Opinion

Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security

Court
District Court, S.D. Ohio
Filed
Jun 29, 2023
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 28.4%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

MEGAN B.,1 : Case No. 1:22-cv-00296

:

Plaintiff, : Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry

: (by full consent of the parties)

vs.

:

:

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL

:

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

:

Defendant. :

DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental

Security Income in July 2019. Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and upon

reconsideration. After a hearing at Plaintiff’s request, an Administrative Law Judge

(ALJ) concluded that Plaintiff was not eligible for benefits because she was not under a

“disability” as defined in the Social Security Act. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s

request for review. Plaintiff subsequently filed this action.

Plaintiff seeks an order remanding this matter to the Commissioner for the award

of benefits or, in the alternative, for further proceedings. The Commissioner asks the

Court to affirm the non-disability decision. For the reasons set forth below, this Court

REVERSES the Commissioner’s decision and REMANDS for further proceedings.

1 See S.D. Ohio General Order 22-01 (“The Committee on Court Administration and Case Management

of the Judicial Conference of the United States has recommended that due to significant privacy concerns

in social security cases federal courts should refer to claimants only by their first names and last

initials.”).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff asserts that she has been under a disability since June 9, 2019.2 At that

time, she was thirty-nine years old. Accordingly, Plaintiff was considered a “younger

person” under Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c), 416.963(c).3

Plaintiff has a “high school education and above.” See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(4).

The evidence in the Administrative Record (“AR,” ECF No. 7) is summarized in

the ALJ’s decision (AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID 35-52), Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors

(“SE,” ECF No. 9), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (“Mem. In Opp.,”

ECF No. 10), and Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum (“Reply,” ECF No. 11). Rather than

repeat these summaries, the Court will discuss the pertinent evidence in its analysis

below.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Social Security Administration provides Disability Insurance Benefits and

Supplemental Security Income to individuals who are under a “disability,” among other

eligibility requirements. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986); see 42

U.S.C. §§ 402, 423(a)(1), 1382(a). The term “disability” means “the inability to do any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental

impairment which . . . has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).

2 Plaintiff initially alleged that her disability began on November 20, 2014, but she subsequently amended

the alleged disability onset date to June 9, 2019. (AR, ECF No. 7-5 at PageID 249.)

3 The remaining citations will identify only the pertinent Disability Insurance Benefits Regulations, as

they are similar in all relevant respects to the corresponding Supplemental Security Income Regulations.

This Court’s review of an ALJ’s unfavorable decision is limited to two inquiries:

“whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ

are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399,

406 (6th Cir. 2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social

Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.”).

“Unless the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has made findings of

fact unsupported by substantial evidence,” this Court must affirm the ALJ’s decision.

Emard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 953 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, the Court “may

not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of

credibility.” Id.

“Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing

administrative record and asks whether it contains ‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the

agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)

(citation omitted). This limited standard of review does not permit the Court to weigh the

evidence and decide whether the preponderance of the evidence supports a different

conclusion. Instead, the Court is confined to determining whether the ALJ’s decision is

supported by substantial evidence, which “means—and means only—‘such relevant

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id.

(citation omitted). This standard “presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which

the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts.” Mullen v.

Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). Thus, the Court may be required to affirm the

ALJ’s decision even if substantial evidence in the record supports the opposite

conclusion. Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir.1997).

The other line of judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal

criteria—may result in reversal even when the record contains substantial evidence

supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651

(6th Cir. 2009). “[E]ven if supported by substantial evidence, ‘a decision of the

Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and

where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a

substantial right.’” Id. (citations omitted). Such an error of law will require reversal even

if “the outcome on remand is unlikely to be different.” Cardew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

896 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

III. FACTS

A. The ALJ’s Factual Findings

The ALJ was tasked with evaluating the evidence related to Plaintiff’s application

for benefits. In doing so, the ALJ considered each of the five sequential steps set forth in

the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ made the following

findings of fact:

Step 1: Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 9,

2019, the amended alleged onset date.

Step 2: She has the severe impairments of osteoarthrosis, depressive and

bipolar related disorders, inflammatory arthritis, ankylosing

spondylitis, disorder of the back, fibromyalgia, sleep-related

breathing disorders, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder; and

migraines.

Step 3: She does not have an impairment or combination of impairments

that meets or equals the severity of one in the Commissioner’s

Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.

Step 4: Her residual functional capacity (RFC), or the most she can do

despite her impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276

F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002), consists of light work as defined in 20

C.F.R. § 404.1567(b), subject to the following limitations: “she is

able to lift and carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds

frequently; able to stand and/or walk 6 hours per 8 hour day and sit 6

hours per 8 hour day with normal breaks. She can occasionally climb

ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; [s]he can

frequently balance and occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl.

She can perform frequent handling and fingering bilaterally. She is

able to perform occasional extension of the neck, meaning able to

bend head backwards as in looking up towards the ceiling. She must

avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold and vibration. She must

avoid all exposure to hazards of unprotected heights of ladders,

ropes or scaffolds and operating dangerous heavy moving

machinery. She can understand, remember and carry out simple

instructions and detailed instructions but no complex instructions.

She can sustain attention, concentration and maintain persistence and

pace to complete simple tasks and detailed tasks with no fast-paced

production requirements. She can adapt to a work environment

where major changes are explained in advance to allow for

adjustment to new expectations with no requirement for strict time

limitations or production standards such as an automated assembly

line.”

She is capable of performing her past relevant work as a loss

mitigation specialist.

Step 5: Even without considering past relevant work, considering Plaintiff’s

age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist

in significant numbers in the national economy that she can perform.

(AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID 37-52.) These findings led the ALJ to conclude that Plaintiff

does not meet the definition of disability and so is not entitled to benefits. (Id. at PageID

52.)

B. Treating Psychiatrist Kevin Eggerman, M.D.

Dr. Eggerman completed a mental capacities assessment form in November 2019.

(AR, ECF No. 7-13 at PageID 3031-33.) Dr. Eggerman opined that Plaintiff was

markedly limited in several areas of work-related mental functioning: understanding,

remembering, and carrying out detailed instructions; maintaining attention and

concentration for extended periods; performing activities within a schedule, maintaining

regular attendance, and being punctual within customary tolerances; working in

coordination with or in proximity to others without being distracted by them; interacting

appropriately with the general public; completing a normal workday and workweek

without interruptions from psychologically-based symptoms; and performing at a

consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (Id. at PageID

3031-32.)

In addition, Dr. Eggerman opined that Plaintiff was moderately limited in

numerous areas of work-related mental functioning: remembering locations and work-

like procedures; understanding, remembering, and carrying out very short and simple

instructions; making simple, work-related decisions; accepting instructions and

responding appropriately to criticism from supervisors; getting along with coworkers or

peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavioral extremes; maintaining socially

appropriate behavior and adhering to basic standards of neatness and cleanliness;

responding appropriately to changes in the work setting; being aware of normal hazards

and taking appropriate precautions; traveling in unfamiliar places and using public

transportation; setting realistic goals; and making plans independently of others. (Id.) Dr.

Eggerman found no significant limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to sustain an ordinary

routine without special supervision. (Id. at PageID 3031.)

Dr. Eggerman explained that Plaintiff suffered from a moderately-severe mood

disorder which had only partially responded to aggressive treatment. (Id. at PageID

3033.) He further noted that Plaintiff’s mood remained unstable and that her ability to

relate effectively with others was “markedly impaired and overall poor.” (Id.)

The ALJ concluded that Dr. Eggerman’s opinion was “not persuasive.” (AR, ECF

No. 7-2 at PageID 50.) The ALJ explained:

This opinion was not persuasive because it overstates [Plaintiff’s]

limitations and is inconsistent with other evidence. [Plaintiff] had varying,

but at times normal, mental status exam findings. For example, she was

typically noted with a depressed mood but other mental status findings

were normal (13F/10-13, 19F/17). However, at the hearing she reported

improvement with her depression (testimony). Dr. Eggman [sic] opinion is

inconsistent with his own treatment notes finding [Plaintiff] to have an

estimated average IQ (39F/5, 10) and she typically presented as cooperative

(see 11F, e.g.). [Plaintiff] testified that her depression is better than it has

ever been, her medication helps and she feels better than she ever did. She

also reported engaging in activities that suggest she is not quite as limited

as alleged, including going out with friends for dessert, riding a Ferris

wheel downtown, shopping online, and preparing simple meals (testimony,

4E). [Plaintiff] testified she has no problems getting along with her parents,

children and doctors. She uses the computer to shop online, engage in

social media and uses her cell phone to access the Internet to engage in

research (testimony).

Moreover, Dr. Eggerman [sic] opinion is inconsistent with his own May

2020 treatment records of of [sic] [Plaintiff’s] reported abilities to be a

peacekeeper in her family, report that she is very happy dating a man she

met through her ex husband and her depression is related to her son moving

to Colorado "empty nest" but doing pretty well from a psychiatric

perspective, and that she remains improved, feels improved with Abilify,

improved with Topamax [sic] (9F/2, 3). In January and February 2020

other treatment provider examinations found [Plaintiff] alert and oriented

times 3 (36F/5, 11). [Plaintiff] testified that she did receive treatment from

Dr. Kevin Eggerman. Further, she testified that her mental health

medications help because prior to taking medication she was not getting out

of the bed for quite a while; however, now she gets out of bed and feels

better than she did. She also testified that her depression is better than it has

ever been (testimony).

(Id.)

C. Primary Care Physician Daniel Silvestri, M.D.

Dr. Silvestri completed a Physical Medical Opinion form in October 2019. (AR,

ECF No. 7-13 at PageID 2997-3001.) Dr. Silvestri opined that Plaintiff could stand for

fifteen minutes at a time and for less than a total of two hours in an eight-hour workday,

walk for less than one block and for less than a total of two hours per day, and sit for

thirty minutes at a time and for a total of approximately four hours per day. (Id. at PageID

2998.) He noted that Plaintiff needed to shift positions at will and would need to take

unscheduled, fifteen-minute-long breaks approximately once or twice per day. (Id.) Dr.

Silvestri opined that Plaintiff could lift and carry no more than ten pounds occasionally

and was unable to lift and carry any significant amount of weight on a frequent basis. (Id.

at PageID 2999.) He also opined that Plaintiff could occasionally climb stairs, rarely

twist, and never crouch, squat, climb ladders, or stoop (bend). (Id.) According to Dr.

Silvestri, Plaintiff was capable of “moderate stress – normal work” but would likely be

off task (defined as experiencing symptoms severe enough to interfere with attention and

concentration needed to perform even simple work tasks) for fifteen percent of the

workday. (Id. at PageID 3000.) He further opined that Plaintiff would likely miss work

more than four times per month. (Id.)

The ALJ concluded that Dr. Silvestri’s opinion was “not persuasive.” (AR, ECF

No. 7-2 at PageID 47.) The ALJ explained:

This opinion was not persuasive because it is inconsistent with other

evidence and overstates [Plaintiff’s] limitations. She underwent RFTC

bilateral and ESI cervical and reported 70-75% improvement of cervical

pain, improved range of motion post intervention and good pain relief

(18F/10). [Plaintiff] had varying, though at times normal, physical exam

findings. She was prescribed methadone (36F/1). The pain medication

helped with her pain [sic] allows her to function with her activities of daily

living (36F/1). [Plaintiff] was noted to report that the medication provides

good analgesia, helps her remain functional in activities of daily living and

thus improve quality of life and helps control the pain (36F/1). She stated

she still had pain in her back, skull, hips, toes, knees, jaw, shoulders, and

wrists. She added that she was off her medications for a few months while

caring for her son in Colorado (33F/34). At a primary care physician exam,

[Plaintiff] her [sic] gait was slow but stable and she remains functional in

activities of daily living and thus improves the quality of life (36F/7). Her

sensory and motor function was intact throughout (36F/5). It was also noted

that medications help with the pain without any side effects and allows [sic]

[Plaintiff] to perform activities of daily living (36F/6). Again, treatment

records indicated her gait was slow but stable and medications help with the

pain without any side effects and allows [sic] [Plaintiff] to perform

activities of daily living (36F/13). For example, one June exam had normal

findings, while another noted she appeared stiff and her neck range of

motion was limited (15F/46-48, 255-259). More recently, one occasion

physical exam findings were unremarkable, including a normal

musculoskeletal range of motion (45F/7) but shortly thereafter a separate

exam noted multiple tender points and reduced neck range of motion

(48F/12). In addition, there is no medical imaging of the spine from after

the alleged onset date but prior findings were largely mild (7F/2). She

testified that Leflunomide treats her inflammatory arthritis by helping the

smaller joints of her fingers such that they do not ache and throb is [sic]

much as they used to and her toes are no longer a problem. These findings

do not support the extreme limitations posited by Dr. Silverstri [sic].

(Id. at PageID 47-48.)

IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and account for the

opinions of treating physician Dr. Silvestri and treating psychiatrist Dr. Eggerman. (SE,

ECF No. 9 at PageID 4167-73.) Finding error in the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Eggerman’s

opinion, the Court does not address the analysis of Dr. Silvestri’s opinion and, instead,

instructs the ALJ to address both opinions on remand.

A. Applicable Law

Social Security regulations require ALJs to adhere to certain standards when

evaluating medical opinions. ALJs must analyze the persuasiveness of “all of the medical

opinions” in the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c (emphasis added). A “medical opinion” is

a “statement from a medical source about what [an individual] can still do despite [her]

impairment(s)” and whether the individual has one or more impairment-related

limitations or restrictions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). By contrast, a statement from a

medical source about an issue reserved to the Commissioner—such as whether an

individual is disabled—need not be addressed by the ALJ. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3).

Because Plaintiff filed her claim after March 27, 2017, the new regulations for

evaluating medical opinion evidence applied. Under these regulations, the ALJ “will not

defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any

medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) . . . .” 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(a). Instead, the ALJ must evaluate the persuasiveness of each medical

opinion and prior administrative medical finding by considering the following factors: (1)

supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the plaintiff; (4) specialization; and

(5) any other factor “that tend[s] to support or contradict a medical opinion or prior

administrative medical finding.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c).

Significantly, because the first two factors—supportability and consistency—are

the “most important” ones, the ALJ “will explain” how he or she considered them. 20

C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2) (emphasis added).4 As to the first factor (supportability), “[t]he

more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a

medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . the more persuasive the

medical opinions . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1). As to the second factor

(consistency), “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from

other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the

medical opinion(s) . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2).

B. The ALJ’s Findings Regarding Dr. Eggerman’s Opinion Are Not

Supported by Substantial Evidence.

The ALJ found Dr. Eggerman’s opinions to be unpersuasive because they were

“inconsistent with other evidence” and “inconsistent with his own treatment notes . . . .”

(AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID 50.)5 In support of this conclusion, the ALJ cited a few

4 By contrast, the ALJ “may, but [is] not required to,” explain the consideration given to the remaining

factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2).

5 The supportability factor requires consideration of the “objective medical evidence and supporting

explanations presented by a medical source . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1) (emphasis added). By

contrast, “consistency” involves comparing a medical opinion or prior administrative medical finding

with “the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim.” 20 C.F.R. §

416.920c(c)(2) (emphasis added). The ALJ appears to have conflated these terms when discussing Dr.

Eggerman’s findings and treatment records. Nevertheless, the ALJ addressed both factors because she

considered the objective findings documented by Dr. Eggerman, as well as other medical and non-

medical evidence of record.

mental status examinations, Plaintiff’s response to treatment, and Plaintiff’s reports of

daily activities. (Id.) The Court finds that the ALJ erred by ignoring evidence and

mischaracterizing the record. Therefore, her findings are not supported by substantial

evidence and reversal is required.

The ALJ cited to treatment notes from Dr. Eggerman and Plaintiff’s therapist to

support her conclusion that that Dr. Eggerman’s opinion was not persuasive: “[Plaintiff]

had varying, but at times normal, mental status exam findings. For example, she was

typically noted with a depressed mood but other mental status findings were normal

(13F/10-13, 19F/17).” (AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID 50.) Yet these examinations occurred

in May 2019, approximately one month prior to the amended alleged disability onset

date. (AR, ECF No. 7-9 at PageID 1134; AR, ECF No. 7-12 at PageID 2866.) Moreover,

contrary to the ALJ’s description, the other mental status findings that Dr. Eggerman

documented in these notes were not normal. For example, Dr. Eggerman documented an

anxious and tense presentation, tearfulness, a reduced range of affect, some slowing, and

some increased latency response. (Id. at PageID 1134-35.) The ALJ’s mischaracterization

of these notes demonstrates that her conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence.

The ALJ further explained: “Dr. Eggman [sic] opinion is inconsistent with his own

treatment notes finding the claimant to have an estimated average IQ (39F/5, 10) and she

typically presented as cooperative (see 11F, e.g.) . . . Moreover, Dr. Eggerman opinion is

inconsistent with his own May 2020 treatment records of of [sic] [Plaintiff’s] reported

abilities to be a peacekeeper in her family, report that she is very happy dating a man she

met through her ex husband and her depression is related to her son moving to Colorado

“empty nest” [sic] but doing pretty well from a psychiatric perspective, and that she

remains improved, feels improved with Abilify, [and] improved with Topamax (9F/2,

3).”6 (AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID 50.)

This explanation is similarly unsupported by substantial evidence. The ALJ cited

only the normal mental status findings that Dr. Eggerman documented, and ignored the

fact that Dr. Eggerman consistently documented abnormalities that included an anxious

and tense presentation, a reduced range of affect, some slowed responses, tearfulness,

frustration, and increased depressive behaviors during nearly every examination since

the amended alleged onset date. (AR, ECF No. 7-9 at PageID 1126-27, 1130-31; AR,

ECF No. 7-12 at PageID 2863; AR, ECF No. 7-13 at PageID 3214, 3218; AR, ECF No.

7-14 at 3783, 3788.) The ALJ also ignored Dr. Eggerman’s statements that Plaintiff

“suffers from a moderately-severe major mood disorder which has only partially

responded to [aggressive] treatment,” that Plaintiff’s mood remained “unstable,” and that

her ability to relate effectively with others was “markedly impaired and overall poor.”

(AR, ECF No. 7-13 at PageID 3033.) The fact that the ALJ ignored all of this evidence

contradicts and undermines her conclusions regarding Dr. Eggerman’s medical opinion.

The ALJ also erred by relying upon her own mischaracterizations of Plaintiff’s

statements to Dr. Eggerman. Contrary to the ALJ’s description of Plaintiff’s “abilities” to

be a peacekeeper, Dr. Eggerman noted in May 2020 that Plaintiff was “struggling” and

6 The ALJ cited to Exhibit 9F, but this record documents an esophagogastroduodenoscopy procedure and

pathology report, not Dr. Eggerman’s records. Dr. Eggerman’s May 2020 treatment notes are found at

Exhibit 39F. (AR, ECF No. 7-14 at PageID 3780-84.)

was “in triangulation” as the “chronic peacekeeper” between her husband and son. (AR,

ECF No. 7-14 at 3780.) Plaintiff said this dynamic led her “to feel never good enough.”

(Id.) Additionally, Dr. Eggerman’s reference to Plaintiff’s statement that “she is very

happy dating” is found in the history section of his May 2020 notes (indicated by “hx”).

(Id. at PageID 3781.) Plaintiff actually reported being “very happy dating” her partner

well over a year earlier in February 2019—several months prior to the amended alleged

onset date. (AR, ECF No. 7-9 at PageID 1144.) Significantly, Plaintiff later complained

repeatedly about this relationship. For example, in June 2019 Plaintiff stated that she

“threw [her partner] out of the house for a few days” when he started drinking alcohol.

(AR, ECF No. 7-8 at PageID 1019.) In August 2019, Plaintiff expressed “concerns

related to her fiancé’s continued drinking and his stopping going to AA meetings,” as

well as his continued conversations with an ex-girlfriend. (AR, ECF No. 7-14 at PageID

3759.) She stated in October 2019 that she and her husband were arguing ‘because of her

increased impulsivity—particularly around spending money’ and that her husband had

“fall[en] off the wagon” again.” (AR, ECF No. 7-13 at PageID 3140.) Plaintiff testified in

November 2020 that she was separated from her husband. (AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID

82.) These significant events are wholly unaccounted for in the ALJ’s analysis and refute

her conclusion that Plaintiff was “happy dating.” (AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID 50.)

Similarly, Dr. Eggerman’s notations that Plaintiff was “doing pretty well from a

psychiatric perspective” and that she “remains improved, feels improved with Abilify,

improved with Topamax [sic]” are also found in the history section of Dr. Eggerman’s

May 2020 notes. (AR, ECF No. 7-14 at PageID 3781.) These statements do not describe

Plaintiff’s functioning as of May 2020.7 To the contrary, Dr. Eggerman noted that

Plaintiff was “struggling” and reported that the mental status examination showed

abnormalities which included an anxious and tense presentation, a reduced range of

affect, some slowing, tearfulness, frustration, and depression. (Id. at PageID 3783.) The

ALJ erred by relying on historical, rather than temporally relevant, information.

The ALJ also mischaracterized the record when she compared Dr. Eggerman’s

opinion to Plaintiff’s reported response to treatment, as well as her daily activities. The

ALJ stated: “[Plaintiff] testified that her depression is better than it has ever been, her

medication helps and she feels better than she ever did . . . [Plaintiff] testified that her

mental health medications help because prior to taking medication she was not getting

out of the bed for quite a while; however, now she gets out of bed and feels better than

she did. She also testified that her depression is better than it has ever been (testimony).”

(AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID 50.) The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s reported activities

“suggest she is not quite as limited as alleged,” and cited to Plaintiff’s statements that

included “going out with friends for dessert, riding a Ferris wheel downtown, shopping

online, and preparing simple meals (testimony, 4E).” (Id.) The ALJ further explained:

“[Plaintiff] testified she has no problems getting along with her parents, children and

doctors. She uses the computer to shop online, engage in social media and uses her cell

phone to access the Internet to engage in research (testimony).” (Id.)

7 Significantly, Dr. Eggerman’s treatment notes dated as early as September 2018 contain the same

historical notations. (AR, ECF No. 7-9 at PageID 1148-49.) It is plain that any characterization that

Plaintiff was experiencing a positive response to treatment relates to Plaintiff’s functioning well before

the relevant time period.

The Sixth Circuit recognizes that an ALJ may consider a claimant’s “household

and social activities” when evaluating complaints of disabling pain and mental

symptoms. Allen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 74 F.3d 1240 (Table), 1996 WL 15651, *3 (6th

Cir. 1996) (citing Blacha v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 927 F.2d 228, 231 (6th

Cir. 1990)). However, the ALJ “may not take part of [Plaintiff’s] testimony and disregard

the rest.” Lowery v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 55 F. App’x 333, 339 (6th Cir. 2003). Here, the

hearing transcript shows that the ALJ disregarded significant portions of Plaintiff’s

testimony. Significantly, Plaintiff testified that her psychotropic medications helped her

to get out of bed for only “a little bit of the day” and that she was “still struggling with a

lot of other things.” (AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID 92-93.) She estimated that she got up

for only a few hours each day, due to pain and depression. (Id. at PageID 106.) With

regard to spending time with others, Plaintiff testified that she had met some friends for

dessert—but only on one occasion. (AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID 102.) She said that

while she and her husband were dating they went downtown and rode the Ferris wheel—

but only on one occasion. (AR, ECF No. 7-2 at PageID 108.) She explained that they had

already known each other for twenty years and otherwise usually “just kind of hung out

together at the house . . . and watched t[elevision] . . . .” (Id. at PageID 108-09.) Plaintiff

also testified that although she did not have difficulty getting along with family or

medical staff, she has “pretty much withdrawn [herself] from everyone.” (AR, ECF No.

7-2 at PageID 101.) Finally, Plaintiff testified that she was able to use her phone to

research information on the internet, but she said she needed to alternate “back and forth”

between her phone and watching television due to focus issues. (AR, ECF No. 7-2 at

PageID 98.)

The ALJ’s failure to acknowledge significant evidence that supports Plaintiff’s

subjective complaints, and her mischaracterization of evidence that was cited, signifies an

impermissibly selective review of the record. See Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723-23 (citing

Minor v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 513 F. App’x 417, 435 (6th Cir.2013) (reversing where the

ALJ “cherry-picked select portions of the record” rather than doing a proper analysis);

Germany–Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 313 F. App’x 771, 777 (6th Cir.2008) (finding

error where the ALJ was “selective in parsing the various medical reports”)). The Court

recognizes that the ALJ is not required to directly address each and every piece of

evidence and finding in the record. See Smith-Johnson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 579 F.

App’x 426, 437 n.11 (6th Cir. 2014). Nevertheless, the ALJ’s “factual findings as a

whole must show that [she] implicitly resolved” any conflicts in the evidence. Id.

Here, the ALJ did acknowledge some of the abnormal findings and testimony in

her earlier discussion of Plaintiff’s symptoms and the medical evidence. (AR, ECF No. 7-

2 at PageID 41-42, 45-46.) But, as discussed above, when the ALJ evaluated Dr.

Eggerman’s opinion she failed to acknowledge any of the abnormal findings that he

documented. The ALJ also mischaracterized Dr. Eggerman’s examinations, Plaintiff’s

response to treatment, and Plaintiff’s reports of daily activities. Accordingly, the Court

finds that the ALJ did not demonstrate that she implicitly resolved the evidentiary

conflicts. Instead, the ALJ performed an impermissibly selective review of the record

when she found that Dr. Eggerman’s opinion was not persuasive.

In sum, the ALJ erred because her evaluation of Dr. Eggerman’s opinion is not

supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ’s error can only be excused as harmless if it

does not prejudice the claimant on the merits or deprive her of substantial rights.

Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 654. The Court finds that the ALJ’s error was not harmless because

it prejudiced Plaintiff on the merits. Therefore, reversal is required.

VI. REMAND

Under Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has authority to affirm,

modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision “with or without remanding the cause for

rehearing.” Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 99 (1991). Consequently, a remand

under Sentence Four may result in the need for further proceedings or an immediate

award of benefits. E.g., Blakley, 581 F.3d at 410; Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1041

(6th Cir. 1994). The latter is warranted where the evidence of disability is overwhelming

or where the evidence of disability is strong while contrary evidence is lacking. Faucher

v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994).

A judicial award of benefits is unwarranted in the present case because the

evidence of disability is neither overwhelming nor strong while contrary evidence is

lacking. Faucher, 17 F.3d at 176. However, Plaintiff is entitled to an Order remanding

this case to the Social Security Administration pursuant to Sentence Four of Section

405(g) for the reasons stated above. On remand, the ALJ should further develop the

record as necessary, particularly as to the opinion of Dr. Eggerman, and evaluate the

evidence of record under the applicable legal criteria mandated by the Commissioner’s

regulations and rulings and governing case law. The ALJ should evaluate Plaintiff’s

disability claim under the required five-step sequential analysis to determine anew

whether Plaintiff was under a disability and whether her applications for Disability

Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income should be granted.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (ECF No. 9) is GRANTED;

2. The Court REVERSES the Commissioner’s non-disability determination;

3. No finding is made as to whether Plaintiff was under a “disability” within

the meaning of the Social Security Act;

4. This matter is REMANDED to the Social Security Administration under

Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration consistent

with this Decision and Order; and

5. This case is terminated on the Court’s docket.

s/ Caroline H. Gentry

Caroline H. Gentry

United States Magistrate Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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