Brown (Family of the Deceased) v. Montgomery County Sheriff's Office

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

FAMILY OF LAMONTE

BROWN, JR.,

Plaintiff, : Case No. 3:23-cv-182

v. Judge Walter H. Rice

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, : Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry

OHIO, SHERIFF’S DEP’T,

et al.,

Defendants. :

DECISION AND ENTRY GRANTING DEFENDANT MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OHIO,

SHERIFF’S OFFICE’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. #4) AND DEFENDANT WRIGHT

PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE’S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. #7); PLAINTIFF

FAMILY OF LAMONTE BROWN, JR.’S COMPLAINT (DOC. #1-3) IS DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE AS AGAINST THE OFFICE AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS AGAINST

THE BASE; JUDGMENT SHALL ENTER IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST

PLAINTIFF; TERMINATION ENTRY

On June 1, 2023, Dashalahn Brown, as the representative of Plaintiff Family of

LaMonte Brown, Jr., filed a pro se Complaint in the Montgomery County, Ohio, Court of

Common Pleas against Defendants Montgomery County, Ohio, Sheriffs Office

(“Office”)' and Wright-Patterson Air Force Base Sensors Directorate AFRL RYZC &

RYZT (“Base”). In the section of the Complaint titled “What do you want from the

Court?[,]” Plaintiff wrote: “To perform a the [sic] investigation into the coverup pertaining

to the deceased Lamonte Brown Jr. dob 10/16/76 — 11/25/18[.]” In the section titled

1 Incorrectly named as “Montgomery County Sheriffs Dept.” (Doc. #1-3, PAGEID 14).

“What do you want to happen?[,]” Plaintiff wrote: “Our family is seeking justice[.]” (Doc.

#1-3, PAGEID 14). The Base removed the case to this Court on June 28, 2023.

(Notice of Removal, Doc. #1). On July 7, 2023, the Office filed a Motion to Dismiss for

Failure to State a Claim (“12(b)(6) Motion”) (Doc. #4), and on July 31, 2023, the Base

filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction (“12(b){1) Motion”).

(Doc. #7). The Court notified Plaintiff of the 12(b)(6) Motion and 12(b)(1) Motion on July

7 and August 1, 2023, respectively. (Notices, Docs. #5, 8). Plaintiff did not file any

memorandum contra or otherwise respond to the Motions, and the time for doing so has

passed. For the reasons set forth below, both Motions are SUSTAINED.

I. Legal Standards

A. — Rule 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that a complaint must contain “a

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The

complaint must provide the defendant with “fair notice of what the .. . claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

Rule 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal of a complaint on the basis

that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The moving party “has

the burden of showing that the [opposing party] has failed to adequately state a claim

for relief.” DirecTV, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007), citing Carver v.

Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1991). The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to

dismiss “is to allow a defendant to test whether, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is

entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is true.” Mayer v.

Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993). In ruling on the motion, the Court must

“construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its [well-

pleaded] allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.”

Treesh, 487 F.3d at 476.

Nevertheless, to survive a Rule 12(b}(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must

contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570. Unless the facts alleged show that the plaintiffs claim crosses “the line

from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.” /d. Although this

standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does require more than

“labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action

will not do.” /d. at 555. “Rule 8... does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff

armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79

(2009). Legal conclusions “must be supported by well-pleaded factual allegations” that

“plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” /d. at 679.

“Pro se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams v.

Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Nonetheless, “pro se plaintiffs must still satisfy basic pleading requirements, and courts

are not compelled to conjure up facts to support conclusory allegations.” Curry v. City

of Dayton, 915 F. Supp. 2d 901, 903 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (Newman, Mag. J.) (citing Wells

v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); Clark v. Johnson, 413 F. App’x 804, 817

(6th Cir. 2011)).

B. Rule 12(b)(1)

The Base, as a federal government entity, has sovereign immunity from suit

unless that immunity has been expressly waived or abrogated. United States v.

Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980). Any purported waiver will be “strictly construed, in

terms of its scope, in favor of the sovereign.” Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996).

In the 12(b}(1) Motion, the Base asserts that it has not waived sovereign immunity.

(Doc. #7, PAGEID 41). Thus, to avoid dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction,

Plaintiff must show that the Base’s immunity has been waived or abrogated. Reetz v.

United States, 224 F.3d 794, 795 (6th Cir. 2000).

As the challenge in the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion is purely legal, the Base has raised

a “facial attack” on the Court's jurisdiction. In evaluating such a challenge, this Court

“takes the allegations in the complaint as true, which is a similar safeguard employed

under [Rule] 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss.” Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922

F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990).

Hl. Analysis

A. 12(b)(1) Motion

The Base argues that, as an agency of the United States government, it has

sovereign immunity, and that that immunity has not been expressly waived or

abrogated. (Doc. #7, PAGEID 41). The Base is correct. First, this Court is unaware of

any abrogation or waiver that would apply here. Second, despite receiving notice,

Plaintiff did not file a memorandum contra the Rule 12(b)(1) Motion, and nowhere in the

Complaint did he identify the abrogation or waiver of sovereign immunity that would

subject the Base to suit. Indeed, Plaintiffs Complaint underscores why the Base is

immune. Plaintiff accuses the Base and the Office of engaging in a cover-up with

respect to the death of Lamonte Brown. (Doc. #1-3, PAGEID 14). Plaintiffs claim, as

best the Court can decipher, sounds as an intentional tort. Yet, most intentional torts

are excepted from the waiver of sovereign immunity contained in the Federal Tort

Claims Act of 1946. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). Also, more generally, immunity is waived

only with respect to torts committed by United States government employees and

representatives while acting within the scope of their respective employments. 28

U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). Nowhere in the Complaint does Plaintiff identify the decedent's

connection to the Base, or any Base employee at all, much less that an employee was

involved in the cover-up and was acting within the scope of his or her employment in

doing so.

As stated above, waivers of sovereign immunity must be narrow, explicit, and

unequivocal. The allegations in Plaintiffs Complaint fall well short of that exacting

standard, and the Base may not be sued based on the facts contained therein.

Consequently, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiffs claims

against the Base, and the Complaint must be dismissed as against it.

B. Rule 12(b)(6) Motion

The Office argues that “having no capacity to be sued, [it] is not a property [sic]

party to this action. It is well settled that a county sheriff's office is not sui juris.” The

Office also notes that this Court has also recognized that the Office, as a division of

Montgomery County, is not an entity capable of being sued. (Doc. #4, PAGEID 34,

quoting Elam v. Montgomery Cnty., 573 F. Supp. 797, 804 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (Rice, J.);

citing Rhodes v. McDannel, 945 F.2d 117, 120 (6th Cir. 1991)). The Office also claims

that the Complaint should be dismissed because it is so lacking in factual allegations

that the Office is not on notice of the claims against it. (/d. at PAGEID 34-35, citing

FED.R.CWV.P. 8). The Office is correct in both regards. If Plaintiff was seeking to hold

the Office liable for actions taken by its employees, then he needed to name

Montgomery County itself as a defendant and put Montgomery County on notice of what

Office employees did to cover up Lamonte Brown’s death. Plaintiff did neither of those

things, meaning that dismissal with prejudice is proper. See, e.g., Carmichael v. City of

Cleveland, 571 F. App’x 426, 435 (6th Cir. 2014), citing Carmichael v. City of Cleveland,

881 F. Supp. 2d 833, 841-42 (N.D. Ohio 2012) (affirming dismissal of a county sheriffs

office under Rule 12(b)(6) on the grounds that the office is not sui juris).

Cc. Amendment would be futile

This Court has broad discretion as to whether to grant leave to amend a

complaint that is dismissed at the Rule 12 stage. /slamic Ctr. of Nashville v.

Tennessee, 872 F.3d 377, 387 (6th Cir. 2017), quoting Sinay v. Lamson & Sessions

Co., 948 F.2d 1037, 1041-42 (6th Cir. 1991). Further, “[nJo abuse of discretion occurs

when a district court denies a party leave to amend where such leave was never

sought.” Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff has not sought leave to amend, and the Court concludes that an amended

complaint would not survive renewed motions to dismiss. Sinay, 872 F.3d at 387.

There is no circumstance under which the Office could be a proper party to suit, and the

Court is unaware of any exception to the Base’s broad entitlement to sovereign

immunity. Moreover, from the bare assertions alleged in the Complaint, the Court

cannot conceive of how or against whom Plaintiff could fashion a plausible claim for

relief. Accordingly, Plaintiff will not be granted leave to amend.

lil. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the 12(b)(6) Motion of the Office (Doc. #4) and the

12(b)(1) Motion of the Base (Doc. #7) are SUSTAINED. Plaintiff's Complaint is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as to the Office and DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE as to the Base. Judgment shall enter in favor of Defendants and against

Plaintiff.

The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of

the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at

Dayton.

IT |S SO ORDERED.

Ly abt YP) VY

WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE

January 18, 2024 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT