Brown v. Dominion Management Services LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JEANETTE BROWN,

Case No. 1:23-cv-10

Plaintiff,

Dlott, J.

v. Bowman, M.J.

DOMINION MANAGEMENT SERVICES LLC,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

By separate Order issued this date, Plaintiff Jeanette Brown has been granted

leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The complaint itself is

now before the Court for a sua sponte review to determine whether the complaint, or any

portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons that follow, the

undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed.

I. General Screening Authority

Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31

(1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous

when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or

law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898

F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the

defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which

clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis

when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly

incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept

as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for

frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S.

at 328).

Congress has also authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints which fail to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii).

Although a plaintiff's pro se complaint must be “liberally construed” and “held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” the complaint must “give

the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it

rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v.

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted)). The complaint “must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

570); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010)(“dismissal standard

articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept

all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,

478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual

allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading

that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders

“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557.

II. Analysis

Plaintiff’s complaint identifies two Defendants: (1) Dominion Management Services

LLC c/o CT Corporation Systems, Registered Agent, and (2) Tina – LNM Property

Manager.1 (Doc. 1-1 at 2, PageID 5). Plaintiff does not identify any specific basis for her

claims or for jurisdiction in this Court. Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” is as follows:

March 2019 went to apply for housing – come back

April 2019 – come back

May 2019 – come back

August 2019 come back

Sept 2019

Jan 2020 Received – filled out – never heard anything in shelter, called

person (Tina) was in email, removed me from a list I was never on. Black

over 55 – disability. I came to office 5 times to get application she denied

me 5 times lied said I was on wait list to hud [sic] but said I was removed

for what? [Illegible] filed complaint 2/21 → with hud – complaint accepted –

discrimination was sent o t [sic] OCR – housing discrimination.

Called March 8, 2021 –

Age

Race

Disability

Filed complaint

One said Tina, was in email of Jeanette Brown

1The address that Plaintiff provides for Defendant “Tina” corresponds with the address of “Courtyard

Apartments,” a development designed for adults aged 62 years and older. See https://www.courtyard-

apartments.com/ (accessed on January 9, 2023).

Screen shot

Turned away 1 year for housing

Rebutted –

Called 721 – Home several times complaints of Tina being a disgrace to

tenets [sic].

(Doc. 1-1 at 3, PageID 6). As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary compensation for being

“homeless in my own city 3 years.” (Doc. 1-1 at 4, PageID 7). She seeks “[j]ust

compensation for 3 years of losing monies, staying in shelters, losing all personal items.

Compensation $1,863,000.00. Asking will go lower if necessary.” (Id.)

The undersigned liberally construes Plaintiff’s complaint as alleging that the two

named Defendants took some type of action in violation of her federal civil rights.

Although no specific federal laws are referenced, the undersigned reasonably construes

the complaint as arising under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1982 and/or the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C.

§3601 et seq. The undersigned further infers that Plaintiff believes that she faced some

form of housing discrimination based upon her protected status as a black female over

the age of 55 with some form of disability.

Despite the undersigned’s liberal construction of her complaint, Plaintiff has failed

to allege sufficient factual “detail from which this Court can discern any conceivable claim”

against either of the named Defendants. Instead, the complaint offers nothing “more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). For example, the allegations against Defendant

“Tina” allege that she removed Plaintiff from some type of “list” on an unknown date,

and/or failed to give Plaintiff an “application” and/or “lied” about Plaintiff being on some

type of wait list on unknown dates. None of these vague and conclusory allegations are

sufficient to give rise to an inference of discrimination, and none are sufficient to state any

claim against “Tina” as a matter of law. Additionally, the complaint contains no allegations

at all against Defendant Dominion Management Services LLC

At the pleading stage, “broad and conclusory allegations of discrimination cannot

be the basis of a complaint and a plaintiff must state allegations that plausibly give rise to

the inference that a defendant acted as the plaintiff claims.” HDC, LLC v. City of Ann

Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 614 (6th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). Therefore, a “complaint that

includes only conclusory allegations of discriminatory intent without supporting factual

allegations does not sufficiently show entitlement to relief.” Id.; accord Franco-Ward v.

Nations Credit Corp., 2000 WL 875894 (6th Cir., June 20, 2000) (affirming dismissal of

retaliation and intimidation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 3617, because plaintiffs' allegations

of racial discrimination were conclusory and unsupported by factual allegations to support

claims); see also McQueen v. City of Cincinnati, 2020 WL 6557590, at *3 (S.D. Ohio, Nov.

9, 2020), adopted at 2021 WL 1909765 (S.D. Ohio May 12, 2021). (“To the extent that

Plaintiff intended to state some form of claim under the Fair Housing Act or under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, she fails to include any factual content or context from which the Court

may reasonably infer that any of the identified Defendants discriminated against her in

violation of the Fair Housing Act or otherwise violated any of Plaintiff's federal or

constitutional rights.”).

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

Plaintiff’s allegations lack sufficient factual detail to state any plausible claim

against either of the two named Defendants. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT

this case be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on

which relief may be granted.

s/Stephanie K. Bowman____

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Magistrate Judge

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JEANETTE BROWN,

Case No. 1:23-cv-10

Plaintiff,

Dlott, J.

v. Bowman, M.J.

DOMINION MANAGEMENT SERVICES LLC,

Defendants.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written

objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of

the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely

motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s)

of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support

of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN

(14) DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections

in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474

U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).