John and Jane Doe 1 v. Springboro Community City School District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JOHN AND JANE DOE 1, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. 1:19-cv-785

v.

JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

SPRINGBORO COMMUNITY

CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

The allegations in this case are disturbing, to say the least. Plaintiffs, parents

of female first-grade students who attended Clearcreek Elementary School during

the 2018–2019 school year, allege that one of the defendants, physical education

teacher John Austin Hopkins, engaged in repeated patterns of sexual contact with

his students (including their children) during his physical education classes. (Third

Am. Compl., Doc. 35, #199–201).1 The parents sued Hopkins and school

administration officials, raising claims under federal and state law. Hopkins moves

to dismiss, arguing that the parents’ allegations are conclusory and insufficient to

plausibly allege their claims. (See generally Doc. 57). For the reasons discussed below,

the Court DENIES Hopkins’s motion.

1 As the Third Amended Complaint is the active complaint in this action, the Opinion refers

to it simply as the Complaint.

BACKGROUND

The parents allege2 that Hopkins began working for Clearcreek Elementary

during the 2017-2018 school year as a long-term substitute physical education

teacher. (Doc. 35, #200). He was then hired permanently for the position during the

2018-2019 school year, allegedly assisted during the hiring process by his

“relationships with teachers and former administration of Springboro.” (Id.). During

that second school year, with the knowledge of school administration, Hopkins kept

the door to the gymnasium locked during his classes, preventing any other adult from

spontaneously walking in. (Id.). He even installed a doorbell on the exterior of the

gymnasium door so that he would be alerted any time any school personnel wanted

to access the gymnasium. (Id.).

It was presumably3 during these classes that Hopkins, according to the

parents, engaged in “sexual contact,” as that term is defined in Ohio Revised Code

§ 2907.01(B) with several female students. (Id. at #201). That statute defines sexual

contact as “any touching of an erogenous zone of another, including without limitation

the thigh, genitals, buttock, pubic region, or, if the person is a female, a breast, for

the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying either person.” Ohio Rev. Code

2 As this matter comes before the Court on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the

well-pleaded allegations in the Complaint as true. Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,

528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). But in reporting the background here based on those

allegations, the Court reminds the reader that they are just that—allegations.

3 The Complaint does not explicitly allege that Hopkins engaged in the sexual contact during

his physical education classes. But the parents allege that security camera footage exists

depicting the contact, leading the Court to infer that the contact occurred during his classes.

(Doc. 35, #202).

§ 2907.01(B). And this allegation is not bald conjecture. The parents state that on

June 17, 2019, Hopkins was criminally indicted on 36 counts of gross sexual

imposition for the same conduct. (Doc. 35, #201). That case eventually went to trial,

where Hopkins was found guilty on 34 counts and was sentenced to an aggregate

prison term of 96 months. Ohio v. Hopkins, No. 19CR35620 (Warren Cnty. Ct.

Common Pleas June 10, 2020).4 In other words, the jury concluded that the state had

proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the activity alleged in those 34 counts

occurred, and that conduct was sufficiently serious that the judge concluded that a

term of 96 months incarceration was appropriate.

After Hopkins’s conduct came to light, the parents sued the Springboro

Community City School District Board of Education;5 the Clearcreek Elementary

superintendent and the Clearcreek Elementary school principal, (School

Administration Defendants); and Hopkins. (Doc. 35, #199–200). They initially

brought five substantive claims6: (1) a claim under Title IX of the Education

Amendments Act of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (against all defendants in their official

capacities); (2) a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, via 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 (against all defendants); (3) a claim under Ohio’s mandatory reporting statute,

4 The Complaint only references the indictment, but the Court takes judicial notice of

Hopkins’s criminal conviction and sentence. The documents for that criminal case are not

accessible online, so the Court procured copies directly from the clerk of the Warren County

Court of Common Pleas.

5 The parents initially sued the school district itself, (Doc. 1, #3), but amended their complaint

to substitute the Board of Education in its place.

6 The sixth claim, which seeks injunctive relief against the school district, is not a standalone

claim but a form of relief. (Doc. 35, #207–08).

Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.421 (against the principal only); (4) civil claims for assault and

battery7 under Ohio law (against Hopkins); and (5) an intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim under Ohio law (also against Hopkins). (Id. at #202–07).

Now, after settling their claims with the school administration defendants, (see

Stipulated Dismissal with Prejudice, Doc. 61), the parents maintain only their

individual claims against Hopkins. (See Doc. 59, #400 (refraining from seeking Title

IX relief against Hopkins individually)). Hopkins has moved to dismiss the claims

against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the parents

fail to allege specific non-conclusory facts from which this Court could reasonably

infer that he is liable. (See generally Doc. 57). The parents responded, (Doc. 59),

Hopkins replied, (Doc. 60), and the motion is now ripe for review.

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

a plaintiff must allege “sufficient factual matter … to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). While

a “plausible” claim for relief does not require a showing of probable liability, it

requires more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id..

The complaint must allege sufficient facts to allow the Court to “draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable.” Id. At the motion-to-dismiss stage, the Court

accepts the facts of the Complaint as true. Id. But that does not mean the Court must

take everything a plaintiff alleges at face value, no matter how unsupported. The

7 Which in actuality are two different claims but are listed together in the Complaint.

Court may disregard “naked assertions” of fact or “formulaic recitation[s] of the

elements of a cause of action.” Id. (cleaned up).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Hopkins maintains that the parents’ complaint is full of vague and thread-bare

allegations and thus fails to state a claim for relief. (Doc. 57, #372). While the Court

agrees the Complaint is short on details, the Court nonetheless finds the parents’

claims plausible enough to proceed to discovery.

Before evaluating the plausibility of the parents’ claims, the Court notes that

some are not asserted against Hopkins. The parents’ response clarifies that

“[b]ecause Hopkins has no capacity to act on behalf of Springboro,” they do not assert

a Title IX claim against him individually. (Doc. 59, #400). And as to the mandatory-

reporting claim, that claim was only ever asserted against the Clearcreek Elementary

principal. For the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the parents’ response also makes

clear that their suit against Hopkins is only against him individually at this point.

(Id. at #400–01). So the current claims against Hopkins include (1) an individual-

capacity Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, (2) civil assault and

battery claims, and (3) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

A. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

To allege a plausible claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that

(1) she was “deprived of a right secured by the Constitution”, and (2) “such

deprivation occurred under color of state law.” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., ex rel.Claiborne

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 495, 511 (6th Cir. 1996). As a public-school teacher,

Hopkins does not argue that he was not acting under color of state law. Rather, he

disputes that the parents have plausibly alleged that he deprived the children of a

right secured by the Constitution.

“It is undisputed that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

protects the right of a child to be free from sexual abuse inflicted by a public school

employee or teacher.” Doe v. Warren Consol. Schs., 93 F. App’x 812, 818 (6th Cir.

2004). Furthermore, “sexual abuse under color of law is so contrary to fundamental

notions of liberty and so lacking of any redeeming social value, that no rational

individual could believe that sexual abuse by a state actor is constitutionally

permissible under the Due Process Clause.” Doe ex rel. Doe v. City of Roseville, 296

F.3d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 2002) (cleaned up). When evaluating whether actions

constitute “sexual abuse” in violation of the Due Process Clause, the Court asks

whether the abuse of power effectuated by the official is so offensive and indefensible

as to “shock[] the conscience” of the Court. Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76

F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir. 1996).

In Lillard, the court applied the “shocks the conscience” standard when

evaluating whether a teacher who rubbed a student’s stomach and made a suggestive

comment violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 726. The court held that while the

teacher’s conduct was “wholly inappropriate,” it did not shock the conscience. Id. The

court specifically noted that the teacher’s conduct amounted to a “single, isolated

incident.” Id.

Contrast Lillard with Doe v. Claiborne County. In the latter case, the teacher,

who doubled as the basketball coach, abused a 14-year-old female student who was a

scorekeeper for the basketball team. 103 F.3d at 500–01. The teacher fondled her

breasts, called her at home, and eventually engaged in sexual intercourse with her.

Id. at 501. The court held that the student’s right to bodily integrity, including her

right to be free from the sexual abuse of a teacher, was violated by the teacher’s

actions. Id. at 507.

Perhaps the most relevant sexual abuse case is Doe v. Warren Consolidated

Schools. In that case, the teacher sexually molested several female students in his

class. 93 F. App’x at 814. The court did not specify what actions constituted

molestation but noted that the teacher had pleaded no contest to charges of Fourth

Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct, a misdemeanor in Michigan. Id. That statute can

be violated in many ways, one of which is sexual contact between a public-school

teacher and student. Mich. Penal Code § 750.520e. “Sexual contact,” under that

Michigan statute, was defined as:

[T]he intentional touching of the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts or the

intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the

victim’s or actor’s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can

reasonably be construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or

gratification, done for a sexual purpose, or in a sexual manner.

Mich. Penal Code § 750.520a. The Warren Consolidated Schools court, relying on

Claiborne County, denied qualified immunity to one of the school administrators

responsible for the teacher’s placement which, necessarily, meant that the teacher’s

actions violated the Constitution. Warren Consol. Schs., 93 F. App’x at 821–23.

Applying Warren Consolidated Schools here, the Court finds that the parents’

claims plausibly allege a constitutional violation. The Complaint’s allegation that

Hopkins engaged in “sexual contact” as defined in Ohio Revised Code § 2907.01(B) is

certainly light on details and, absent more, would perhaps constitute the kind of bare

legal conclusion that receives no weight under the Iqbal/Twombly framework. But

here a jury of Hopkins’s peers determined that he committed the elements of that

crime. Given the jury’s factual determination in the related criminal matter, the

Court must reasonably infer from the Complaint that Hopkins touched the erogenous

zone of school-aged girls for the purpose of sexual gratification. Ohio Rev. Code

§ 2907.01(B). That makes Hopkins’s conduct here virtually indistinguishable from

the teacher’s conduct in Warren Consolidated Schools, both as to level of specificity

and the severity of the conduct. Thus, the Court finds that the parents have plausibly

alleged that Hopkins violated the constitutional rights of his students.

Hopkins resists this conclusion, arguing that he is entitled to qualified

immunity, which means that the parents must “allege with particularity” Hopkins’s

conduct. (Doc. 57, #378 (citing Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 518

(6th Cir. 2016))). And because the parents do not particularly allege what Hopkins

did to his students, Hopkins argues he is entitled to a dismissal of the claims on

qualified immunity grounds. (Id. at #382).

Two thoughts. First, the Court notes that the Sixth Circuit has held that

qualified immunity disputes are “more appropriately dealt with at the summary-

judgment stage or at trial,” rather than at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Mills v.

Barnard, 869 F.3d 473, 487 (6th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases); Wesley v. Campbell, 779

F.3d 421, 433–34 (6th Cir. 2015). That is because qualified immunity, an immunity

that often turns on the specific facts of each case, is difficult to adjudicate before

discovery. Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted Village Sch. Dist.,

428 F.3d 223, 235 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, C.J., concurring).

But, second, even assuming the doctrine applies at this stage, it does not

impose any “heightened pleading requirement.” Courtright, 839 F.3d at 518 (cleaned

up). Plaintiffs need only plausibly allege a violation of a clearly established

constitutional right. Id. And when determining whether plaintiffs have done so, the

Court still must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id.

As illustrated by the discussion of Doe v. Warren Consolidated Schools above,

the parents have plausibly alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional

right. Warren Consolidated Schools clearly establishes that criminal sexual

molestation, in the form of touching young students in intimate areas for the purpose

of sexual gratification, violates the Constitution. 93 F. App’x at 814. The parents

allege that Hopkins engaged in “sexual contact” with the victims, as defined in Ohio

Revised Code § 2907.01(B). (Doc. 35, #201). The term is statutorily defined as

touching the “erogenous zone” of another for the purpose of sexual gratification. Even

if the statute is ambiguous and could cover conduct not as egregious as the conduct

in Doe, the Court must draw any reasonable inferences in favor of the parents. The

Court finds that it is reasonable to infer, especially given that Hopkins is serving an

eight-year sentence for criminally touching school-aged girls, that his conduct falls

on the clearly established side of the Warren Consolidated Schools line.

All in all, the parents have plausibly alleged that Hopkins violated a clearly

established constitutional right, so the Court will allow this claim to go forward.

B. Civil Assault and Battery

The next “claim” is actually two claims lumped together. Parents allege that

Hopkins committed two Ohio torts—assault and battery—when he touched his

students. Civil assault under Ohio law is the “intentional offer or attempt, without

authority or consent, to harm or offensively touch another that reasonably places the

other in fear of such contact.” Hopkins v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 2008-Ohio-1515,

¶ 29 (10th Dist.) (cleaned up). Civil assault requires intent—that is that the alleged

tortfeasor must know “with substantial certainty that his or her act would bring

about harmful or offensive contact.” Id. (cleaned up). Civil battery, on the other hand,

involves more than just an offer or attempt to touch another. Battery requires an

actual harmful or offensive contact by another who intends to cause that harmful or

offensive contact. Gerber v. Veltri, 203 F. Supp. 3d 846, 851 (N.D. Ohio 2016).

The parents have plausibly alleged that Hopkins committed both assault and

battery. Start with battery. The parents allege that Hopkins violated Ohio Revised

Code §–2907.01(B), which means he (1) actually touched his students in an erogenous

zone (2) for the purpose of sexual gratification. Touching a school-aged child in an

erogenous for the purpose of sexual gratification is highly offensive to a reasonable

person. Furthermore, because the parents allege (and a jury has found) that Hopkins

touched the students for a particular purpose (sexual gratification), by definition the

touching must have been intentional.

Proving battery typically proves assault as well. But to the extent that a

creative mind could come up with scenarios where the students were not put in

apprehension of contact but were nevertheless offensively touched by Hopkins (say,

using the element of surprise), the Court must draw reasonable inferences in favor of

the parents. The Court infers that if Hopkins touched several students in erogenous

zones he plausibly put those students in reasonable apprehension of that contact—

thus plausibly committing civil assault.

Hopkins contends that the parents only offer legal conclusions—that he

“assaulted and committed battery against the Child Victim[s].” (Doc. 57, #384). But

the Complaint incorporated its prior allegations when pleading the assault and

battery claims, including that Hopkins engaged in “sexual contact” with his students

under Ohio Revised Code § 2907.01(B). (Doc. 35, #201, 206). And for the reasons

above, given the jury verdict in the related criminal matter, that allegation is

sufficient to plausibly make out claims for civil assault and battery.

Because the parents have plausibly alleged civil assault and battery claims

against Hopkins, the Court will allow those claims to go forward.

C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To allege a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the parents

must allege:

(1) the defendant intended to cause, or knew or should have known that

his actions would result in serious emotional distress; (2) the defendant’s

conduct was so extreme and outrageous that it went beyond all possible

bounds of decency and can be considered completely intolerable in a

civilized community; (3) the defendant’s actions proximately caused

psychological injury to the plaintiff; and (4) the plaintiff suffered serious

mental anguish of a nature no reasonable person could be expected to

endure.

Marconi v. Savage, 2013-Ohio-3805, ¶ 28 (8th Dist.).

The parents have plausibly alleged that Hopkins intentionally caused

emotional distress to his students. First, it is obvious that sexually molesting school-

aged girls is beyond any bounds of decency. Society views this conduct as deplorable,

which is why it is a crime. Second, any reasonable person should know that sexually

molesting children would cause them extreme mental anguish. The Court finds that

Hopkins plausibly knew or should have known his actions would have caused

emotional distress. Third, the parents allege that their children suffered severe

emotional distress as a result of Hopkins’s conduct and the Court finds that sexual

molestation could plausibly cause such distress.

Hopkins counters that the Complaint fails to allege his intent. (Doc. 57, #386–

87). And the parents’ response, that they are subject to Ohio’s notice-pleading

standard rather than Rule 8’s plausibility requirement, misapprehends basic civil

procedure law. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470–71 (1965) (federal courts

apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure even in diversity cases). Still, the Court

finds that the parents have plausibly alleged intent. Their incorporation of Ohio

Revised Code § 2907.01(B), coupled with the jury verdict that Hopkins’ conduct falls

within that statutory definition, means that they have alleged that Hopkins touched

his students’ erogenous zones “for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying

either person.” Inherent in the incorporation of this provision is the allegation that

Hopkins’s conduct was intentional. One cannot do something unintentionally and yet

for a purpose at the same time. And because the parents have plausibly alleged that

Hopkins touched the students intentionally, the Court reasonably infers that he knew

or should have known his conduct would cause severe emotional distress.

Because the parents have plausibly alleged an intentional infliction of

emotional distress claim, the Court will allow this claim to go forward.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Hopkins’s motion to dismiss

(Doc. 57).

SO ORDERED.

January 17, 2024

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE