The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CAROLYN A., )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 20-CV-00570-CDL
)
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,1 )
Acting Commissioner of the )
Social Security Administration, )
)
Defendant. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration (Commissioner) denying Social Security disability benefits. The
parties have consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1), (2). For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned affirms
the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits.
Standard of Review
The Social Security Act (the Act) provides disability insurance benefits to qualifying
individuals who have a physical or mental disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 423. The Act defines
“disability” as an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
1 Effective July 9, 2021, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)(1), Kilolo
Kijakazi, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, is substituted as the defendant in this
action. No further action need be taken to continue this suit by reason of the last sentence
of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than
12 months.” See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
Judicial review of a Commissioner’s disability determination “‘is limited to
determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards and whether the
agency’s factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.’” Noreja v. Soc. Sec.
Comm’r, 952 F.3d 1172, 1177 (10th Cir. 2020) (citing Knight ex rel. P.K. v. Colvin, 756
F.3d 1171, 1175 (10th Cir. 2014)). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Id. at 1178 (quoting Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.
2005)); see also Biestek v. Berryhill, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). “Evidence
is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or constitutes mere
conclusion.” Noreja, 952 F.3d at 1178 (quoting Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1261-62).
So long as supported by substantial evidence, the agency’s factual findings are
“conclusive.” Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1152 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). Thus, the Court
may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Noreja, 952
F.3d at 1178.
Procedural History
Plaintiff filed an application for social security disability benefits and supplemental
social security income on February 15, 2019. (R. 228). Plaintiff alleges she became
disabled due to neck and back pain, autism, hypermobility, asthma, allergies,
gastroesophageal reflux, sensory processing disorder, depression, and PTSD. (R. 260).
Plaintiff was fifty-one years old on the alleged onset date of February 1, 2017. Prior to the
onset date, Plaintiff worked as a merchandiser. (R. 261). The Social Security
Administration denied Plaintiff’s application on initial review and on reconsideration.
Plaintiff then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
The ALJ held a video hearing on March 9, 2020. Testimony was given by Plaintiff
and a Vocational Expert (VE). On April 14, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision denying
disability benefits. (R. 12). On September 9, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review, which rendered the ALJ’s decision the agency’s final decision. (R. 1).
Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s April 14, 2020 decision under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The ALJ’s Decision
The Commissioner uses a five-step, sequential process to determine whether a
claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v). At step
one, the ALJ determines whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity. At
step two, the ALJ determines whether the claimant has an impairment or a combination of
impairments that is severe. At step three, the ALJ determines whether the claimant’s severe
impairment or combination of impairments is equivalent to one that is listed in the
applicable regulation, which the Commissioner “acknowledges are so severe as to preclude
substantial gainful activity.” Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 751 (10th Cir. 1988)
(internal quotation and citation omitted); see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
subpt. P, App’x 1 (Listings). At step four, the claimant must show that her impairment or
combination of impairments prevents her from performing her previous work.
The claimant bears the burden on steps one through four. Lax v. Astrue, 489 F.3d
1080, 1084. If the claimant satisfies this burden, thus establishing a prima facie case of
disability, the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner to show at step five that the
claimant retains the capacity to perform other work available in the national economy, in
light of the claimant’s age, education, and work experience. Id.
Here, the ALJ determined at step one that Plaintiff engaged in substantial gainful
activity from February 1, 2017 to February 28, 2017. (R. 18). There are no earnings
reported for Plaintiff after 2017; therefore, the ALJ found that there has been a continuous
12-month period during which the Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity
since the alleged onset date. Id. At step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the
following severe impairments: hypermobility of the joints, right shoulder impairment
status post-injury, autism spectrum disorder, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD). Id. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff’s impairments of side effects of
medication--including dizziness and nausea--are non-severe, as her medications were not
properly regulated and Plaintiff failed to adhere to medical advice of not taking medication
that caused stomach issues. Id. At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s physical and
mental impairments do not meet or equal the criteria for any listing. (R. 19). The ALJ
specifically noted Plaintiff’s physical impairments in connection with Listing 1.00
(Musculoskeletal System) and Listing 1.02 (major dysfunction of a joint(s) due to any
cause). Id.
With regard to mental impairments, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments do
not meet or medically equal the criteria of Listings 12.04 (Depressive, bipolar, and related
disorders), 12.06 (Anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders), and 12.15 (Trauma and
stressor-related disorders). Id. The ALJ discussed application of the “paragraph B”
criteria—four areas of mental functioning used to determine whether a claimant’s mental
impairments functionally equal a listing. (R. 19-22; see 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt. P App’x 1).
To satisfy the paragraph B criteria, a claimant’s mental impairments must result in at least
one extreme or two marked limitations in four areas of functioning. 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpt.
P App’x 1. A marked limitation means that the claimant’s functioning in the area
independently, appropriately, effectively, and on a sustained basis is seriously limited. Id.
An extreme limitation means the inability to function independently, appropriately, or
effectively, and on a sustained basis. Id.
Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has a moderate limitation in each of the four
paragraph B domains: understanding, remembering, or applying information; interacting
with others; concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing
oneself. (R. 19-21). Because Plaintiff does not have at least one extreme or two or more
marked limitations, her mental impairments do not meet or medically equal the criteria of
the Listings. (R. 22). Finally, the ALJ also addressed the “paragraph C” criteria for “serious
and persistent mental disorders,” see Listing 12.00A(2)(c), and determined that they are not
satisfied. Id. In accordance with these findings, the ALJ proceeded to step four.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the RFC
to lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and up to 10
pounds frequently. She is able to stand and/or walk at least six
hours in an eight-hour workday and sit at least six hours in an
eight-hour workday. She should avoid work above the
shoulder level. She should work in a temperature-controlled
environment (as controlled as an ordinary Wal-Mart). She is
able to perform simple, repetitive tasks. She occasionally is
able to interact with co-workers and supervisors. She should
not work with the public.
Id. In making his finding, the ALJ considered all symptoms and the extent to which these
symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence
and other evidence, based on the requirements of 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529 and 416.929 and
SSR 16-3p. Id. The ALJ also considered medical opinion(s) and prior administrative
medical finding(s) in accordance with the requirements of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c and
416.920c. Id.
Citing the VE’s testimony as to a hypothetical person with Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff is unable to perform her past relevant work. (R. 33). Accordingly, the
ALJ proceeded to step five. Based on the VE’s testimony as to a hypothetical person with
Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff can
perform the requirements of representative occupations, including:
Silver wrapper, light exertion, unskilled, specific vocational preparation
(SVP) level 1, DOT # 318.687-018, with 34,627 jobs existing in the national
economy;
Hand packer, light exertion, unskilled, SVP level 2, DOT # 559.687-074,
with 81,905 jobs existing in the national economy; and
Collator operator, light exertion, unskilled, SVP 2, DOT # 208.685-010,
with 59,419 jobs existing in the national economy.
(R. 34). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded at step five that Plaintiff is not disabled. (R. 35).
Plaintiff’s Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s mental RFC determination is not supported by
substantial evidence, as he failed to include the proper limitation in his mental RFC
assessment for Plaintiff’s social interaction impairments.2 The Commissioner contends
that the ALJ’s mental RFC determination adequately addresses Plaintiff’s limitations, is
based on medical evidence in the record, and is supported by substantial evidence.
Discussion
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s mental RFC determination is not supported by
substantial evidence and is inconsistent with the record as a whole. Specifically, Plaintiff
argues the ALJ failed to include a limitation for social interaction with coworkers and
supervisors that is consistent with prior administrative medical findings and medical
opinions of Plaintiff’s medical providers. In support, Plaintiff cites evidence in the record
that she had significant difficulties sustaining appropriate social interactions or completing
tasks when social interactions were necessary. Plaintiff’s brief cites the following
examples: significant anxiety, especially in public (citing R. 664); poor social skills (citing
R. 663); problems with social cues (citing R. 654); significant symptoms of anxiety and
social withdrawal (citing R. 634); angry mood with aggressive behaviors (citing R. 616-
17); struggles to be around others because she will blurt things out at people (citing R.
608); and excessive motor activity and admitted to believing people were against her
2 Plaintiff’s challenges in this appeal relate only to the ALJ’s mental RFC
determination. (See Pl.’s Br., Doc. 18 at 6-7). Accordingly, this opinion focuses on the
relevant evidence relating to Plaintiff’s mental impairments.
(citing R. 329). (See Doc. 18, p. 7). As Plaintiff’s arguments relate to how the ALJ weighed
the medical evidence when assessing the Plaintiff’s mental RFC, the discussion below
addresses the ALJ’s treatment of the prior administrative medical findings and medical
opinions in the record.
Mental RFC Determination
A. Prior Administrative Findings
Plaintiff asserts the ALJ ignored the prior administrative medical findings of state
agency reviewing experts Debby Doughty, Ph.D. and Gary Lindsay, Ph.D., which support
a more restrictive RFC limitation for social interaction with coworkers and supervisors. In
support, Plaintiff cites the opinion of Dr. Doughty that Plaintiff could “relate to supervisors
and peers on a superficial work basis.” (See Pl.’s Br., Doc. 18 at 10) (citing R. 84). Plaintiff
also cites the opinion of Dr. Lindsay that Plaintiff would do best in a setting where she
could work “mostly alone.” Id. (citing R. 122). Plaintiff argues the ALJ’s limitation of
“occasional” social interaction is less restrictive than the “superficial” social interaction
limitation opined by Dr. Doughty and the opinion of Dr. Lindsay that she should work
“mostly alone.” Further, Plaintiff contends that while the ALJ found the prior
administrative medical findings of Dr. Doughty and Dr. Lindsay persuasive and consistent
with medical evidence in the record, he nonetheless assessed a social interaction limitation
that was less restrictive and inconsistent with the findings he found persuasive.
The ALJ’s decision must articulate how he considered the medical opinions or prior
administrative medical findings from each medical source. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(1).3
The most important factors for the ALJ to consider are supportability and consistency, and
the ALJ’s decision must explain how he considered those factors in determining
persuasiveness of a medical source’s medical opinions or prior administrative medical
findings. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2).4 In his decision, the ALJ cites the opinion of Dr. Doughty
that Plaintiff “could perform simple tasks with routine supervision,” she “could relate to
supervisors and peers on a superficial work basis,” she “could not relate to the general
public,” and she “could adapt to a work situation.” (R. 31). The ALJ also cites the opinion
of Dr. Lindsay that Plaintiff “would have difficulty with interpersonal relations due to her
mental condition and would perform better in jobs with limited requirements to interact
with co-workers,” she “would not interact well with the public,” and she “could work with
normal supervision in a setting where the claimant could work mostly alone.” Id.
The opinions of Dr. Doughty and Dr. Lindsay clearly reflect that Plaintiff should be
limited in her interactions with coworkers and supervisors and should have no interaction
with the general public. The ALJ states he found the opinions of Dr. Doughty and Dr.
Lindsay persuasive and consistent with the evidence in the record. Id. The ALJ explained,
3 For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, such as Plaintiff’s claim here, the
Commission does not “defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling
weight, to any medical opinions.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a).
4 The ALJ must also consider the medical source’s relationship with the claimant,
specialization, and other factors, but the ALJ’s decision is not required to specifically
address those additional factors. Id. § 404.1520c(c).
based on factors of consistency and supportability, why he found the opinions of Dr.
Doughty and Dr. Lindsay persuasive. As such, the ALJ agreed that Plaintiff’s social
interaction impairments require additional limitations, but those limitations are not
disabling. Accordingly, the ALJ included limitations in Plaintiff’s mental RFC that she is
only able to occasionally interact with coworkers and supervisors and she should not work
with the public. (R. 22).
To support the assessment for a limitation of “occasional” social interaction, the ALJ
cites Plaintiff’s own statements and treatment records from her other mental health
providers. Specifically, the ALJ notes, “[t]he claimant reported that she is independent in
her activities of daily living and able to maintain her household,” and “[t]he claimant
indicated that she did not have episodes that required inpatient hospitalization.” (R. 31).
The ALJ further notes that Plaintiff’s Adult Function Report dated February 28, 2019 states
she “went to stores approximately three times per week”. (R. 20). (citing Exhibit 5E, p.4).
Plaintiff reported that “she sometimes went to the casino, but did not spend as long there
as she had previously”, and “she went to a genealogy meeting once a month and went to
church monthly.” Id. (citing Exhibit 5E, p.5). The ALJ notes that Plaintiff testified that
“if she did not have to do any heavy lifting and did not have to work with customers, she
could return to work.” (R. 23). The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff testified that “[i]f she had
her physical capabilities, she could work; but she was told that they could not fix her
shoulder.” Id.
Below is an excerpt of Plaintiff’s hearing testimony in response to the ALJ’s
questioning:
Q (by ALJ): “So, let’s say if you didn’t have – if your pain was
fixed, you know, if you didn’t have your physical problems,
could you go back to stocking the shelves and doing the kind
of work you used to do?
A: If I could do the heavy lifting and I didn’t have to work
with the customers.
(R. 61). The Plaintiff had similar responses to questions from her attorney:
Q (by attorney): “So, if you were in more of an environment
where you weren’t--dealing with public, so, like, not the floor
of a busy shopping mall, and not, you know, like at a cashier
where you’re dealing with customers, but you’ve got your own
group of coworkers and supervisors that are kind of doing their
own thing, you’re not working teamwork-type tasks, you’ve all
got your own duties as part of a bigger whole; do you think
you’d be able to work in a setting more like that? Or do you
think that you would still have difficulties if we were to restrict
you to that kind of setting?
A: Well, I did that kind of stuff, but most of the time worked
by myself, so I did better”.
Q: Do you have a reason to believe that you would not work
well? I understand that you prefer to work by yourself, but is
there a reason that wouldn’t be able to work in the setting I’ve
described?
A: If all my physical capabilities were back, I probably could
if it was a, you know, decent environment and stuff, but they’ve
told me that they can’t fix things like my shoulder and my back.
You know, I haven’t seen any light at the end of the tunnel.
(R. 62-63). The ALJ’s characterization of Plaintiff’s testimony is consistent with her
hearing testimony. Further, Plaintiff’s testimony indicates that she finds her physical
impairments, and not her mental limitations, are the deterrents preventing her return to
work.
The ALJ’s RFC assessment is further supported by and consistent with treatment
records from Larry Gantt, LPC. For example, the ALJ cited the August 5, 2019 counseling
session with Counselor Gantt where he reported the “claimant’s mood was euthymic, her
affect was appropriate, her attention span was good, and her thought process was linear.”
(R. 28-29) (citing Exhibit 12F, p.43). Counselor Gantt also noted that Plaintiff reported
that her moods had been “okay,” and she had participated in fun activities with a friend.
Id. The ALJ noted the January 27, 2020 counseling session with Counselor Gantt again
reported that Plaintiff’s mood was euthymic, her affect was appropriate, her attention span
was good, and her thought process was linear. (R. 29) (citing Exhibit 12F, p. 23).
Counselor Gantt also noted that Plaintiff reported her moods had been “pretty good” and
she was able to go to a concert with a friend. Id.
Despite using different terminology, the ALJ’s RFC assessment for a limitation of
“occasional” social interaction is generally consistent with the opinions of Dr. Doughty
and Dr. Lindsay and supported by substantial evidence in the record. Further, “exact
correspondence between a medical opinion and the mental RFC is not required.” Wells v.
Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1071 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing Chapo v. Astrue, 682 F.3d 1285, 1288
(10th Cir.2012) (“[T]here is no requirement in the regulations for a direct correspondence
between an RFC finding and a specific medical opinion on the functional capacity in
question,” because “the ALJ, not a physician, is charged with determining a claimant’s
RFC from the medical record” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted))).
Moreover, the undersigned finds the mental RFC determination is supported by substantial
evidence, as evidenced by Plaintiff’s statements and the medical evidence outlined above.
Therefore, the undersigned finds the ALJ evaluated the prior administrative medical
findings as the new regulations require. Thus, the Court finds no reversible error regarding
the ALJ’s consideration of the prior administrative medical findings.
B. Medical Opinion of Peggy Beck, LSCSW
Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly evaluated the medical opinion of therapist Peggy
Beck which supports a more restrictive social interaction limitation than accounted for in
the mental RFC assessment. Plaintiff focuses on the March 14, 2019 medical source
statement (MSS) of Counselor Peggy Beck, which opined that Plaintiff “was markedly
limited in her ability to: work in coordination with or proximity to others without being
distracted by them; complete a normal workday and workweek without interruption from
psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an
unreasonable number and length of rest periods; and ask simple questions or request
assistance.” (See Pl.’s Br., Doc. 18 at 4) (citing R. 327). Ms. Beck also opined that Plaintiff
“was extremely limited in her ability to: interact appropriately with the general public;
accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; get along with
coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; maintain
socially appropriate behavior and to adhere to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness;
and respond appropriately to changes in the work setting.” Id.
In his decision, the ALJ considered the opinion of Counselor Beck and found it to be
unpersuasive. (R. 31-32). Specifically, the ALJ found the extreme limitations assessed by
Counselor Beck were not consistent with her own treatment and progress notes, treatment
notes from other mental health providers, or Plaintiff’s own testimony. (R. 32). For
example, the ALJ cited the December 7, 2018 appointment where Counselor Beck stated
the Plaintiff was oriented, cooperative, and had adequate grooming and hygiene. (R. 26).
(citing Exhibit 14F, p. 24). Counselor Beck also stated that Plaintiff’s attention was
adequate, her thought content was congruent, her memory was intact, and her motor
activity was normal/calm. Id. Counselor Beck described Plaintiff’s mood as angry and
her affect was congruent, and her thought content was congruent with mood and
circumstance; however, Counselor Beck reported that Plaintiff’s insight and judgment
were normal. Id. The ALJ cited the March 11, 2019 therapy appointment with Counselor
Beck which reported Plaintiff was oriented, had adequate grooming, was cooperative,
mood was euthymic, and she made adequate eye contact. (R. 27). (citing Exhibit 14F,
p.14). Counselor Beck also reported Plaintiff’s impulse control was stable, and her insight
and judgment were normal. Id. (p. 15). The ALJ cited the March 25, 2019 therapy session
with Counselor Beck which reported Plaintiff was neatly dressed and groomed, her
attention was adequate, she was oriented, cooperative, her mood was euthymic, and she
made adequate eye contact. Id. (p.12). Counselor Beck also reported Plaintiff’s memory
appeared congruent, her thought content was congruent with mood and circumstance and
indicated her insight and judgment were normal. (R. 27-28). (citing Exhibit 14F, p. 12-
13).
The Plaintiff’s statements and mental examination records from Counselor Gantt, as
outlined above, also support the ALJ’s finding that Counselor Beck’s opinion is not
persuasive. “The record must demonstrate that the ALJ considered all of the evidence, but
an ALJ is not required to discuss every piece of evidence. Rather, in addition to discussing
the evidence supporting [the] decision, the ALJ also must discuss the uncontroverted
evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as well as significantly probative evidence he
rejects.” Mays v. Colvin, 739 F.3d 569, 576 (10th Cir. 2014) (quoting Clifton v. Chater, 79
F.3d 1007, 1009-10 (10th Cir. 1996)). Here, the ALJ properly considered the opinion of
Counselor Beck and explained why he found it unpersuasive due to the lack of
supportability and consistency in the record. Further, even if the evidence could support a
different finding, the Court cannot displace the agency’s choice between two fairly
conflicting views. See Oldham v. Astrue, 509 F.3d 1254, 1257–58 (10th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff’s argument simply invites the Court to improperly re-weigh the evidence. See
Noreja, 952 F.3d at 1178; see also Lax, 489 F.3d at 1084. Thus, the Court finds no
reversible error regarding the ALJ’s consideration of the opinion of Counselor Beck.
C. Step Five
Plaintiff lastly argues that the VE testified that the inability for Plaintiff to be around
coworkers or supervisors would erode the job base. (See Pl.’s Br., Doc. 18 at 12) (citing R.
69). The restriction that Plaintiff should have no interaction with coworkers or supervisors
is not supported by the medical record. As outlined above, both Dr. Doughty and Dr.
Lindsay opined that Plaintiff was only limited in her ability to be around coworkers or
supervisors and neither doctor opined that she is unable to be around coworkers or
supervisors altogether. Therefore, the Court finds this argument has no merit.
Furthermore, the three jobs the VE found that Plaintiff was capable of performing at step
five require little social interaction.> All three jobs have a people rating of 8, indicating
“the lowest possible level of human interaction that exists in the labor force.” Lane y.
Colvin, 643 F. App’x 766, 770 (10th Cir. 2016). Therefore, the Court finds the ALJ’s
findings at step five are supported by substantial evidence.
Conclusion
The undersigned finds that the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence
based on the applicable legal standards. Accordingly, the decision of the Commissioner
finding Plaintiff not disabled is affirmed.
SO ORDERED this 21st day of December, 2021.
Christine D. Little
United States Magistrate Judge
5 According to Appendix B of the DOT, the fifth number of the nine-digit code
reflects the job’s relationship to people. Dictionary of Occupational Titles, App. B—
Explanation of Data, People, & Things, 1991 WL 688701. The DOT rates the amount of
interaction with people on a scale of 0-8, with 8 representing the lowest possible level of
human interaction that exists in the labor force. That ranking describes the need to take
instructions as only “[a]ttending to the work assignment instructions or orders of
supervisor” with “[n]o immediate response required unless clarification of instructions or
orders is needed.” /d. Even more specifically, the DOT entries for silver wrapper, hand
packer, and collator operator describe the amount of “[t]aking [i]nstructions” required as
“(not [slignificant.” DOT 318.687-018, 1991 WL 672757; DOT 559.687-074, 1991 WL
683797; DOT 208.685-010, 1991 WL 671753. Thus, these job descriptions are consistent
with Plaintiff's argument for “superficial” contact with supervisors and co-workers.
16