Skillings v. Crowder

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

SHEMIKA N. SKILLINGS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 17-CV-572-TCK-JFJ

)

J. CHISUM, A. LAUDERDALE, and )

C. CHAMBERS, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants J. Chisum, A. Lauderdale,

and C. Chambers (Doc. 116) filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The defendants argue that

Plaintiff Shemika Skillings’s (“Ms. Skillings”) Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 115) fails to state

a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ms. Skillings filed a Response opposing the motion

(Doc. 123), and the defendants filed a Reply. (Doc. 129).

I. Allegations

This civil rights action arose when the defendants arrested Ms. Skillings in 2016. Ms.

Skillings contends the arrest by the defendants, all of whom were officers with the Broken Arrow

Police Department, violated her constitutional rights. What follows are the facts as alleged in the

operative complaint.

On March 11, 2016, Officers Chisum and Lauderdale appeared at Ms. Skillings’s residence

and asked her to verify her name and date of birth. (Doc. 115 ¶ 11). Then, without telling her why

they were there or showing her a warrant, the officers handcuffed her and placed her in a patrol

car. (Id. ¶¶ 11–12). The officers then entered her home and detained her four-year-old daughter.

(Id. ¶ 13).

After Ms. Skillings’s arrest, the officers took her to the city jail where she was booked and

held for “approximately 36 hours.” (Id. ¶¶ 14–15). An unknown Broken Arrow PD officer then

transferred Ms. Skillings to the Wagoner County Jail, where she was booked as a “Fugitive from

Justice” and held for an additional three days. (Id. ¶¶ 15–16, 32). When she asked a deputy at the

jail to see the warrant, the deputy “admitted to not having a warrant” and said the department was

waiting for “further instruction” from authorities in Dinwiddie County, Virginia. (Id. ¶ 17). “No

criminal charges were ever proffered against [her] regarding the arrest, detainment and

imprisonment by the City of Broken Arrow . . . .” (Id. ¶ 18).

Ms. Skillings alleges that her arrest was unconstitutional because the defendants were

acting without a valid warrant. “The purported warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff as in which

the officers assumed to act was void,” and “[t]he warrant that Defendant Chisum attempted to

obtain after the arrest was made, [sic] was invalid on its face, as would be clearly apparent to any

ordinarily intelligent layperson.” (Doc. 115 ¶ 28). Moreover, she alleges, “the warrant was not

properly obtained consistent with federal law and the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.” (Id.).

Ms. Skillings alleges a variety of harms stemming from her arrest. She lost wages when

she was placed on administrative leave by her employer for eight months. (Id. ¶ 22). She was

humiliated when her mugshot appeared on the local news and in the local newspaper. (Id.). And

she suffered severe mental anguish, loss of reputation, and emotional distress. (Id.).

Ms. Skilling’s complaint divides her claims into two counts. Count I alleges “Wrongful

Arrest and Imprisonment” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Count II alleges “Violation of

the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.” Additionally, the Court construes the complaint as alleging

municipal liability. Although the complaint does not specifically identify municipal liability claims

as such, it names the officers in both their individual and official capacities. (Id. ¶ 4). Accordingly,

the Court construes her complaint as alleging both personal liability against the individual officers

and municipal liability against the City of Broken Arrow. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

165-66 (1985) (“[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a

suit against the entity.”).

II. Defendants’ Motion

The defendants, citing a variety of court and police records, recite a different version of

events, which can be summarized as follows:

In 2016, a Virginia court awarded custody of Ms. Skillings’s daughter, B.F., to the girl’s

father. (Custody Order, July 3, 2014, Doc. 50-3; Custody Order, March 7, 2016, Doc. 50-4). On

March 7th, 2016, B.F.’s father petitioned the Circuit Court of Prince George County, Virginia, for

a show cause order, alleging that Ms. Skillings had taken B.F. to Oklahoma without his permission.

(Affidavit and Petition, March 7, 2016, Doc. 50-5). Based on his affidavit, the court entered an

order directing Ms. Skillings to appear in court to show cause why she should not be fined or

imprisoned for her contempt of the court’s prior custody order. (Show Cause Order, March 7,

2016, Doc. 50-6). In addition, on March 11, 2016, a magistrate with the Juvenile and Domestic

Relations District Court of Dinwiddie County, Virginia, issued a warrant for Ms. Skillings’s arrest

on a charge of abduction and kidnapping by a parent in violation of § 18.2-47 of the Virginia Code.

(Warrant, Doc. 116-1).

The same day the warrant was issued, the Dinwiddie County Sheriff’s Department

uploaded a request for Ms. Skillings’s arrest and extradition to the National Crime Information

Center (NCIC) database. (Doc. 116 at 9, ¶ 13 (citing Aff. Jacqueline Deatherage, Doc. 116-2;

NCIC Request of March 11, 2016, Doc. 116-3)). At 6:49 p.m., the Department also asked Broken

Arrow PD to send officers to an address where she was believed to be staying. (Id. at 9–10, ¶ 15

(citing NCIC Attempt to Locate Request of March 11, 2016, Doc. 116-4)). At 7:14 p.m., Dinwiddie

County faxed a copy of the arrest warrant. (Id. at 10, ¶ 16 (citing Fax, Doc. 116-5)).

At 7:07 p.m., after Broken Arrow had received the NCIC communications but before it had

received the warrant, the department dispatched Officer Chisum, who arrived at Ms. Skillings’s

address at about 7:19 p.m. (Id. at 10, ¶ 17 (citing Arrest and Booking Report, Doc. 116-8)). At

7:34 p.m., Broken Arrow PD sent a message to Dinwiddie County indicating that an officer was

on the scene with the suspect and requesting that Dinwiddie County confirm the felony warrant

and extradition request. (Id. at 10, ¶ 18 (citing Confirmation Request of March 11, 2016, Doc. 116-

6)). At 7:48 p.m., Dinwiddie County confirmed. (Id. at 10, ¶ 19 (citing NCIC Confirmation, Doc.

116-7)). Chisum then placed Ms. Skilling under arrest. (Id. at 11, ¶ 20). In his report, he listed two

crimes “Fugitive from Justice” and “Warrant-Abduction by Parent, Remove from State.” (Arrest

and Booking Report, Doc. 116-8). The warrant number listed in the report matched the warrant

issued by Dinwiddie County.

Records show that Ms. Skillings was then booked into the Broken Arrow city lockup at

8:43 p.m. on Friday, March 11, 2016, transferred to the Wagoner County Sheriff’s Office about

14 hours later, and brought before a Wagoner County District Court judge on Monday, March 14.

(Doc. 116-11; Doc. 116-12; Doc. 116-13). The judge then released Ms. Skillings on a $20,000

extradition bond and ordered her to return in two weeks with proof that she had reported to

Dinwiddie County on the outstanding warrant. (Doc. 116-13; Doc. 116-14).

In light of these facts, the defendants argue that Ms. Skillings cannot state a claim entitling

her to relief because (1) the officers had probable cause to arrest her, and (2) they brought her

before a magistrate “with all practicable speed” as required under Oklahoma’s Uniform Criminal

Extradition Act. (Doc. 116 at 24–26).

III. Legal Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require a plaintiff to include in her complaint “a short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2). The defendants argue that Ms. Skillings has failed to meet this burden and move to dismiss

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

A court’s function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh the evidence that the parties

might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint is legally sufficient to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted. Brokers’ Choice of Am., Inc. v. NBC Universal, Inc., 757

F.3d 1125, 1135 (10th Cir. 2014). A complaint is legally sufficient only if it contains factual

allegations such that it states a claim to relief that “is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

In assessing a claim’s plausibility, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and

view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Brokers’ Choice, 757 F.3d at 1136. The court

is not bound to accept an allegation as true when it amounts to no more than a legal conclusion

masquerading as a fact. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The Court is mindful that Ms. Skillings proceeds pro se. While pro se pleadings must be

liberally construed and held to less stringent standards than pleadings drafted by lawyers, Haines

v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), a district court should not assume the role of advocate, Hall

v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975

(10th Cir. 2009); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).

Moreover, even pro se plaintiffs are required to comply with the “fundamental requirements of the

Federal Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure” and substantive law, and the liberal construction

to be afforded does not transform “vague and conclusory arguments” into valid claims for relief.

Ogden v. San Juan County, 32 F.3d 452, 455 (10th Cir. 1994).

IV. Matters Outside the Pleadings

Before advancing to the merits of Ms. Skillings’s claims, the Court must determine whether

it should evaluate the sufficiency of the claims under Rule 12(b)(6) or convert the defendants’

motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Ordinarily, a 12(b)(6) motion must be

converted to a motion for summary judgment if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to

and not excluded by the court.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). This rule is subject to two notable exceptions.

First, “a document central to the plaintiff’s claim and referred to in the complaint may be

considered in resolving a motion to dismiss, at least where the document’s authenticity is not in

dispute.” Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1072 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Utah Gospel Mission

v. Salt Lake City Corp., 425 F.3d 1249, 1253–54 (10th Cir. 2005). Second, courts may consider

facts subject to judicial notice. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(d) (“The court may take judicial notice at

any stage of the proceeding.”). The defendants argue that the Court may consider the documents

under either or both of the exceptions. Having examined the documents, which the defendants

attach as exhibits to their response, the Court cannot agree.

With respect to the incorporation-by-reference exception, only the warrant (Doc. 116-1)

would qualify. The basis of Ms. Skillings’s Fourth Amendment claim is that the officers did not

have a warrant when they arrested her and the warrant the officers purported to rely on was facially

invalid. Thus, because the warrant is both central to one of her claims and referenced in her

complaint,1 it may be considered without converting the motion to one for summary judgment. As

1. Although Ms. Skillings disputes the validity of the warrant, she does not appear to dispute the

authenticity of the certified copy submitted by the defendants.

the same cannot be said of the other documents, they are not eligible for consideration under the

incorporation exception.

The judicial-notice exception is also unavailable. Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of

Evidence provides that “[t]he court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable

dispute because it . . . can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy

cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). When, as here, a party requests the court

to notice certain facts, notice is mandatory only where the court has been supplied with the

information necessary to make this determination. See Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(2). The burden of

proving “indisputability” rests on the party requesting judicial notice. Kenneth W. Graham, Jr.,

Federal Practice and Procedure (Wright & Miller) § 5104, Westlaw (April 2021 update)

(collecting cases). The defendants have not carried this burden.

First and foremost, the defendants fail to identify the specific facts they seek to notice. Rule

201 allows for the notice of facts, not documents. See Graham, supra, § 5104 (“Courts could save

themselves much grief and embarrassment by insisting that lawyers specify precisely the fact to

be noticed.”).

Second, insofar as the Court can surmise the facts the documents are meant to establish,

the defendants have not shown that these are beyond reasonable dispute. Several of the documents

appear to be aimed at establishing the officers’ knowledge of the Virginia warrant in order to show

that they had probable cause to arrest her. This is not a fact that can be judicially noticed based on

the materials submitted by the defendants. “Probable cause to arrest exists if the facts and

circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to justify a prudent officer in believing

the defendant committed or is committing an offense.” Wilder v. Turner, 490 F.3d 810, 813 (10th

Cir. 2007). Exactly what the officers knew and when they knew it cannot be “accurately and readily

determined” from evidence consisting of nothing more than cryptic teletype communications, a

self-serving affidavit, and a police report completed by one of the very officers whose knowledge

is at issue.

The defendants also seek to notice the fact that Ms. Skillings was held in jail for less than

three days, presumably for the purpose of showing that the officers complied with Oklahoma’s

Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, which requires that arrestees be brought before a judge or

magistrate “with all practical speed.” See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1141.14. These documents, however,

cannot be conclusively relied upon because they are neither authenticated nor self-authenticating.

See Graham, Jr., supra, § 5106.4 (“[C]ourt records that are not self-authenticating must be properly

authenticated before they are noticed.”). Accordingly, they are unfit for judicial notice.

In sum, the Court finds that only the warrant may be considered without converting the

defendants’ motion to a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56. This is not to say, however,

that the motion need be converted in its entirety. As explained further below, her extradition

claims, her municipal liability claims, and her claims against Officer Chambers are deficient on

their face. Accordingly, the Court will exclude all outside matter with respect to these claims and

evaluate them under Rule 12(b)(6).

V. Discussion

A. Extradition Claims

Ms. Skillings’s complaint is ambiguous regarding the source of her extradition claims. The

heading of Count II—“Violation of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act 18 U.S.C. § 3182”—

cites mismatched statutes. The UCEA is a model extradition statute that has been adopted in states

across the country, including Oklahoma,2 while 18 U.S.C. § 3182 is a federal extradition statute.

2. Oklahoma’s version of the statute is codified at Okla. Stat. tit. 22, §§ 1141.1–1141.30.

Nevertheless, the Court need not resolve the ambiguity. Both provide a mechanism for

implementing the Constitution’s provision for interstate extradition. Ortega v. City of Kansas City,

Kan., 875 F.2d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir. 1989); Sanders v. Conine, 506 F.2d 530, 532 (10th Cir.

1974). And failure to comply with either will give rise to § 1983 liability. See Ortega, 875 at 1500

(collecting cases where violation of the state Act supported recovery); Crumley v. Snead, 620 F.2d

481, 482–83 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 3182 and U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 provide a

federal right to contest extradition).

In this case, however, Ms. Skillings has not alleged a violation of either the UCEA or 18

U.S.C. § 3182. These statutes exist to protect individuals from wrongful extradition. Accordingly,

extradition—i.e., the forcible transfer of the claimant across state lines—is essential to a wrongful

extradition claim. Here, there was no extradition. Ms. Skillings alleges that the officers arrested

her without a valid warrant, but she makes no allegation that she was subsequently extradited to

Virginia. On the contrary, in her response, she represents that she went to Virginia voluntarily after

a judge granted bail on the condition that she travel to the state to answer for the charge against

her. (Doc. 123 at 2). If the officers arrested her without probable cause, she may be able to state a

claim for wrongful arrest under the Fourth Amendment, but she cannot state a claim for wrongful

extradition absent a plausible allegation that she was actually extradited.

B. Claims Against Chambers

Ms. Skillings also fails to state a claim of any kind against Defendant Chambers. The Tenth

Circuit has held that, when a plaintiff brings § 1983 claims against several government actors in

their individual capacities, it is essential “that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to

have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims

against him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state.” Robbins v.

Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008). “It is axiomatic that, to prevail on a damages

claim for a constitutional violation pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must show that the defendant,

acting under color of state law, ‘personally participated in the alleged violation.’” Robertson v.

Las Animas Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1193 (10th Cir. 2007) (emphasis added) (quoting

Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 994 (10th Cir.1996)). “Conclusory allegations are not sufficient to

state a constitutional violation.” Id. These principles apply with equal force when, as here, the

individual also sues under a statutory theory.

Ms. Skillings alleges that the defendants acted “jointly and individually amongst each other

to carry out the illegal arrest and imprisonment,” but she makes no specific allegations about

Officer Chambers’ role. (Doc. 115 ¶ 10). With the exception of a handful of allegations, mostly

directed to Officer Chisum, the contested conduct is either attributed to “the defendants” generally

or stated in the passive voice. Moreover, unlike Chisum and Lauderdale, whom Ms. Skillings at

least places at the scene during her arrest, nothing in the complaint indicates that Chambers was

even there when she was arrested. If anything, the complaint suggests the opposite. (See id. ¶¶ 11–

13 (alleging that “neither” Chisum nor Lauderdale acted lawfully)). Because her complaint fails

to allege any specific facts indicating that Officer Chambers participated in her arrest, Ms.

Skillings has not stated a plausible § 1983 claim against Chambers, whether under a constitutional

or statutory theory.

C. Municipal Liability Claims

As explained above, the Court construes Ms. Skillings’s official-capacity claims against

the officers as municipal-liability claims against the City of Broken Arrow. The Supreme Court

has held that “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by

its employees or agents.” Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694

(1978). Instead, “local governments are responsible only for ‘their own illegal acts.’” Connick v.

Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479

(1986)). “[I]t is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts

the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

Thus, in order to state a viable claim against a local government under § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege “1) the existence of a municipal policy or custom and 2) a direct causal link between the

policy or custom and the injury alleged.” Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006)

(citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). Several types of actions may

constitute a municipal policy or custom, as explained by the Tenth Circuit in Bryson v. City of

Oklahoma City:

A municipal policy or custom may take the form of (1) “a formal regulation

or policy statement”; (2) an informal custom “amount[ting] to ‘a widespread

practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy,

is so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force

of law’”; (3) “the decisions of employees with final policymaking authority”; (4)

“the ratification by such final policymakers of the decisions—and the basis for

them— of subordinates to whom authority was delegated subject to these

policymakers’ review and approval”; or (5) the “failure to adequately train or

supervise employees, so long as that failure results from ‘deliberate indifference’

to the injuries that may be caused.”

627 F.3d 784, 788 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Brammer-Hoelter v. Twin Peaks Charter Acad., 602

F.3d 1175, 1189–90 (10th Cir. 2010)).

Here, the only allegation in Ms. Skillings’s complaint that bears on municipal liability is

her claim that the defendants “should have . . . been trained on the proper documentation needed

to arrest an alleged ‘Fugitive from Justice.’” (Doc. 115 ¶ 47). This is not nearly sufficient to state

a municipal-liability claim based on a failure-to-train theory.

In order for a plaintiff to successfully plead a § 1983 claim alleging failure to train, she

must plead facts that plausibly show the City’s failure to train its employees amounts to “deliberate

indifference to the rights of persons with whom the [untrained employees] come into contact.”

Connick, 563 U.S. at 61 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). “Only then ‘can such a

shortcoming be properly thought of as a city “policy or custom” that is actionable under § 1983.’”

Id. (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389). An allegation that the defendant officers should have

been trained regarding the documentation required to make an arrest is far too conclusory to make

out a plausible claim of municipal liability.

D. Fourth Amendment Claims Against Chisum and Lauderdale

When extraneous matters are excluded, Ms. Skillings’s complaint states plausible claims

for false arrest against Defendants Chisum and Lauderdale. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he

right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.” The general

rule is that an arrest is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment only when it is based on probable

cause to believe that the individual has committed a crime. Bailey v. U.S., 568 U.S. 186, 192

(2013). “‘[P]robable cause’ to justify an arrest means facts and circumstances within the officer’s

knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in

believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about

to commit an offense.” Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). Here, Ms. Skillings has

alleged that Officers Chisum and Lauderdale came to her home and arrested her in front of her

house without a warrant or any reason to believe that she had committed or was committing a

crime.

The defendants argue that this claim fails as a matter of law because the officers, having

received NCIC communications notifying them that she was wanted on a felony warrant out of

Virginia, had probable cause to believe that she had committed “the crime of being a fugitive from

justice.” (Doc. 116 at 19). This argument is untenable, as it depends on facts outside the complaint.

As explained above, with the exception of the warrant itself, Ms. Skillings’s claims must

be evaluated by reference to the allegations contained within the four corners of her complaint,

which alleges simply that Officers Lauderdale and Chisum arrived at her doorstep, asked her to

verify her name and date of birth, and then arrested her. And while the Virginia warrant appears

to be valid on its face, there is nothing in the complaint that would establish that the officers knew

of its existence when they arrested her. Thus, under the facts as alleged, neither Chisum nor

Lauderdale had probable cause to make the arrest.

The defendants further argue that, even if Ms. Skillings’s arrest was unconstitutional, they

are entitled to qualified immunity. Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials

are shielded from liability unless the federally protected right was “clearly established” at the time

the right was violated. Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656 (2014). “Ordinarily, in order for the law

to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or

clearly established weight of authority from other courts,” establishing that the alleged conduct at

issue was in violation of federal law. See Seifert v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cty. / Kan. City,

779 F.3d 1141, 1159 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir.

2012)). Courts are “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality,” but a case

“directly on point” is not required where “existing precedent [has] placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741–42 (2011).

Here, Ms. Skillings’s complaint alleges that Officers Lauderdale and Chisum arrested her

without a warrant or probable cause that she had committed an offense of any kind. This is a case

where existing precedent places the constitutional question beyond debate. “A police officer

violates an arrestee’s clearly established Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable

seizure if the officer makes a warrantless arrest without probable cause.” Olsen v. Layton Hills

Mall, 312 F.3d 1304, 1312 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).

“The law . . . is unambiguous: a government official must have probable cause to arrest an

individual.” Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108, 1117 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Garner, 471 U.S.

at 7). Because Officers Lauderdale and Chisum are alleged to have violated Ms. Skillings’s clearly

established right not to be arrested except on probable cause that she had committed a crime, they

are not entitled to qualified immunity.

Because the defendants’ motion has not shown Ms. Skillings’s Fourth Amendment claims

against Chisum and Lauderdale to be facially deficient, the motion must be denied or converted to

summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). Given that the motion identifies the key factual

questions and includes evidence that would be dispositive if unrebutted, the Court will convert the

existing motion rather than deny it with respect to these claims.

V. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above, the Court grants in part and converts in part Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 116).

The Court grants the motion with respect to Ms. Skillings’s extradition claims, her claims

against Defendant Chambers, and her municipal liability claims. The Court declines to grant leave

to amend, as further amendment would be futile. Ms. Skillings was on notice that her claims

against the city of Broken Arrow and Defendant Chambers lacked the specificity necessary to

survive a motion to dismiss,3 yet she failed to correct for the deficiencies when filing her Third

Amended Complaint. The Court has no reason to believe she would do otherwise if given another

opportunity. As for her extradition claims, no amendment could account for an extradition that

admittedly never occurred.

3. See Order, Doc. 76 at 18–19 (setting out the law of municipal liability); M. Dismiss, Doc. 111

at 6–7 (arguing for dismissal of claims against Defendant Chambers on identical grounds).

With respect to Ms. Skillings’s Fourth Amendment claims against Defendants Chisum and

Lauderdale, the Court converts the motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.

Defendants Chisum and Lauderdale shall file any evidentiary supplementation by August 10,

2021. By August 24, 2021, Plaintiff shall file any supplement to her response to the motion and

shall include any evidence she desires that the Court consider. Defendants shall then file a reply

by September 7, 2021.

SO ORDERED, this 28th day of July, 2021