Ameyaw v. Delaware County Commissioners

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

KEITH AMEYAW,

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:21-cv-5039

Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

v. Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

DELAWARE COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Deputy Jesse Rodriguez-Lipps’ Motion for

Summary Judgement.1 (ECF No. 37.) For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant’s

motion.

I.

The facts set out below are taken from the evidence of record before the Court. On

October 27, 2019, Plaintiff Keith Ameyaw was traveling southbound on U.S. Route 23 in

Delaware County, Ohio. At 4:01 p.m., Defendant Jesse Rodriguez-Lipps, a deputy sheriff for the

Delaware County Sheriff’s Office assigned to road patrol, stopped Plaintiff’s vehicle because the

officer was unable to observe a visible license plate. Recordings from Defendant’s patrol

cruiser’s in-car camera and his body-worn camera captured some of their interactions for the

next few minutes.

After stopping Plaintiff, Defendant Deputy exited his patrol vehicle and approached

Plaintiff’s vehicle, a white Porsche SUV with an upside-down North Carolina license plate taped

1 As originally filed, Defendant’s motion also moved for summary judgment on behalf of former

Defendants Delaware County Commissioners, County of Delaware, and former Delaware

County Sheriff Russell Martin. The Court, however, has since dismissed these Defendants from

this action pursuant to Plaintiff’s unopposed motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 44.)

to the rear window. Defendant informed Plaintiff, an African American man, that he stopped his

vehicle because his license plate was not visible, which Plaintiff disputed. Defendant Deputy

asked Plaintiff for his driver’s license and insurance information and asked him where he was

traveling. Plaintiff answered that he was coming from Michigan and was bound for Georgia.

Defendant Deputy testified that during this interaction, Plaintiff appeared nervous and

was generally avoided making eye contact. Defendant also observed Plaintiff pick up a Gucci

bag and rest his hand on an object inside the bag, causing Defendant to step back from Plaintiff’s

vehicle and place his own hand near his firearm. Plaintiff then removed his empty hand from the

bag and proceeded to gather his driver’s license and proof of insurance without incident.

At approximately two minutes into the traffic stop, Defendant walked to the rear of

Plaintiff’s vehicle to inspect the license plate, which Plaintiff had taped upside down to the rear

windshield. Defendant believed the license plate was improperly displayed, thus violating

Ohio’s statutory requirements.

Defendant then returned to his patrol cruiser, where he reported Plaintiff’s name and

driver’s license information to dispatch. He also began searching the cruiser’s mobile data

terminal with Plaintiff’s information. At approximately three minutes into the traffic stop, the

Sheriff’s Department dispatch relayed to Defendant that the Porsche was properly registered to

Plaintiff and that Plaintiff had a validly issued Michigan driver’s license.

Defendant Deputy requested canine assistance as he suspected drug activity based on his

assessment of Plaintiff’s behavior (i.e., Plaintiff’s initial nervousness, his general avoidance of

eye contact, and the manner in which he reached into his Gucci bag), the location of the traffic

stop (Defendant recognized U.S. Route 23 as a common corridor for drug trafficking), and

Plaintiff’s stated travel plans to drive from Michigan to Georgia (two port states) while operating

a vehicle with a North Carolina license plate.

At approximately four and a half minutes into the traffic stop, dispatch confirmed that

Deputy John Laudeman and his canine partner were enroute. Another officer, Deputy Close,

arrived as back-up to assist with the traffic stop. She approached Plaintiff, walking up to the

passenger-side window of his vehicle, and spoke with him for several minutes. While speaking

with Plaintiff, Deputy Close observed several high-priced designer clothes in the vehicle.

Further, she learned from Plaintiff that he was in the military as an E-4 in rank. She did not,

however, observe any signs of Plaintiff appearing nervous, avoiding eye contact, or making

furtive gestures. Deputy Close returned to Defendant’s cruiser and conveyed this information to

him.

During the same period Deputy Close was speaking with Plaintiff, Defendant continued

investigating Plaintiff’s information, such as his criminal history and whether he had any

outstanding warrants. This involved checking Ohio Law Enforcement Gateway, various clerk of

courts websites in North Carolina based on Plaintiff’s driver’s license and the Michigan county

where Plaintiff’s vehicle was registered, as well as running Google searches.

At just under ten minutes into the traffic stop, Deputy Laudeman arrived at the scene with

his canine partner. Defendant remained in his cruiser, continuing to investigate Plaintiff. A

minute later, Deputy Laudeman and his canine partner began conducting a free-air sniff of

Plaintiff’s vehicle. In less than 30 seconds, the canine registered a “hit” on Plaintiff’s vehicle,

indicating the presence of possible narcotics in the vehicle. Upon seeing the “hit,” Defendant

stopped investigating Plaintiff and exited his cruiser to conduct a search of Plaintiff’s vehicle.

Approximately eleven minutes into the traffic stop, Defendant asked Plaintiff to step

outside of his vehicle. Plaintiff complied, and Defendant proceeded to conduct a pat-down

search of Plaintiff. Approximately two minutes later, Defendant, with Deputy Close’s

assistance, performed a search of Plaintiff’s vehicle.

Approximately fifteen minutes into the traffic stop, Deputy Close located a loaded

handgun in the Gucci bag in which Plaintiff had retrieved his license earlier. Plaintiff was then

handcuffed and placed under arrest in the rear of Defendant’s cruiser. For the next ten minutes,

Defendant and Deputy Close searched Plaintiff’s vehicle. No drugs or contraband were found

during the search. Defendant did, however, inform Plaintiff that he would be charged with

improper handling of a firearm under Ohio Revised Code § 2923.16(E)(1).

Defendant then transported Plaintiff to the Delaware County Jail, where Plaintiff

remained for half a day until he was released. Nine months later, the municipal prosecutor

dismissed the criminal charge of improper handling of a firearm that Plaintiff was charged by

Defendant Deputy.

In response to these events, Plaintiff brought the instant action against Defendant, the

County of Delaware, Delaware County Commissioners, and former Delaware County Sheriff

Russell Martin (the “County Defendants”). The Complaint alleges two counts: Count 1, brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that Defendant unlawfully seized Plaintiff, violating

Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights; and Count 2 raises a claim against the

County Defendants. (See id. ¶¶ 36-50.)

On March 31, 2023, Defendants filed the pending summary judgment motion, seeking

dismissal of both counts. (See ECF No. 37.) Plaintiff filed his opposition to Defendant’s motion

(ECF No. 42) while simultaneously moving to dismiss his claim against the County Defendants

(ECF No. 41), which the Court permitted (ECF No. 44). On June 2, 2023, Defendant filed his

Reply in support of his motion. (ECF No. 43.) Consequently, only one claim remains against

one defendant.

II.

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The movant has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact,

which may be accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to

support an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986);

Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388–89 (6th Cir. 1993). To avoid

summary judgment, the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,

475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); accord Moore v. Philip Morris Cos., 8 F.3d 335, 340 (6th Cir. 1993).

“[S]ummary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson

v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the evidence must be viewed in the light

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59

(1970); see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (stating that

the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and must refrain

from making credibility determinations or weighing evidence). Furthermore, the existence of a

mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonmoving party’s position will not be sufficient;

there must be evidence on which the jury reasonably could find for the nonmoving party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251; see Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995); see also

Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587–88 (finding reliance upon mere allegations, conjecture, or

implausible inferences to be insufficient to survive summary judgment).

Finally, “where, as here, there is a videotape capturing the events in question, the court

must view the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.” Green v. Throckmorton, 681 F.3d

853, 859 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted and alterations adopted).

III.

Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Deputy violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth

and Fourteenth Amendments when Defendant unlawfully seized and detained him longer than

was necessary to effectuate the initial purpose of the traffic stop (i.e., to investigate whether

Plaintiff’s vehicle had a properly displayed license plate).

A. Law

Plaintiff predicates his claim upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “provides a cause of action

for deprivation under color of state law, of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States. To succeed on a Section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must

satisfy two elements: first, that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws

of the United States; and second, the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of

state law. Redding v. St. Eward, 241 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2001); Green v. Throckmorton, 681

F.3d at 859–60 (6th Cir. 2012).

Plaintiff alleges a constitutional violation of the Fourth Amendment, which bars

“unreasonable . . . seizures,” which the Supreme Court has interpreted as prohibiting police

officers from prolonging a traffic stop beyond the time necessary to investigate the initial traffic

violation unless the officer has reasonable suspicion that the seized vehicle’s occupants are

engaged in other criminal conduct. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354–56 (2015).

The Supreme Court explained the law concerning the permissible duration of a traffic stop:

A seizure for a traffic violation justifies a police investigation of that violation. A

relatively brief encounter, a routine traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called

Terry stop than to a formal arrest. [Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)]. Like a Terry

stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is

determined by the seizure’s mission—to address the traffic violation that warranted

the stop and attend to related safety concerns. Because addressing the infraction is

the purpose of the stop, it may last no longer than is necessary to effectuate that

purpose. Authority for the seizure thus ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction

are—or reasonably should have been—completed.

. . . .

[T]he Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations that d[o] not

lengthen the roadside detention. . . . [A] traffic stop can become unlawful if it is

prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete the mission of issuing

a warning ticket. . . . The seizure remains lawful only so long as unrelated inquiries

do not measurably extend the duration of the stop. An officer, in other words, may

conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop. But . . . he

may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion

ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an individual.

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 354–55.

In addition to defining the contours of the lawful duration of a traffic stop, the Rodriguez

Court also identified the tasks that may be necessary to “complete the mission of issuing a

warning ticket”:

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes

ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop. Typically, such inquiries involve

checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants

against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of

insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code:

ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; see also United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535, 542 (6th Cir. 2009)

(“[w]aiting for the results of the license check was clearly within the purpose of the initial stop”

and “any time that the [o]fficers spent in pursuing other matters while the background check was

processing, even if those matters were unrelated to the original purpose of the stop, did not

extend the length of the stop”).

“In assessing whether a [stop] is too long in duration . . . , we consider it appropriate to

examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to

confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly . . . .” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686

(1985). That is to say, the touchstone of the analysis is “the officer’s diligence—i.e., his

‘persevering’ or ‘devoted . . . application to accomplish [the] undertaking’ of ascertaining

whether the suspected traffic violation occurred, and, if necessary, issuing a ticket.” United

States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 494 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). This requires a court to

evaluate the officer’s diligence “under the totality of the circumstances.” Id.

Administering a dog sniff, however, cannot properly be characterized as incidental to the

officer’s traffic mission. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355–57. Officers may engage in a dog sniff

during the time that they undertake the traffic-related tasks necessary to the violation that

triggered the stop. Id. at 354–55; Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 406–409 (2005) (noting that

a canine officer may walk her dog around a car while another officer completes a ticket).

Conducting a canine sniff can turn a lawful stop into an unreasonable seizure if it “prolongs—

i.e., adds time to—the stop.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 357 (cleaned up). Thus, “[o]nce a stop

begins, . . . detaining the motorist any longer than is reasonably necessary to issue the traffic

citation requires reasonable suspicion that the individual has engaged in more extensive criminal

conduct.” United States v. Smith, 601 F.3d 530, 542 (6th Cir. 2010). Officers may “extend a stop

to conduct a dog sniff when such action is supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal

activity.” United States v. Salas, 820 F. App’x 405, 412 (6th Cir. 2020).

B. Analysis

Based on the law set forth above, this Court considers three issues: (1) whether

Defendant Deputy prolonged the stop beyond the time necessary to resolve the license-plate

violation; (2) if Defendant did prolong the stop, did he have reasonable suspicion to believe that

Plaintiff was engaging in other crimes that would support a dog sniff, and (3) whether Defendant

is entitled to qualified immunity.

1. A reasonable jury could find that Defendant prolonged the stop.

The evidence here as to whether Defendant Deputy prolonged the traffic stop of Plaintiff

beyond the time necessary to resolve the license-plate violation, points in different directions. In

such a situation, the Sixth Circuit has directed that answering this question turns on the

“historical facts” of this case—a determination best left for the jury. Klaver v. Hamilton Cnty.,

Case Nos. Nos. 22-5083/5084, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 30642, at *10 (6th Cir. Nov. 3, 2022)

(citing, inter alia, U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC v. Vill. at

Lakeridge, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 960, 966; Hernandez v. Boles, 949 F.3d 251, 257–58 (6th Cir. 2020);

United States v. Howard, 815 F. App’x 69, 75–76 (6th Cir. 2020)).

There is evidence, on the one hand, that would support the conclusion that Defendant

Deputy did not prolong the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to investigate the initial traffic

violation. Both Defendant and Deputy Passet testified that a traffic stop, including the

subsequent investigation and issuance of a citation, typically takes between ten and twenty

minutes. (Rodriguez Dep. 40:10-41:1, ECF No. 32; Passet Dep. 19:2-16, ECF No. 35.) The

arrival of the canine and its ensuing alert occurred less than twelve minutes into the traffic stop—

well within the range for a typical stop. In addition, Defendant’s testimony and body-worn

camera indicates that he was using his cruiser’s mobile data terminal for investigative purposes

incidental to the traffic stop when Deputy Laudeman and his canine partner arrived. (Rodriguez

Dep. 129:15-21; Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 1; Pl. Dep. Ex. 5 at 00:09:42.) Moreover, Defendant testified

that, due to Plaintiff’s out-of-state license plate and interstate travel, he needed additional time to

complete the investigation into Plaintiff’s background when compared to a local motorist.

(Rodriguez Dep. 40:10-41:1; Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 2.) Defendant then points to the fact that he had

not yet begun drafting a traffic citation or written warning when the canine alerted, which,

according to Defendant, indicates that he was still completing tasks incident to the traffic stop at

that time.

On the other hand, there is evidence to support a finding that Defendant Deputy did

prolong the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to investigate the initial traffic violation.

First, he requested canine assistance at approximately three minutes into the traffic stop, which

did not relate to the purpose of the traffic stop. Further, Defendant’s body-worn camera shows

him actively utilizing his cruiser’s mobile data center, but, due to the quality of the video

recording, the extent of websites Defendant searched and whether such searches were incidental

to the traffic stop is unclear, as well as whether Defendant conducted these searches with

appropriate diligence. For example, at one point while using his cruiser’s mobile data center,

Defendant initiated a Google search that appeared to return a series of t-shirt advertisements.

“[A]n officer may not avoid this rule by ‘slow walking’ the traffic-related aspects of the stop to

get more time to investigate other crimes.” Klaver, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 30642, at *9 (citing

Untied States v. Whitley, 34 F.4th 522, 531–32 (6th Cir. 2022)). Defendant also failed to even

begin drafting a traffic citation or written warning by the time Deputy Laudeman arrived at

approximately ten minutes into the traffic stop. Deputy Passet testified, in the absence of issuing

a ticket or warning, a traffic stop typically takes about five minutes. (Passet Dep – 29:17-19.)

Moreover, when Deputy Close arrived at approximately six minutes into the stop,

Defendant instructed her to speak with Plaintiff. This directive occurred after Defendant had

already verified Plaintiff’s license and registration and made the ordinary inquiries incident to

the traffic stop, and thus could be reasonably considered to fall outside of the checklist of tasks

the Supreme Court articulated in Rodriguez. 575 U.S. at 355. That is to say, a reasonable jury

could find that by sending Deputy Close to talk with Plaintiff, Defendant did not “diligently

pursue[] a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel [his] suspicions quickly”

that Plaintiff had committed a license-plate violation. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686. The same

could be said for Defendant’s use of his cruiser’s mobile data terminal while he waited for

Deputy Laudeman and his canine partner to arrive.

When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a reasonably jury

may, or may not, find that Defendant prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to

investigate the traffic violation. Thus, Plaintiff has raised genuine issues of material fact that are

for a jury to determine.

2. A reasonable jury could find that Defendant did not have reasonable

suspicion to prolong the stop.

Because a jury could reasonably find that Defendant Deputy prolonged the stop, he

would violate the Fourth Amendment under the Plaintiff’s version of the facts unless he had

“independent reasonable suspicion” for that extended seizure. Boles, 959 F.3d at 256; United

States v. Sheckles, 996 F.3d 330, 344 – 45 (6th Cir. 2021). “The reasonable-suspicion test is not

a particularly ‘demanding’ one.” Klaver v. Hamilton Cnty., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 30642, at *8

(6th Cir. Nov. 3, 2022) (quoting Kansas v. Glover, 140 S. Ct. 1183, 1188 (2020)). It sets a lower

standard than probable cause, which itself does not set a “high bar.” Id. (citing Sheckles, 996

F.3d at 343) (citation omitted).

To have reasonable suspicion here, Defendant Deputy needed a “particularized” belief

(that is, one tied to Plaintiff) and an “objective” belief (that is, one tied to articulable facts rather

than amorphous hunches) that Plaintiff engaging in other crimes. Id. (quoting Glover, 140 S. Ct.

at 1187 (citations omitted). The Court looks to the totality of the circumstances available to

Defendant Deputy when he acted to decide whether they met this test. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-

18.

Defendant Deputy identifies five pieces of evidence as grounds for reasonable suspicion

to believe Plaintiff was engaging in other crimes: (1) Plaintiff initially appeared nervous during

the stop; (2) Plaintiff was avoiding making eye contact early during the interaction; (3) Plaintiff

made furtive hand movements when asked to provide his driver’s license by placing his hand

inside his Gucci bag without looking inside, and resting his hand in the bag and staring at

Defendant. He then retrieved his license from an entirely different area from the car; (4) the

location along State Route 23 was known by Defendant and the Delaware County Sheriff’s

Office as a heavily trafficked corridor for drug activity; (5) Plaintiff’s stated travel plans were to

drive from Michigan to Georgia, both well-known port states for drug trafficking. (Defs’ Reply

at 14–15, ECF No. 43.)

Each of these factors, however, are weak indications of criminal activity. The Sixth

Circuit has cautioned district courts not to “cavalierly” invoke an individual’s alleged nervous or

furtive behavior when assessing reasonable suspicion, United States v. Caruthers, 458 F.3d 459,

466 (6th Cir. 2006), and generally gives nervousness “very limited or no weight” in a traffic-stop

setting, United States v. Urrieta, 520 F.3d 569, 577 (6th Cir. 2008). A detainee’s nervous

demeanor, furtive behavior, or lack of eye contact are generally “unreliable indicator[s],

especially in the context of a traffic stop.” Id. This factor is appropriately relied upon “only

when a suspect ‘was exhibiting visible signs of nervousness beyond’ the usual level in traffic

stops and only in combination with other more suspicious factors.” Klaver, 2022 U.S. App.

LEXIS 30642, *17 (citing United States v. Campbell, 511 F. App’x 424, 428 (6th Cir. 2013) and

United States v. Coker, 648 F. App’x 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2016)).

With regard to the location of the stop, State Route 23, and Plaintiff’s travel plans,

Michigan and Georgia, they too fail to carry much weight. As pointed out by a sister district

court, a “court must of course credit to some degree [the defendant deputy’s] observation that

criminals sometimes transport drugs on [that particular highway], but the same can unfortunately

be said of virtually every highway in our nation.” United States v. Maddox, 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 128062, *9–10 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 2, 2010). Traveling on this type of highway “is not an

inherently suspicious activity, and under a totality of the circumstances analysis this factor

supports reasonable suspicion in only a minor way.” Id.

Travel plans are relevant to reasonable suspicion analysis. Stepp, 680 F.3d at 666. The

Sixth Circuit has “placed weight on implausible travel plans,” especially where traveling

companions report inconsistent details about their plans. Id. (citing United States v. Hill, 195

F.3d 258, 272 (6th Cir. 1999). In this case, Defendants’ travel itinerary was not so out of the

ordinary or “far-fetched” as to support reasonable suspicion. United States v. Townsend, 305

F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2002). Further, the Court notes that Defendant cooperated with every

request Defendant made and timely provided all documentation requested.

It is possible for factors, although insufficient individually, to add up to a reasonable

suspicion, as is the nature of the totality of the circumstances test. But “it is impossible for a

combination of wholly innocent factors to combine into a suspicious conglomeration unless there

are concrete reasons for such an interpretation.” Karnes, 62 F.3d at 496. “[B] behavior that is

consistent with innocent activity cannot suffice to establish reasonable suspicion.” Joshua v.

DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 446 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Fla.v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 512 (1983)). In

the case sub judice, the factors upon which Defendant relies to provide reasonable suspicion can

reasonably be viewed as wholly innocent and there are no concrete reasons for these innocent

reasons to combine into a suspicious conglomeration.

The Court concludes that a reasonably jury, when reviewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to the Plaintiff, could conclude that Defendant lacked reasonable suspicion that

Plaintiff was committing other crimes. Thus, the question of whether Defendant Deputy

unreasonably prolonged the stop is properly reserved to a jury.

3. Qualified Immunity

Section 1983 claims are subject to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity which, if

applicable, shields individuals from liability. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).

Qualified immunity protects state officials so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, (1982) (citations omitted). Thus, “officers are entitled

to qualified immunity under §1983 unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional

right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” District of

Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U. S. 658, 664

(2012)).

Defendant, correctly, does not argue that the law applicable to this case was not clearly

established. Instead, he contends that “the evidence shows that there was no constitutional

violation, [so] Deputy Rodriguez is entitled to qualified immunity and, accordingly, summary

judgment on Plaintiff’s claims.” (Mot. Summ. J. at 12, ECF No. 37; Def’s Reply at 18, ECF No.

43.) Defendant further contends that “Plaintiff relies on blatant factual misstatements and

mischaracterizations to fabricate a constitutional violation which the record proves never

happened. These efforts do not defeat Deputy Rodriguez’s qualified immunity.” Id.

As set forth above, this Court disagrees with Defendant’s assessment of what the

evidence shows. When viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, a

reasonably jury may, or may not, find that Defendant prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time

necessary to investigate the traffic violation. The shield of qualified immunity does not

immunize Defendant from allowing a jury to resolve this factual dispute. See Gambrel v. Knox

Cty., 25 F.4th 391, 400 (6th Cir. 2022) (“So when deciding whether force was excessive or

whether our precedent clearly established that result, we must view genuine factual

disagreements in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. If a reasonable jury could credit the

plaintiff’s version of events and if that version clearly shows the excessive nature of the

defendants’ force, we cannot grant the officers summary judgment.”)

IV.

For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES Defendant Deputy Jesse Rodriguez-

Lipps’ Motion for Summary Judgement. (ECF No. 37.) This case remains open.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

9/5/2023 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE