“[F]ictitious names are allowed when necessary to protect the privacy of . . . rape victims, and other particularly vulnerable parties or witnesses.”
How later courts described this case
- “[F]ictitious names are allowed when necessary to protect the privacy of . . . rape victims, and other particularly vulnerable parties or witnesses.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JANE DOE, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v. Civil Action 2:23-cv-02704
Judge Edmund A. Sargus
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
TEAYS VALLEY LOCAL SCHOOL
BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Permission to Proceed Under
Pseudonym. (Doc. 2). For the following reasons, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs, Jane Doe, individually and on behalf of her son, John Doe, initiated the present
action by filing a Complaint on August 23, 2023. (Doc. 1). In short, Plaintiffs allege that Teays
Valley school officials disregarded the grooming, sexual harassment, and rape of minor Plaintiff,
John Doe. (Id., ¶ 1). Plaintiffs bring the present Motion to proceed anonymously throughout this
litigation. (Doc. 2). Defendants do not oppose Plaintiffs’ Motion, and it is therefore ripe for
consideration.
II. STANDARD
Generally, a complaint must state the names of all the parties. Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). Yet,
the Court “may excuse [parties] from identifying themselves in certain circumstances.” Doe v.
Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004). “In exercising its discretion, a court must balance the
public’s common law right of access to court proceedings against the interests of litigants in
nondisclosure.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 2:15-CV-2519, 2015 WL 12698036, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 26, 2015) (citing In re Polemar Constr. Ltd. P’ship, 23 F. App’x. 423, 425 (6th Cir.
2001). To determine whether a party’s privacy interests outweigh the presumption in favor of
openness, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has identified factors to
consider, including:
(1) whether the [party] seeking anonymity [is] suing to challenge governmental
activity; (2) whether prosecution of the suit will compel the [party] to disclose
information ‘of the utmost intimacy’; (3) whether the litigation compels [a party]
to disclose an intention to violate the law, thereby risking criminal prosecution; and
(4) whether the [party is a child].
Porter, 370 F.3d at 560 (citing Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185-86 (5th Cir. 1981)).
III. DISCUSSION
According to Plaintiffs, John Doe has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the
presumption of disclosure. (Doc. 2). And, by extension, “as the mother of John Doe, the disclosure
of Jane Doe’s identity will compromise the privacy of John Doe.” (Id. at 2). The Court agrees.
Under the first Porter factor, this suit challenges governmental activity. In the Complaint,
Plaintiffs name the Teays Valley Board of Education as the principal Defendant. (See Doc. 1).
The application of the second factor—whether this litigation will disclose information of
the utmost intimacy—also favors Plaintiffs’ request. This factor is typically invoked in cases
involving sexual assault. Nationally, courts have routinely found that the privacy interests of
alleged sexual assault victims outweigh the presumption in favor of openness. See Doe v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[F]ictitious names
are allowed when necessary to protect the privacy of . . . rape victims, and other particularly
vulnerable parties or witnesses.”); K.S. v. Detroit Pub. Sch., No. 14-12214, 2015 WL 13358204,
at *3 (E.D. Mich. July 22, 2015) (allowing alleged sexual assault victim to proceed anonymously).
According to Plaintiffs, given the nature of their claims, John Doe “will be forced to
discuss details involving multiple instances of [one of the Defendants] grooming him, engaging in
sexually charged conduct towards him, and raping him.” (Doc. 2 at 6). The Court agrees that the
litigation implicates information of the utmost intimacy.
Finally, John Doe is a minor. (Id. at 2). This is another compelling reason to allow
Plaintiffs to proceed anonymously. Doe v. Mechanicsburg Sch. Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 3d
1024, 1027 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (“Courts frequently grant protective orders to minors who challenge
governmental conduct.”). Given the weight of the factors, the balance of the litigants’ interests in
nondisclosure outweighs the public’s right to access court proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Permission to Proceed Under Pseudonym
(Doc. 2) is GRANTED.
Date: October 3, 2023 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE