The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
DAVID HALL, : Case No. 2:21-cv-01135
:
Plaintiff, : Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley
: Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
vs. :
:
ANNETTE CHAMBERS SMITH, et al.,
:
Defendants. :
:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This matter is before the undersigned on Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time
for Leave to Amend Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 38) and Motion for Leave to File
Amended Complaint (Doc. 39). Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension is GRANTED. For the
reasons set forth below, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Leave be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, a pro se prisoner currently incarcerated at North Central Correctional
Complex (“NCCC”), filed this civil rights action against the Director of the Ohio
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), Annette Chambers-Smith;
Deputy Director of ODRC’s Division of Parole and Community Service, Cynthia
Mausser; former ODRC Ohio Parole Board Member Jim Bedra; and John Does,
unknown Parole Members, Board Members, or other officials. (Doc. 1).
Plaintiff is currently serving a prison sentence of twenty-six years to life for
murder and felonious assault. (Doc. 20 at 2.) He was convicted of felonious assault while
on parole in 1992 and was sentenced to a term of eleven to fifteen years, which was
aggregated with his earlier murder conviction. (Doc. 1 at 21.) Plaintiff states that since
his parole was revoked in 1992, he has been denied parole sixteen times. (Id. at 15.) In
this case, Plaintiff alleges that he was denied parole under racist parole guidelines and
due to retaliation for filing prior lawsuits. (Id. at 13.) He also alleges that Defendants
unlawfully applied changing parole guidelines and statutes in violation of the ex post
facto clause of the Constitution. (Id. at 15.)
Defendants previously moved to dismiss the Complaint and the Court granted
most of that Motion. Specifically, the Court dismissed all claims against Defendants in
their official capacity; all due process claims; all equal protection claims; all retaliation
claims; all claims against Defendant Bedra; and most of his ex post facto claims relating
to changed parole guidelines. (Doc. 37 at PageID 247.) The sole remaining claim is an ex
post facto claim relating to the parole guideline that changed in May 2019, which is the
only ex post facto claim asserted within the two-year statute of limitations. (Doc. 26).
Plaintiff now seeks to amend his Complaint to add a claim for false imprisonment.
Specifically, he argues that he “will demonstrate his conviction and sentence on felonious
assault expired in July of 2006, and his parole on his murder conviction and sentence has
not been revoked leaving no colorable reason(s) for his confinement.” (Doc. 39 at PageID
250). Defendants have opposed the Motion for Leave. (Doc. 42).
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard For Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 Motions to Amend
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) governs a plaintiff’s ability to amend the
complaint. A complaint may be amended once as a matter of course within 21 days of
service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). If a plaintiff wishes to amend the complaint after the
21-day period has expired, then he must obtain written consent of the opposing party or
leave of Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
The granting or denial of a motion to amend pursuant to Rule 15(a) is within the
discretion of the trial court. Leave to amend a complaint should be liberally granted, Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), and this Court “should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “In deciding whether to grant a motion to amend, courts
should consider undue delay in filing, lack of notice to the opposing party, bad faith by the
moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, undue
prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.” Brumbalough v. Camelot Care
Ctrs., Inc., 427 F.3d 996, 1001 (6th Cir. 2005). The test for futility is whether the amended
complaint could survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Rose v. Hartford Underwriters
Ins. Co., 203 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2000).
B. Legal Standard For Fourth Amendment Claim For False Imprisonment
As Defendants point out, Ohio law bars Plaintiff from asserting a state-law claim
for false imprisonment against them before he files suit in the Ohio Claims Court and
litigates the issue of Defendants’ entitlement to qualified immunity. See Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2743.02(F). The Court will therefore construe Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim as a
federal claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
individuals will “be arrested only upon probable cause.” Crockett v. Cumberland Coll.,
316 F.3d 571, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2003). “Claims of false arrest and false imprisonment
under Section 1983 overlap, with false arrest being a species of false imprisonment.”
Kanu v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:19-cv-156, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37293, *22 (S.D.
Ohio Mar. 1, 2021) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). False
imprisonment is “detention without legal process” and “necessarily ends when the
individual becomes held pursuant to legal process,” such as being indicted. Id. at *22-23.
To plead and prove a cause of action for false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, a plaintiff must show that he was detained without legal process. Id. at *23.
C. Plaintiff’s Proposed False Imprisonment Claim Is Futile Because It Is
Barred By The Applicable Two-Year Statute Of Limitations
Plaintiff’s federal false imprisonment claim is time-barred by the two-year statute
of limitations that applies to claims brought in Ohio federal courts under Section 1983.
See Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 989, 992 (6th Cir. 1989) (citing Ohio Rev. Code
§ 2305.10). A claim under Section 1983 accrues when the plaintiff knows or should know
of the injury that gives rise to it. Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007).
The Court determines the accrual date by “look[ing] to what event should have alerted
the typical lay person to protect his or her rights.” Edison v. Tenn. Dept. of Children’s
Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 635 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that “his conviction and sentence on felonious assault
expired in July of 2006, and his parole on his murder conviction and sentence has not
been revoked leaving no colorable reason(s) for his confinement.” (Doc. 39 at PageID
250). Because Plaintiff should have known of this claim in July 2006, the two-year
statute of limitations began to run at that time and expired in July 2008. This claim is
therefore time-barred and would be dismissed on that basis if it were asserted. Since it
would be futile to allow Plaintiff to amend his Complaint to add this claim, the
undersigned recommends that his request for leave be denied with prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension (Doc. 38) is
GRANTED. Further, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave
(Doc. 39) be DENIED with prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
United States Magistrate Judge
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after
being served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d),
this period is extended to SEVENTEEN days if this Report is being served by one of the
methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), or (F). Such objections shall
specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is
based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the
objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions
of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof.
Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on
appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947,
949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).