Hall v. Chambers Smith

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

DAVID HALL, :

:

Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:21-cv-01135

:

v. : Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

:

ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al., : Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry

:

Defendants. :

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the court on Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry’s Report and

Recommendation (ECF No. 45), which recommended that this Court deny Plaintiff’s Motion for

Leave to File Amended Complaint (ECF No. 39). For the reasons set forth more fully below, this

Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 46) and ADOPTS WITH

MODIFICATIONS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 45).

Plaintiff’s motion for leave is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff David Hall is an inmate at North Central Correctional Complex (“NCCC”),

serving a prison sentence of twenty-six (26) years to life for murder and felonious assault. (R. &

R. at 1, 2, ECF No. 45) (citing Defs.’ Reply Br. at 2, ECF No. 20). Proceeding without the

assistance of counsel, Hall brings this civil rights action against: Annette Chambers-Smith, the

director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”); Cynthia Mausser,

the Deputy Director of ODRC’s Division of Parole and Community Service; Jim Bedra, a former

member of the ODRC Parole Board; and John Does, unknown Parole Board members and other

officials. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1).

Hall was convicted in 1992 of felonious assault while on parole. For the felonious assault,

he was sentenced to a term of eleven (11) to fifteen (15) years, aggregated with his earlier murder

sentence of 26 years to life. (See R. & R. at 2, ECF No. 45). Since 1992, he has been denied

parole sixteen times. (Id.). His suit alleges that the parole guidelines are racist, that he has suffered

from retaliation for prior lawsuits, and that Defendants have violated the ex post facto clause of

the Constitution in changing parole guidelines and statutes. (Id.).

All but one claim (the ex post facto claim relating to the parole guideline changed in May

2019) was dismissed by this Court on March 31, 2022. (See Order, ECF No. 37). Hall now seeks

to amend his Complaint to add a claim for false imprisonment, on the basis that his sentence for

felonious conviction ended in July 2006 and his continued imprisonment since then has been

unlawful. (See R. & R. at 2, ECF No. 45). Defendants oppose Hall’s request for leave. The

Magistrate Judge recommended denying Hall’s motion for leave, to which Hall timely objected.

The matter is now ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

If a party objects within 14 days to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and

recommendations, the district court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the

report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The district court may “accept, reject or modify the

recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate with

instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). On the other hand, if a party fails to object timely to the

magistrate’s recommendation, that party waives the right to de novo review by the district court

of the report and recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It does not

appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s factual or legal

conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those

findings.”).

A party’s objection should be specific, identify the issues of contention, and “be clear

enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.”

Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995). The onus is on the objecting party “to pinpoint

those portions of the magistrate’s report that the district court must specially consider.” Mira v.

Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 637 (6th Cir. 1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted). When a

pleader fails to raise specific issues, the district court will consider this to be “a general objection

to the entirety of the magistrate report, [which] has the same effects as would a failure to object.”

Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), a plaintiff may amend her complaint once as a matter of

course within 21 days of service or, after the 21-day period has expired, with the written consent

of the opposing party or by leave of Court. Here, Defendants have not consented to Hall’s motion

for leave. Thus, Hall’s desired amendment must be authorized by the Court, which retains broad

discretion to grant or deny a motion to amend and is instructed to “freely give leave when justice

so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Factors to be considered by the Court include “undue delay

in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to

cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of

amendment.” Brumbalough v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 427 U.S. 996, 1001 (6th Cir. 2005). An

amended complaint is considered futile if the amended or added claims would not survive a motion

to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See Doe v. Mich. State Univ., 989

F.3d 418, 427 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing Rose v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 420

(6th Cir. 2000)).

In the Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge Gentry recommended that the Court

deny Hall’s motion for leave to amend on the basis that amendment would be futile as time-barred.

Because a claim of false imprisonment under state law must be filed first in the state Court of

Claims, see Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.02(F), which Hall has not done, the Magistrate Judge analyzed

his false amendment claim as a federal claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth

Amendment.1 Of course, “a prerequisite to bringing a § 1983 claim . . . is that it must be brought

within the applicable statute of limitations period.” Hollis v. Erdos, 480 F. Supp. 3d 823, 829 (S.D.

Ohio 2020). The length of the statute of limitations period is governed by state law—in Ohio, “the

appropriate statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights actions . . . is contained in Ohio

Rev. Code § 2305.10, which requires that all actions for bodily injury be filed within two years

after their accrual,” Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc)—but

federal law dictates when the period accrues or begins to run. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,

388 (2007).

The accrual date is ordinarily determined by “when the plaintiff knows or has reason to

know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” Edison v. Tenn. Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., 510

F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. Cnty. of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 519 (6th

Cir. 1997)). The Supreme Court has explained that, because “false imprisonment consists of

1 One of Hall’s objections is that he believes the false imprisonment claim sounds in the Fourteenth

Amendment, rather than the Fourth Amendment; thus, he takes issue with Magistrate Judge Gentry’s discussion of

the Fourth Amendment in her Report and Recommendation, when it has not been mentioned in Hall’s motion for

leave. (See Obj. at 6–7, ECF No. 46). While it is true that the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to enforce the provisions

of the Fourteenth Amendment, claims pursuant to § 1983 must allege the deprivation of a right, privilege, or immunity

secured by the Constitution or federal laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For a claim of false imprisonment, that right

sounds in the Fourth Amendment, see Wallace, 549 U.S. at 386, which is why the Magistrate Judge analyzed Hall’s

false imprisonment claim through the lens of the Fourth Amendment.

detention without legal process,” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389, it does not end when the prisoner is

released from custody but “much earlier, when legal process was initiated against him.” Id. at 390.

Once legal process is initiated, the prisoner’s injury is transformed into a claim of malicious

prosecution, “which remedies detention accompanied, not by absence of legal process, but by

wrongful institution of legal process.” Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). Thus, a §

1983 claim of false imprisonment accrues, and the statute of limitations period begins to run

barring any tolling events, when the alleged false imprisonment ends—that is, when legal process

is initiated and the plaintiff is held pursuant to that process. Id. at 389.

Here, Magistrate Judge Gentry noted that Hall should have known of his false

imprisonment claim in July 2006, when he alleges that his prison sentence for the felonious assault

conviction expired; as such, the statute of limitations for his claim expired in July 2008. (See R.

& R. at 5, ECF No. 45). Hall disagrees, arguing that his false imprisonment has not yet ended

because he is still detained, and thus that his claim has not accrued, even though he has been aware

that he is falsely imprisoned for 16 years. (See Obj. at 3, ECF No. 46) (citing Wallace, 549 U.S.

at 388).

In keeping with the liberal construction afforded to pro se litigants, see Williams v. Curtin,

631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that pleadings from pro se litigants are subject to “less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and therefore should be liberally

construed” (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004))), the Court understands

Hall’s Objection as arguing that his claim is more properly construed as an overdetention claim—

i.e., that he continued to be detained even after his jail term expired—rather than as a typical false

imprisonment claim, which entails detention from a false arrest. See, e.g., Streit v. Cnty. of Los

Angeles, 236 F.3d 552, 563 (9th Cir. 2001); Rhoades v. Tilley, 2022 WL 684576, at *2 (6th Cir.

Mar. 8, 2022). After all, the crux of Hall’s allegations is that he is still imprisoned even though

his sentence for the felonious assault conviction ended; at no point was he subject to further legal

process. Thus, his claim is not time-barred because he has not been subject to legal process after

the end of his felonious assault sentence, which would have ended his alleged false imprisonment

and triggered the statute of limitations period. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (“Limitations begin

to run against an action for false imprisonment when the alleged false imprisonment ends.”

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).

Of course, he was not released after that sentence ended because of his additional sentence

for murder, which included an indefinite term. See Offender Details: David Hall, OHIO DEP’T OF

REHAB. & CORR., https://appgateway.drc.ohio.gov/OffenderSearch/Search/Details/A256570.

Prior to 1996, under the previous version of Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.41(B), “sentences for crimes

committed while on parole [had to] be served consecutively to sentences committed before the

parole violation.” Davis v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-4589, ¶ 15, 2014 WL

506848, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting State ex rel. Thompson

v. Kelly, 137 Ohio St.3d 32, 2013-Ohio-2444, ¶ 8, 997 N.E.2d 498, 499 (Ohio 2013)). In other

words, a crime committed on parole would typically reinstate the earlier sentence (i.e., the new

sentence is “aggregated” with the previous sentence); if the earlier sentence had an indefinite term

while the new crime carried a definite term, “the prisoner must serve the definite term first,

followed by the indefinite term.” Id. (internal citations omitted). And this appears to be what

happened in Hall’s case: his prior sentence for murder was aggregated with his sentence for

felonious assault, with the indefinite sentence tolled pending the duration of the definite sentence.

(See Ex. 2 to Am. Compl., ECF No. 39-3 at 6, 7). Thus, Hall remains in prison not because he has

been unlawfully held over from his definite sentence for felonious assault, but pursuant to the

indefinite sentence for murder. (See Obj. at 4–5, ECF No. 46).

Hall suggests that the murder sentence is inapplicable because he never had a revocation

hearing prior. He recounts that he was returned to prison on May 5, 1992, for the felonious assault

conviction and had to wait until December of that year to speak to officers of the Parole Board,

who asked him to waive his right to a revocation hearing. (See Am. Compl. at 2, ECF No. 39-3).

When he refused to waive his right, the Parole Board allegedly revoked his parole anyway and

aggregated his sentences without a hearing. (Id.). Ohio law does not require an individual hearing

for the revocation of parole based on a subsequent conviction; instead, that authority is placed in

the discretion of the Ohio Adult Parole Authority (“OAPA”). See Kellogg v. Shoemaker, 46 F.3d

503, 507 (6th Cir. 1995). Prior to September 1, 1992, the implementing regulations issued by

OAPA mandated that all parolees be given a “meaningful” hearing prior to the revocation of

parole—including to parolees who had been convicted for a new crime (though with a presumption

that they had violated parole). See id. at 505. That changed after September 1, 1992, when new

OAPA regulations no longer required a hearing if the parolee was convicted of a new crime by an

Ohio court. Id. at 506. The new regulations, however, did not apply to any parolee who had

committed her initial crime prior to September 1, 1992. See id. at 510. Thus, the new regulations

would not have applied to Hall, because his crimes occurred before the new regulations were

enacted; under the old regulations, “a parolee convicted of a subsequent crime is entitled to a parole

revocation hearing if he requests it.” Moss v. Patterson, 555 F.2d 137, 139 (6th Cir. 1977); see

also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480–82 (1972).

But, while Hall’s allegations of being denied a revocation hearing may support a claim for

a violation of due process, they provide no basis for a claim of false imprisonment (or for

overdetention); the two sentences were indisputably aggregated by the parole authorities, as Hall

himself concedes—thus requiring Hall serve his indefinite sentence after the conclusion of his

definite sentence in 2006. As he is being held pursuant to his conviction for murder, permitting

amendment to add the false imprisonment claim would be futile.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Objection (ECF No. 46) is OVERRULED. This Court ADOPTS

WITH MODIFICATIONS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 45).

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (ECF No. 38) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

ALGENON L. MARBLEY

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: March 22, 2023