Chaplin v. Social Security Administration

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

BRIAN KEITH CHAPLIN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

v. ) Case No. CIV–22–170–JAR

)

KILO KIJAKAZI, )

Acting Commissioner of the )

Social Security Administration, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Brian Keith Chaplin (the “Claimant”) requests judicial review of

the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the

“Commissioner”) denying Claimant’s application for disability benefits under the

Social Security Act. Claimant appeals the decision of the Administrative Law

Judge (“ALJ”) and asserts that the Commissioner erred because the ALJ

incorrectly determined that Claimant was not disabled. For the reasons

discussed below, it is the finding of this Court that the Commissioner’s decision

should be and is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further

proceedings.

Social Security Law and Standard of Review

Disability under the Social Security Act is defined as the “inability to

engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical or mental impairment[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A

claimant is disabled under the Social Security Act “only if his physical or mental

impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do

his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work

experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in

the national economy[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423 (d)(2)(A). Social security regulations

implement a five-step sequential process to evaluate a disability claim. See 20

C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.1

Section 405(g) limits the scope of judicial review of the Commissioner’s

decision to two inquiries: whether the decision was supported by substantial

evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied. See Hawkins v.

Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir. 1997). Substantial evidence is “‘more

than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Richardson v. Perales, 402

U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,

1 Step one requires the claimant to establish that he is not engaged in substantial

gainful activity. Step two requires the claimant to establish that he has a

medically severe impairment (or combination of impairments) that significantly

limits his ability to do basic work activities. If the claimant is engaged in

substantial gainful activity, or his impairment is not medically severe, disability

benefits are denied. If he does have a medically severe impairment, it is measured

at step three against the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpt. P, App.

1. If the claimant has a listed (or “medically equivalent”) impairment, he is

regarded as disabled and awarded benefits without further inquiry. Otherwise,

the evaluation proceeds to step four, where the claimant must show that he lacks

the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to return to his past relevant work. At

step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show there is significant work

in the national economy that the claimant can perform, given his age, education,

work experience, and RFC. Disability benefits are denied if the claimant can

return to any of his past relevant work or if his RFC does not preclude alternative

work. See generally Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir. 1988).

229 (1938)); see also Clifton v. Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996). The

Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its discretion for the

Commissioner’s. See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933 F.2d

799, 800 (10th Cir. 1991). But the Court must review the record as a whole, and

“[t]he substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record

fairly detracts from its weight.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,

488 (1951); see also Casias, 933 F.2d at 800–01.

Claimant’s Background

The claimant was fifty-two years old at the time of the administrative

hearing. (Tr. 30, 47). He possesses at least a high school education. (Tr. 47). He

has no past relevant work. (Tr. 47). Claimant alleges that he has been unable to

work since April 1, 2007, due to limitations resulting from “debilitating

depression,” anxiety, diabetes, inflammation of the prostate, paranoid

schizophrenic, and mental psychosis. (Tr. 122).

Procedural History

On May 8, 2020, Claimant protectively filed for supplemental security

income pursuant to Title XVI (42 U.S.C. § 1381, et seq.) of the Social Security

Act. Claimant’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. After

an administrative hearing, Administrative Law Cynthia G. Weaver (“ALJ”) issued

an unfavorable decision on December 23, 2021. Appeals Council denied review,

so the ALJ’s written opinion is the Commissioner’s final decision for purposes of

this appeal. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1481.

Decision of the Administrative Law Judge

The ALJ made her decision at step five of the sequential evaluation. She

determined that while Claimant suffered from severe impairments, he retained

the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with limitations.

Error Alleged for Review

Claimant asserts the ALJ committed error in (1) improperly evaluating the

medical opinion evidence, and (2) improperly determining Claimant’s RFC thus

failing to include all of Claimant's limitations in the RFC and the hypothetical

questioning of the vocational expert at step five.

Consideration of Medical Evidence

In her decision, the ALJ determined Claimant suffered from the severe

impairments of degenerative disc disease, major depressive disorder, anxiety

disorder, and unspecified schizophrenia-spectrum disorder. (Tr. 32). The ALJ

concluded that Claimant retained the RFC to perform light work. Specifically,

the ALJ found that Claimant can occasionally perform postural maneuvers but

can never climb, ropes, ladder, or scaffolds. Claimant must avoid concentrated

pulmonary irritants. The ALJ also opined that Claimant can only understand,

remember, and perform unskilled, one-to-three step instructions and tasks with

a GED reasoning of “1” or “2.” Claimant can adapt to infrequent and well-

explained workplace changes. Additionally, Claimant can only casually and

occasionally interact with coworkers and the general public. Claimant can,

however, concentrate and remain on task for two hours at a time, sufficient to

complete an eight-hour workday. The ALJ lastly found that Claimant must be

afforded an option to sit or stand during the workday, one-to-two minutes at a

time, while remaining on task. (Tr. 37)

After consultation with a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Claimant

could perform the representative jobs of assembler, router, and merchandise

marker. (Tr. 48). As a result, the ALJ found Claimant has not been under a

disability since May 8, 2020, the date the application was filed. (Tr. 48).

Claimant contends that the ALJ did not properly consider and discuss the

medical opinion evidence of the state reviewing physicians and psychiatrists. For

claims filed on or after March 27, 2017, medical opinions are evaluated pursuant

to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c. Under these rules, the ALJ does not

“defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any

medical opinion(s)[.]” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a), 416.920c(a). Instead, the ALJ

evaluates the persuasiveness of all medical opinions and prior administrative

medical findings by considering a list of factors. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b),

416.920c(b). The factors are: (i) supportability, (ii) consistency, (iii) relationship

with the claimant (including length of treatment relationship, frequency of

examinations, purpose and extent of treatment relationship, and examining

relationship), (iv) specialization, and (v) other factors that tend to support or

contradict a medical opinion or prior administrative finding (including, but not

limited to, “evidence showing a medical source has familiarity with the other

evidence in the claim or an understanding of our disability program’s policies

and evidentiary requirements.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c), 416.920c(c).

Generally, the ALJ is not required to explain how the other factors were

considered. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2). However, when the

ALJ finds that two or more medical opinions or prior administrative findings on

the same issue are equally well-supported and consistent with the record but

are not exactly the same, the ALJ must explain how “the other most persuasive

factors in paragraphs (c)(3) through (c)(5)” were considered. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520c(b)(3), 416.920c(b)(3).

Supportability and consistency are the most important factors in

evaluating the persuasiveness of a medical opinion and the ALJ must explain

how both factors were considered. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2),

416.920c(b)(2). The supportability factor examines how well a medical source

supported their own opinion with “objective medical evidence” and “supporting

explanations.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1). The consistency

factor calls for a comparison between the medical opinion and “the evidence from

other medical sources and nonmedical sources” in the record. 20 C.F.R. §§

404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).

An ALJ continues to have the duty to evaluate every medical opinion in

the record regardless of its source. Hamlin v. Barnhart, 365 F.3d 1208, 1215

(10th Cir. 2004). She may not “pick and choose among medical reports, using

portions of evidence favorable to [her] position while ignoring other evidence.”

Hardman v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Haga v.

Astrue, 482 F.3d 1205, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (finding an ALJ “is not entitled to

pick and choose through an uncontradicted medical opinion, taking only the

parts that are favorable to a finding of nondisability”). If she rejects an opinion

completely, the ALJ must give “specific, legitimate reasons” for doing so. Watkins

v. Barnhart, 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted).

Considering first the ALJ’s analysis of the state reviewing psychiatrist’s

opinions, the ALJ found the multiple opinions to be “mostly persuasive” and

“partially supported.” (Tr. 44). The ALJ then followed with the same boilerplate

language she used when considering each of the medical opinions. The ALJ

stated that the “doctors again never personally examined the claimant. However,

these assessments [were] at least somewhat explained. Moreover, these

conclusions [were] broadly consistent with the medical evidence of record.” (Tr.

44). Although, the ALJ did connect some of these assertions to the actual

conclusions and medical records, she then improperly rejects one specific

conclusion. Particularly, the ALJ improperly rejected the findings on social

limitations. Despite the state reviewing physicians, at both levels, finding

limitations in Claimant’s ability to interact with supervisors, the ALJ found these

opinions to be unpersuasive. Initially the state reviewing physician determined

that Claimant could “relate to supervisors . . . on a superficial work basis.” (Tr.

116). On reconsideration, the state reviewing physician opined that Claimant

would work best in a setting with “limited contact with supervisors.” (Tr. 140).

Nonetheless, the ALJ determined these conclusions were unsupported, citing to

instances of normal eye contact and speech throughout the medical record. The

ALJ came to this conclusion in spite of the similar, consistent conclusions offered

by the consultative physicians, who likewise determined Claimant had

limitations in interacting with supervisors. (Tr. 45).

Clearly, an ALJ cannot substitute her own medical opinion for that of a

medical professional. Miller v. Chater, 99 F.3d 972, 977 (10th Cir. 1996). This

Court cannot be assured that the ALJ’s decision was guided by the objective

medical evidence rather than her own personal opinion and medical knowledge.

In rejecting the conclusion consistent through the medical opinions that

Claimant had a limitation in interacting with supervisors, it is clear to this Court

that the ALJ substituted her own medical opinion for that of qualified medical

professionals. On remand, the ALJ shall provide specific, legitimate reasons for

rejecting the medical opinion evidence.

Given that this Court is reversing on the ALJ’s improper consideration of

the medical opinion evidence, it need not address the additional arguments at

this time. However, if the ALJ in properly considering the medical opinion

evidence finds an alternative RFC, the ALJ shall conform her RFC determination

and hypothetical question accordingly.

Conclusion

The decision of the Commissioner is not supported by substantial evidence

and the correct legal standards were not applied. Therefore, the Magistrate Judge

finds for the above and foregoing reasons, the ruling of the Commissioner of

Social Security Administration should be and is REVERSED and the case be

REMANDED for further proceedings.

DATED this 13th day of October, 2023.

________________________________________

JASON A. ROBERTSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE