Bramlett v. Crow

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

RENESE BRAMLETT, )

)

Petitioner, )

)

v. ) Case No. 20-CV-0537-JFH-CDL

)

SCOTT CROW, )

)

Respondent. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Petitioner Renese Bramlett’s Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ

of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (“Petition”). Dkt. No. 1. Bramlett seeks federal

habeas relief from the judgment entered against him in the District Court of Tulsa County, Case

No. CF-2015-4266, and identifies three claims in the Petition. Bramlett also seeks leave to amend

or supplement the Petition to add a fourth claim. For the reasons that follow, the Court, DENIES

Bramlett’s Motion for Leave to Supplement Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Motion to Supplement”)

[Dkt. No. 2] and DENIES the Petition.

BACKGROUND

In 2016, a Tulsa County jury convicted Bramlett of first-degree murder and recommended

a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Dkt. No. 1 at 1; Dkt. No. 18-5 at 183. The

State presented evidence during the guilt phase of the trial establishing that Bramlett strangled to

death his ex-girlfriend, Michelle Spence, and that her two sons, who were then fourteen and eleven

years old, discovered her body in the backseat of Spence’s SUV—naked and covered in a

blanket—after they walked to Bramlett’s apartment complex and saw Spence’s SUV parked across

the street from Bramlett’s apartment complex. Bramlett v. State, 422 P.3d 788, 791 (Okla. Crim.

App. 2018). During the sentencing phase of the trial, the State presented evidence establishing

that Bramlett had two prior felony convictions, evidence the jury could consider in determining

whether to recommend either a life sentence with the possibility of parole or a life sentence with

no possibility of parole. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 701.10-1(A). The jury recommended the latter, and

the trial court sentenced Bramlett accordingly. Dkt. No. 17-3 at 1; Dkt. No. 21 at 18-2.

Bramlett filed a direct appeal. In 2018, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals

(“OCCA”) affirmed Bramlett’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing

based on its finding that the prosecutor committed “flagrant misconduct” by misstating the law

regarding parole eligibility and, further, that the misconduct “so infected the sentencing stage of

Bramlett’s trial that it was rendered fundamentally unfair.” Bramlett v. State, 422 P.3d 788, 799-

801 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018). At the conclusion of the resentencing hearing, the jury

recommended a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, and the trial court resentenced

Bramlett accordingly and entered a new judgment and sentence. Dkt. No. 17-3 at 2.

Bramlett then filed a resentencing appeal asserting three claims. Dkt. No. 17-3 at 2. On

October 31, 2019, the OCCA issued a decision rejecting all three claims on the merits and

affirming Bramlett’s new judgment and sentence. Id. at 2, 8. Bramlett did not seek further direct

review by filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court. Dkt. No. 1 at

3. Nearly one year later, on October 16, 2020, Bramlett filed, in state district court, a Motion for

DNA Testing of Evidence (“DNA Motion”) and a Sworn Affidavit of Innocence (“Affidavit”),

seeking relief under Oklahoma’s Postconviction DNA Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1373-1373.7.

Dkt. No. 17 at 2; Dkt. No. 17-4 at 1-30. The DNA Motion is pending in state district court. Dkt.

No. 24 at 5.

Three days after filing the DNA motion, Bramlett filed the Petition, in this Court, seeking

federal habeas relief on the same three claims he raised through his resentencing appeal. Dkt. No.

1 at 5, 7-8.1 In an Order filed December 2, 2020, the Court directed Crow to respond to the

allegations in the Petition.2 Dkt. No. 7. Crow filed a Response in Opposition to the Petition

(“Response to Petition”) on March 2, 2021. Dkt. No. 17. Bramlett filed a Reply Brief (“Reply”)

on March 15, 2021. Dkt. No. 20. At that point, the Petition was ripe for adjudication.

Over three months later, on June 29, 2021, Bramlett filed an Application for Postconviction

Relief (“APCR”) in state district court, seeking relief under Oklahoma’s Uniform Post-Conviction

Procedure Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1080-1089. Dkt. No. 21 at 3. In the APCR, Bramlett alleged

he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process because the State of Oklahoma

lacked criminal jurisdiction over his prosecution. Dkt. No. 21 at 3. In support of this claim, he

cited McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020), alleged that his victim was Native American

and that the crime for which he was convicted was committed within the boundaries of the

Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation, and argued that he should have been prosecuted in federal

court under the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (hereafter, “McGirt claim”).3 Dkt. No. 21 at

1 Bramlett appears pro se in this matter and is entitled to liberal construction of his pleadings but

he is not entitled to have this Court act as his advocate by formulating arguments on his behalf.

James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013). Because Bramlett’s Petition expressly

refers this Court to the appellate brief he filed in the OCCA to support his resentencing appeal, as

to all three claims, the Court construes the Petition as raising the same claims and arguments that

were presented to and rejected by the OCCA through Bramlett’s resentencing appeal.

2 In the order directing Crow to file a response, the Court dismissed the Petition, in part, to the

extent it could be construed as asserting a “fourth ground for habeas relief arising from his pending

motion for DNA testing,” reasoning that a claim alleging actual innocence is not cognizable on

habeas review. Dkt. No. 7 at 2 n.2.

3 In McGirt, the Supreme Court determined that Congress did not disestablish the historical

boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation, that the reservation thus remains “Indian

country” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), and that, as a result, certain crimes committed within

the boundaries of that reservation must be prosecuted in federal court. 140 S. Ct. 2462-68, 2479.

3-10, 15-17. Bramlett filed the Motion to Supplement on July 29, 2021, seeking leave to amend

or supplement the Petition to include the McGirt claim.4 Dkt. No. 21 at 1-2. Crow opposes the

Motion to Supplement and urges the Court to deny the Petition. Dkt. Nos. 17, 24.

DISCUSSION

I. Motion to Supplement

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 governs Bramlett’s request for leave to amend or

supplement the Petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2242; see also Mayle v. Felix, 545 U.S. 644, 655-65 (2005)

(discussing application of Rule 15 in habeas context); Postelle v. Carpenter, 901 F.3d 1202, 1225

(10th Cir. 2018) (same). Because Crow filed a response to the Petition and opposes Bramlett’s

request to add a new claim, Bramlett may not amend or supplement the Petition without leave of

Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Under Rule 15(a)(2), a “court should freely give leave” to amend

“when justice so requires.” A court may, however, deny leave to amend if, among other reasons,

the amendment would be futile. Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1560 (10th Cir. 1994).

Crow contends, in part, that amendment would be futile because the McGirt claim lacks

merit. Dkt. No. 24 at 3-7. The Court agrees. Critically, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in

4 On April 11, 2022, Bramlett filed a Motion to Stay, asking the Court to stay this habeas

proceeding pending the conclusion of Bramlett’s efforts to exhaust available state remedies as to

the McGirt claim. Dkt. No. 31 at 1-3. State prisoners must exhaust available state remedies as to

any federal claims before raising those claims in a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. §

2254(b)(1)(A); Ellis v. Raemisch, 872 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir. 2017). To satisfy the exhaustion

requirement, “state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any

constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review

process.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). More recently, Bramlett filed a

Motion to Expedite Ruling, advising the Court that he has now exhausted the McGirt claim and

asking this Court to adjudicate the Petition and, presumably, his pending Motion to Supplement.

Dkt. No. 38. Based on representations in the Motion to Expedite Ruling, the Court DENIES as

moot the Motion to Stay. Because this Opinion and Order adjudicates the Petition and resolves

the Motion to Supplement, the Court also DENIES as moot the Motion to Expedite Ruling.

Oklahoma v. Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. 2486 (June 29, 2022), precludes relief on the McGirt claim.

Bramlett’s McGirt claim alleges that the State of Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him

for murder in Indian Country because his victim was Native American. Dkt. No. 21 at 3-10, 15-

17. And Bramlett makes clear that only the victim is Native American. See Dkt. 31 at 2

(“Petitioner never claimed to be an Indian, only that victim was an enrolled member of the

Cherokee Tribe.”). But the Major Crimes Act applies to “Any Indian” who commits murder in

Indian Country. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). “So even assuming that the text of the Major Crimes Act

provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over major crimes committed by Indians in Indian

country,” Castro-Huerta, 142 S. Ct. at 2496, the Major Crimes Act does not apply to Bramlett.

And, to the extent Bramlett asserts that some other federal law barred the State from exercising

criminal jurisdiction, he is mistaken because the Castro-Huerta Court held that “the Federal

Government and the State have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed by non-

Indians against Indians in Indian Country.” 142 S. Ct. at 2504-05.

Because Bramlett’s McGirt claim clearly lacks merit, it would be futile to permit Bramlett

to amend or supplement the Petition to add that claim. The Court therefore DENIES Bramlett’s

Motion to Supplement.

II. Petition

Based on the foregoing, the Court will adjudicate the Petition only as to the three claims

raised therein.5 Because Bramlett is in custody under a state-court judgment, this Court may not

5 Bramlett appears to assert additional claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

counsel in his Reply to the Petition, filed March 15, 2021. Dkt. 20 at 3-9. But nothing in the

record suggests that Bramlett has exhausted, or even attempted to exhaust, available state remedies

as to these claims. Further, Bramlett did not mention these claims in his Motion to Supplement or

his Motion to Stay. Under these circumstances, there are no ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

claims properly before this Court.

grant him federal habeas relief unless he shows that he “is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). In other words, a

federal court may grant federal habeas relief only if a state violates a petitioner’s right that is

protected by the Constitution or federal law. See Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (“[I]t

is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to

collateral attack in the federal courts.”); Eizember v. Trammell, 803 F.3d 1129, 1145 (10th Cir.

2015) (“[T]his court’s role on collateral review isn’t to second-guess state courts about the

application of their own laws but to vindicate federal rights.”); but see Leatherwood v. Allbaugh,

861 F.3d 1034, 1043 (10th Cir. 2017) (noting that “[a] prisoner may seek relief . . . if a state law

decision is so fundamentally unfair that it implicates federal due process”).

Further, as relevant here, federal law “prohibits federal habeas relief for any claim

adjudicated on the merits in state court, unless one of the exceptions listed in § 2254(d) obtains.”

Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 121 (2011); see also Shinn v. Kayer, 141 S. Ct. 517, 520 (2020)

(stating that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) “restricts the

power of federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus based on claims that were ‘adjudicated on

the merits’ by a state court.”). A federal court may not grant habeas relief on federal claims that

were rejected on the merits by a state court unless the petitioner first demonstrates that the state

court’s adjudication of his or her federal claims “resulted in a decision that” either: (1) “was

contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,” 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1); or (2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the

evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding,” id. § 2254(d)(2). And, in any case, a federal

court must presume the correctness of the state court’s factual findings unless the petitioner rebuts

that presumption “by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). In short, “[w]hen

a state court has applied clearly established federal law to reasonably determined facts in the

process of adjudicating a claim on the merits, a federal habeas court may not disturb the state

court's decision unless its error lies ‘beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Kayer,

141 S. Ct. at 520 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)).

Crow urges the Court to deny the Petition. He contends Bramlett’s second and third claims

do not assert cognizable habeas claims and, to the extent claims two and three are sufficient to

allege violations of federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) bars relief as to all three claims in the Petition

because the OCCA’s decision is neither contrary to nor based on an unreasonable application of

clearly established federal law. Dkt. No. 17 at 11-26.

A. Prosecutorial Misconduct

Bramlett first claims he was denied his constitutional right to a fair resentencing hearing

because the prosecutor’s remarks during closing arguments elicited sympathy for the victims of

his crime, particularly Spence’s sons. Dkt. No. 1 at 5, 69-72. Bramlett argues, as he did in state

court, that the prosecutor’s following remarks, from the first closing argument, were improper

appeals to sympathy:

You heard the victim’s son being asked, Do you like the defendant? No. He never

wants to see the defendant. He didn’t want to see him this time, but he came to do

it for his mother. Two boys, trusting Renese, and he betrayed their trust when he

killed their mother.

Dkt. No. 1 at 70. Bramlett further argued that the prosecutor who gave the final closing argument

committed misconduct when he:

• “reminded the jury how ‘[the victim’s two sons] at the ripe age of 14 found their mother’

dead with fecal matter on her body,”

• “suggested that [the victim] was killed in ‘[t]he home where she raised her children,’”

• “questioned: ‘What does Michelle mean to her family now? It’s loss. It’s hurt. What does

mom mean for those two boys now because of [Appellant’s] decisions?,’” and

• stated, “In Tulsa County, what’s it worth when you strangle a woman, move her body for

children to find in that state.’”

Dkt. No. 1 at 70. In addition, Bramlett questioned the prosecutor’s decision to have Spence’s

oldest son testify at the resentencing hearing and argued that it is well-settled that “it is improper

for a prosecutor to ask jurors to have sympathy for crime victims.” Id. at 71.

The OCCA rejected Bramlett’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim. Initially, the OCCA noted

that Bramlett did not object to the challenged remarks and that the claim was subject to review for

plain error. Dkt. No. 17-3 at 2-3. The OCCA agreed with Bramlett that “‘blatant appeals to

sympathy’ are inappropriate.” Id. at 3. But the OCCA reasoned that a prosecutor’s challenged

remarks must be evaluated “within the context of the entire trial” and, further, that “[r]elief is only

granted where the prosecutor’s flagrant misconduct so infected the defendant’s trial that it was

rendered fundamentally unfair.” Id. Applying these standards, the OCCA concluded that the

prosecutors’ challenged remarks “were not inappropriate appeals to sympathy but, rather, were

proper comments on the evidence and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.” Id. at 4.

Under clearly established federal law, “a prosecutor’s improper comments will be held to

violate the Constitution only if they “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting

conviction a denial of due process.” Parker v. Matthews, 567 U.S. 37, 45 (2012) (per curiam)

(quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)). Because Supreme Court precedent

sets a “highly generalized standard for evaluating claims of prosecutorial misconduct,” id. at 49,

state courts have “more leeway . . . in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations,” id. at

48 (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)).

Bramlett does not explain how the OCCA’s decision either is contrary to clearly established

federal law, based on an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts. Regardless, the Court has carefully considered each

possibility and finds that Bramlett cannot make these showings. First, because it is clear from the

OCCA’s decision that it applied Darden’s general principles when it evaluated his claim, this

Court cannot say that the OCCA’s decision is “contrary to” clearly established federal law. See

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000) (explaining that “a run-of-the-mill state-court

decision applying the correct legal rule from [Supreme Court] cases to the facts of a prisoner’s

case would not fit comfortably within § 2254(d)’s ‘contrary to’ clause”). Second, having reviewed

the transcripts from the resentencing hearing, the Court cannot say that the OCCA either

unreasonably applied Darden to the facts of this case or rested its decision on an unreasonable

determination of the facts. See Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1525 (2022) (explaining

that, to show an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, “a petitioner must

persuade a federal court that no ‘fairminded juris[t]’ could reach the state court’s conclusion under

[the Supreme] Court’s precedents, and that to show an unreasonable determination of the facts, “it

is not enough to show that ‘reasonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the finding

in question.’” (first quoting Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 269 (2015), then quoting Brumfield v.

Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015))). Those transcripts support the OCCA’s determination that the

prosecutor’s challenged remarks were fair comments on the evidence and, that those comments,

viewed in context of the entire proceeding, did not violate Bramlett’s right to due process or his

right to a fair resentencing hearing. As a result, § 2254(d) bars relief, and the Court denies the

Petition as to claim one.

B. Unconstitutional Statute

Next, Bramlett claims Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 701.10-1(A) violates the Fourteenth

Amendment’s Due Process Clause because the law permits the State, in a noncapital case, to offer

evidence in aggravation but does not provide a corresponding right to the defendant to offer

evidence in mitigation. Dkt. No. 1 at 7, 72-76. The challenged statute provides:

Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder in the first degree,

wherein the state is not seeking the death penalty but has alleged that the defendant

has prior felony convictions, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing

proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to life

imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment, wherein the state shall be given

the opportunity to prove any prior felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.

The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge before the same trial jury as

soon as practicable without presentence investigation.

Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 701.10-1(A). As he did in state court, Bramlett primarily discusses the

OCCA’s prior decision in Vanderpool v. State, 434 P.3d 318 (Okla. Crim. App. 2018). In

Vanderpool, the OCCA considered several constitutional challenges to this statute and found “no

violation of the Eighth Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, or the Due Process Clause when

a trial court does not consider mitigating factors during a noncapital sentencing proceeding.” Dkt.

1 at 72-73. Bramlett effectively asked the OCCA to revisit its decision in Vanderpool, asserting

that the OCCA “wrongly concluded [in Vanderpool] that statutory restrictions against mitigation

apply in a non-capital case even when the state is permitted to present aggravating evidence.” Dkt.

1 at 75 (emphasis omitted). Bramlett also cites the Supreme Court’s decision in Lockett v. Ohio,

438 U.S. 586 (1978), to support his second claim. In Lockett, the Supreme Court held that “the

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital

case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s

character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a

basis for a sentence less than death.” 438 U.S. at 604 (footnotes omitted). But Bramlett

acknowledges that Lockett was a capital case and that the Lockett Court “did not address the issue

before [the OCCA]: Whether a defendant has any right to present evidence in mitigation when a

statute permits a jury to hear evidence for the exclusive purpose of aggravation” in a noncapital

case. Dkt. 1 at 73-74. Relying on Vanderpool, the OCCA rejected Bramlett’s argument that the

challenged statute violates a defendant’s right to due process. Dkt. 17-3 at 6.

The Court agrees with Crow that § 2254(d) bars relief as to claim two.6 As Bramlett’s

second claim alleges a legal error rather than a factual one,7 he must satisfy one of the

preconditions to habeas relief identified in § 2254(d)(1) before this Court may grant relief on his

claim. See House v. Hatch, 527 F.3d 1010, 1015 (10th Cir. 2008) (“Subsection (d)(1) governs

claims of legal error while subsection (d)(2) governs claims of factual error.”). When § 2254(d)(1)

guides this Court’s review of a habeas claim, the first question for this Court is whether there are

any “Supreme Court holdings in cases where the facts are at least closely-related or similar to the

case [at issue].” Id. at 1016. If the answer to that question is no, this Court “need not assess

whether a state court’s decision was ‘contrary to’ or involved an ‘unreasonable application’ of

[clearly established federal] law” because no such law exists. Id. at 1017.

As Crow argues, there is no clearly established federal law governing Bramlett’s claim that

a state law violates due process if it allows a state to present “aggravation” evidence, i.e., evidence

of the defendant’s prior felony convictions, for purposes of imposing a sentence in noncapital case,

6 The Court rejects Crow’s preliminary argument that Bramlett’s second claim does not assert a

cognizable habeas claim. As presented in state court and as reasserted here, Bramlett’s second

claim alleges the state sentencing law, as applied to him (or, possibly, on its face) violates his right

to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. That allegation is sufficient to state

a cognizable habeas claim.

7 Bramlett presented his second claim to the OCCA as “a legal issue,” and that is how the OCCA

addressed the claim. Dkt. 1 at 72; Dkt. 17-3 at 4-6. Bramlett appears to suggest, however, that

the OCCA’s decision as to this claim rests on a “wrong determination of the facts and a limited

look at the evidence of mitigation that was ‘clearly constrained’ during the trial.” Dkt. 21 at 2.

Bramlett’s argument is not entirely clear, but the Court finds no basis in the record for his apparent

suggestion that the OCCA’s decision as to the second claim rests on an unreasonable determination

of the facts.

but does not also allow the defendant to present mitigation evidence. Rather, while the Supreme

Court has held that the Constitution requires “that the sentencer in capital cases must be permitted

to consider any relevant mitigating factor” before imposing a death sentence, Eddings v.

Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 102, 112 (1982); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, the Supreme Court has not

extended that principle to noncapital cases, see Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991)

(“We have drawn the line of required individual sentencing at capital cases, and see no basis for

extending it further.”). Because there is no clearly established federal law governing Bramlett’s

second claim, § 2254(d)(1) bars relief. The Court thus denies the Petition as to claim two.

C. Appellate Remedy

Last, Bramlett appears to claim either: (1) that the OCCA should have modified his

sentence to life with the possibility of parole as a remedy for the prosecutorial misconduct it found

on his direct appeal, rather than remanding the case for resentencing; or (2) that the OCCA should

have modified his sentence to life with the possibility of parole as a remedy for “perceived

deficiencies in the resentencing process as applied to the facts of his case.” Dkt. No. 1 at 8, 76-

83.

The OCCA understood this claim as arguing “that modification is the preferred remedy

when sentencing error has occurred” because, in Bramlett’s view, “the decision to remand a case

for resentencing disadvantages a defendant.” Dkt. No. 17-3 at 6-7. The OCCA rejected this claim,

reasoning that Bramlett’s “policy” arguments “would be best directed to the Legislature,” and that

his “arguments that he was disadvantaged by a resentencing trial are purely speculative” because

Bramlett “does not allege any error of law in his resentencing trial and [the OCCA found] none.”

Id. at 7-8.

As to this third claim, the Court agrees with Crow that, however Bramlett’s arguments are

construed, he does not state a cognizable habeas claim. Instead, his arguments merely express

dissatisfaction with state laws regarding the appropriate appellate remedy for errors that impact

the sentencing phase of a defendant’s trial. These arguments, to the extent the Court understands

them, do not implicate any of Bramlett’s rights that are protected by federal law. See Eizember,

803 F.3d at 1145 (“[T]his court’s role on collateral review isn’t to second-guess state courts about

the application of their own laws but to vindicate federal rights.”). The Court therefore denies the

Petition as to claim three.

C. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court concludes Bramlett is not entitled to federal

habeas relief and thus DENIES the Petition. Further, to the extent Bramlett requests a certificate

of appealability, the Court DENIES that request because reasonable jurists would not debate the

correctness of this Court’s assessment of Bramlett’s claims. 28 U.S.C. §2253(c); Rule 11, Rules

Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.

473, 484 (2000).

THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that:

1. The Motion for Leave to Supplement Writ of Habeas Corpus [Dkt. No. 21] is DENIED.

2. The Motion to Stay [Dkt. No. 31] is DENIED as moot.

3. The Motion to Expedite Ruling [Dkt. No. 38] is DENIED as moot.

4. The Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State

Custody [Dkt. No. 1] is DENIED.

5. Bramlett’s request for a certificate of appealability is DENIED.

6. A separate judgment shall be entered in this matter.

Dated this 24th day of August 2022.

____________________________________

JOHN F. HEIL, III

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE