The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ROSALINDA IBARRA, as the Special )
Administrix of the Estate of JORGE )
MARTINEZ, deceased, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 20-CV-598-TCK-JFJ
)
CHEYENNE LEE, SCOTT WALTON, )
Sheriff of Rogers County in his Official )
Capacity, and THE BOARD OF )
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF )
ROGERS COUNTY, )
)
Defendants. )
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is the Defendants’ Scott Walton’s, Sheriff of Rogers County in his official
capacity, and the Board of County Commissioners of Rogers County’s Partial Motion to Dismiss
filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (Doc. 17). Plaintiff filed a Response
(Doc. 27), and Defendants filed a Reply. (Doc. 30).
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff brings this action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, against these Defendants and
Deputy Cheyenne Lee. Plaintiff alleges that on the afternoon of March 13, 2020, Deputy Cheyenne
Lee entered the home of Plaintiff’s decedent, Jorge Martinez, “without warrant, consent, or
justification, under the pretext of performing a wellness check on Martinez’s children.” Complaint
¶ 17. Plaintiff claims that after illegally entering her home, Deputy Lee confronted Jorge Martinez
and when Jorge Martinez objected to Deputy Lee’s presence, Deputy Lee proceeded to arrest Jorge
Martinez. Deputy Lee then allegedly took Mr. Martinez to the ground and shot him resulting in
Jorge Martinez’s death.
Plaintiff further contends that Jorge Martinez was unarmed, had no weapons in his home
and stood 5’4” and weighed 117 pounds. Deputy Lee was in excess of 6-foot-tall and weighed
over 200 pounds and was fully armed when he approached Jorge Martinez who was standing in
his bedroom. When Jorge Martinez realized that Deputy Lee had unlawfully entered his home, he
requested that Deputy Lee leave the residence. Instead of leaving or retreating, Deputy Lee placed
Jorge Martinez under arrest and shot him in the chest even though there was no immediate threat
of death or serious bodily injuries to themselves or others. Complaint ¶¶ 17-26
According to the Complaint, at the time of the shooting, Deputy Lee gave no warnings or
commands to the Decedent. Id. “The Decedent was lying on the floor on his back asking his mother
to record what was happening on her cell phone. The Decedent’s mother, Isidra Mitchell, looked
on while attempting to focus her cell phone camera on her son who was underneath Deputy Lee
when she heard the shot that ultimately killed her son.” Id.
“Immediately prior to the shooting, Deputy Lee never considered or exhausted less than
lethal alternatives, never attempted to deescalate the situation and was never faced with a situation
which would cause any reasonable officer to think that there was immediate threat of death or
serious bodily injuries. Deputy Lee simply shot Jorge Martinez dead without any reasonable basis
or justification.” Id.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that “despite knowing that Jorge Martinez was seriously injured
after being shot in the chest, Deputy Lee failed to timely initiate any emergency medical treatment
or timely summon emergency medical responders to provide life-saving medical treatment to the
Decedent. Complaint ¶ 24. As stated supra, the Decedent’s mother witnessed the death of her son.
The Decedent’s two children also witnessed the death of their father. Complaint ¶ 26.
Plaintiff brings this suit on behalf of the estate of Jorge Martinez, alleging that Sheriff Scott
Walton, in his official capacity, and the Rogers County Board of County Commissioners, are liable
under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for: (1) failure to adequately train deputies; (2) establishing various
unconstitutional customs, practices or policies, including failure to appropriately screen Deputy
Lee prior to hiring, and failure to adequately supervise and discipline Deputy Lee; and (3)
ratification of Deputy Lee’s allegedly unconstitutional acts.
II. MOTION TO DISMISS STANDARD
A Complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim, showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A Complaint must contain enough “factual
matters, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). The trial court must insist the plaintiff put
forward specific, non-conclusory factual allegations, to assist the court in determining whether the
complaint is plausible. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1249 (10th Cir. 2008). The mere
metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded
claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe [the] plaintiff has a
reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for [the] claims.” Id. at 1247.
“The nature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary
based on the context.” Kansas Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir.
2011). A plaintiff is not entitled to file a bare bones complaint and fill in the necessary facts after
discovery is complete. London v. Beaty, 612 Fed. Appx. 910, 916 (10th Cir. 2015). The trial court
must insist that the plaintiff put forward specific, non-conclusory factual allegations, to assist the
court in determining whether the complaint is plausible. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249.
The final determination of whether a warrantless search was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment is a question of law. United States v. Botero–Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 785 (10th Cir.
1995). In the context of § 1983 claims, “plausibility” refers to the scope of the allegations in the
complaint. If they are “so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it
innocent” or if the allegations are no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a mere formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” then such allegations may be inadequate to
overcome a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1247-48. Importantly, a complaint must present factual
allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Sheriff Walton in his Official Capacity
Defendants contend Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Walton in his official capacity are
subsumed within the claims against the Rogers County Board of County Commissioners, and
Plaintiff’s claims against Sheriff Walton should be dismissed as redundant. The Court concurs and
finds a suit against an official in his official capacity is the same as asserting a claim against the
municipality or county the official represents. Porro v. Barnes, 624 F.3d 1322, 1328 (10th Cir.
2010); see also, Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985), (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in
all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”); Cox v. Glanz, 800 F.3d
1231, 1254 (10th Cir. 2015). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s §1983 claims against Sheriff Scott Walton
in his official capacity are dismissed.
B. Failure to Train / Supervise
Defendants also allege Plaintiff’s claim for failure to train does not state a claim for
municipality liability under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Plaintiff, however, contends that facts surrounding
the shooting death of Jorge Martinez demonstrate a lack of training of the Sheriff’s deputies in the
usage of lethal and nonlethal force. Complaint ¶ 61, 67. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the Rogers
County Sheriff failed to train his deputies “how to deescalate situations and to handle the usual
and recurring situations involving citizen encounters, conducting welfare checks, entering private
homes and otherwise interacting with citizens in situations which might possibly become
confrontational.” Complaint ¶ 61. Moreover, by citing examples of cases which allegedly involved
Sheriff Walton’s “failure to discipline, reprimand, retrain, suspend, or otherwise penalize deputies
for taking actions in other instances,” Plaintiff has sufficiently pled that the Rogers County
policymakers failed to implement adequate training despite being on actual or constructive notice
that its training program was inadequate. Id.
C. Municipal Liability
Plaintiff’s claim for municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (an unconstitutional
custom, practice, or policy) also survives. Plaintiff claims the Defendants maintained various
unconstitutional customs or practices concerning their use of unreasonable and unlawful deadly
force. Complaint ¶ 71. “In order to impose liability on a municipality for the misdeed of its
employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate 1) the existence of a municipal
policy or custom by which the plaintiff was denied a constitutional right and 2) that the policy or
custom was the moving force behind the constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 379 (1989); Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see Bryson v. City of Oklahoma City, 627 F.3d
784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010); see Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006). A
“custom” has been defined to include acts which are not “formally approved by an appropriate
decision maker” but have “such widespread practice as to have the force of law.” Carney v. City
and County of Denver, 534 F.3d 1269, 1274 (10th Cir. 2008).
To show an unconstitutional custom, practice, or policy, Plaintiffs need not present facts
showing that similar conduct has repeatedly occurred in the past. See Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 484 fn. 11 (1986). Further, Monell liability may attach based on a policy
of inaction that demonstrates deliberate indifference to constitutional rights. “The city’s ‘policy of
inaction’ in light of notice that its program will cause constitutional violations ‘is the functional
equivalent of a decision by the city itself to violate the Constitution.’” Connick, 563 U.S. at 61–62
(citing Canton, 489 U.S., at 395 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Here, Plaintiff has also sufficiently pled allegations to support a claim for municipal
liability pursuant to an unconstitutional custom or policy. Plaintiff alleges that the six prior cases
cited in her Complaint are only a few examples of cases in which Rogers County failed to take any
action in response to its deputies’ and officers’ use of excessive force and/or custom or policy to
resort to use of force. Complaint ¶ 29(a)-(f). Further, Plaintiff contends there is no indication the
municipality took any action in response to these deputies’ previous conduct, and therefore it is
reasonable to infer that such conduct “is in accordance with Rogers County’s policy or custom
concerning the use of deadly and excessive force in events such use of force is not warranted.” Id.
The Complaint need only allege “the policy or custom itself… in general terms[,]” as “[i]t
is a rare plaintiff who will have access to the precise contours of a policy or custom prior to having
engaged in discovery, and requiring a plaintiff to plead its existence in detail is likely to be more
than an exercise in educated guesswork.” Estate of Osuma v. Cty. Of Stanislaus, 392 F. Supp. 3d
1162, 1174-75 (E.D. Cal. 2019). Plaintiff alleges that here, unlike other municipal entities in this
country, Rogers County does not post use of force related official policies on the Sheriff’s office’s
website or publish Officer-Involved-Shooting reports on the District Attorney’s office websites.
“Accordingly, without such information readily available to the public or without going through
discovery, it is inevitably difficult for anyone to point at specific policy implemented by the county
for Monell claims at the pleading stage.” (Doc. 27 at 9). Therefore, Plaintiff alleges that the
examples provided in her Complaint are sufficient to support a claim for an unconstitutional
custom or policy.
Defendants contend in their Motion that Plaintiff fails to show an unconstitutional custom
or policy. However, “deliberate indifference” may also “be found absent a pattern of
unconstitutional behavior if a violation of federal rights is a highly predictable or a plainly obvious
consequence of a municipality’s action or inaction....” Coffey v. McKinley Cty., 504 Fed. Appx.
715, 719 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307–08 (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In the instant case the Court finds the Plaintiff’s Complaint sufficiently
establishes a pattern of unconstitutional behavior by Rogers County, and also meets the burden of
proof to establish deliberate indifference by Rogers County. Plaintiff may establish that Deputy
Lee’s alleged violation of Jorge Martinez’s Constitutional rights was highly predictable as Deputy
Lee works in an environment in which use of force is often necessary and may prove that Deputy
Lee was not retrained, reprimanded or disciplined after this incident if it amounted to an excessive
use of force.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court finds Plaintiff’s Complaint meets the standards set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Plaintiff has
set forth factual allegations sufficient to show a constitutional violation. Accordingly, Defendants’
Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 22nd day of July, 2021.