The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JOHN WALDRON,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:22-cv-3556
v. Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
CHRIS BROWN, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF No. 32) filed by
Defendants Chris Brown and CBE Touring, LLC (collectively, “Defendants”), Plaintiff John
Waldron’s Response (ECF No. 34), and Defendants’ Reply (ECF No. 35). Plaintiff agreed to
delay discovery pending resolution of this motion and the Court entered a temporary stay of
discovery following a status conference held on February 23, 2023. For the following reasons,
Defendants’ Motion to Stay Discovery is GRANTED and the temporary stay of discovery is
EXTENDED until September 30, 2023, or until the motions to dismiss are resolved, whichever
is earlier.
I.
Plaintiff filed this action on October 3, 2022, (Complaint, ECF No. 1), alleging the
following. Defendant Chris Brown agreed to give a live performance on March 19, 2022, at the
Toyota Center in Houston, Texas in connection with an event known as “The One Night Only
Tour” (the “Event”). (Id. at ⁋ 6.) DML Real Estate, through two promoters, organized the
Event. (Id. at ⁋ 7.) Mr. Brown contracted with DML Real Estate to receive a $1,000,000.00
appearance and performance fee. (Id.) Plaintiff John Waldron was not a party to that contract.
(Id.) Nevertheless, on March 15, 2022, Mr. Waldron sent Mr. Brown $500,000.00 by wire
transfer, which represented one-half of Mr. Brown’s fee to appear and to perform at the Event.
(Id. at ⁋ 8.) The Defendants understood and agreed that Plaintiff would pay the $500,000.00
because Defendants, “either directly or through agents and/or representatives, regularly and
consistently solicited Mr. Waldron for the money on and before March 15, 2022.” (Id.)
Ultimately, Mr. Brown did not appear or perform at the Event. (Id. at ⁋ 9.) Despite Mr. Brown’s
failure to appear, Defendants “have refused to return the $500,000 to Plaintiff and have retained
custody and control over the funds designated as payment of one-half the appearance and
performance fee to Mr. Brown.” (Id. at ⁋ 10.) Plaintiff brings claims for Quantum
Meruit/Unjust Enrichment, Promissory Estoppel, Fraud, and Conversion.
In their current motion, Defendants assert that a stay of discovery is necessary because
they have moved to dismiss raising threshold, legal questions about (a) whether this action
should be dismissed or stayed under the Colorado River doctrine pending resolution of an action
filed against DML Real Estate in Texas or transferred to New York under the terms of a forum
selection clause contained in the performance agreement , (b) whether DML Real Estate must be
joined as a necessary, indispensable party, and (c) whether Plaintiff has stated a cognizable cause
of action. Moreover, Defendants argue, even a decision short of dismissal would clarify the
claims and defenses at issue and determine the scope of discovery.
Beyond this, Defendants argue that discovery will not alter the outcome of these motions
to dismiss. Additionally, Defendants contend that, given the surrounding circumstances,
discovery would be complicated, burdensome, and expensive. Finally, Defendants argue that
Plaintiff will suffer no prejudice if discovery is stayed. In fact, Defendants explain that, under a
continued stay, Plaintiff will be spared responding to their own discovery which, as they describe
it, will be designed to “fully explore the universe of any potential claim.” (ECF No. 32 at 15.)
In Defendants’ view, a stay of discovery will delay or perhaps eliminate their need to request
production of every single text message, email, letter, and any other communication for nearly a
one-year period that in any way involved Plaintiff.” (Id.)
For his part, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ motions to dismiss are merely the garden
variety sort which this Court generally finds to be insufficient to support a discovery stay.
Further, he contends that he will be placed at a tactical disadvantage if discovery is delayed.
Finally, he argues that a stay will neither simplify the issues nor reduce any litigation burden
because his claims will proceed either in this court or a court in Texas or New York.
II.
“A district court has the inherent power to stay proceedings based on its authority to
manage its docket efficiently.” Ferrell v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., No. 1:01-CV-447, 2005 WL
2709623, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 21, 2005) (citing In re Airline Pilots Ass’n v. Miller, 523 U.S.
866, 880 (1998) (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55 (1936))). The Court,
however, “must tread carefully in granting a stay of proceedings since a party has a right to a
determination of its rights and liabilities without undue delay.” Ohio Envtl. Council v. U.S. Dist.
Ct., 565 F.2d 393, 396 (6th Cir. 1977) (citing Landis, 299 U.S. at 254–55).
In deciding whether to grant a stay, courts commonly consider the following factors: (1)
the stage of litigation; (2) whether the non-moving party will be unduly prejudiced or tactically
disadvantaged; (3) whether a stay simplifies the issues; and (4) whether the burden of litigation
on the parties and on the court is reduced. Grice Eng’g, Inc. v. JG Innovations, Inc., 691 F.
Supp. 2d 915, 920 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (citations omitted). The movant bears the burden of
showing both a need for delay and that “neither the other party nor the public will suffer harm
from entry of the order.” Ohio Envtl. Council, 565 F.2d at 396.
In exercising its discretion, the Court has found that filing a case-dispositive motion is
insufficient to grant a stay of discovery. Bowens v. Columbus Metro. Library Bd. of Trs., No.
2:10-CV-00219, 2010 WL 3719245, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 16, 2010) (citing Ohio Bell Tele. Co.,
Inc. v. Global NAPs Ohio, Inc., No. 2:06-CV-0549, 2008 WL 641252, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 4,
2008)) (denying the defendants’ motion to stay discovery despite their pending summary
judgment motion). Indeed, if a motion does not raise an issue “which would be substantially
vitiated absent a stay” and there is no showing that the case will “certainly be dismissed” then “a
stay should not ordinarily be granted to a party who has filed a garden-variety Rule 12(b)(6)
motion.” Williams v. New Day Farms, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-0394, 2010 WL 3522397, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Sept 7, 2010).
Nevertheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recognized that
“[l]imitations on pretrial discovery are appropriate where claims may be dismissed ‘based on
legal determinations that could not have been altered by any further discovery.’” Gettings v.
Bldg. Laborers Local 310 Fringe Benefits Fund, 349 F.3d 300, 304 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Muzquiz v. W.A. Foote Memorial Hosp., Inc., 70 F.3d 422, 430 (6th Cir. 1995)). This Court,
however, retains broad discretion in determining whether to “stay discovery until preliminary
questions which may dispose of the case are answered.” Bangas v. Potter, 145 F. App’x 139,
141 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 719 (6th Cir. 1999)). “At bottom,
‘a motion to stay discovery involves a pragmatic decision whether the possibility of saving the
time and expense of discovery justifies a delay in proceedings.’” Anderson v. Catalina
Structured Funding, Inc., No. 1:21-CV-197, 2021 WL 9000112, at *2 (W.D. Mich. July 1, 2021)
(quoting Romar Sales Corp. v. Seddon, No. 1:12-cv-838, 2013 WL 141133, at *2 (W.D. Mich.
Jan. 11, 2013)).
III.
Applying the above factors, the Court concludes that, under the unique circumstances
surrounding this case, it is a better exercise of its broad discretion to extend the temporary stay of
discovery previously entered. Admittedly, this Court repeatedly has held that a garden-variety
motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) ordinarily is insufficient to warrant a stay of discovery.
The Court considers each case on its own merit, however, and Defendants’ motions to dismiss in
the context of the surrounding circumstances, raise issues beyond the typical. That is, while the
resolution of the pending dispositive motions could dispose of this action, even short of that, the
resolution would clarify the issues presented, including necessary parties and proper venue.
Thus, from a pragmatic perspective, an additional short extension of the temporary stay pending
such resolution could preserve both judicial and counsel’s resources.
Moreover, the Court cannot perceive how Plaintiff will be unduly prejudiced or tactically
disadvantaged by a short extension of the stay designed to simplify the discovery process. The
Court recognizes that Plaintiff argues both points in opposing a stay. His objections, however,
are largely conclusory and therefore ring hollow. For example, he argues that Defendants “raise
a number of factual arguments in an effort to obtain dismissal.” (ECF No. 34 at 10.)
Nevertheless, he does not suggest that he lacks the information necessary to properly respond to
the motions to dismiss. Indeed, he filed his response to those motions prior to Defendants’
having filed their motion to stay. (See ECF No. 30 filed February 13, 2023.) Further, Plaintiff
does not describe with any specificity the nature of any claimed tactical disadvantage. Notably,
he does not assert any change in the status quo.
With respect to the remaining factors, as Plaintiff acknowledges, this case is “relatively
early in the litigation process.” (ECF No. 34 at 10.) Indeed, in light of the pending dispositive
motions and the agreed stay of discovery, a case schedule is yet to be set. Thus, this case
remains in its initial stages. Finally, Plaintiff asserts that discovery should proceed because it
will occur at some point. To the extent that this may turn out to be true, that single factor,
standing alone, is an insufficient basis for denying a stay when weighed against all the other
factors present in this case. Moreover, as discussed, any potential discovery will be undertaken
with a clarified scope thereby conserving both judicial and the parties’ resources.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendants have carried their burden to
show that a stay of discovery is warranted under the particular and limited circumstances
presented by this case. The Court, therefore, exercises its broad discretion to extend the
temporary stay of discovery previously entered. Accordingly, the Motion to Stay Discovery is
GRANTED. (ECF No. 32.) The temporary stay is extended until SEPTEMBER 30, 2023, or
until the motions to dismiss are resolved, whichever is earlier.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: June 26, 2023 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers .
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE