Pillar Title Agency v. Pei

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

PILLAR TITLE AGENCY, et al.,

Case No. 2:14-cv-525

Plaintiffs, JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

v. Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

YEZHE PEI, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to Defendant Yezhe Pei’s Motion to Expunge this

Case. (ECF No. 50.) For the reasons stated below, the Court DENIES Pei’s motion.

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On June 4, 2014, Plaintiffs James Blazek and Pillar Title Agency filed this action alleging,

among other things, defamation and libel after Pei made comments on two websites about his

former attorney. After litigating this action for a little over a year, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed

their Amended Complaint. (Mot. for Dismissal, ECF No. 49.)

On April 11, 2023, Pei, proceeding pro se, filed the pending Motion to Expunge this Case,

which asks the Court to “expunge the record of Case 2014-CV-525 from the Court’s docket and

the public record, pursuant to the applicable rules and procedures.” The Court construes this

request as a motion to seal the entire case file.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Sixth Circuit recognizes that “[t]he public has a strong interest in obtaining the

information contained in the court record.” Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d

1165, 1180 (6th Cir. 1983.) This interest rests on several grounds, including the public’s interest

“in ascertaining what evidence and records the District Court and this Court have relied upon in

reaching our decisions.” Id. at 1181. By protecting the public’s access to judicial records, courts

“serve[s] to promote trustworthiness of the judicial process, to curb judicial abuses, and to provide

the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a better perception

of its fairness.” S.E.C. v. Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d 845, 849 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting Littlejohn

v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, courts apply a “‘strong presumption

in favor of openness’ as to court records.” Shane Grp., Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 825 F.3d

299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179). The burden of

overcoming the “strong presumption in favor of openness” of court records is a heavy one: “‘Only

the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.’” Shane Grp., Inc. v.

Blue Cross Blue Shield, 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Knoxville News-Sentinel

Co., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983)).

The Sixth Circuit’s approach largely aligns with the Judicial Conference of the United

State’s policy articulating the limited circumstances in which an entire case should be sealed. See

Judicial Conference Policy on Sealed Cases, UNITED STATES COURTS,

https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/judicialconferencepolicyonsealedcivilcases2011.pdf

(last visited Apr. 12, 2023). While not binding, the policy statement encourages federal courts to

seal entire cases only when “required by statute or rule or justified by a showing of extraordinary

circumstances and the absence of narrower feasible and effective alternatives such as sealing

discrete documents or redacting information, so that sealing an entire case file is a last resort.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

In his motion, Pei asks the Court to “expunge the record of Case 2014-CV-525 from the

Court’s docket and the public record, pursuant to the applicable rules and procedures.” (ECF No.

50.) Pei provides the following reasons to justify his request: (1) this is a civil case that “was

resolved without any finding of liability or wrongdoing of [Pei]”; (2) given the limited number of

case records publicly available on the internet, “[r]eaders usually do not get a complete picture

about this case . . . and may easily have biased opinions about either party of this case”; (3) sealing

this case is “necessary to protect our privacy and prevent any harm or prejudice to our reputation”;

(4) “[t]he case involves personal and sensitive information that could be used against me or my

family, including my young children, and I would like to prevent this information from being

publicly available”; and (5) public access to this case may negatively impact Pei and Pei’s family’s

reputation. (Id.)

Pei has failed to carry his burden. His vague and conclusory allegations fall far short of

overcoming the “strong presumption in favor of openness” of court records. See Shane Grp., 825

F.3d at 305; see also Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179–80 (citing Joy v. North, 692 F.2d

880, 884 (2d Cir. 1982)) (“A naked conclusory statement that [disclosure will injure a producing

party] . . . falls woefully short of the kind of showing which raises even an arguable issue as to

whether it may be kept under seal.”).

The Court begins its analysis with Pei’s first justification, which misses the mark—that is,

Pei offers no compelling reason justifying why the public’s interest in accessing judicial records

should yield to his interest in privacy simply because no liability arose from this action. Despite

this case resolving without a finding of liability, the Court still issued multiple orders, including a

ruling on Pei’s motions to dismiss and motion for sanctions. (See ECF Nos. 6, 8, 11, 18, 21, 30,

39, 45, 47.) By maintaining access to these records, the Court promotes the public’s interest “in

ascertaining what evidence and records the District Court . . . relied upon in reaching [its]

decision,” see Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1181, and the Court provides “the public with a

more complete understanding of the judicial system, including a better perception of its fairness.”

See Van Waeyenberghe, 990 F.2d at 849.

Pei’s second, third, and fifth grounds fail not only because they are vague and conclusory,

but also because they largely concern potential reputational damage stemming from this litigation.

The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly held that harm to one’s reputation does not outweigh the public’s

interest in access to court records. See Kiwewa v. Postmaster Gen. of United States, No. 18-3807,

2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 9050, 2019 WL 4122013, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 26, 2019) (“Harm to

reputation is insufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of public access . . . .”);

Rudd Equip. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co., 834 F.3d 589, 591 (6th Cir. 2016)

(“Simply showing that the information would harm the company’s reputation is not sufficient to

overcome the strong common law presumption in favor of public access to court proceedings and

records”); Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The

private litigants’ interest in protecting their vanity or their commercial self-interest simply does

not qualify as grounds for imposing a prior restraint. It is not even grounds for keeping the

information under seal . . . .”).

Finally, Pei’s fourth reason similarly fails due to its conclusory nature. Simply alleging that

personal information could be used against Pei or his family, without anything more, is “[a] naked

conclusory statement that . . . falls woefully short” of the compelling justification necessary to

warrant sealing this case. See Brown & Williamson, 710 F.2d at 1179–80.

In sum, after carefully reviewing Pei’s motion, the Court concludes that the public interest

in full access to the work of this Court outweighs Pei’s private interest in barring continued public

access. Pei has failed to demonstrate any interest compelling enough to overcome the presumptive

right of public access to this civil action; therefore, the Court DENIES Pei’s motion.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Defendant Pei’s Motion to Expunge this

Case. (ECF No. 50.)

This case remains closed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

4/13/2023 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE