Salinda refused. Hayes et al. v. Owen et

al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 10. Salinda was taken to a pod within the jail. Id.

“Officers ask[ed] for Anita’s name and she refuse[d] to answer any questions.” Id. Anita told

“officers and anyone within proximity that her rights are being violated.” Id. “B. Underwood

joke[d] about how stubborn [Anita] is with [Anita’s] wife, Salinda Hayes.” Id.

Anita was released from the jail on January 17, 2021, and Salinda was released from the

jail on January 18, 2021. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 30, at 4.

When Anita was released, she first was wheeled out to the main booking area of the jail, then was

“wheeled out of the jail in the party wagon and into the passenger side of her car.” Hayes et al. v.

Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 10. Upon her release, Anita was taken to the

emergency room where her injuries were diagnosed and documented. Id. Anita has been

“wheelchair bound” since her arrest. Id. at 11.

Plaintiffs filed complaints with Sheriff Owen, Undersheriff Copeland, and the Board

regarding their treatment at the jail, but all complaints “went ignored.” Hayes et al. v. Owen et al.,

No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 10.

Based on these facts, plaintiffs allege violations of their rights under the Fourth, Eighth,

and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs allege that, because of the detention, Anita

suffered physical injuries and mental trauma, and Anita suffered mental trauma. Hayes et al. v.

Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 11. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief,

specifically, they request “de-escalation training for jail staff & WCSO employees” and “easier

access to [the] complaint process in Washington County.” Id. at 12. Plaintiffs also seek $21

million in compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

III. Dismissal standards

Dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(1) is appropriate if the district court lacks subject

matter jurisdiction. “Rule 12(b)(1) motions generally take one of two forms. The moving party

may (1) facially attack the complaint’s allegations as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction,

or (2) go beyond allegations contained in the complaint by presenting evidence to challenge the

factual basis upon which subject matter jurisdiction rests.” Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v.

Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1013

(10th Cir. 2003)).

Dismissal of claims under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate if the facts alleged in the complaint

fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted. To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the

complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible if the facts alleged “raise

a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of the conduct necessary to establish

plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 556; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). The complaint need

not contain “detailed factual allegations,” but it must contain “more than labels and conclusions”

or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 555.

When considering the sufficiency of the complaint, a court must accept as true all the well-pleaded

factual allegations and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. But the court may disregard legal

conclusions or conclusory statements devoid of factual support. Id.; Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

When a plaintiff appears pro se the court must liberally construe the complaint. Erickson

v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Like all plaintiffs, a pro se plaintiff bears the burden to “alleg[e]

sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d

1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But the rule of liberal construction eases that burden by permitting

the court to overlook basic drafting errors and confusion of legal theories in determining whether

the complaint can be “reasonably read . . . to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could

prevail.” Id. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a “well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it

strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of [the alleged] facts is improbable.” Straub v. BNSF Ry.

Co., 909 F.3d 1280, 1287 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). But dismissal

is appropriate “when the allegations in [the] complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of

entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 558.

IV. Discussion

As previously stated, plaintiffs bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a

plausible claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that (1) a

“person” (2) acting under color of state law, (3) deprived the plaintiff of, or caused another to

deprive the plaintiff of, (4) a right protected by the United States Constitution or other federal law.

Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199-1200 (10th Cir. 2010); Summum v. City of Ogden,

297 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 2002). Under § 1983, a plaintiff can seek to impose liability against

state officials in their individual capacities, in their official capacities, or in both capacities.

When a plaintiff sues a defendant in his or her individual capacity, the defendant “may be

subject to personal liability and/or supervisory liability.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1163

(10th Cir. 2011). To impose personal liability a plaintiff must allege facts showing the defendant’s

“personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. Id. To “impose liability upon a

defendant-supervisor,” who did not personally participate in the alleged violation, a plaintiff must

allege facts “show[ing] that ‘(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed

responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of

constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged

constitutional deprivation.’” Brown, 662 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199).

When a plaintiff sues a defendant in his or her official capacity, the suit is “essentially

another way of pleading an action against the county or municipality [the official] represent[s].”

Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir. 2010). But a county “may not be held liable under

§ 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor.” Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown,

520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). Rather, a county may be liable only under a theory of municipal

liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). To state a plausible

municipal-liability, or Monell, claim, a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating “(1) the existence

of a municipal policy or custom by which the plaintiff was denied a constitutional right and (2)

that the policy or custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.” Sanders v.

Glanz, 138 F. Supp. 3d 1248, 1254 (N.D. Okla. 2015). “A plaintiff can demonstrate a “municipal

policy or custom” through an officially promulgated policy; a custom or persistent practice; a

single decision by an official with final decision-making authority; ratification by an official with

final decision-making authority of subordinates’ decisions; or deliberately indifferent training that

results in the violation of plaintiff’s federally protected rights.” Gooding v. Ketcher, 838 F. Supp.

2d 1231, 1238 (N.D. Okla. 2012).

A. The Board’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 14)

Plaintiffs name the Board as a defendant in both complaints and by suing the Board, rather

than individual Board members, effectively assert municipal liability claims against Washington

County for the alleged violations of plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fourth, Eighth, and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. In the arrest complaint, plaintiffs allege the Board (1) was “aware”

that plaintiffs’ arrests and the search of plaintiffs’ vehicle were “illegal,” (2) was “aware” that

excessive force was used against plaintiffs, and (3) ignored plaintiffs’ complaints. Hayes et al. v.

Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 11. In the jail complaint, plaintiffs allege they

filed “numerous complaints” with the Board regarding their treatment at the jail, but all complaints

“went ignored.” Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 10.

The Board moves to dismiss all claims asserted against it for three reasons. The Board

contends: (1) it is not a proper party; (2) plaintiffs’ claims against the Board are duplicative of

plaintiffs’ claims against Sheriff Owen in his official capacity; and (3) plaintiffs lack standing to

seek prospective injunctive relief. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. #

14, at 4-12.

The Court agrees with the Board that plaintiffs’ claims against the Board are redundant

with its claims against Sheriff Owen in his official capacity. To the extent plaintiffs claim

Washington County may be liable for the alleged misconduct of WCSO deputies or jail staff and

for allegedly failing to provide adequate medical care to Anita while she was detained at the

Washington County Jail, the Court agrees that those municipal liability claims should be asserted

against Sheriff Owen, in his official capacity, not the Board. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, §§ 513, 547;

Estate of Crowell ex rel. Boen v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cleveland Cnty., 237 P.3d 134, 142

(Okla. 2010) (explaining that, “[u]nder Oklahoma law, the sheriff is the final policymaker for a

county jail,” and is responsible for providing medical care to those in custody at the county jail,

and that a board of county commissioners “has no statutory duty to hire, train, supervise, or

discipline county sheriffs or deputies”). The Court therefore grants the Board’s motion to dismiss

and dismisses the arrest complaint and the jail complaint, in part, as to all claims asserted against

the Board.

B. Lieutenant Prentice’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 22)

Plaintiffs name WCSO Lieutenant Jeff Prentice as a defendant only in the arrest complaint

and sue Prentice, only in his official capacity, for the alleged violations of their rights under the

First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-

CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 1, 4-5.

Lieutenant Prentice moves to dismiss all claims against him for four reasons. He contends:

(1) he has no “official capacity” because he has no final policymaking authority; (2) even if he

could be sued in his official capacity, plaintiffs fail to state any plausible municipal liability claims;

(3) plaintiffs fail to state any plausible First and Eighth Amendment claims; and (4) plaintiffs lack

standing to seek prospective injunctive relief. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-

SH, Dkt. # 22, at 5-11.

For several reasons, the Court agrees that plaintiffs’ official capacity claims against

Lieutenant Prentice should be dismissed. First, by suing Prentice only in his official capacity,

plaintiffs effectively seek to hold Washington County liable for the alleged constitutional

violations under a theory of municipal liability. As Prentice argues, Sheriff Owen, not Prentice,

has final policymaking authority regarding the hiring, training, and discipline of WCSO deputies.

Estate of Crowell, 237 P.3d at 142. Thus, any official capacity claims asserted against Prentice in

the arrest complaint are redundant with the official capacity claims asserted against Sheriff Owen

in the arrest complaint.

Second, as Lieutenant Prentice argues, plaintiffs fail to state any plausible First

Amendment claims under a theory of municipal liability. Plaintiffs mention the First Amendment

only in the arrest complaint. But their specific claims and the factual allegations that they rely on

to support any First Amendment claims are not clear. Generously reading the arrest complaint,

the Court finds that plaintiffs may be asserting that Deputy Davis or Deputy Ballard violated their

rights to free speech by asking them to identify themselves or by arresting them in retaliation for

recording their interactions with the deputies, or that Deputy Davis violated their rights to free

speech when she told plaintiffs to shut up or when she took plaintiffs’ phones and ended Salinda’s

Facebook livestream. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 7-11.

But even if this accurately describes plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims, nothing in the arrest

complaint suggests, plausibly or otherwise, that an existing Washington County policy or custom

was the moving force behind the alleged violations of plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights. Sanders,

138 F. Supp. 3d at 1254. On the facts alleged, it is not plausible that Washington County could be

liable for any alleged violations of plaintiffs’ rights under the First Amendment under a theory of

municipal liability.

Third, the Court agrees with Prentice that plaintiffs fail to state any plausible Eighth

Amendment claims in the arrest complaint. At all times relevant to plaintiffs’ claims that they

were subjected to the use of excessive force during their arrests, plaintiffs were protected by the

Fourth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment. Porro, 624 F.3d at 1325-26 (10th Cir. 2010).

Because the facts alleged in the arrest complaint cannot establish that any individual defendant

violated plaintiffs’ rights under the Eighth Amendment, plaintiffs also cannot establish that

Washington County could be liable, under a theory of municipal liability, for any Eighth

Amendment violations related to plaintiffs’ arrests. See Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774,

782 (10th Cir. 1993) (“A municipality may not be held liable where there was no underlying

constitutional violation by any of its officers”). And while Prentice does not appear to discuss the

plausibility of any Fourteenth Amendment claims plaintiffs assert in the arrest complaint, the same

analysis applies to those claims as well. Porro, 624 F.3d at 1325-26. As a result, all Eighth

Amendment and all Fourteenth Amendment claims asserted in the arrest complaint against all

defendants shall be dismissed.

For these reasons, the Court grants Lieutenant Prentice’s motion to dismiss and dismisses

the arrest complaint, in part, as to all claims asserted against Prentice5and as to all Eighth

Amendment and all Fourteenth Amendment claims asserted against all defendants.

C. Jail defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 16)

Plaintiffs name defendants Undersheriff Jon Copeland, Kristin Davis, Jared Cutler, Jordan

Inman, Brooks Berens, Reed Blackard, William Jacobs, Braden Wano, Aaron Witt, and Andrew

Galanis as defendants in the jail complaint. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-

SH, Dkt. # 1, at 1-6. In the jail complaint, plaintiffs purport to assert only official capacity claims

against Undersheriff Copeland and Kristin Davis, and purport to assert individual capacity and

5 Plaintiffs do not appear to sue Lieutenant Prentice in his individual capacity. However,

to the extent the arrest complaint could be construed as attempting to assert individual capacity

claims against Prentice, plaintiffs fail to state any claims on which relief could be granted.

Plaintiffs’ sole allegation about Prentice’s involvement in their arrests is that he received a phone

call from Deputy Davis describing the arrests as atypical. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-

0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 10. This allegation does not support any plausible claims against

Prentice, in any capacity.

official capacity claims against the remaining jail defendants. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-

CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 1-6. Plaintiffs also name Undersheriff Copeland as a defendant in

the arrest complaint, and, in that complaint, plaintiffs assert claims against Copeland in his

individual and official capacity. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1,

at 1-2, 4.

The jail defendants move to dismiss all claims against them for four reasons. They contend

(1) none of the jail defendants has an “official capacity” because none has final policymaking

authority; (2) none of the jail defendants was personally involved in the alleged constitutional

violations; (3) plaintiffs do not state any plausible First or Eighth Amendment claims; and (4) to

the extent jail defendants are sued in their individual capacities, they have qualified immunity.

Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 16, at 4-12.

For the following reasons, the Court grants in part and denies in part the jail defendants’

dismissal motion. First, the Court agrees that all official capacity claims asserted in the jail

complaint against the jail defendants should be dismissed. As previously discussed, any official

capacity claims plaintiffs assert in the jail complaint to hold Washington County liable for the

alleged constitutional violations are properly asserted against Sheriff Owen, the county official

with final policymaking authority over the operation of the jail and the conduct of WCSO and jail

employees. Estate of Crowell, 237 P.3d at 142. Plaintiffs’ official capacity claims asserted against

the jail defendants are therefore redundant with the official capacity claims asserted against Sheriff

Owen in the jail complaint and shall be dismissed. Likewise, any official capacity claims plaintiffs

assert against Undersheriff Copeland in the arrest complaint are redundant with the official

capacity claims plaintiffs assert against Sheriff Owen in the arrest complaint and shall be

dismissed.

Second, the Court also agrees that plaintiffs’ allegations in the jail complaint fail to state

any plausible Eighth Amendment claims.6 At all times relevant to plaintiffs’ detention at the

Washington County Jail, plaintiffs were pretrial detainees protected by the Fourteenth

Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment. Porro, 624 F.3d at 1325-26. Because the facts alleged

in the jail complaint cannot establish that any individual defendant violated plaintiffs’ rights under

the Eighth Amendment, plaintiffs also cannot establish that Washington County could be liable,

under a theory of municipal liability, for any Eighth Amendment violations related to plaintiffs’

detention. Hinton, 997 F.2d at 782. And while the jail defendants do not appear to discuss the

plausibility of any Fourth Amendment claims plaintiffs assert in the jail complaint, the same

analysis applies to those claims as well. Porro, 624 F.3d at 1325-26. As a result, all Fourth

Amendment and all Eighth Amendment claims asserted in the jail complaint against any

defendants shall be dismissed.

Third, the Court agrees with the jail defendants that plaintiffs do not plausibly allege in the

jail complaint any violations of Salinda Hayes’s Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs’

allegations show only that Salinda was detained in a jail cell near Anita, overheard the alleged use

of excessive force against Anita, and heard Anita say that she needed medical care. Hayes et al.

v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 9-10. There are no allegations plausibly

suggesting that Salinda herself was subjected to the use of excessive force or denied adequate

medical care while detained at the jail. Id. Thus, to the extent plaintiffs assert Fourteenth

6 The jail defendants also argue that plaintiffs fail to state any plausible First Amendment

claims. But the jail complaint alleges only violations of plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth,

Fourteenth, and Eighth Amendments. The Court therefore disregards the jail defendants’

arguments regarding any First Amendment claims.

Amendment claims in the jail complaint arising from Salinda’s detention, those claims shall be

dismissed as to all defendants.

Fourth, the Court disagrees with the jail defendants’ argument that all individual capacity

claims asserted against them should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. The jail defendants

correctly argue that personal participation in an alleged constitutional violation is essential to

imposing liability against an individual defendant under § 1983. Brown, 662 F.3d at 1163. And

plaintiffs who sue multiple defendants must provide fair notice to each defendant of the claims

that each defendant must defend against. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249-50 (10th

Cir. 2008). Here, many of plaintiffs’ allegations in the jail complaint refer to the alleged

misconduct of “[s]everal corrections officers,” “corrections officers,” “a male officer,” “the male

corrections officer on Anita’s left side,” “one male corrections officer,” “all officers,” and

“officers.” Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 9-10. The jail

defendants argue these collective allegations “do not distinguish in any way what acts they

consider attributable to any of the [jail defendants],” thereby leaving “many” of them “in confusion

as to how the [p]laintiffs came to associate them with the incident underlying this case as they

were either not on duty or never had any contact with the [p]laintiffs.” Hayes et al. v. Owen et al.,

No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 16, at 6-7. At this stage of the litigation, the Court finds

plaintiffs’ collective allegations sufficient to withstand the jail defendants’ request to dismiss all

individual capacity claims asserted against them in the jail complaint. As the jail defendants’

argument acknowledges, the jail complaint describes a sufficiently narrow “incident” that occurred

at a specific time on a specific date at the Washington County Jail. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al.,

No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 9-10. At most, those jail defendants who are sued in their

individual capacities are being asked to defend against two Fourteenth Amendment claims, one

alleging corrections officers used excessive force against Anita and one alleging corrections

officers were deliberately indifferent to Anita’s need for medical care. Further, as the jail

defendants’ argument recognizes, at least some jail defendants may have already contemplated

how to defend against those claims. See Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH,

Dkt. # 16, at 6-7 (asserting some jail defendants were “not on duty or never had any contact with

the [p]laintiffs”). As one federal district court recently explained:

It’s true that liability for an individual-capacity claim under section 1983 hinges on

a defendant’s personal involvement in the deprivation of a constitutional right. See

Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S. Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985).

But at this early stage, “an allegation directed at multiple defendants can be

adequate to plead personal involvement.” Rivera v. Lake County, 974 F. Supp. 2d

1179, 1194 (N.D. Ill. 2013) (citing Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 582 (7th Cir.

2009)). In any case in which “the plaintiff has been injured as the consequence of

the actions of an unknown member of a collective body, identification of the

responsible party may be impossible without pretrial discovery.” Rodriguez v.

Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). So the “initial

inability to identify the injurers is not by itself a proper ground for the dismissal of

the suit.” Id. The “children's game of pin the tail on the donkey” is not a “proper

model for constitutional tort law.” Id. (citation omitted).

Hill v. Cook Cnty., 463 F. Supp. 3d 820, 836 (N.D. Ill. 2020). Contrary to the jail defendants’

argument, plaintiffs’ collective allegations regarding the alleged actions and omissions of several

corrections officers, only some of whom plaintiffs have been able to identify by name absent

further pretrial discovery, does not support the jail defendants’ request for dismissal of Anita’s

Fourteenth Amendment excessive force and deliberate indifference claims as asserted in the jail

complaint against Jared Cutler, Jordan Inman, Brooks Berens, Reed Blackard, William Jacobs,

Braden Wano, Aaron Witt, and Andrew Galanis, in their individual capacities. And, because

further discovery may lead plaintiffs to abandon their claims against at least some of the jail

defendants they have sued in their individual capacities, the Court declines to consider the jail

defendants’ blanket assertion of qualified immunity at this stage of the litigation.

Fifth and finally, to the extent Undersheriff Jon Copeland seeks dismissal of all individual

capacity claims asserted against him in the arrest complaint, the Court agrees that dismissal is

appropriate. In the arrest complaint, plaintiffs purport to sue Copeland in his individual and official

capacity. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 1-2, 4. The Court

has already concluded that the official capacity claims shall be dismissed as redundant with the

official capacity claims asserted against Sheriff Owen. And, on the facts alleged, plaintiffs fail to

state any plausible claims that Undersheriff Copeland could be personally liable for the alleged

violations of their federally protected rights. Plaintiffs’ sole allegation in the arrest complaint

regarding Undersheriff Copeland is that he “intentionally ignored Open Records requests made by

the plaintiffs and denied them access to body camera footage, sallyport videos, use of force and

incident reports, and jail videos with inculpatory evidence of misconduct.” Hayes et al. v. Owen

et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 11. These facts do not plausibly allege a

constitutional violation and thus fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted under § 1983.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants in part and denies in part the jail defendants’

motion to dismiss. The Court dismisses the jail complaint, in part, as to: (1) all official capacity

claims asserted against the jail defendants; (2) all Eighth Amendment and Fourth Amendment

claims asserted against all defendants; and (3) all Fourteenth Amendment claims alleging

violations of Salinda Hayes’s rights to be free from the use of excessive force or to be provided

adequate medical care asserted against all defendants. The Court also dismisses the arrest

complaint, in part, as to all claims asserted against Undersheriff Jon Copeland.

D. Sheriff Owen’s and the WCSO’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. # 15)

Plaintiffs name the WCSO and Sheriff Owen as defendants in both complaints, sue the

WCSO in its official capacity, and sue Sheriff Owen in his individual and official capacity. By

asserting official-capacity claims against these defendants, plaintiffs seek to impose liability

against Washington County for the alleged violations of plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fourth,

Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

The WCSO and Sheriff Owen move to dismiss all claims asserted against them for five

reasons. They contend: (1) the WCSO is not a suable entity; (2) plaintiffs fail to state any plausible

individual-capacity claims against Sheriff Owen; (3) plaintiffs fail to state any plausible official-

capacity claims against Sheriff Owen; (4) plaintiffs lack standing to seek prospective injunctive

relief; and (5) Sheriff Owen is entitled to qualified immunity as to any individual-capacity claims.

Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 15, at 4-15.

For several reasons, the Court finds that both complaints should be dismissed as to most

claims asserted against Sheriff Owen and that the WCSO should be dismissed from this action

with prejudice. First, the WCSO is not a proper defendant in this action because it is a

governmental sub-unit of Washington County and is not a “person” that can be sued under § 1983.

The law of the state in which the district court is located determines a noncorporate entity’s

capacity to be sued. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(b)(3). Under Oklahoma law, a county sheriff’s office is

not subject to suit under § 1983 because it has no legal identity of its own. See Reid v. Hamby,

No. 95-7142, 124 F.3d 217 (Table), 1997 WL 537909, at *6 (10th Cir. Sept. 2, 1997) (unpublished)

(holding that “an Oklahoma ‘sheriff’s department’ is not a proper entity for purposes of a § 1983

suit”); Hollis v. Creek Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., No. 13-CV-0590-CVE-FHM, 2013 WL 6074165, at

*2 (N.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2013) (unpublished) (collecting cases and stating that the “Sheriff’s Office

is not a proper defendant”); Lindsey v. Thompson, 550 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289 (E.D. Okla. 2006)

(holding that the Carter County Sheriff’s Department is not a legal entity subject to suit). The

Court therefore dismisses the WCSO from this action, with prejudice.

Second, plaintiffs fail to state any plausible individual-capacity claims against Sheriff

Owen. As previously stated, a defendant sued in his or her individual capacity “may be subject to

personal liability and/or supervisory liability.” Brown, 662 F.3d at 1163. Personal liability

requires facts showing the defendant’s “personal involvement in the alleged constitutional

violation.” Id. None of plaintiffs’ factual allegations plausibly suggests that Sheriff Owen

personally participated in the alleged violations of plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. In the arrest

complaint, plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Owen “was aware that the incident [presumably, the

plaintiffs’ arrests] had been recorded and broadcasted live to Facebook,” that Sheriff Owen “was

aware” that plaintiffs’ arrests and the subsequent search of their vehicle “were illegal” and that

excessive force was used against plaintiffs, and that Sheriff Owen ignored plaintiffs’ complaints

about the arrest. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, at 11. These

allegations, and the reasonable inferences drawn from them, show, at most, that Sheriff Owen

knew about the plaintiffs’ arrests after the fact, not that he personally participated in any violations

that allegedly occurred during the arrests. In the jail complaint, plaintiffs allege that Sheriff Owen

ignored “numerous complaints,” presumably, complaints about Anita’s alleged mistreatment

while detained at the Washington County Jail. Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No. 22-CV-0230-CVE-

SH, Dkt. # 11, at 10. Again, this allegation suggests no personal participation by Sheriff Owen in

any of the events that allegedly occurred at the Washington County Jail. Thus, even liberally

construed, neither complaint states any plausible individual-capacity claims against Sheriff Owen

under a theory of personal liability. Plaintiffs similarly fail to state any plausible individual-

capacity claims against Sheriff Owen under a theory of supervisory liability. Under this theory, a

plaintiff must allege facts “show[ing] that ‘(1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented

or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained

of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged

constitutional deprivation.’” Brown, 662 F.3d at 1164 (quoting Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1199). In other

words, to hold supervisors individually liable for constitutional deprivations committed by their

subordinates, there must be “an ‘affirmative’ link . . . between the unconstitutional acts by their

subordinates and their ‘adoption of any plan or policy . . . –– express or otherwise –– showing their

authorization or approval of such misconduct.’” Dodds, 614 F.3d at 1200-01 (quoting Rizzo v.

Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976)). As just discussed, plaintiffs’ allegations suggest Sheriff

Owen’s involvement, if any, with plaintiffs’ arrests and detention occurred after the fact, not that

he created a plan or policy, “express or otherwise” approving or authorizing the alleged use of

excessive force by WCSO deputies and corrections officers or the corrections officers’ alleged

failure to provide Anita with adequate medical care. At most, plaintiffs’ allegations suggest Sheriff

Owen was aware that plaintiffs were arrested and detained and that he received and did not respond

to their complaints. On the facts alleged, plaintiffs fail to state any plausible individual-capacity

claims against Sheriff Owen under a theory of supervisory liability.7

Third, and for the reasons previously discussed, plaintiffs’ factual allegations in the arrest

complaint and the jail complaint do not state any plausible municipal liability claims against

Sheriff Owen for alleged violations of their rights under the First and Eighth Amendments. See

supra sections IV.B and IV.C (discussing First and Eighth Amendment claims). The Court finds,

however, that it is a much closer question as to whether plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to state

any plausible municipal liability claims against Sheriff Owen for alleged violations of their rights

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiffs’ complaints both describe, in detail, the

7 Because plaintiffs fail to state any plausible individual-capacity claims against Sheriff

Owens, the Court does not address Sheriff Owen’s argument that he is entitled to qualified

immunity.

alleged misconduct of several WCSO deputies and corrections officers. Taken as true, plaintiffs’

allegations plausibly show that one or more individual defendants may have violated plaintiffs’

rights under the Fourth Amendment, during plaintiffs’ arrests, and may have violated Anita’s rights

under the Fourteenth Amendment, during plaintiffs’ subsequent detention at the Washington

County Jail. But, by suing Sheriff Owen in his official capacity, plaintiffs seek to impose liability

against Washington County for these alleged constitutional violations. And Monell holds that a

governmental entity is only liable under § 1983 when the constitutional injury can fairly be said to

have been caused by that entity’s own policies and customs. 436 U.S. at 694. As previously

discussed, Sheriff Owen is the final policymaker for the Washington County Jail and he is the

county official responsible for hiring, training, and supervising WCSO deputies and corrections

officers. None of plaintiffs’ allegations, in either complaint, identify any policy or custom that

Sheriff Owen created, implemented, or enforced that can be fairly said to have caused plaintiffs’

alleged constitutional injuries. That said, when plaintiffs’ factual allegations are considered

collectively and accepted as true, the Court finds them sufficient to at least raise a reasonable

inference that Sheriff Owen maintains a policy or custom, or a reasonable inference that there

exists a “persistent practice,” that caused multiple WCSO deputies and corrections officers at two

separate locations (the site of the arrest and the jail) to engage in the alleged violations of plaintiffs’

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Gooding, 838 F. Supp. 2d at 1238. As this case

proceeds, plaintiffs may fall short of proving Washington County is liable under a theory of

municipal liability. But, at this stage of the litigation, the Court is not convinced that plaintiffs’

Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims should be dismissed for failure to state plausible claims

against Sheriff Owen, in his official capacity.

Based on the foregoing, the Court grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss

filed by Sheriff Owen and the WCSO. The Court (1) dismisses the WCSO from this action, with

prejudice, because it is not a proper defendant, (2) dismisses the arrest complaint and the jail

complaint, in part, as to all claims asserted against Sheriff Owen in his individual capacity, and (3)

dismisses the arrest complaint and the jail complaint, in part, as to the First and Eighth Amendment

claims asserted against Sheriff Owen in his official capacity.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Board of

County Commissioners of the County of Washington (“the Board) on August 15, 2022 (Dkt. # 14)

is granted, and the Board is terminated as a party.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by defendants Washington

County Sheriff Scott Owen and the Washington County Sheriff’s Office (“WCSO”) on August 15,

2022 (Dkt. # 15) is granted in part and denied in part, and the WCSO is terminated as a party.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by defendants Jon

Copeland, Kristin Davis, Jared Cutler, Jordan Inman, Brooks Berens, Reed Blackard, Williams

Jacobs, Braden Wano, Aaron Witt, and Andrew Galanis on August 15, 2022 (Dkt. # 16) is granted

in part and denied in part, and Jon Copeland and Kristen Davis are terminated as parties.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss filed by defendant Jeff Prentice

on August 22, 2022 (Dkt. # 22) is granted, and Jeff Prentice is terminated as a party.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the arrest complaint, Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No.

22-CV-0231-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, is dismissed, in part, as to: (1) all claims asserted against the

Board; (2) all claims asserted against Lieutenant Jeff Prentice; (3) all Eighth Amendment claims

asserted against all defendants; (4) all Fourteenth Amendment claims asserted against all

defendants; (5) all claims asserted against Undersheriff Jon Copeland; (6) all claims asserted

against Sheriff Owen in his individual capacity; and (7) all First Amendment claims asserted

against Sheriff Owen in his official capacity.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the jail complaint, Hayes et al. v. Owen et al., No.

22-CV-0230-CVE-SH, Dkt. # 1, is dismissed, in part, as to: (1) all claims asserted against the

Board; (2) all claims asserted against Undersheriff Jon Copeland and Kristin Davis; (3) all official

capacity claims asserted against Jared Cutler, Jordan Inman, Brooks Berens, Reed Blackard,

Williams Jacobs, Braden Wano, Aaron Witt, and Andrew Galanis; (4) all Eighth Amendment

claims asserted against all defendants; (5) all Fourth Amendment claims asserted against all

defendants; (6) all Fourteenth Amendment claims alleging violations of Salinda Hayes’s rights to

be free from the use of excessive force or to be provided adequate medical care asserted against

all defendants; and (7) all claims asserted against Sheriff Owen in his individual capacity.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs may proceed on the following claims, as

alleged in the arrest complaint, against the following defendants: (1) plaintiffs’ Fourth

Amendment excessive force claims against (a) Sheriff Owen, in his official capacity, (b) Deputy

Summer Davis, in her individual capacity, and (c) Deputy Patrick Ballard, in his individual

capacity; (2) plaintiffs’ First Amendment claims against (a) Deputy Summer Davis, in her

individual capacity, and (b) Deputy Patrick Ballard, in his individual capacity.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiffs may proceed on the following claims, as

alleged in the jail complaint, against the following defendants: (1) Anita Hayes’s Fourteenth

Amendment deliberate indifference claim (inadequate medical care) against (a) Sheriff Owen, in

his official capacity, and (b) Michael Kitchens, B. Underwood, Jared Cutler, Jordan Inman, Brooks

Berens, Reed Blackard, Williams Jacobs, Braden Wano, Aaron Witt, and Andrew Galanis, in their

individual capacities; and (2) Anita Hayes’s Fourteenth Amendment due process claim (excessive

force) against (a) Sheriff Owen, in his official capacity, and (b) Michael Kitchens, B. Underwood,

Jared Cutler, Jordan Inman, Brooks Berens, Reed Blackard, Williams Jacobs, Braden Wano,

Aaron Witt, and Andrew Galanis, in their individual capacities.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the stay of discovery (Dkt. # 45) in this case is hereby

lifted and that a new scheduling order shall be entered forthwith.

DATED this 30th day of March, 2023.

Chiuay Le

By lee

CLAIRE V.EAGAN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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