Ware v. Kunzweiler

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

DAVID ANTHONY WARE, )

DERRICK WAYNE STITH, )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 22-CV-0076-JFH-CDL

)

STEVE KUNZWEILER, in his )

official capacity as Tulsa County )

District Attorney, )

THE DISTRICT JUDGES of the )

Fourteenth Judicial District, Tulsa )

County, State of Oklahoma, in their )

official capacities, )

THE ASSOCIATE DISTRICT JUDGE )

of the Fourteenth Judicial District, Tulsa )

County, State of Oklahoma, in his or her )

official capacity, )

THE SPECIAL DISTRICT JUDGES of )

the Fourteenth Judicial District, Tulsa )

County, State of Oklahoma, in their )

official capacities, )

THE TULSA COUNTY DISTRICT )

COURT CLERK, in his official capacity )

as member of the Court Fund Board of )

Tulsa County, )

)

Defendants. )

ORDER

This matter is before the Court, sua sponte, for screening of the Second Amended

Complaint (“Complaint”), filed March 25, 2022, by Plaintiffs David Anthony Ware and Derrick

Wayne Stith (collectively, “Plaintiffs”). Dkt. No. 9. Plaintiffs are currently detained in state

custody while awaiting criminal prosecution in two separate cases filed in the District Court of

Tulsa County. Plaintiffs have been charged, among other things, with capital murder. They bring

this action to challenge the constitutionality of the State of Oklahoma’s statutory scheme for

compensating conflict counsel in capital cases. Plaintiffs’ claim that because state law does not

provide adequate compensation for conflict counsel in capital cases, permitting the State to

prosecute Plaintiffs, both of whom are facing the death penalty and are represented by appointed

conflict attorneys, will violate Plaintiffs’ rights, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, to

be provided with effective assistance of counsel, to equal protection of the law, and to due process

of law. Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that two Oklahoma statutes and one Tulsa County

local rule governing compensation rates for conflict counsel in capital cases are unconstitutional,

and Stith seeks an injunction “prohibiting Defendant Kunzweiler from seeking the death penalty

against [him], unless and until the Constitutional violations associated with his legal representation

have been remedied.” Dkt. No. 9, at 11. This Court previously granted Ware’s request to proceed

in forma pauperis, and he paid the filing fee in full on March 28, 2022. Having screened the

Complaint, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court DISMISSES the Complaint,

without prejudice, on the ground of abstention under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).

A. Screening and Dismissal Standards

Because Plaintiffs are currently incarcerated and “seek[] redress from a . . . [an] officer or

employee of a governmental entity,” the Complaint is subject to screening under the Prison

Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). On review of the Complaint, the Court

must “identify any cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if

the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted;

or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. § 1915A(b).

Section 1915A(a)’s screening requirement is similar to the screening requirement for complaints

filed by litigants who, like Ware, are proceeding in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

But the PLRA screening provision applies to all civil actions filed by prisoners who seek redress

from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, “without regard to their fee status.” Plunk v.

Givens, 234 F.3d 1128, 1129 (10th Cir. 2000).

In determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court accepts as true Plaintiffs’ factual

allegations, construes reasonable inferences therefrom in Plaintiffs’ favor, and disregards legal

conclusions that are devoid of supporting facts. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell

Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is

appropriate “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a [plausible] claim

of entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp., 550 U.S. at 558. In addition, because federal courts are

courts of limited jurisdiction, this Court has an independent duty to determine whether Plaintiffs

have alleged sufficient facts to establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Henderson ex rel. Henderson

v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011); Rice v. Office of Servicemembers’ Group Life Ins., 260 F.3d

1240, 1244-45 (10th Cir. 2001).

B. Younger Abstention

Accepting Plaintiffs’ factual allegations in the Complaint as true, the Court finds those

allegations sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Nevertheless, the

Court must decline to exercise that jurisdiction in this civil action.

In Younger, the United States Supreme Court stated that “Congress has . . . manifested a

desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts.” 401 U.S.

at 43. The “underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal

prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a

proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a

Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government

will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in

their separate ways.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 44.

“Under the Younger abstention doctrine, federal courts are to abstain from exercising

jurisdiction to interfere with state proceedings when the following three requirements are met: ‘(1)

there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding; (2) the state court provides

an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint; and (3) the state proceedings

involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution

or implicate separately articulated state policies.’” Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir.

2019) (quoting Chapman v. Oklahoma, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006)). “Once these three

conditions are met, Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary

circumstances, a district court is required to abstain.” Chapman, 472 F.3d at 749 (quoting Crown

Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)). The

Younger abstention doctrine applies to requests for declaratory judgments and requests for

injunctive relief. Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 69-73 (1971).

All three conditions requiring abstention are met here. First, it is clear from the Complaint

that Plaintiffs’ state criminal proceedings, in Tulsa County District Court Case Nos. CF-2020-2889

(Ware) and CF-2017-6158 (Stith), are ongoing. Dkt. No. 9, at 2, 5-6. Second, Plaintiffs have not

plausibly alleged that they lack an adequate forum in state court to litigate their constitutional

claims. Notably, “‘unless state law clearly bars the interposition of the federal statutory and

constitutional claims, a plaintiff typically has ‘an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in

state court.’” Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258 (quoting Crown Point I, LLC, 319 F.3d at 1215). Plaintiffs

allege in the Complaint that they lack an adequate state forum “because the Oklahoma Legislature

has created a system by which the conflict capital counsel is funded out of the same ‘court fund’

that funds the judicial retirement accounts.” Dkt. No. 9 at 9. Thus, Plaintiffs speculate, “every

judge in Oklahoma has a conflict of interest in deciding” Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. Id. Even

if this Court accepts as true Plaintiffs’ allegation that conflict counsel in capital cases and judicial

retirees receive monies from the same “court fund,” that fact does not demonstrate that Plaintiffs

are entirely precluded from raising their constitutional claims, or their related judicial-bias claims,

in state court. “Younger requires only the availability of an adequate state-court forum, not a

favorable result in the state forum.” Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258; see also J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez,

186 F.3d 1280, 1292 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing that to avoid Younger abstention plaintiffs bear

burden to “show that they could not have raised their [federal] claims” during ongoing state

proceeding). Under these circumstances, the Court finds the second condition requiring Younger

abstention is satisfied. Third, the State necessarily has an important interest in prosecuting

Plaintiffs for their alleged crimes. See, e.g., Aid for Women v. Foulston, 441 F.3d 1101, 1119 (10th

Cir. 2006) (emphasizing that states have a “strong interest” in enforcing their criminal laws and

other statutes).

Because all three conditions requiring abstention are met, the only remaining question is

whether any exceptional circumstances militate against abstention. “[A]bstention is mandatory

unless one of three exceptions applies: the prosecution was ‘(1) commenced in bad faith or to

harass; (2) based on a flagrantly and patently unconstitutional statute; or (3) related to any such

other extraordinary circumstance creating a threat of “irreparable injury” both great and

immediate.’” Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258-59 (quoting Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 1058, 1063-64

(10th Cir. 1995)). None of the factual allegations in the Complaint plausibly suggest that the first

exception applies. Dkt. No. 9 at 5-9. Plaintiffs, however, expressly invoke the second exception

by asserting that “Tulsa County Local Rule CR 10 (4) and/or Oklahoma’s statutory scheme for

limiting compensation of conflict counsel in death penalty cases is ‘patently unconstitutional’ and

is an exception to the Younger doctrine.” Id. But this assertion does not support that “the

prosecution [of either Ware or Stith] was . . . based on a flagrantly and patently unconstitutional

statute.” Winn, 945 F.3d at 1258-59 (emphases added). Plaintiffs are being prosecuted under state

criminal laws, not under the allegedly unconstitutional state laws governing compensation for

conflict counsel in capital cases.1

Finally, even if this Court were to construe Plaintiffs’ factual allegations as attempting to

invoke the third exception—irreparable injury—that exception too does not apply. Plaintiffs claim

that they will suffer constitutional harms if the State is permitted to prosecute them because the

attorneys appointed to represent them at their upcoming trials are being underpaid. But “Younger

and its descendants tell us that the burden of having to endure a trial is not—outside the double-

jeopardy context—irreparable injury in the Younger sense.” Winn, 945 F.3d at 1263. Plaintiffs’

allegations that they will be deprived of their rights to the effective assistance of counsel, to due

process, and to equal protection of the law if they are prosecuted in state court do not allege

irreparable injury sufficient to warrant federal intervention in their ongoing criminal prosecutions.

See, e.g., Winn, 945 F.3d at 1263-64 (concluding district court was required to abstain under

Younger when appellant alleged his pending state criminal prosecution would be tainted by his

allegedly invalid waiver of his right to a jury trial); Sweeten v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713, 715 (10th

Cir. 1972) (“The claimed denial of Sixth Amendment rights [to have counsel appointed] does not

afford an adequate basis for enjoining the state criminal proceedings since appellee has an adequate

1 Even if Plaintiffs were alleging that any relevant criminal statute was unconstitutional, that would

not preclude application of the Younger abstention doctrine. See Samuels, 401 U.S. at 67-68, 73

(concluding that the three-judge court should have abstained, under Younger, instead of

“proceeding to a consideration of the merits of the New York criminal anarchy law” when two

state criminal defendants awaiting prosecution under that law sought to enjoin the state

prosecutions and, in the alternative, requested a declaratory judgment that the law was

unconstitutional).

remedy at law in the state trial of this case, an appeal to the state supreme court, and the right to

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for review of any federal question.”). Like the

appellee in Sweeten, Plaintiffs, if convicted, will have adequate mechanisms for presenting any

federal constitutional claims in federal courts—following their trials and direct appeals to the

Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals—either through a petition for writ of certiorari filed in the

United States Supreme Court or a federal habeas petition. The availability of these mechanisms

further underscore the absence of irreparable injury. Thus, the third exception does not apply here.

C. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing analysis, this Court DISMISSES the Complaint, without prejudice,

under the Younger abstention doctrine. As a result, the Court DENIES as moot Defendant Steve

Kunzweiler’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 11], filed March 31, 2022.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. The Second Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 9] is DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. Defendant Steve Kunzweiler’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No. 11] is DENIED as moot.

3. This is a final Order terminating this action.

4. A separate judgment shall be entered in this matter.

Dated this 6th day of April 2022.

____________________________________

JOHN F. HEIL, III

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE