The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
EARNEST JOE FIELDS, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 21-CV-0179-CVE-SH
)
CITY OF TULSA, OKLAHOMA, )
OFFICER LUCAS TEMPLE, )
OFFICER CHERISH COMFORT, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Now before the Court are Defendant Officer Lucas Temple’s Motion for Summary Judgment
and Brief in Support (Dkt. # 55) and Defendant Officer Cherish Comfort’s and City of Tulsa’s
Combined Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (Dkt. # 57). This case arose out of
incident that took place on October 16, 2018 in which plaintiff Earnest Joe Fields was arrested for
obstructing an officer. Defendant Cherish Comfort argues that he did not use excessive force against
plaintiff when he was taken into custody, and Comfort and Lucas Temple assert that they had
probable cause to arrest plaintiff for obstructing an officer. Plaintiff responds that police officers
violated his Fourth Amendment rights by detaining him without probable cause to believe that he
had committed an offense, and Comfort using excessive force when he took an unresisting and
compliant suspect to the ground.
I.
On October 16, 2018 at approximately 5:55 a.m., Tameko Warren called 911 to report that
she was parked at a QuikTrip store located at 46th Street North and Lewis Avenue in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, and she claimed that a man was letting the air out of her tires. Dkt. # 55-1, at 00:10-
00:21 (recording of 911 call). Warren also stated that the man had blocked her vehicle into the
parking space with his truck, and she identified the man as her “soon to be ex-husband,” Fields. Id.
at 00:21-00:26. Warren described Fields as a black man driving a white Chevy truck. Id. at 00:28-
00:33. The 911 dispatcher asked if Fields had any weapons, and Warren claimed that Fields had a
hammer that he was “hitting” on her window. Id. at 00:36-00:39. The dispatcher asked to Warren
to describe Field’s appearance, and Warren stated that Field was wearing a brown hat with the word
Tulsa, a blue jacket, and a black shirt. Id. at 00:55-1:02. Warren did not know if Fields was still in
possession of the hammer, and she told the dispatcher that it was probably in her tire. Id. at 1:12-
1:18. Warren told the 911 dispatcher that she was alone in her vehicle and Fields had not hit her
with the hammer. Id. at 1:30-1:36. Warren identified her car as a green Toyota Corolla and her car
was still blocked in the parking lot by Fields’ truck. Id. at 1:59-2:10 Upon further questioning,
Warren stated that her vehicle was in a parking space, not at a gas pump, and Fields was continuing
to let air out of her tires. Id, at 2:18-2:26. Warren clarified that she could see the hammer in Fields’
hand and she did not want to get out of the vehicle. Id. at 2:30-2:43. Police officers were sent to
Warren’s location and she waited in her car until they arrived.
Tulsa Police Department (TPD) Officer Jill Sallee arrived on the scene and briefly entered
the store before going to speak to Warren. Dkt. # 55-8, at 0:01-0:07 (Sallee bodycam video). Sallee
walked over to Warren’s vehicle, which was parked near an air pump at the side of the parking lot,
and she asked Warren what happened to prompt her to call for help. Id. at 00:10-00:36. Warren
stated that Fields pulled up in his truck in front of Warren’s vehicle and began letting the air out of
the tires of Warren’s vehicle, but Warren had not exited her vehicle to inspect the tires since the
encounter with Fields began. Id. at 00:37-00:45 Upon further questioning from Sallee, Warren
stated that Fields had not actually hit her and Fields “tapped on the window” with a hammer. Id. at
1:05-1:15. Warren acknowledged that she was scared by Fields conduct, even though she had not
been injured, and Fields had been “violent” before this encounter. Id. at 1:20-1:28. Temple and
Comfort arrived on the scene while Sallee was interviewing Warren, and Temple entered the store
to locate Fields .
Temple entered the store and found Fields making a cup of coffee.1 Dkt. # 55-11, at 00:01-
00:30. Temple asked Fields to go outside the store to speak with police, but Fields indicated that
he was going to pay for his coffee and get some gas for his truck. Id. at 00:45-00:51. At this point
in the encounter, Fields paid for his coffee and gas and Temple went to speak to Sallee at Warren’s
vehicle, but Temple directed Comfort to make sure that Fields did not leave the store. Id. at 1:45-
2:03. Temple spoke to Sallee and learned that Fields “tapped” on Warren’s vehicle with a hammer,
and Temple inspected Warren’s vehicle for possible damage. Id. at 3:00-3:32. Temple returned to
the store, and Fields was speaking in a raised voice to Comfort as Comfort directed Fields to remain
in the store. Id. at 4:01-4:15. Comfort clearly told Fields to stay in the store and Fields again stated
that he was going to put gas in his truck. Id. at 4:17-4:25. Temple advised Fields that the officers
were trying to determine what happened during Fields’ interaction with Warren at her vehicle, and
Fields continued to state that he was going to put gas in his truck. Id. at 4:30-4:45. Temple told
Fields to go outside the store to speak with the officers to avoid interfering with the business, and
Fields walked toward the checkout counter. Id. at 4:47-4:53. Fields took off his jacket and he
removed some items that were clipped onto his pants, and he began to walk past the officers on his
1 There is no audio at the beginning of Temple’s bodycam footage, and it is not possible to
determine what Temple said to Fields while he was making a cup of coffee.
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way out of the store. Id. at 4:55-5:01. Fields was fully out of the store and walking toward his truck
when Comfort performed a takedown maneuver. Id. at 5:03-5:07. Comfort placed Fields in
handcuffs and promptly allowed Fields to stand up, and Fields began to demand that the officers
stop touching him. Id. at 5:43-6:03. The officers told Fields to calm down and they brought him to
one of the patrol vehicles, and Fields sat in the back seat of a patrol car after continuing to argue with
the officers. Id. at 6:05-7:57. Fields continued to argue with Comfort after he was placed in the
patrol vehicle. Id. at 10:55-13:10. Fields was arrested on a misdemeanor charge of obstructing an
officer, but the charge was dismissed before the case went to trial. Dkt. # 55-3, at 2; Dkt. # 72, at
13.
On October 16, 2020, Fields filed this case in Tulsa County District Court alleging claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City, Temple, and Sallee for the use of excessive force to arrest
plaintiff and for wrongful arrest. Fields’ state court petition names Sallee and Temple as defendants
as to his claims of excessive force and wrongful arrest, and he alleged a § 1983 claim against the
City based on a theory of municipal liability. Defendants removed the case to this Court based on
the presence of a federal question in Fields’ petition. Fields filed an amended complaint (Dkt. # 21)
clarifying that it was Comfort who allegedly use excessive force by performing a take down
maneuver, and the use of excessive force claim (claim I) was alleged against Comfort only. Fields
asserted a wrongful arrest claim (claim III) against Comfort, Temple, and Sallee, and a claim of
municipal liability (claim II) against the City. Fields subsequently dismissed his claim against Sallee
with prejudice to refiling. Dkt. # 74.
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II.
Summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 is appropriate where there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 250 (1986); Kendall v. Watkins, 998 F.2d 848, 850 (10th Cir. 1993). The plain language of
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon
motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 317. “Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored
procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed
‘to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’” Id. at 327.
“When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more
than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. . . . Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there
is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586-87 (1986) (citations omitted). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the
plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the [trier of fact] could
reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In essence, the inquiry for the Court
is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 250. In its review,
the Court construes the record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Garratt v. Walker, 164 F.3d 1249, 1251 (10th Cir. 1998).
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III.
Defendants seek summary judgment on plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Comfort argues that his
use of a take down maneuver was objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and plaintiff
cannot establish that his constitutional rights were violated by Comfort’s conduct. Dkt. # 57.
Comfort and Temple argue that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for the offense of
obstructing an officer in violation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 540. Plaintiff disputes defendants’
contention that he acted in a hostile manner toward police officers or that he refused to obey
commands to speak to the officers. Plaintiff claims that it was unnecessary for Comfort to use any
amount of force to detain him, and he asserts that police officers lacked probable cause to arrest him
for the offense of obstructing an officer.
A.
Plaintiff argues that he was suspected of committing a non-violent misdemeanor and he was
not resisting arrest, and he claims that any use of force by Comfort was unreasonable under the
circumstances. Dkt. # 72, at 22-25. Comfort argues that he was investigating a possible domestic
violence with a weapon charge and plaintiff was actively obstructing a police investigation, and the
minimal use of force employed by Comfort to detain plaintiff was reasonable. Dkt. # 57, at 14-16.
The Fourth Amendment governs claims concerning the use of force for a warrantless arrest
before a probable cause hearing has been held. Estate of Booker v. Gomez, 745 F.3d 405, 419 (10th
Cir. 2014). In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the Supreme Court set out the standards
governing excessive force claims under the Fourth Amendment, and as a general matter explained
that the reasonableness of the force used requires a “balancing of ‘the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’ against the countervailing governmental
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interests at stake.” Id. at 396. The reasonableness of the use of force “must be judged from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with 20/20 vision of hindsight,” and not
“every push or shove . . . violates the Fourth Amendment.” Id. The Court must consider factors
such as the “severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade
arrest by flight.” Estate of Ceballos v. Husk, 919 F.3d 1204, 1213 (10th Cir. 2019). The
reasonableness inquiry is wholly objective and “an officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth
Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force . . . .” McCoy v. Meyers, 887
F.3d 1034, 1045 (10th Cir. 2018). The use of force may become unreasonable, even if the use of
force is initially appropriate, if the person being detained is no longer a threat to the safety of police
officers. Dixon v. Richer, 922 F.2d 1456, 1463 (10th Cir. 1991).
The first Graham factor is the severity of the crime at issue, and the parties dispute the nature
of the underlying offense that police were investigating. Comfort argues that plaintiff was suspected
of a domestic violence offense involving a weapon, and he reasonably believed that plaintiff could
be armed with a hammer. Dkt. # 57, at 15. Plaintiff states that he was suspected of committing a
“nonviolent misdemeanor,” whether it was the domestic incident involving Warren or a possible
obstruction offense. Dkt. # 72, at 23. The evidence shows that Warren made a 911 call concerning
plaintiff’s conduct, and she told the 911 dispatcher that plaintiff had blocked her vehicle with his
truck. Dkt. # 57-3, at 3. She also claimed that plaintiff was banging on the window of her vehicle
with a hammer and letting the air out of her tires. Id. Warren subsequently clarified that Fields
“tapped” on her window with the hammer, but at all times she maintained that she was afraid of
Fields and she felt threatened by him. Warren’s statement at least provided police officers with
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reasonable suspicion to warrant further investigation into a possible domestic violence with a
weapon incident, and Fields’ contention that police were investigating a “nonviolent misdemeanor”
is not supported by the evidence. The evidence also shows that officers developed additional
evidence supporting a second possible crime of obstructing an officer based on Fields’ conduct
during their investigation. When police officers made contact with plaintiff, he refused to comply
with numerous requests to speak with the officers, and he became increasingly hostile towards
Temple and Comfort as the encounter continued. Plaintiff claims that he was “insulted” by the
officers’ requests to speak with him because “he knew that he had done nothing wrong,” and he
denies that he was hostile or agitated towards the officers. Dkt. # 72, at 7. The Court must view the
evidence from the perspective of a reasonable police officer at the scene, and plaintiff’s refusal to
comply with commands given by the officers and his demeanor could have suggested to a reasonable
officer that plaintiff would use physical force against an officer. The Court finds that nature of the
underlying offenses supports the use of some force to detain plaintiff.
Plaintiff disputes that he posed any threat to police officers or that he was obstructing an
investigation, and he claims that the second Graham factor (threat to officers) clearly supports his
position that the use of any amount of force by Comfort was unreasonable. Plaintiff claims that he
posed no immediate threat to police officers when he was taken to the ground, and he asserts that he
was clearly attempting to comply with Temple’s request to exit the store. Dkt. # 72, at 23. However,
a reasonable police officer could have perceived plaintiff’s actions as threatening and combative,
even if the Court were to accept plaintiff’s subjective belief that he did not intend to use physical
force against the police officers. Comfort argues that Fields was “walk[ing] aggressively” toward
Comfort, and Comfort could have believed that Fields was armed with a hammer and attempting to
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flee from the officers. Dkt. # 57, at 15. The Court will not rely on any party’s characterization of
the events and, instead, the Court has independently reviewed the video evidence to apply the
Graham factors. The video footage shows that plaintiff essentially ignored the police officers who
were attempting to speak to him, and he refused to obey numerous commands to speak to the police
officers outside the store. Plaintiff became more hostile as the encounter continued and he directly
told Comfort and Temple that he was going to ignore their commands and put gas in his car. After
putting some personal items on the counter inside the store, plaintiff again ignored a command to
speak to the officers and he attempted to walk toward his car in direct violation of a command from
Comfort. The Court finds that plaintiff became increasingly agitated and hostile as the encounter
continued and he made it clear that he would not obey any command issued by the officers on the
scene. Comfort took plaintiff to the ground and handcuffed him, and Comfort brought plaintiff to
his feet as soon as the handcuffs were in place. Plaintiff did not appear to suffer any injuries from
the takedown and he did not make any statements suggesting that he was injured by Comfort’s use
of force.
The third Graham factor (flight risk) shows that the use of minimal force to detain plaintiff
was reasonable under the circumstances. Temple and Comfort had given plaintiff numerous
commands to speak to them about Warren’s allegations. Plaintiff’s conduct towards the officers
was initially somewhat dismissive, but he became increasingly hostile as the encounter continued.
Although plaintiff made statements suggesting that he would speak to police officers after he put gas
in his truck, plaintiff’s conduct would have suggested to a reasonable police officer that he had no
intention of complying with their commands and that he intended to flee from the scene.
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Considering all of the Graham factors, the Court finds that Comfort’s use of a take down
maneuver to detain plaintiff was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Police officers
were initially investigating a possible domestic violence with a weapon charge and, as the encounter
with Fields developed, his increasingly hostile conduct provided support for an additional possible
charge of obstructing an officer. Plaintiff’s behavior and demeanor, viewed from the perspective of
a reasonable police officer, suggested that he could potentially use physical force against a police
officer, and he plainly showed no intention of complying with the officers’ commands to speak to
them. Comfort used a takedown maneuver as plaintiff was actively disobeying a command by
Temple to stay and speak with the officers, and Comfort allowed plaintiff to quickly back to his feet
after he was placed in handcuffs. The use of force and the amount of force used was reasonable
under the circumstances, and plaintiff has not shown that Comfort violated plaintiff’s constitutional
rights due to the excessive use of force.
B.
Defendants argue that police officers had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for the offense of
obstructing an officer in violation of OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 540, based on plaintiff’s failure to
comply with repeated commands to speak with police officers about a potential domestic violence
offense. Dkt. # 55, at 9. Plaintiff responds that police officers learned information contradicting
Warren’s initial statements made during the 911 call, and they had no basis to continue to investigate
plaintiff for a possible domestic violence offense. Dkt. # 72, at 18. Plaintiff also claims that he
agreed to comply with Temple’s request to speak to him after he pumped gas for which he had
already paid, but Comfort prematurely used physical force to detain plaintiff before he could comply
with the officer’s commands. Id. at 19.
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The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure .. . against
unreasonable searches and seizures ....” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. In the context of a false arrest
claim, “an arrestee’s constitutional rights were violated if the arresting officer acted in the absence
of probable cause that the person had committed a crime.” Kaufman v. Higgs, 697 F.3d 1297, 1300
(10th Cir. 2012). Probable cause exists when a police officer has sufficient information “to warrant
a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.” Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). This is an objective standard and a court must consider the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable officer would have believed there was
probable cause to make an arrest. Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2011).
Probable cause “is measured at the moment the arrest occurs and must derive from facts and
circumstances based on reasonably trustworthy information.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108,
1121 (10th Cir. 2007). Once probable cause is established, a police officer is not required to search
for exculpatory evidence before arresting a suspect. Id. A defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity from a false arrest claim if there was “arguable probable cause” to make an arrest.
Kaufman, 697 F.3d at 1300. “Arguable probable cause is another way of saying that the officers’
conclusions rest on an objectively reasonable, even if mistaken, belief that probable cause exists.”
Stonecipher v. Valles, 759 F.3d 1134, 1141 (10th Cir. 2014). “The proper inquiry ina § 1983 claim
based on false arrest is not whether the person arrested actually committed an offense, but whether
the arresting officer had probable cause to believe that he had.” Crawford ex. rel. Crawford v.
Kansas City, Kansas, 952 F. Supp. 1467, 1474 (D. Kan. 1997) (citing Dowling v. City of
Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988)).
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Under § 540, “[e]very person who willfully delays or obstructs any public officer in the
discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his or her office” is guilty of a misdemeanor. There
is no requirement that a person use physical force against a police officer in order to sustain a
conviction under this statute. Marsh v. State, 761 P2d 915, 916 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). “[W]ords
alone may suffice to support a conviction for Obstructing an Officer.” Trent v. State, 777 P.2d 401,
402 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989). The Tenth Circuit has found that a person’s actions constituting
potential flight or the failure to comply with an order to halt qualifies as a violation of § 540. United
States v. Sanchez, 555 F.3d 910, 919 (10th Cir. 2009). Conduct that delays or impedes a police
officer’s investigation of a domestic violence offense can provide a sufficient basis for an arrest
under § 540. Tucker v. City of Oklahoma City, 2013 WL 5303730 (W.D. Okla. Sep. 20, 2013).
The Court has independently viewed the video evidence and finds that police officers had
probable cause to arrest plaintiff for the offense of obstructing an officer. The offense of obstructing
an officer under Oklahoma law simply requires that a person delay or obstruct a public official in the
performance of his or her duties, and plaintiff plainly delayed an ongoing investigation into a
domestic violence incident by refusing to speak with Temple and Comfort. Even if plaintiff was not
ultimately charged with a domestic violence offense, Warren’s statements about Fields’ conduct
provided a sufficient basis for police to conduct an investigation about a possible domestic violence
with a weapon charge. At a minimum, police officers had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain
plaintiff while they investigated a possible domestic violence offense, and plaintiff’s conduct during
the officers’ investigation gave rise to probable cause for plaintiff’s arrest for obstructing an officer.
Plaintiff’s argument in opposition to summary judgment on this claim is essentially that he believed
he was complying with the orders given by the police officers, and he disputes that police had
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sufficient facts that would support any investigation into Warren’s allegations concerning a possible
domestic violence charge. Dkt. # 73, at 13-15. The Court must consider how a reasonable police
officer would have viewed the facts and circumstances at the time plaintiff was arrested, and
plaintiff’s claims concerning his subjective beliefs or intentions during the encounter with police do
not detract from the existence of probable cause in this case. Comfort and Temple have established
that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for the offense of obstructing an officer based on the
objective evidence available to them when plaintiff was arrested.
Temple and Comfort also argue that they would be entitled to qualified immunity from this
claim, even if plaintiff were able to show that facts developed after the incident called into question
some of Warren’s allegations concerning Fields’ conduct. The Supreme Court has held that
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982). Qualified immunity shields public officials from facing the burdens of litigation and is an
immunity from suit, not simply a defense to a plaintiff’s claims. Serna v. Colorado Dept. of
Corrections, 455 F.3d 1146, 1150 (10th Cir. 2006). The Tenth Circuit applies a two-step analysis
to determine if a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. A plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s actions violated a specific constitutional right and, if the plaintiff has shown that a
constitutional violation occurred, the plaintiff must show that the constitutional right was clearly
established when the conduct occurred. Toevs. v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2012). Even
if plaintiff could show that officers mistakenly relied on Warren’s statements as a basis for an
investigation into Fields’ conduct, the Court would find that Temple and Comfort had arguable
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probable cause to believe that plaintiff committed the offense of obstructing an officer. The officers
had an objectively reasonable belief that they had sufficient facts to warrant an investigation into a
possible domestic violence incident, even if Warren subsequently changed or clarified her
allegations, and plaintiff committed the offense of obstructing an officer while they were engaged
in this lawful investigation. Plaintiff’s failure to comply with the officers’ commands, not the validity
of Warren’s allegations, ultimately gave rise to his arrest for obstructing an officer, and Temple and
Comfort have established that they had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for this charge. Plaintiff’s
failure to establish the existence of a constitutional violation would also support a finding that
Temple and Comfort have qualified immunity from plaintiff’s false arrest claim.
C.
The City argues that plaintiff has not established that any violation of his constitutional rights
occurred and plaintiff cannot proceed with a § 1983 claim against the City. Dkt. # 57, at 19. Under
§ 1983, a local government or municipality may be held liable for adopting an official policy or
custom causing a violation of constitutional rights, but local governments can not be sued under a
respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436
U.S. 658, 691 (1978). “To establish a claim for damages under § 1983 against municipal entities
or local government bodies, the plaintiff must prove (1) the entity executed a policy or custom (2)
that caused the plaintiff to suffer deprivation of constitutional or other federal rights.” Moss v.
Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155, 1168 (10th Cir. 2009). It is not enough for a plaintiff to allege that the actions
of a governmental employee injured him. Olsen v. Layton Hills Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1318 (10th
Cir. 2002). “Instead, it must be shown that the unconstitutional actions of an employee were
representative of an official policy or custom of the municipal institution, or were carried out by an
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official with final policy making authority with respect to the challenged action.” Seamons v. Snow,
206 F.2d 1021, 1029 (10th Cir. 2000). One way for a plaintiff to prove a claim of municipal liability
is to show that an express policy deprived the plaintiff of a constitutional right. Christensen v. Park
City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1279 (10th Cir. 2009). Another way to establish municipal liability
is to show that an action taken by a final policymaker for the governmental entity violated or caused
a violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Simmons v. Uintah Health Care Special Dist., 506
F.3d 1281, 1285 (10th Cir. 2007).
The Court has determined that Comfort did not use excessive force when he detained
plaintiff, and the Court has also found that police had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for
obstructing an officer in violation of Oklahoma law. “The general rule in [Trigalet v. City of Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 239 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2001] is that there must be a constitutional violation, not just
an unconstitutional policy, for a municipality to be held liable” under § 1983. Crowson v.
Washington County Utah, 983 F.3d 1166, 1191 (10th Cir. 2020). “If a plaintiff suffered no
constitutional violation, he cannot recover simply because some municipal policy might have
authorized an officer to violate the Constitution.” Frey v. Town of Jackson, Wyoming, 41 F.4th
1223, 1239 (10th Cir. 2022). Even if the Court were to assume that plaintiff could identify an
unconstitutional policy, he has not established that any person acting on behalf of the City violated
his constitutional rights, and he cannot recover on a § 1983 claim against the City.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant Officer Lucas Temple’s Motion for
Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (Dkt. # 55) and Defendant Officer Cherish Comfort’s and
City of Tulsa’s Combined Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support (Dkt. # 57) are
granted. A separate judgment is entered herewith.
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DATED this 7th day of December, 2022.
CLAIRE V. EAGAN □
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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