Craig v. CoreCivic, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

SAMUEL CRAIG, as Personal )

Representative of the Estate of )

Rosco Craig, deceased, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 6:21-cv-183-JAR

)

(1) CORECIVIC, INC., a foreign for- )

profit business corporation, )

(2) CASE MANAGER DOE, )

)

Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter comes before the court on the Motion for Summary Judgment

[Doc. 69] of defendant CoreCivic, Inc. (“CoreCivic”).

Plaintiff Samuel Craig (“Dr. Craig”), as Personal Representative of the

Estate of Rosco Craig, deceased, brings the following claims under 42 U.S.C. §

1983 for alleged constitutional violations during the decedent’s incarceration at

Davis Correctional Facility (“DCF”): (1) failure to ensure inmate safety against all

defendants, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (2) Monell liability against

CoreCivic.1 CoreCivic seeks summary judgment on the following grounds: (1) as

the private owner and operator of DCF, CoreCivic did not fail to protect the

decedent because the conditions of his confinement were constitutionally

satisfied; and (2) with respect to the Monell liability claim, Dr. Craig has failed to

establish any violation of the decedent’s constitutional rights by DCF staff.

I. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 2

The following facts are undisputed for summary judgment purposes.

CoreCivic is a for-profit corporation with its principal place of business in

Nashville, Tennessee. [Doc. 69-1, p. 1 ¶1]. At all times material, CoreCivic

privately owned DCF – a medium-to-maximum security prison located in

Holdenville, Oklahoma. [Doc. 69, p. 8]. CoreCivic staffed DCF, managed prison

operations, and housed inmates under the custody of the Oklahoma Department

of Corrections (“ODOC”). [Id.].

A. CORECIVIC POLICIES AND CUSTOMS

Pursuant to the contractual relationship between CoreCivic and ODOC,

facility operations at DCF were largely governed by ODOC policy and procedure.

See e.g., [Doc. 69-2; Doc. 69-22].

1. Inmate Custody Assessment Procedures

Per ODOC’s male custody assessment policy, a DCF classification

committee was required to conduct “Custody Assessment Procedures” to

“update, review, and re-assess an inmate’s initial or previous custody

assessment” on an annual basis. [Doc. 69-2, p. 2]. While the committee members

ultimately had “total[] discretion[]” in deciding custody placements, they were

required to complete a “Classification Assessment Scale” form and score inmates

based on consideration of a number of factors, including but not limited to:

severity of convictions; severity of active disciplinary convictions; participation

in prison educational programs; current earned credit class level; and age. [Id.

pp. 2-10]. Using the corresponding scoring rubric, facility staff determined an

assessed security level – that is, whether the inmate would be placed in

minimum, medium, or maximum security. [Id. p. 10].

2. Inmate Housing Assignment Procedures

Designated DCF staff members were also required to make housing

assignments “on the basis of rational and objective criteria” by “taking into

consideration each individual inmate’s safety, security, and treatment needs.”3

[Doc. 69-22, p. 2]. Facility staff was obligated to consider the following factors

when making housing determinations: escape history; conviction offense; gang

affiliation; compatibility with inmate population; history of institutional

adjustment; institutional misconduct; custody level; medical and/or mental

health needs; subjective safety and security needs; information gathered from

inmates in the “Cell Assessment Form” and “Activity/Housing Summary” – i.e.,

sexual orientation and educational background; and information provided by

inmates in the “Self-Report Form” – i.e., mental/development disabilities, gender

orientation, sexual victimization, and inmate perception of other vulnerabilities.

[Id. pp. 2-4]. Using the corresponding scoring rubric, DCF staff assigned inmates

with either an “unrestricted” or “restricted” housing status. [Id. p. 4].

If an inmate met the “restricted” criteria in a Cell Assessment form, he

would receive a special housing assignment. [Id. p. 5]. If an inmate met the

“unrestricted” criteria, he would be assigned to the first available bunk in a

multi-inmate cell within the appropriate security level. [Id. p. 4]. Upon assigning

a new inmate to a multi-inmate cell, a “Unit Classification Committee” was

required to complete a “New Arrival Packet,” otherwise known as an “Adjustment

Review,” and make any necessary changes to the inmate’s Cell Assessment form.

[Id. p. 5, ¶III(C)(2)]. Once the committee confirmed an appropriate assignment

was made, a designated staff member was required to sign and date the inmate’s

Cell Assessment form. [Id. p. 6, ¶III(C)(3)]. ODOC’s housing policy further

provides:

The “Cell Assessment Form” will be utilized to determine if it is

necessary to place an inmate in a single cell based on

behavioral/security related issues, the need for administrative

segregation and/or protective measures consideration.

Such inmates include but are not limited to the following: . . . (3)

Sexual predators; (4) Inmates who are identified as likely to be

exploited or victimized by others; and (5) Inmates who have

committed violence against other inmates or staff.

If it is possible to provide a single cell, then the process outlined on

the assessment form will be followed . . .

[Id. p. 7, ¶III(C)(4)(d)].

As a matter of its contractual agreement with ODOC, CoreCivic could not

provide qualified inmates with single cell housing at DCF. [Doc. 82, p. 13, ¶25;

Doc. 87, p. 10, ¶25]. Chief of Unit Management Julia Dorman testified that she

does not recall transferring any inmates to facilities capable of providing single

cell housing [Doc. 82-7, pp. 8-9 (114:1-115:15)] since she began working at DCF

in or around 2017. [Doc. 69-1, ¶2].

3. Inmate Complaint Process and Protective Measures

An administrative grievance process was available for inmates to report

any violation of ODOC’s housing policy. See [Doc. 69-22, p. 2]. Inmates under

ODOC custody could also submit a “Request to Staff” or speak with facility

personnel to raise any type of issue. [Doc. 69-12, p. 3, ¶7]. If an issue involved

safety concerns, inmates could submit a verbal or written request for protective

measures which required DCF staff to conduct a “Protective Measures

Investigation” (“PMI”), complete a PMI form, and send the form to ODOC to decide

whether the requesting inmate qualified for protective custody. [Doc. 82-7, p. 11

(176:11-22)]. Facility staff could also initiate protective measure procedures on

their own accord with documented cause. [Doc. 82-8, p. 5 (82:1-11)]. In the event

ODOC concluded an inmate qualified for protective custody, DCF lacked capacity

to provide the same and qualified inmates would be transferred to another

facility. [Doc. 82-7, pp. 11-12 (176:14-177:7)].

B. THE DECEDENT’S INCARCERATION AT DCF

On June 22, 2018, an Oklahoma County District Court revoked the

suspended sentence of Rosco Craig for failure to register as a sex offender. [Doc.

82, p. 8, ¶1; Doc. 87, p. 7, ¶1]. Craig self-reported as bisexual with no fear of

sexual victimization by fellow inmates. [Doc. 69-4, p. 3; Doc. 82-14, p. 1]. After

completing an Initial Custody Assessment form [Doc. 69-3] and Cell Assessment

form [Doc. 69-4], ODOC classified Craig as a medium security inmate with

unrestricted housing status. [Doc. 69, p. 9, ¶¶3-4; Doc. 82, p. 6 ¶2-4].

ODOC transferred Craig to DCF on August 7, 2018. [Doc. 69, p. 8, ¶1;

Doc. 82, p. 6, ¶1]. Craig self-reported as a perceived gay or bisexual man who

felt vulnerable and/or at risk for sexual victimization. [Doc. 69-5, p. 2]. DCF staff

classified Craig as a “potential predator”4 based on his answers in the Self-Report

form [Id. p. 5] and chose to rely upon the housing classifications previously made

by ODOC rather than complete an Adjustment Review or Cell Assessment form

for Craig upon his arrival. [Doc. 82, p. 8, ¶3; Doc. 87, p. 7, ¶3]. As noted by Case

Manager Nikki Gibson on August 30, 2018, an Adjustment Review was being

completed for Craig “to correct [this] issue.” [Doc. 82-14, p. 2]. An initial Cell

Assessment form was not completed until October 5, 2018 [Doc. 69-23],5 and

the record indicates DCF staff completed only one Adjustment Review for Craig

in June 2019. [Doc. 82-11, pp. 1-2].

On December 10, 2018, Craig submitted a Request to Staff seeking to be

housed with inmate Corey Huntley because Craig felt unsafe with his allotted

cellmate, Chris Nolan.6 [Doc. 82-1, p. 3]. Craig further alleged that his facility

case manager had placed false information in his inmate file. [Id.]. Chief Dorman

denied this Request and failed to address Craig’s allegations concerning his case

4 Craig subsequently requested to be reclassified as a “potential victim” because, as a convicted

sex offender, he felt vulnerable in his unit containing like-classified inmates. [Doc. 82-1, p. 8 (“I

was assaulted in county by inmates because of my allegations [of which] expose me to an

unreasonable risk of harm.”)]. Finding “no reason to change any documents,” Chief Dorman

denied Craig’s reclassification request. [Id. p. 7].

5 This cell assessment was conducted by Ms. Gibson, of whom assigned Craig an unrestricted

status with no special housing needs. [Doc. 69-23; Doc. 82-7, p. 16 (213:6-25)].

manager. [Id. (“You are housed, according to all [O]DOC policies, where you

should")].

On December 20, 2018, Craig submitted another Request to Staff seeking

a facility transfer based on the following allegations:

[Get] me away from this facility[.] I’m not safe here[.] My life is in

danger[.] . . . If I stay on the yard, I will get killed because of my

case[.] . . . I’ve already been fearing my life is in danger because my

case was exposed by Ms. Gibson[.] . . . I’m in fear for my life and

need to be moved please.

[Doc. 82-1, p. 4]. According to Chief of Security Kevin Brown, this Request was

insufficient under applicable policy to warrant approval. [Doc. 82, p. 9, ¶8; Doc.

87, p. 8, ¶8]. Craig nevertheless submitted an Inmate Grievance on January 7,

2019, seeking a facility transfer based on allegations that he had been sexually

harassed by Ms. Gibson and when he “refused her advances she started yelling

[to other] inmates” about his criminal charges to get him “hurt.” [Doc. 82-20]. He

further alleged that Ms. Gibson put false information in his inmate file to get him

“killed.” [Id.]. This Grievance was denied on procedural grounds. [Doc. 82, p. 9,

¶10; Doc. 87, p. 8, ¶10]. There is no evidence that a PMI was conducted on the

allegations set forth in Craig’s December 20 Request or January 7 Grievance.

In late-February 2019, DCF’s Warden affirmed an internal referral

recommending that Craig be transferred from general population to an intensive

supervision unit (“ISU”).7 [Doc. 69, p. 9, ¶7; Doc. 82, p. 6, ¶7]. Accordingly, on

March 18, 2019, Craig was placed with inmate Shawn Farley in cell 213 on an

ISU known as “Fox Delta” or “FD.” [Doc. 82, p. 10, ¶11; Doc. 87, p. 8, ¶11]. Farley

had been convicted of nonviolent crimes, including computer crimes and

possession of a weapon. [Id.]. Nonetheless, on May 13, 2019 at approximately

5:12 a.m., Craig was found “hog tied” in cell FD 213. [Doc. 82, p. 10, ¶12; Doc.

87, p. 8, ¶12]. According to the Correctional Officer who found Craig, “Farley had

taken a torn sheet and tied inmate Craig’s hands and feet behind his back and

placed him under the lower bunk in the cell.” [Doc. 82-3, p. 1]. Farley received a

misconduct write-up for assault without serious injury, as Craig sustained

abrasions on the back of his head and left wrist. [Doc. 87-8, p. 3; Doc. 82-24].

DCF staff chose not to conduct a PMI into Farley’s assault.8 [Doc. 69-26, p. 3,

¶7; Doc. 82-8, pp. 6-7 (83:23-84:14)]. After receiving medical care for his injuries,

Craig awaited housing reassignment in a segregated holding cell. [Doc. 87-9].

A few hours later, Craig was placed back in cell FD 213 with inmate

Trevohn Price. [Doc. 82, p. 10, ¶14; Doc. 87, p. 8, ¶14]. Price had numerous

violent crime convictions including burglary, sexual battery, rape, and forcible

oral sodomy. [Doc. 82-25, p. 1; Doc. 82-26, p. 1]. By the time they were assigned

as cellmates, Price had accumulated thirty-two misconduct write-ups over a

three-year span – five of which were for assaultive behavior9 – while Craig had

8 According to a CoreCivic Rule 30(b)(6) witness, no PMI was initiated because DCF staff did not

believe Craig’s injuries were consistent with his “statement” regarding the assault. [Doc. 82-8,

pp. 5-8 (82:20-86:18) (“How are you going to be hog-tied and only get one hand hurt?”)]. Ms.

Gibson was purportedly responsible for reviewing the Incident Report on Farley’s assault [Id. p.

9 (87:12-16)] and the decision to forgo protective measure procedures was ultimately made by

Chief Dorman. [Id. p. 9 (87:6-11)].

9 See [Doc. 82-5, pp. 8-9 (262:13-263:4); Doc. 69-11; Doc. 82-25; Doc. 82-27]. Price’s history of

accrued seven misconduct write-ups for nonviolent infractions over an eight-

month span. [Doc. 82, p. 8, ¶6; Doc. 87, p. 7, ¶6]. A Cell Assessment form was

completed for Price on May 19, 2019, assigning him an unrestricted housing

status based on the following determinations: (i) Price had an active or prior

violent offense; (ii) his past misconduct reflected no pattern of violence; and (iii)

Price had no history of violence towards cellmates. [Doc. 82-28]. A Cell

Assessment form was not completed for Craig because, according to CoreCivic,

ODOC policy only required completion of said form upon cell reassignment – not

cellmate reassignment.10 [Doc. 87, p. 9, ¶16 (citing Doc. 69-22, ¶IV(A)(2))]. The

applicable provision of ODOC’s housing policy provides:

Circumstances which may warrant a review of housing status may

include, but not be limited to, the following: . . . [c] An inmate

identifies enemies and/or provides documented evidence of the need

for protection through an assessment of protective measures need[;]

[d] An inmate’s health (medical/mental condition) changes for better

or worse, and a move is warranted for health reasons[;] . . . [f] Based

upon an inmate’s risk for victimization or abusiveness, the inmate

will be re-assessed as determined by the facility head, not to exceed

30 days, from the date of the last cell assessment.

*** Any changes in an inmate’s housing assignment status because

of the above circumstances will be documented by completing a new

‘Cell Assessment Form’ []. This information will remain in section 3

of the inmate’s field file throughout their incarceration.

[Doc. 69-22, p. 8, ¶IV(A)(1)-(2)].

cellmate in March 2018, whereby Price inflicted “minor” injuries. [Id.]. In addition, Price was

previously disciplined for refusing to house with an inmate whom he perceived was gay. [Id. p. 4

(“I’m not going to live with a faget [sic].”)].

Within the first week of rooming with Price, Craig informally requested a

single cell assignment upon the first sign of conflict. [Doc. 82-9, p. 5]. According

to Price and his mother, Carmen Scott, Price also informally requested a new

cellmate soon after being placed with Craig.11 [Doc. 82-5, pp. 28-29 (438:11-

439:22); Doc. 82-6, p. 5 (46:7-15)]. Correctional Counselor Heather Runyan

purportedly denied the request and told Price there had to be a “physical

altercation” for him to be moved. [Id. pp. 28-29 (438:24-439:22); Doc. 82-6, pp.

5-6 (46:16-47:20)]. Ms. Runyan does not recall receiving or discussing this

housing request with Price. [Doc. 87-11, pp. 5-6 (372:11-373:15)]. Notably, on

June 17, 2019, Ms. Runyan filed an Offense Report against Craig for “refusing

to return to general population from the phase unit.” [Doc. 69-7, p. 20]. An

Adjustment Review was completed for Craig on the following day, of which

documented his worsening behavior towards DCF staff and inmates, poor

personal hygiene, and unkempt living area. [Doc. 82-11, pp. 1-2]. There is no

evidence that any remedial measures were taken to address this seemingly

sudden decline in Craig’s mental condition.

In the early morning hours of June 24, 2019, inmate Charles Snail heard

a “ruckus” and “thumping” emanating from a nearby Fox Delta cell. [Doc. 82, p.

12, ¶18; Doc. 87, p. 9, ¶18]. This event occurred while it was “still dark before

breakfast time.” [Doc. 82-5, p. 21 (394:9-17)]. Snail then heard someone “begging

11 Ms. Scott recalls Price stating that because Craig behaved strangely at night – i.e., he crawled

and turned cartwheels around the cell while yelling – Price “felt like he would . . . end up . . .

for his life” for around “three or four minutes.” [Id. pp. 22-23 (396:24-397:24)].

DCF staff did not respond for a “couple of hours.” [Id. pp. 25-26 (399:8-400:2)].

According to Case Manager Shana Taylor, staff members responsible for

monitoring the FD unit should have responded immediately:

The inmates in the ISU program on Fox Delta were regularly

monitored by staff. Throughout each 24-hour period the posted

security staff members made rounds through the housing unit and

by each cell, the . . . Shift Supervisor made rounds, the Corrections

Counselor and Case Manager made rounds, the Unit Manager made

rounds, the medical staff made rounds, and the facility leadership

made rounds.

[Doc. 69-13, pp. 3-4, ¶7].

At 6:00 a.m. on June 24, 2019, Ms. Runyan relieved Correctional Officer

Joseph Wimberly of his overnight monitoring duties on the FD unit. [Doc. 87-14,

pp. 2-4]. She spoke with Price through his cell door at around 7:00 a.m.

regarding his desire to make a phone call and noticed that Craig was “in bed and

under the covers” [Doc. 69-12, ¶11] with “his head covered with a towel.” [Doc.

82-29, p. 1]. During this conversation, Ramie Mires distributed morning

medication to Price and “saw nothing” inside cell FD 213 “that suggested a fight”

had occurred. [Doc. 69-19, ¶10].

At about 8:20 a.m., an Assistant Shift Supervisor began making rounds

and initialed each log sheet posted next to each FD cell door. [Doc. 69-12, ¶13].

At approximately 8:56 a.m., Ms. Runyan again approached cell FD 213 to remove

the telephone cart and close the food port. [Id. ¶14]. She noticed Craig was still

covered up on the bottom bunk and knocked on the cell door in an unsuccessful

but Ms. Runyan saw a “small blood smear” on an exposed part of Craig’s bed

sheet and immediately radioed for emergency response teams. [Id.].12

At approximately 9:00 a.m., medical and emergency response teams

arrived on the Fox Delta unit. [Doc. 82, p. 12, ¶20; Doc. 87, p. 10, ¶20]. Price

was escorted to a holding enclosure and security staff placed Craig on a gurney

while medical personnel began performing CPR [Doc. 82-30, p. 1], as Craig was

“unresponsive, cold, with no respirations” or “pulse” [Doc. 69-20, p. 3, ¶3; Doc.

69-21, p. 2]. At around 9:20 a.m., EMS arrived and administered CPR for another

twenty minutes before rushing Craig to Holdenville General Hospital. [Doc. 82-

30, p. 1]. Craig was pronounced dead at approximately 10:06 a.m. on June 24,

2019. [Id.]. It was ultimately determined that Craig died by homicide through

blunt-force trauma to the head.13 [Doc. 82, pp. 12-13, ¶21; Doc. 87, p. 10, ¶20].

CoreCivic conducted an internal investigation into Craig’s death and found

that, among other things, there was a “delayed response time” by DCF staff

members responsible for supervising the FD unit on June 24, 2019. [Doc. 82-

30, p. 3]. ODOC also investigated the circumstances surrounding Craig’s death

and reported, among other things, that: (i) Price had placed a towel over Craig to

conceal his “bloodied face and head”; (ii) two “wet towels covered in blood,” a

“pair of blood-stained pants,” and one “blood-soaked sock” were found within

cell FD 213; and (iii) the scene appeared to have been altered, “as blood stains

12 According to Ms. Mires, however, “[t]he bed covers over Rosco Craig were not soiled or bloody.”

[Doc. 69-19, p. 4, ¶10].

were evident throughout cell 213 as if someone had attempted to clean the cell.”

[Doc. 82-29, p. 2].

Dr. Craig initiated this § 1983 suit on June 24, 2021, and his remaining

causes of action include an Eighth Amendment claim for failure to ensure inmate

safety against all defendants and a claim for Monell liability against CoreCivic.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A fact is

“material” if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is “genuine”

if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” Id. “Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will

not be counted.” Id. Further, the nonmoving party “must do more than simply

show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

However, “at the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not

himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to

determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

A court must examine the factual record in light most favorable to the party

opposing summary judgment. Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793,

796 (10th Cir. 1995). Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the pleadings,

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

III. ANALYSIS

Before a substantive analysis of Dr. Craig’s claims, the court must first

determine whether CoreCivic is a proper defendant under § 1983. The statute

provides that “[e]very person who . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege

two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the

United States was violated, and (2) “that the alleged violation was committed by

a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

In addition to suing the individual(s) directly responsible for the

constitutional violation alleged, Dr. Craig has sued the private company that

employs and pays such individual(s). When “private individuals or groups” like

CoreCivic “are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in

nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its

constitutional limitations.” Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966). As a state

grantee “acting for the government out of a government program in accordance

with government regulations,” CoreCivic does not challenge its status as a

person acting under color of state law. Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194,

duties imposed by government contract, when sued solely on basis of those acts

dictated by government, is implicitly subject to liability).

Under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) and its

progeny, municipal liability requires Dr. Craig to first demonstrate that the

decedent suffered some violation of rights protected by the constitution. Id. at

690. If such violation exists, Dr. Craig must then prove the violation was the

direct result of a custom or policy maintained by CoreCivic. Id. at 694.

A. ALLEGED CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION

The Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause imposes

a duty on prison officials to “provide humane conditions of confinement,”

including “taking reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates.”

Hooks v. Atoki, 983 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)). This overarching obligation includes a duty

“to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners.” Id. (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833). “It is not, however, every injury suffered by one

prisoner at the hands of another that translates into constitutional liability for

prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.

Rather, a prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements

are met: (1) the deprivation alleged must objectively be “sufficiently serious,” and

(2) the defendant’s state of mind must subjectively have been one of “deliberate

indifference” to inmate safety. Id.; Smith v. Cummings, 445 F.3d 1254, 1259

(10th Cir. 2006) (“Mere negligence does not constitute deliberate indifference;

To satisfy the objective component, Dr. Craig must show CoreCivic set in

motion a series of events that it knew or reasonably should have known would

cause others to deprive the decedent of his constitutional rights. See Schneider

v. City of Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760, 768 (10th Cir. 2013). The

undisputed harm suffered by Craig – death by inmate-on-inmate assault – is

itself sufficient to satisfy the objective prong. See Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745,

753 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining the objective component is met when the harm

suffered rises to sufficiently serious levels and is significant, not trivial,

suffering); see also Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991) (noting the

objective test inquiry is simply: “Was the deprivation sufficiently serious.”).

To meet the subjective component, Dr. Craig must show DCF staff was

“aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists” and that certain DCF staff members actually “[drew] the

inference.” Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1204 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). “[A]n Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that

a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall

an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his

knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. In

sum, “a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for

denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a

substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it.” Id. at 847.

Dr. Craig makes several arguments with respect to his claim that DCF staff

knew or should have known housing Craig with Price presented a substantial

risk of serious harm to the decedent. Dr. Craig initially contends that, despite

Price’s prior infraction for refusing to house with an inmate whom he perceived

as homosexual and Craig self-reporting as bisexual and/or a perceived

homosexual, DCF staff chose to house the two inmates together in total disregard

for Craig’s safety. While the record confirms Dr. Craig’s contentions, it also

indicates that Craig inconsistently self-reported as heterosexual [Doc. 69-6, p.

2; Doc. 69-24, p. 3], and was also disciplined for refusing to house with an

inmate whom he perceived was homosexual. [Doc. 69-7, p. 3]. In addition, Dr.

Craig draws no connection between the decedent’s sexuality and the fatal assault

he suffered at the hands of Price.

Nevertheless, Dr. Craig further contends the nature of Craig’s underlying

conviction generally placed him at a heightened risk of assault. Both the record

and common sense suggest that DCF staff had actual knowledge of the risk to

Craig’s safety with respect to his sex offender status. It is undisputed that facility

staff classified Craig as a “potential predator” because of his underlying

conviction, housed him in a general population unit with like-classified inmates,

and then denied Craig’s requests to either be reclassified as a “potential victim”

or be reassigned to a safer unit or facility. There is no evidence that facility

personnel investigated any of the seven Requests to Staff wherein Craig

expressed concerns for his safety based on allegations that Ms. Gibson and/or

conviction. [Doc. 82-1, pp. 4-8, 13-16]. In addition, the record suggests that Ms.

Gibson was permitted to continue managing certain aspects of Craig’s

incarceration following his allegations that, with malicious intent, she was

informing other inmates of his status as a sex offender. She purportedly played

a role in the decision to forgo protective measures for Craig after he was

assaulted by Farley. See [Doc. 82-8, p. 9 (87:1-16)]. By housing Craig with Price

a few hours later, it appears DCF staff (i) disregarded Craig’s allegations against

Ms. Gibson and repeated requests for greater protections, (ii) overlooked (or

ignored) Price’s history of violence, and (iii) discounted the safety risks that

inherently beset prisoners with sex offender convictions.

In the same vein, Dr. Craig contends that DCF staff clearly demonstrated

their indifference towards Craig’s safety by housing him with Price – an inmate

with a well-documented history of violence.14 This housing decision was made

on the same day that Craig was assaulted by Farley – an inmate convicted of

nonviolent crimes with a peaceable prison record. It is reasonable to infer that

replacing Farley with Price presented a substantial risk of serious harm to Craig.

The repeated failure of DCF staff to conduct PMIs or provide Craig with protective

measures is further indicative of such indifference.15

14 See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43 (“[I]f an Eighth Amendment plaintiff presents evidence showing

that a substantial risk of inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, well-documented, or

expressly noted by prison officials in the past, and the circumstances suggest that the defendant-

official being sued had been exposed to information concerning the risk and thus must have

known about it, then such evidence could be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to find that the

defendant-official had actual knowledge of the risk.”).

Accordingly, this court finds that the allegations and evidence set forth by

Dr. Craig sufficiently show DCF staff had knowledge that a substantial risk of

serious harm existed for the decedent and disregarded such risk by repeatedly

failing to take reasonable measures to guarantee his safety. CoreCivic is

therefore not entitled to summary judgment on Dr. Craig’s Eighth Amendment

claim for failure to ensure inmate safety.

B. LIABILITY OF CORECIVIC UNDER § 1983

The second step in the § 1983 analysis is to determine whether the

violation alleged resulted from a policy or custom of CoreCivic. See Monell, 436

U.S. at 694. To start, a private defendant such as CoreCivic cannot be held liable

under § 1983 based solely on the actions of its employees. See id. at 691. Rather,

“it is when execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its

lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official

policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under

§ 1983.” Id. at 694; Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty., Okla. v. Brown, 520

U.S. 397, 405 (1997) (“Where a plaintiff claims that the municipality . . . has

caused an employee to [violate the decedent’s constitutional rights], rigorous

standards of culpability and causation must be applied to ensure that the

municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee.”).

Thus, Dr. Craig must go beyond a respondeat superior theory of liability

and establish (1) an official policy or custom of CoreCivic (2) caused a violation

of the decedent’s federal rights and (3) was enacted or maintained with deliberate

at 770. Put simply, Dr. Craig must show “a direct causal link between the action

and the deprivation of federal rights.” Brown, 520 U.S. at 404.

Dr. Craig argues that CoreCivic maintained a policy or custom of failing to

provide protective measures for inmates, like the decedent, who were at excessive

risk of inmate-on-inmate assault. See Hinkle v. Beckham Cnty. Bd. of Cnty.

Comm’rs, 962 F.3d 1204, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2020) (noting that policies or

customs meeting the Monell standard may arise from “an informal custom that

amounts to a widespread practice”) (citation omitted); see also City of St. Louis

v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988). The record contains evidence supporting

this contention, the most prominent example being DCF staff’s failure to conduct

a PMI or provide Craig with protective measures after he was assaulted by Farley.

Dr. Craig must next demonstrate that CoreCivic’s de facto custom caused

the alleged Eighth Amendment violation. See Schneider, 717 F.3d at 768. To

establish causation, Dr. Craig must show, by “rigorous standards,” that

CoreCivic was the “moving force” behind the injury. Brown, 520 U.S. at 405. Dr.

Craig makes several arguments with respect to his claim that, because DCF staff

enforced CoreCivic’s challenged custom, the decedent suffered fatal injuries. To

start, Dr. Craig contends that Craig’s death resulted in part from DCF staff’s

failure to complete paperwork16 that was required under ODOC’s housing policy

16 Based on the record before the court, it also appears CoreCivic had no measures in place to

ensure completed paperwork was properly maintained by DCF. Chief Dorman testified that, as

the head of unit management, she never audited inmate files to ensure compliance with ODOC

policy. [Doc. 82-7, p. 4 (29:13-21)]. The Case Manager for inmates housed in the FD unit believed

for the stated purpose of ensuring the safety of inmates. See [Doc. 69-22, p. 2].

Per ODOC policy, facility staff was required to conduct an Adjustment Review

upon initially assigning Craig to a general population unit. [Doc. 69-22, p. 6,

¶III(C)(2)]. While Ms. Gibson represented in August 2018 that new arrival

paperwork was being processed for Craig, the record contains a single

Adjustment Review that was completed on June 20, 2019 – four days before

Craig was fatally assaulted.17 [Doc. 82-11]. The Review documented Craig’s

deteriorating state of mind, but there is no indication that DCF staff implemented

any remedial measures to ensure the safety of Craig or his fellow inmates.

Furthermore, despite ODOC policy explicitly requiring facility staff to make

“any necessary changes” to an inmate’s Cell Assessment form following

completion of an Adjustment Review in order “to determine if any special housing

needs exist” [Doc. 69-22, p. 5, ¶III(B)], a Cell Assessment form was not completed

for Craig following the aforementioned Review.18 If DCF staff had complied with

ODOC’s housing policy rather than CoreCivic’s custom, Craig arguably would

have qualified for single cell housing or some other form of protective custody

prior to his death on June 24, 2019. See [Id. pp. 6-7, ¶III(C)(4)(a)-(d)].

17 According to Chief Dorman, an Adjustment Review should have been completed for Craig upon

a “level change[] or every four months.” [Doc. 82-7, p. 13 (185:1-3)]. Craig was incarcerated at

DCF for a total of ten months, during which time he underwent numerous level changes.

18 DCF staff completed a total of two Cell Assessment forms for Craig, both of which predated his

housing assignment with Price. As noted, CoreCivic argues ODOC policy only required its

employees to complete said form upon cell reassignments, rather than cellmate reassignments.

DCF staff did, however, classify Craig as a potential predator because of

his sex offender status and immediately housed him in a general population unit

filled with like-classified inmates. When Craig requested to either be reclassified

as a potential victim or be transferred to a different facility based on concerns

for his safety, Chief Dorman responded by stating: “[T]here is no reason to

change any documents.” [Doc. 82-1, p. 7].19 The record contains at least nine

requests from Craig for housing reassignment, facility transfer, or single cell

housing – all of which were denied by DCF staff with no indication that any good

faith reviews were conducted. See [Doc. 69-22, p. 9, ¶V(B) (mandating review of

circumstances underlying all inmate requests for housing reassignment)]. While

CoreCivic argues, in part, that its employees denied these housing requests

because Craig lacked evidence to support his claimed safety needs, it is

undisputed that no protective measures were provided for Craig following

Farley’s assault – an inmate-on-inmate attack of which there was ample evidence

to substantiate.20

Finally, Dr. Craig contends Ms. Runyan informed Price that his request for

cellmate reassignment would be denied absent evidence of a physical altercation

with Craig. The facts underlying this contention are heavily disputed. While

CoreCivic denies that it maintained a custom of refusing housing reassignment

19 But see [Doc. 69-22, p. 7, ¶III(C)(4)(e) (“Assignments may be made for inmates who are

unrestricted but need specific housing arrangements due to the inmate’s vulnerability such as .

. . criminal history[.]”)].

20 See e.g., [Doc. 82-2 (Incident Statement by the Correctional Officer that found Craig hog-tied

requests absent evidence of an assault, the company fails to address the fact

that both Price and a CoreCivic Rule 30(b)(6) witness testified to the existence of

this allegedly fictitious practice. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

to Dr. Craig and due to the existence of a genuine dispute over material facts,

the court finds the issue of causation is a question of fact for the jury. Therefore,

CoreCivic is not entitled to summary judgment on Dr. Craig’s claim for Monell

liability.

IV. CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by defendant

CoreCivic, Inc. [Doc. 69], is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 14th day of March, 2024.

____________________________________

JASON A. ROBERTSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE