Opinion

Myers v. Turn Key Health Clinic, LLC

Court
District Court, N.D. Oklahoma
Filed
Jan 12, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.5%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

ASHLEY MYERS, individually and as )

Co-Personal Representative of the Estate of )

Lorri Gayle Tedder; and )

)

COURTNEY VAUGHN, individually and as )

Co-Personal Representative of the Estate of )

Lorri Gayle Tedder, )

)

Plaintiffs, ) Case No. 22-CV-119-TCK-JFJ

)

v. )

)

BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS )

OF ROGERS COUNTY, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This case arises from November 2019 death of Lorri Gayle Tedder (Tedder), a pretrial

detainee who was being held in custody at the Amos G. Ward Detention Center in Rogers County,

Oklahoma. Plaintiffs Ashley Myers and Courtney Vaughn (Plaintiffs), both individually and in

their capacity as co-personal representatives of the Tedder’s estate, filed their Second Amended

Complaint (Complaint) on April 13, 2022, asserting eight claims for relief against 15 separate

defendants. (Doc. 20). Two of the defendants, namely Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC, (Turn Key),

and Kylee Foster (Foster, collectively Defendants), have moved to dismiss the claims against them

under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Docs. 22, 23). Plaintiffs filed a response to each motion, (Docs.

25, 26), and Defendants each filed a reply, (Docs. 27, 28).

I. BACKGROUND

According to the Complaint, on November 7, 2019, Tedder was taken into custody by the

Catoosa Police Department for non-violent but erratic behavior at the Hard Rock Casino. (Doc. 20

at ¶ 33). Tedder was eventually booked at the Amos G. Ward Detention Center in Rogers County,

Oklahoma at approximately 8:00 a.m. on the morning of November 7. (Id. at ¶¶ 35, 36).

Throughout her arrest and detention, Tedder was incoherent and evincing signs of intoxication or

suffering from a severe mental health crisis. (Id. at ¶¶ 41-43). In particular, Tedder was unable to

stand on her own accord and making delusional statements, such as “God is the King and I am the

Queen.” (Id. at ¶¶ 41, 48). When Tedder was taken to the showers during the booking process, she

had soiled herself and was covered in feces. (Id. at ¶ 44). However, despite these clear

manifestations of severe intoxication/mental distress, the Complaint alleges that Tedder did not

receive an adequate, if any, medical or mental health screening during her detention. (Id. at ¶ 53).

At some point, Tedder was placed in a restraint chair in the detention center, where she

remained until approximately 6:15 p.m. on November 7. (Id. at ¶ 66). After removal from the

restraint chair, Tedder’s head had been slammed into a glass window, resulting in a deep laceration

on her forehead. (Id. at ¶ 72). Tedder was taken to the ground and laid in a prone position with

jailers exerting force to her back, ribs, and legs by kneeling on Tedder’s back and legs. (Id. at ¶¶

67-76). As she was pinned to the ground, the jailers covered her face with a spit mask—a mask

that was improperly placed such that Tedder’s eyes, nose, and mouth were covered, thereby

impairing her vision and breathing. (Id.) The Complaint alleges that Tedder was held in this

manner for more than four minutes, during which time Tedder had alerted the jailers that she could

not breathe. (Id. at ¶¶ 91, 128). After being held down, Tedder eventually ceased moving and

urinated herself, as she became unconscious, and the Complaint states that she was unconscious

for nearly eight minutes before any cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) efforts were made. (Id.

at ¶¶ 124, 131).

The Complaint states that it is well known in law enforcement and medical communities

that holding a person in a prone position for long periods of time is dangerous and that compression

on the back and abdomen can result in asphyxiation. (Id. at ¶¶ 100-01). Despite this ubiquitous

understanding, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Foster—a licensed practical nurse (LPN),

employed by Turn Key to provide medical assistance at the Amos G. Ward Detention Center—

witnessed Tedder being held in the prone position and struggling to breath, but she did not provide

any assistance to Tedder. (Id. at ¶¶ 14, 123). Though Foster cleaned Tedder’s urine from the floor

with paper towels, she did not check on Tedder’s condition as she lay in the prone position. (Id. at

¶ 129). Rather, only a cursory check of Tedder’s pulse was performed by placing a finger on the

back of Tedder’s neck and affirming “I think” that she is breathing, causing another jailer to retort

that Tedder was “just playing games.” (Id. at ¶¶ 129, 132-33). In fact, after observing Tedder

urinating herself, being unable to stand or walk, having open eyes with no pupil dilation or

blinking, and not breathing, the Complaint states that Foster left the area without leaving medical

instruction to the jailers or consulting an outside medical provider. (Id. at ¶ 163). When officers

did eventually initiate CPR, the chest compressions were performed incorrectly, and Foster did not

intervene to perform the compressions or give instructions regarding proper technique. (Id. at ¶¶

168-71). Foster did, however, place the automated external defibrillator (AED) on Tedder, at

which point, Foster allegedly turned and said, “She’s [expletive] dead.” (Id. at ¶ 174). Tedder was

ultimately transported by ambulance to a hospital, where she stayed until she was pronounced dead

on November 9, 2019. (Id. at ¶¶ 175-76).

From these facts, Plaintiffs maintain that Foster either knew of Tedder’s acute respiratory

distress and failed to render proper treatment or did not know of the danger posed to Tedder

because she was poorly trained by her employer. (Id. at ¶¶ 164-65). While the Complaint asserts

eight claims against fifteen different defendants, it levies three of its claims against Foster, namely:

1) negligent medical treatment, actionable under the Oklahoma Government Tort Claim Act

(OGTCA); 2) deliberate indifference to serious medical need in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and

3) failure to intervene to prevent the use of excessive force in violation 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at

¶¶ 236-40, 245-65, 410-18). The Complaint also asserts claims against Foster’s employer,

Defendant Turn Key, which is an Oklahoma limited liability corporation that is independently

contracted by the Rogers County Sheriff, Scott Walton, and the Rogers County Jail Administrator,

Kellie Guess, to provide medical services at the Amos G. Ward Detention Center. (Id. at ¶¶ 4-6).

Specifically, the Complaint asserts that Turn Key was negligent in its hiring, retention, training,

and supervision; and Turn Key was deliberately indifferent in its capacity as final decisionmaker

regarding municipal policy, under a Monell theory of municipal liability. (Id. at ¶¶ 334-409).

Turn Key filed a motion to dismiss, raising three broad challenges to the Complaint,

namely: 1) Plaintiffs fail to state a claim for relief against Turn Key; 2) Plaintiffs lack standing to

bring individual claims against Turn Key; and 3) Turn Key is immune from liability under the

OGTCA. (Doc. 22). Likewise, Foster filed a motion to dismiss, raising three similar challenges to

the Complaint. (Doc. 23). In response to the motions, Plaintiffs concede their individual capacity

claims as well as its claim regarding Foster’s failure to intervene against the use of excessive force.

(Docs. 25 at 1; 26 at 2). Plaintiffs do, however, contest Defendants’ assertion that the Complaint

fails to state a claim against Defendants and that Foster and Turn Key are immune from liability

under the OGTCA. Accordingly, all claims made in Plaintiffs’ individual capacity are dismissed,

and Plaintiffs’ claim against Foster for the failure to intervene against the use of force is also

dismissed. The Court now turns to the contested issues raised in the motions to dismiss.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

“The court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the

parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s . . . complaint alone is legally

sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted.” Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC

Universal, Inc., 757 F.3d 1125, 1135 (10th Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). A complaint is

legally sufficient only if it contains factual allegations such that it states a claim to relief that “is

plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “While a

complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations,

a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than

labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”

Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted) (alteration original). Instead, “[a] claim has facial plausibility

when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that

the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

This plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. For the purpose of making the dismissal determination, a court must accept all the

well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true, even if doubtful, and must construe the

allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Alvarado v.

KOB–TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs fail to state a § 1983 claim because the Complaint fails to

establish a connection between Tedder’s alleged injuries and the conduct of Turn Key and its

employee, Defendant Foster. (Docs. 22 at 11-15; 23 at 10-15). Moreover, Defendants argue that

the Complaint fails to establish that Turn Key or Foster subjected Tedder to any constitutional

deprivation. (Docs. 22 at 26-30; 23 at 15-19). Turn Key additionally argues that the Complaint

does not sufficiently allege a specific Turn Key policy that was the moving force behind Tedder’s

constitutional deprivations. (Doc. 22 at 16-25). With respect to Plaintiffs’ negligence claims,

Defendants maintain that they are immune from liability under Okla. Stat. tit. 51 § 155(25) of the

OGTCA, (Docs. 22 at 32-35; 23 at 21-24), and that the Complaint does not sufficiently establish

Foster as the legal cause of Plaintiffs’ negligence claim. (Doc. 23 at 25-27). The Court disagrees.

Although Defendants raise numerous challenges to the Complaint, stripped to the studs,

Defendants are essentially attacking the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ factual allegations. Yet,

Defendants’ arguments are belied by the 91 pages and 434 paragraphs of the Complaint. The

pleading requirements under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 demand only that a defendant be given fair notice

of what the claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d

1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). The Complaint

goes above and beyond what is required under Rule 8 and leaves nothing to the imagination

regarding Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants. That is to say, the Complaint pleads sufficient

factual content to support Plaintiffs’ § 1983 and negligence claims against Defendants.

Further, the issue of immunity under the OGTCA turns on whether the allegedly tortious

conduct rises to the level of bad faith, and thus, falls outside the scope of Defendants’ employment.

Mustain v. Grand River Dam Auth., 2003 OK 43, ¶ 21, 68 P.3d 991, 999 (“An employee whose

acts are malicious, willful, wanton and in bad faith is not acting in the scope of his employment.”).

Despite overtures that Defendants’ “cursory search” of the Complaint failed to yield factual

allegations sufficient to establish bad faith by Turn Key or its employees, (Docs. 27 at 9; 28 at 10),

as discussed above, a more probing search reveals that Plaintiffs have sufficiently pleaded facts to

plausibly infer that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference toward Tedder’s medical need,

which is tantamount to acting with reckless disregard. Whether that reckless disregard rises to the

level of bad faith, such that it falls outside the ambit of OGTCA immunity, is an issue of fact that

“cannot properly be determined in a motion to dismiss.” Smith v. Allbaugh, 2020 WL 889165, at

*9 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 2020), rev’d on other grounds, 987 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting

Pendergraft v. Bd. of Regents of Okla. Colls., 2019 WL 3806639, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 13,

2019)). Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss are DENIED, except as to the issues that

Plaintiffs have conceded.

IV. CONCLUSION

Plaintiffs have conceded all claims in their individual capacity and the claim against

Defendant Kylee Foster for failure to intervene against the use of excessive force, and therefore,

those claims are DISMISSED. However, based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the Second

Amended Complaint (Doc. 20) sufficiently alleges facts to support all of Plaintiffs’ remaining

claims against Defendants Kylee Foster and Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC. Accordingly, the

motions to dismiss filed by Defendant Turn Key Health Clinic, LLC, (Doc. 22), and Defendant

Kylee Foster, (Doc. 23), are DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 11" day of January 2023.

—— >

TERENCE C. KERN

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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