Campbell v. Riahi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

CRISTI CAMPBELL,

ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE

ESTATE OF BRYANA BAKER,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:20-cv-678

v. JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE

APRIL RIAHI, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Tragedy struck at Butler County Jail on September 25, 2018. Bryana Baker,

an inmate there, hanged herself while locked alone in a cell. She’d recently come off

suicide watch and, like nearly all of the inmates at the facility, had not been cleared

for single celling. But she and her cellmate fought. Fearing for their safety, a jail

guard put them in separate cells for a few minutes while seeking help. That’s when

Baker died by suicide. It was a horrifying chain of events for all involved. Cristi

Campbell, Baker’s mother and the administratrix of her estate, claims the tragedy

was preventable. She has sued:

• April Riahi, the jail guard,

• Richard Jones, Sheriff of Butler County,

• the Butler County Board of Commissioners,

• and Butler County itself.

Defendants have now moved for summary judgment. (Doc. 35). Based on its review

of the record, the Court concludes that, while Baker suffered a senseless death,

Campbell cannot show her jailers bear responsibility for it. So the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 35) and DISMISSES her

Complaint (Doc. 1) WITH PREJUDICE. In addition, the Court DENIES AS MOOT

Campbell’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 49).1

BACKGROUND

As is often the case with people who die by suicide, Baker led an unreasonably

hard life. She had a drug addiction problem that ceaselessly hounded her. (Doc. 23–

2, #814–19; Doc. 46-1, #2792–93). Over time, she drifted from addiction to other

criminal behavior, either resulting from or supporting that addiction. (Doc. 23–2,

#814–19). On September 19, 2018, she once again found herself in jail. (Doc. 46-1,

#2790). This time it was for failing to appear for an arraignment in an assault case.

(Id. at #2790–91). Perhaps unsurprisingly given her addiction issues, she was also

charged with drug possession on the day she was booked. (Id. at #2791).

She was originally detained at the Butler County Jail’s Main facility. (Id. at

#2790). But on the evening of her arrest, she was transferred to the “Court Street”

location. (Id. at #2791). That didn’t last long. While there, she began experiencing

withdrawal symptoms and became disruptive. (Id.). So the next morning, jail

personnel transferred her back to the Main Jail. (Id.). During transport to the Main

1 Based on the Court’s review of Defendants’ opening brief in support of the Motion for

Summary Judgment and Campbell’s opposition, the merits appeared to favor Defendants. So

the Court largely avoided relying on their reply, which is the brief that Campbell moves to

strike. When the Court did rely on the reply, it also considered Campbell’s proposed sur-reply

(which she tendered as an alternative to her request to strike). But note that the Court does

not suggest anything about the merits of Campbell’s Motion to Strike. It simply did not affect

the outcome. Thus, the issue is moot.

Jail, Baker briefly escaped into the Court Street parking lot. (McIlvaine Dep., Doc.

22, #630). Upon recapture, a forensic report was prepared that noted her escape

attempt and revealed she was going through withdrawal from methadone, heroin,

and alcohol. (Doc. 23–2, #782).

When Baker arrived back at the “Main Jail” facility, Becky Brown, a licensed

social worker, completed a forensic intake examination. (Doc. 46-1, #2792). Brown

concluded that Baker was going through withdrawal but that she was not suicidal.

(Id. at #2792–93). Nonetheless, corrections officers decided to place her on “suicide

watch” because of the erratic behavior she had displayed in attempting escape. (Doc.

23–2, #782).

While on suicide watch, Baker was housed in a glass cell in the intake area,

and officers checked on her every ten minutes. (Doc. 24-2, #1100–04; Brown Dep.,

Doc. 27, #1710). Brown reassessed Baker the next day, September 21, and concluded

that she continued to experience withdrawal and was a “medium” suicide risk. (Doc.

26-2, #1610). Brown also concluded that she should remain on watch. (Id.). The next

day, Baker’s condition and her conduct worsened, ultimately resulting in officers

placing her in a restraint chair for two hours. (Doc. 22, #629–30). Brown again

examined her and concluded she should remain on suicide watch, with another

assessment in 24 hours. (Doc. 26-2, #1608–09). Another social worker, Michelle

Reimer, reached the same conclusion the following day. (Id. at #1607–08).

Things changed, though, on September 24. Lead Social Worker Christina

Dingledine arrived to find the withdrawal symptoms were abating. (Id. at #1606).

Baker reported that she was feeling “better overall” and that she had identified

coping skills for her anxiety. (Id.). Based on Dingledine’s evaluation of Baker,

Dingledine determined that Baker was a low risk of suicide and released her from

suicide watch. (Id.). That said, Dingledine noted that Baker was not cleared for a

single cell, due to residual concerns about suicide or self-harm. (Id.). That did not

make Baker unique. The general rule at Butler County Jail is that inmates are not

cleared for single-cell placement. (Adams 1/28/22 Dep., Doc. 24, #1062). And any time

an officer is going to place an inmate in a single-cell placement, the officer must first

obtain express approval from Forensics. (Id. at #973). That is because it is generally

understood that single-cell placements may give rise to opportunities for self-harm.

(Baughman Dep., Doc. 21, #343–44; Dingledine Dep., Doc. 26, #1570–71).

Once she was removed from the suicide watch cell, Baker was placed in

isolation housing (the step before general population) in a cell with Rosanna Herbert.

(Doc. 21, #363, 367). Herbert was the only other female inmate in isolation housing,

and thus was the only potential cellmate for Baker so long as she remained in

isolation. (Opp’n, Doc. 46, #2748).

On the next morning, September 25, Riahi was working. Baker went to court

in the morning. Upon her return, Herbert went to court. (Id. at #2749; Doc. 21, #385).

That left Baker alone in her cell with the door open. During the afternoon, Riahi

conducted observation rounds and established a playful, joking rapport with Baker.2

2 Campbell denies these details as “an[] after-the-fact attempt … to characterize Riahi’s

interactions with [Baker] as polite or friendly.” (Doc.46-1, #2814–16). But Campbell fails to

identify “specific facts” that refute Riahi’s account of what transpired during her afternoon

(Doc. 21, #379–80). Things took a turn when Herbert arrived back from court. Baker

buzzed Riahi on the intercom and claimed that Herbert was assaulting her. (Id. at

#414–15). When Riahi investigated, both women were yelling at each other and

calling the other crazy.

After consulting her supervisor, Riahi moved Herbert to a single cell next door

but kept both doors open. (Id. at #422; Doc. 23-2, #783). The fighting continued.

Herbert apparently returned to her former cell and assaulted Baker and then fled to

her new cell. (Doc. 21, #422–23, 425). Riahi again called her supervisor, while Baker

allegedly assaulted other inmates and then went over to Herbert’s new cell to return

the favor. (Id. at #423–24, 429). They continued to brawl, so Riahi temporarily shut

the cell doors after separating them “to stop the threat.” (Id. at #429–30). Meanwhile,

she continued to speak to her supervisor to find an appropriate resolution. (Id. at

#428–30, 441). Within ten to fifteen minutes after Riahi closed the doors,3 Baker

hanged herself. (Doc. 21, #441–42; Doc. 23-2, #762, 784).

rounds to check in on Baker. Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 912 (6th Cir. 2009).

Campbell’s citation to another inmate’s description of insults Riahi allegedly used against

Baker earlier that day, (Doc. 46, #2749), even if presented at trial in an admissible form—an

issue the Court does not address—fails to create a triable issue of fact. It deals with an

orthogonal issue: whether Riahi insulted Baker speaks to Riahi’s personal opinion of her—

not to what their interactions later in the day entailed. Thus, Campbell does not create more

than a “metaphysical doubt” as to what occurred during Riahi’s interactions with Baker on

the afternoon of September 25. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586.

3 While the parties dispute the exact time frame, (Doc. 46-1 ¶ 162, #2824–25), Plaintiff admits

that Riahi closed the doors “at approximately 5:00 p.m.,” (Id. ¶ 156, at #2823), and that a call

was placed to the prison investigator “at approximately 5:10 p.m.” to notify him of the

hanging and to order him to begin an investigation, (Id. ¶ 188, at #2828). And Plaintiff fails

to identify evidence that contradicts the notation in the prison’s investigative report that

Riahi was notified of Baker’s death at “5:13 p.m.” (Doc. 23-2, #784). These undisputed facts

demonstrate that Baker had been alone in her cell for approximately ten to fifteen minutes

before hanging herself.

Baker’s mother sued all the Defendants under § 1983 and Riahi and the Sheriff

alone under state law. Her federal claims consist of deliberate indifference claims

against Riahi and the Sheriff, and Monell claims against Butler County and its Board

of Commissioners. Meanwhile, her state-law claims against Riahi and the Sheriff

sound in wrongful death and negligence. Now, Defendants move for summary

judgment, while Campbell moves to strike their reply to her response in opposition.

The motions are ripe for review.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant must establish that there are no

genuine disputes of material fact, which may be accomplished by showing that the

non-moving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of her case. Celotex

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling

Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388–89 (6th Cir. 1993).

But as the Sixth Circuit has explained, “the mere existence of some alleged

factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported

motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of

material fact.” Int’l Outdoor, Inc. v. City of Troy, 974 F.3d 690, 697 (6th Cir. 2020)

(cleaned up) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986)).

In sum, the non-moving party, at this stage, must present some “sufficient

disagreement” that would warrant submission to a jury. See Moore v. Phillip Morris

Cos., Inc., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52). In

making that determination, though, the Court must view the evidence in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith

Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Cox v. Ky. Dep’t of Transp., 53 F.3d 146, 150

(6th Cir. 1995).

LAW AND ANALYSIS

Campbell brings claims under federal and state law. Her federal claims arise

from 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “creates a cause of action against any person who, under

color of state law, deprives ‘any citizen of the United States ... of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.’” Harris v. Olszewski, 442 F.3d

456, 460 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting § 1983). Here, the Court considers several alleged

violations of the Fourteenth Amendment by Baker’s jailers, which can be broken into

two categories: deliberate indifference claims against Riahi and the Sheriff, and

Monell claims against Butler County and its Board of Commissioners. Meanwhile,

she also asserts state-law wrongful death and negligence claims, which she brings

solely against Riahi and the Sheriff. All fail.

A. Deliberate Indifference Claims.

“Pretrial detainees have a right to adequate medical care under the Fourteenth

Amendment. An officer violates that right if that officer shows deliberate indifference

to a pretrial detainee’s serious medical needs.” Hyman v. Lewis, 27 F.4th 1233, 1237

(6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up) (citing City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239,

244 (1983); Greene v. Crawford Cnty., 22 F.4th 593, 605 (6th Cir. 2022)).

But there’s a bit of a problem in analyzing such claims. Since Brawner v. Scott

Cnty., 14 F.4th 585 (6th Cir. 2021), changed the traditional test for deliberate

indifference claims, district courts have faced conflicting guidance from the Sixth

Circuit about the appropriate analytical framework. Sometimes, the Sixth Circuit

says liaiblity arises only when a prison official actually “knew that [the] failure to

respond would pose a serious risk to the pretrial detainee and ignored that risk.” See

Trozzi v. Lake Cnty., 29 F.4th 745, 757–58 (6th Cir. 2022). Other times, the court says

“should [have] known” is enough. Helphenstine v. Lewis Cnty., 60 F.4th 305, 317 (6th

Cir. 2023) (rejecting Trozzi as irreconcilable with Brawner, and finding that Brawner

controls under prior panel rule). Absent clarification,4 the safest course is perhaps to

analyze such claims under both standards, with fingers crossed that they agree.

Thankfully, here, they do. Even under Helphenstine’s more plaintiff-friendly

standard, Campbell’s claims fail. So the Court will explain its decision using that

standard.

Under Helphenstine’s reading of Brawner, the Court must evaluate a claim of

deliberate indifference by asking whether the detainee

1. had a sufficiently serious medical need and

2. each defendant acted deliberately (not accidentally), and also recklessly

in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or

so obvious that it should be known.

4 Recently, the Sixth Circuit decided not to accept the issue for en banc review. Helphenstine

v. Lewis Cnty., 65 F.4th 794 (6th Cir. 2023).

Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 317 (6th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up) (quoting Brawner, 14 F.4th

at 596). The first is often called the objective component, while the second is called

the subjective component. Campbell cannot show either component.

1. Objective Component.

It might seem straightforward that if a woman kills herself, she had some sort

of “serious medical need.” But this first element, which Brawner and its progeny did

not alter,5 is a bit more nuanced than that. A “medical need [is] sufficiently serious”

if the plaintiff can show that “the conditions of incarceration imposed a ‘substantial

risk of serious harm.’”6 Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 482

(6th Cir. 2020) (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803, 812

(6th Cir. 2005)). Of course, suicide constitutes “serious harm.” So “[a] detainee’s

psychological needs may constitute serious medical needs, especially when they

result in suicidal tendencies.” Horn v. Madison Cnty. Fiscal Ct., 22 F.3d 653, 660 (6th

Cir. 1994). But merely showing Baker at one point had suicidal tendencies does not

5 “Brawner left the ‘objectively serious medical need’ prong untouched.” Hyman, 27 F.4th at

1237.

6 The Sixth Circuit has also stated that a “sufficiently serious medical need is one that has

been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a

lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Griffith v. Franklin

Cnty., 975 F.3d 554, 567 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up) (quoting Harrison v. Ash, 539 F.3d 510,

518 (6th Cir. 2008)). But this is not to suggest that all medical conditions requiring treatment

are sufficiently serious. Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d 890, 897–98 (6th Cir. 2004).

“[M]inor maladies or non-obvious complaints of serious need for medical care” cannot support

a deliberate indifference claim unless the plaintiff “place[s] verifying medical evidence in the

record to establish the detrimental effect” of a failure to provide medical care. Id. The key

inquiry underlying this analysis is whether the medical condition from which a detainee

suffers creates a substantial risk that serious injury might manifest and thereby creates a

constitutional obligation to address that risk “to avoid ‘the unnecessary and wanton infliction

of pain.’” Id. at 896 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)).

equate to establishing that Baker had serious medical needs constitutionally

requiring Defendants’ attention at the time of the events at issue. Rather, Campbell

must show facts from which a jury could conclude that at the relevant time, Baker

had “psychological needs [that] manifest[ed] themselves in suicidal tendencies.”

Davis v. Fentress Cnty., 6 F. App’x 243, 249 (6th Cir. 2001). And not just any level of

suicidal tendencies will do. Rather, Campbell must present facts “demonstrat[ing] a

strong likelihood that [s]he w[ould] commit suicide.”7 Bradley v. City of Ferndale, 148

F. App’x 499, 506 (6th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). Campbell cannot do so.

True, following her earlier escape attempt, non-expert jail staff—not the jail’s

expert forensics staff—placed Baker on suicide watch. (Doc. 22, #577–78; Doc. 23-2,

#782). And while on watch she experienced withdrawal, which made her do unusual

things like jump off half walls. (Doc. 27, #1717). That led the jail forensic team to

conclude that she should remain on that suicide watch over each of the next few days.

(Id. at #1716–18). But four days after first being placed on suicide watch, the forensic

team leader (Dingledine) again re-evaluated her. (Doc. 26-2, #1606–07). And

Dingledine concluded that Baker no longer exhibited suicidal tendencies. (Id. at

7 Note that suicidal ideation is unique among medical conditions because it depends on an

intervening cause to manifest—the volitional act of the prisoner to engage in self-harm.

Unlike other symptomology, such as vomiting, bleeding, or the like, which are all involuntary

physiological reactions, the harm arising from suicidal ideation depends on the actor’s own

conduct. But that does not mean that the prisoner’s conduct relieves others of potential

liability—suicidal ideation still reflects the prisoner’s mental condition and is indicative of a

deeper psychological condition that may be serious or obvious enough to require medical care.

Barber v. City of Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 239–40 (6th Cir. 1992) (In the context of a detainee’s

suicide, the objective component asks “whether the decedent showed a strong likelihood that

he would attempt to take his own life in such a manner that failure to take adequate

precautions amounted to deliberate indifference to the decedent’s serious medical needs.”).

For this reason, prison officials are still obliged to manage any suicide risk that gives rise to

a substantial risk that self-harm will manifest absent proper medical care.

#1606). In fact, Dingledine declined to diagnose her with any psychological condition.

(See id. at #1607 (She left the “diagnosis” box empty.)). It’s unsurprising why. Baker

denied “any current suicidal ideation,” “for clear reasons” in Dingledine’s estimation.

(Id. at #1606). Baker reported that “she is no longer withdrawing” and that “she feels

more clear and feels better overall.” (Id.). Based on all of this, Dingledine rated her

risk of suicide “[l]ow” and said she had “no intent or plan” to kill herself. (Id.).

Moreover, this assessment matches Baker’s behavior before and after

Dingledine released her from suicide watch. Baker was friendly and humorous (see,

e.g., Doc. 21, #379–80 (noting Baker “joke[d] back and forth,” “ma[de] [] goofy face[s],”

and “playful[ly] banter[ed]” with Riahi)) and expressed hopefulness about her

situation (see, e.g., Doc. 27-1, #1750 (reporting Baker said that “she has 2 children

that she lives for”)). And although she fought with Herbert, both Dingledine and

another prison social worker, who are experts on assessing suicidal tendencies in the

prison setting, have explained that they do not consider inmate conflict to be a sign

of suicide risk. (See Doc. 26, #1514–15; Doc. 27, #1688–89). Sure, Campbell cites two

prison officials’ deposition testimony in which they testified to their lay opinion that

fighting could suggest a suicide risk. (Rumpler Dep., Doc. 28, #1812; Hurst Dep., Doc.

29, #1942). But here the prison experts who had just interviewed Baker (albeit before

the fighting incident) did not detect suicidal tendencies. In light of that recent

examination, the conflicting evidence between the guards and the licensed

professionals as to what the fighting incident may have meant about Baker’s suicidal

ideations does not create a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to whether Baker

manifested a “strong likelihood” that she would commit suicide. Barber v. City of

Salem, 953 F.2d 232, 238–40 (6th Cir. 1992). And certainly, that conflicting evidence

regarding the implications of such conduct suggests, at the very least, that those

implications were not “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize” them.

Griffith v. Franklin Cnty., 975 F.3d 554, 567 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). In

short, Campbell fails to identify any facts showing that a jury could conclude that the

objective component is met.

Campbell principally counters in two ways. First, she says that, although

Dingledine released Baker from suicide watch, Dingledine also put Baker on a

treatment plan—evoking the language in Griffith that a medical need “diagnosed by

a physician as mandating treatment” is a serious medical need. (Doc. 46, #2758).

But the central problem with that line of argument is that Dingledine did not

diagnose a serious medical need requiring treatment. Indeed, she declined to provide

Baker any diagnosis and rated her suicide risk as “low.” That bill of health is counter

to one that reflects a diagnosis of a serious medical need, or in particular a “strong

likelihood,” Barber, 953 F.2d at 238–40, that a prisoner will commit suicide. True, the

form included a heading labeled “treatment plan” in which Dingledine wrote that

“[c]lient is not cleared single celled.” (Doc. 26-2, #1606). And she testified that Baker

was “not cleared” for a single cell because “of the presence of the ongoing risk of self-

harm or suicide” (though a “[l]ow” one by Dingledine’s own words). (Doc. 26, #1548–

49; Doc. 26-2, #1606). But context is important. The jail offers single-cell clearance to

a very small portion of detainees—it is not the norm there. (Doc. 21, #299, 353; Doc.

24, #972, 1061; Doc. 28, #1824). A “treatment plan” in which a medical professional

calls for a detainee to be treated like nearly every other healthy member of her

community is hardly one that signals a “serious medical need.” Indeed, Dingledine

did not conclude that the risk merited any treatment.8 She did not suggest that Baker

receive further counseling or medication or anything of the sort. Rather, the residual

risk merely meant that Baker should not receive a rare clearance—the ability to

reside in a single cell—that was open to only a fraction of inmates. In short, the

identified “low” residual suicide risk was not an objectively serious medical need.

Second, apart from any such diagnosis, Campbell points to Troutman and other

cases to argue that, on the record here, Baker did exhibit suicidal tendencies.9 Not

so. Take Troutman as an example—it’s the one Campbell spends the most time

discussing. In Troutman, the inmate “attempted suicide three to four times in the

past,” “was currently thinking about suicide,” “had a plan or suicide instrument in

[his] possession,” “showed signs of depression,” “expressed feelings of hopelessness,”

“appeared anxious, afraid, or angry,” and “appeared embarrassed or ashamed.” 979

8 Moreover, it is improper to label Baker’s lack of clearance to be single celled a “treatment

plan.” As Campbell acknowledges, the refusal to clear detainees who were recently on suicide

watch for single celling was a “step-down” policy implemented by the non-expert correctional

staff at Butler County. (Doc. 46, #2739; Doc. 26, #1548–49, 1568–70). Thus, not only was

Baker treated akin to almost the entire prison population, but she was also subject to an

internal prison policy that applied to all detainees in Baker’s situation regardless of any

medical assessment of risk of self-harm—a “low” risk, here. Nothing in how Baker was

treated as an inmate following her removal from suicide watch would have alerted officials—

let alone lay individuals—to the fact that she suffered from a serious medical or psychological

need that manifested in the form of suicidal ideation.

9 Campbell also tries to take a list of factors used in Troutman, created by the expert in that

case, and apply them here. But Troutman does not suggest that those factors necessarily

dictate whether someone exhibits suicidal tendencies that rise to the level of a “serious

medical need” in other cases.

F.3d at 477–78. And the plaintiff there—the inmate’s daughter—called to report her

father’s brain injury and, when calling him, was concerned by his crying. Id. at 478.

This case is very different. Baker did not have a history of suicide attempts.

She did not have a plan or intent to commit suicide, according to Dingledine. She

showed signs of hopefulness, was friendly, and showed little agitation besides her

roommate troubles. And unlike in Troutman, at the relevant time, Baker’s mother

expressed similar views to those of the experts—that Baker was fine. (See Campbell

Dep., Doc. 31, #2180 (Campbell phoned and said “Suicide watch? She’s not suicidal.”)).

Again, if close family or medical experts couldn’t see any suicidal tendencies, how

could they be “so obvious” that a lay person would “easily recognize” them? Griffith,

975 F.3d at 567 (citation omitted). They couldn’t. So, as a legal matter,10 Baker did

not have a sufficiently serious medical need at the time of her death, and thus

Campbell cannot satisfy the objective component of her claim.

2. Subjective Component.

Next, consider the subjective component. Recall that to establish this

component, Campbell must be able to show that “each defendant acted deliberately

(not accidentally), and also recklessly in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm

10 Usually this phrase is redundant. The Court uses it here because it is clear that, as a matter

of fact (and with the benefit of hindsight), Baker had a problem that in common parlance we

might call a serious medical need. She killed herself. Nobody healthy does that. But as a

matter of law, Baker did not manifest a sufficiently serious medical need at the time of her

death to warrant imposing liability on someone.

that is either known or so obvious [to the defendant] that it should be known.”11

Helphenstine, 60 F.4th at 317 (6th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up) (quoting Brawner, 14 F.4th

at 596). She cannot show that for either defendant.

a. Riahi.

To establish this component against Riahi, Campbell must show that Riahi

both

(1) knew or should have known that Baker was at risk for suicide and

(2) deliberately and recklessly disregarded this risk by placing Baker in

a single cell.

See Troutman, 979 F.3d at 485; see also Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 425

(6th Cir. 2006). Because Helphenstine turns this into a recklessness analysis, it’s

convenient to ask what we would expect of a reasonable officer in Riahi’s shoes.

Consider the facts reasonably available to Riahi. Yes, Riahi knew or should

have known that Baker had come off suicide watch. (Doc. 21, #390, 392). But the “off”

part of that is important. It means that a trained professional had decided that Baker

did not present a sufficient suicide risk to warrant that labeling. Beyond that, officers,

like Riahi, at the time had no access to records of Baker’s behavior. (Doc. 26, #1537;

Doc. 27, #1682). Meanwhile, as described above, Baker acted normally in Riahi’s

presence. (Doc. 21, #379–80 (Baker “joke[d] back and forth,” “ma[de] [] goofy face[s],”

11 Note that obviousness plays a role in both the objective and subjective components. But

there is a difference. In the objective component, the question is whether the serious medical

need would have been obvious to anyone. In other words, to meet the objective component,

the plaintiff can point to facts known to others, not merely those known to a particular

defendant. As for the subjective component by contrast, the obviousness inquiry is whether

a particular defendant knew or should have known of the unjustifiably high risk of harm.

and “playful[ly] banter[ed]” with Riahi.)). No reasonable officer faced with those facts

would detect hopelessness or other depressive personality traits in Baker.

True, an officer would have known, as Riahi did, that Baker was not cleared to

be single-celled, and likely should have known that it was because of the potential for

self-harm. But the same could be said of nearly everyone at the jail. (Doc. 21, #299,

353; Doc. 24, #972, 1061; Doc. 28, #1824). The potential for self-harm inherent in

single-celling meant that no inmate could be single-celled without specific clearance

from Forensics. The lack of such clearance would not have been much of a flag, if any,

to an officer in Riahi’s place.

Apart from that, Baker and Herbert were clearly fighting. While inmate

conflict, as established above, does not necessarily reveal a suicide risk—or at least,

would not reveal a risk that was obvious to a lay person (see Doc. 26, #1514–15; Doc.

27, #1688–89)—it does, of course, present a palpable risk to the inmates’ physical

safety. That is also something we expect jail guards to protect. In essence, an officer

in Riahi’s shoes would have been forced to balance two competing issues—a general

policy against single celling that she had no reason to believe was that important for

Baker anymore (as she had been cleared from suicide watch), on the one hand, and a

specific concern about potential harm to Baker (and Herbert) based on an ongoing

fight occurring in the open, on the other. Faced with these competing concerns, Riahi

balanced them by briefly single celling both Baker and Herbert while she sought help.

(Doc. 21, #429-30; Doc. 23-2, #783). That is not reckless.

Campbell responds that it was improper for Riahi to do so because Herbert

“was the aggressor” and “it is appropriate to close the cell door of the aggressor, not

of the victim.” (Doc. 46, #2751). There are two problems with this argument. First,

unrefuted evidence in the record shows that Baker, in the midst of her altercation

with Herbert, shoved another inmate against a second-floor railing creating a risk

that the other inmate “could have fallen off a top tier.” (Doc. 21, #418, 431–32, 447).

While Campbell disputes this account, she identifies no contrary record evidence and

instead contends that the Court should discount Riahi’s self-serving deposition

testimony. (Doc. 46, #2767). But the absence of contradictory evidence cannot

constitute specific evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact for trial.

Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901, 912 (6th Cir. 2009). Thus, the record

shows that Baker also posed a risk to the safety of other inmates, not just Herbert—

justifying Riahi’s decision to single cell both inmates. Second, even assuming that

Baker did not specifically pose a risk to other inmates, the Court cannot say it was

unreasonable, let alone reckless, for Riahi to have concluded that single celling both

inmates was necessary to prevent retaliation by either inmate against the other,

regardless who started the altercation. (Doc. 21, #432).

Moreover, it is also important to recall the duration of the single celling here.

Riahi did not elect to permanently house Baker in a single cell. Nor did Riahi even

leave her alone there for any extended period of time. Indeed, Baker had been alone

in a cell far longer (granted, with the door open) earlier in the day, when Herbert, her

cellmate, was at court. And recall, Herbert—the inmate with whom Baker was

fighting—was the only other female inmate in isolation, so the options for re-celling

were limited. Given these exigent circumstances, Riahi elected to place Baker in a

cell alone for a few minutes to protect her, her fellow combatant, and other inmates

while Riahi worked on a more permanent fix. And within fifteen minutes after Riahi

shut the cell doors to prevent the fighting, indeed, while Riahi was still on the phone

with her supervisor, Baker hanged herself. (Doc. 21, #441–42; Doc. 23-2, #762, 784).

Another guard may have made different choices (and, with the benefit of deliberation

and hindsight, perhaps others would claim the same). But the Court cannot say that

Riahi acted unreasonably or recklessly on the facts available to her in the situation

in which she found herself. Thus, Campbell also cannot satisfy the subjective

component of her claim.

b. The Sheriff.

A plaintiff can sue a supervisory official under § 1983 when that official

“implicitly authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional

conduct of [an] offending subordinate.” Taylor v. Michigan Dep’t of Corr., 69 F.3d 76,

81 (6th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up). But that leads to a corollary. “[I]f a plaintiff cannot

establish that a subordinate engaged in unconstitutional conduct, any attempt to

impose supervisory liability must fail.” Young v. Campbell Cnty., Kentucky, 846 F.

App’x 314, 324 (6th Cir. 2021).

As explained above, Campbell cannot establish that Riahi acted with

deliberate indifference. So she cannot pursue a supervisory liability theory against

the Sheriff. And because Campbell cannot establish liability against Riahi or the

Sheriff under § 1983, the Court need not consider their qualified immunity defenses.

B. Monell Claims.

“Municipalities may be held liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations

committed by their employees if the violations result from municipal practices or

policies.” Baker v. City of Trenton, 936 F.3d 523, 535 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Monell v.

Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978)). But “where there has been no showing

of individual constitutional violations on the part of the officers involved, there can

be no municipal liability.” Id. (citing Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682,

687 (6th Cir. 2001)).

Campbell brings Monell claims against Butler County and its Board of

Commissioners. But because there has been no showing of individual constitutional

violations by Riahi or the Sheriff, there can be no municipal liability either.

C. State Law Claims.

Campbell brings claims under Ohio law against Riahi and the Sheriff. But

under Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6), as relevant here, “state employees are immune

from suit unless they act … in a wanton or reckless manner.” Downard for Est. of

Downard v. Martin, 968 F.3d 594, 602 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). One way “an

employee acts in a reckless manner” is if he has “indifference to a known or obvious

risk of harm to another that is unreasonable … and is substantially greater” than

negligence. Id. That sounds a lot like deliberate indifference. So it makes sense, then,

that when the employee is found to have not acted with deliberate indifference under

federal law, he is entitled to immunity under § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). See id. at 602-03

(citing Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 517 (6th Cir. 2002)).

Here, the Court found that Riahi and the Sheriff did not act with deliberate

indifference. They are therefore immune from Campbell’s state-law claims.

CONCLUSION

Because Campbell cannot show that the jailers were responsible for her

daughter’s death, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(Doc. 35) and DISMISSES her Complaint (Doc. 1) WITH PREJUDICE. In addition,

the Court DENIES AS MOOT Campbell’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 49). The Court

DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment and TERMINATE this matter on the Court’s

docket.

SO ORDERED.

September 13, 2023 :

DATE DOUGLAS R. COLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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