Spears v. Okmulgee County Criminal Justice Trust Authority

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

RONALD SPEARS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 23-CV-065-JFH-GLJ

OKMULGEE COUNTY CRIMINAL

JUSTICE AUTHORITY, and

OKMULGEE COUNTY BOARD OF

COMMISSIONERS,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court following Defendants’ Objections to Magistrate Judge

Jackson’s Report and Recommendation, which would grant in part, and deny in part, Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss. The Court, having conducted a de novo review of those issues to which

Defendants have properly objected, holds that the Report and Recommendation should be, and

hereby is, adopted in full.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff originally filed this matter on July 7, 2022 in the Okmulgee County District Court,

and Defendants removed this case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of

Oklahoma on February 20, 2023. Dkt. No. 2. On April 25, 2023, all proceedings in this case were

assigned to Magistrate Judge Gerald L. Jackson. Dkt. No. 14. The governing pleading, Plaintiff’s

Second Amended Complaint, was filed on July 6, 2023. Dkt. No. 25.

Plaintiff alleges that he was employed by Defendants for thirteen years, including as a

facility director within the Okmulgee County Jail. Dkt. No. 25, ¶¶ 2-3, 15. In 2016, during his

employment with Defendants, Plaintiff was diagnosed with cancer. Id. at ¶ 17. Plaintiff’s

condition required three monthly medical treatments and also required Plaintiff to take time off

from work or make changes to his work schedule. Id. at ¶ 19. Plaintiff’s treatment “consistently

required work accommodations” relating to limitations caused by symptoms of his cancer

treatments. Id. at ¶¶20-21. Plaintiff alleges that he consistently performed his job functions, but

Defendants "refused to provide accommodations regarding his disability….” Id. at ¶ 21. Plaintiff

alleges that upon a change in administration at the Okmulgee County Jail, a blanket policy was

instituted “not allowing employees to take time off work to address health care issues, or work

from home.” Id. at ¶ 24. This policy “eliminated the possibility of individuals, including the

Plaintiff, who needed medical treatment or an ADA accommodations, [sic] to continue to work.”

Id. Plaintiff alleges that he was terminated without any reason given but alleges that he was

terminated because “Plaintiff’s previously requested accommodations which had been approved

under a prior administration were no longer in line with the newly instituted blanket policy…which

did not allow accomm0dations [sic] of the type Plaintiff required.” Id. at ¶ 25. Plaintiff alleges

that Defendants knew of Plaintiff’s cancer treatments; Defendants “did not engage in any

meaningful dialogue” regarding Plaintiff’s previously requested accommodations and Defendants

did not “attempt to accommodate the Plaintiff in regards to cancer treatment requirements and

schedule.” Id. at 26.

Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them [Dkt. No. 30], arguing that

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. Magistrate Judge Jackson issued

a Report and Recommendation on September 20, 2023, which recommended that Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss be granted in part. Dkt. No. 34. Specifically, Magistrate Judge Jackson found

that Plaintiff had properly alleged a disability discrimination claim on a failure-to-accommodate

theory. Dkt. No. 34, pp. 5-10. Magistrate Judge Jackson recommended dismissal of all other

claims that Plaintiff attempts to assert. Dkt. No. 34. Defendants have objected to the Report and

Recommendation, contending that Magistrate Judge Jackson erred in not recommending dismissal

of Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim. Dkt. No. 35. Defendants’ objections largely rehash

arguments made within their dismissal motion; essentially, Defendants maintain that the

Magistrate Judge erred in not dismissing the failure-to-accommodate claim because Plaintiff has

not specifically alleged that Defendants applied the “blanket policy” of not permitting time off for

medical purposes to Plaintiff.

AUTHORITY AND ANALYSIS

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW.

A. The Court will review de novo those parts of the Report and Recommendation to which

Plaintiff has properly objected.

After a Report and Recommendation has been issued, “a party may serve and file specific

written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The Court

“must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has been properly

objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive

further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Id.; see also, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

Any objections not properly raised are waived for purposes of review by the district court.

Klein v. Harper, 777 F.3d 1144 (10th Cir. 2015); Silva v. United States, 45 F.4th 1134 (10th Cir.

2022).

B. Standard of review regarding Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.

In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must determine whether the claimant

has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. A motion to dismiss is properly granted when

a complaint provides no "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

elements of a cause of action." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A complaint

must contain enough "facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" and the factual

allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. (citations

omitted).

For purposes of a dismissal determination, a court must accept all well-pled allegations of

the complaint as true, even if doubtful in fact, and must construe the allegations in the light most

favorable to claimant. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Alvarado v. KOB—TV, L.L.C., 493 F.3d 1210,

1215 (10th Cir. 2007); Moffett v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 291 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir.

2002). The Court “must liberally construe the pleadings and make all reasonable inferences in

favor of the non-moving party.” Rajala v. Spencer Fane LLP (In re Generation Res. Holding Co.

LLC, 946 F.3d 958, 965 (10th Cir. 2020). However, a court need not accept as true those allegations

that are conclusory in nature. Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. Of Cnty. Com'rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154-

55 (10th Cir.2001). "[C]onclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are

insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1109-

10 (10th Cir. 1991).

II. PLAINTIFF HAS ADEQUATELY PLED A FAILURE-TO-ACCOMMODATE

CLAIM.

The only pending objection to the Report and Recommendation is that submitted by

Defendants, who object to Magistrate Judge Jackson’s determination that Plaintiff has stated a

plausible claim for disability discrimination under a failure-to-accommodate theory. Having

conducted de novo review of the adequacy of the failure-to-accommodate claim, the Court finds

that Defendants’ objections are not persuasive. Defendants adopt an overly literal, narrow view of

Plaintiff’s allegations and ignore the reasonable implications drawn from the Second Amended

Complaint; this is contrary to applicable legal standards. The Court accordingly overrules

Defendants’ objections to Magistrate Judge Jackson’s Report and Recommendation as explained

below.

A. Law Governing Plaintiff’s Failure to Accommodate Claim.

The Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§12111 et seq., among other aims,

prohibits workplace discrimination on the basis of disability. As relevant here, 42 U.S.C. §12112

(b)(5)(A) specifically provides that disability discrimination includes:

not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental

limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant

or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation

would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered

entity….

The Tenth Circuit has held that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case for such a

failure-to-accommodate claim by pleading that: “(1) [he] is disabled; (2) [he] is otherwise

qualified; and (3) [he] requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation.” Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co.,

900 F.3d 1166, 1204 (10th Cir. 2018) (alterations in original) (citing Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d

1040, 1050 (10th Cir. 2017)).

Given the above principles, once a reasonable accommodation has been granted, an

employer cannot simply withdraw that accommodation—unilateral withdrawal of a reasonable

accommodation is simply one manner in which an employer might “not mak[e] reasonable

accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. §12112; Bilinsky v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 928 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2019)

(“Absent some change in circumstance, an employer may not rescind an accommodation simply

because it is inconvenient or burdensome”); see also, Kass v. Synovus Fin. Corp., 800 F. App’x

804, 810 (11th Cir. 2020)1; Boggs v. Cedar Creek, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208226 (W.D.

Okla. Dec. 19, 2017); Isbell v. John Crane, Inc., 30 F. Supp. 3d 725, 734 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 21, 2014).

With these principles in mind, the Court has no difficulty overruling Defendants’ objection

and finding that Plaintiff has stated a plausible failure-to-accommodate claim.

B. Plaintiff’s Allegations Plausibly Allege a Failure-to-Accommodate Claim.

Plaintiff has alleged that, during his employment with Defendants, he was diagnosed with

cancer in 2016 and that Plaintiff’s cancer treatments required Plaintiff to take time off from work

and make changes to his schedule. Dkt. No. 25, ¶¶ 17, 19. These accommodations were previously

granted to Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 20. Upon the hiring of a new executive director, a “blanket policy”

was implemented whereby employees were no longer allowed “to take time off work to address

health care issues,” and the policy “eliminated the possibility of individuals, including the Plaintiff,

who needed medical treatment or an ADA accommodations (sic), to continue to work.” Id. at ¶

24.

Defendants have never challenged that Plaintiff is “disabled” or “otherwise qualified” for

the position that Plaintiff had held with Defendants. Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1204. Rather, Defendants

have solely challenged whether Plaintiff has adequately alleged that he “requested a plausibly

reasonable accommodation.” Id. In briefing below, Defendants argued at length that Plaintiff

failed to allege that he requested an accommodation from Defendants themselves. Dkt. No. 30,

pp. 7-11.

Plaintiff has alleged that, due to his disability, he had previously been granted reasonable

accommodations, and Plaintiff has alleged that Defendants instituted a policy that unilaterally

1 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent but may be cited for their persuasive value. See

10th Cir. R. 32.1; Fed. R. App. P. 32.1.

retracted those reasonable accommodations. Dkt. No. 25, ¶ 24. Such allegations are sufficient to

plausibly allege that Defendants have refused to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations” for

Plaintiff’s disability. 42 U.S.C. §12112. Defendants’ protestations that Plaintiff never alleges that

he requested an accommodation from Defendants directly is thus largely beside the point.

Even if the Court were inclined to agree with Defendants that Plaintiff must allege that he

directly requested accommodation from Defendants, the Court would still find that, reading the

Second Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, it could be reasonably inferred

from the allegations that Plaintiff did request accommodations from Defendants. Plaintiff alleges

that he had been receiving accommodations regarding his work schedule; that Defendants

implemented a “blanket policy” disallowing such accommodations; and that Defendants “refused

to engage in a dialogue” with Plaintiff regarding his accommodations. Dkt. No. 25, ¶¶ 19-24.

Having alleged that Defendants “refused to engage in a dialogue” with Plaintiff regarding his

accommodations, it is reasonably inferred that Plaintiff attempted to engage in such a dialogue

regarding reasonable accommodations. Defendants’ entire argument for dismissal before the

Magistrate Judge was misjudged and based entirely upon an overly narrow reading of Plaintiff’s

allegations.

C. Defendants’ Objections Advocate for an Overly Literal, Improper Reading of Plaintiff’s

Allegations.

In Defendants’ objections to the Report and Recommendation, they argue that the Report

and Recommendation erred in not recommending dismissal of Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate

claim because Plaintiff never alleged that the offending blanket policy was applied to Plaintiff

himself. Dkt. No. 35.

The Court is, frankly, confused by Defendants’ argument. The Plaintiff has explicitly

alleged that the “blanket policy” “eliminated the possibility of individuals, including the Plaintiff,

who needed medical treatment or an ADA accommodations (sic), to continue to work.” Id. at § 24

(emphasis added). Moreover, even if Plaintiff did not expressly allege that the policy was applied

to him—and he did—the other allegations in the Second Amended Complaint clearly allow for the

reasonable inference that the complained of policy was applied to Plaintiff. For instance, in

alleging a “blanket policy,” it is implied that the policy was applied to Plaintiff or else it would not

be a “blanket policy.” Given that the Court “must liberally construe the pleadings and make all

reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party,” the Court has no difficulty in overruling

Defendants’ objections to Magistrate Judge Jackson’s Report and Recommendation. Rajala, 946

F.3d at 965.

CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Objections filed by Defendants [Dkt. No. 35] are

OVERRULED. The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation [Dkt.

No. 34] in whole.

Dated this 3rd day of May 2024.

Neth LEW

JOHMNF. HEIL, I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE