Courthouse News Service v. O'Shaughnessy

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE,

Plaintiff,

:

v. Case No. 2:22-cv-2471

Judge Sarah D. Morrison

MARYELLEN O’SHAUGHNESSY, Magistrate Judge Chelsey M.

in her official capacity as Clerk Vascura

of the Franklin County Court of

:

Common Pleas,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court for consideration of Defendant Maryellen

O’Shaughnessy’s Motion to Dismiss. (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff

Courthouse News Service responded (Resp., ECF No. 17), and Ms. O’Shaughnessy

replied (Reply, ECF No. 18). This matter is now ripe for consideration. For the

reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

Courthouse News Service reports on trial and appellate court proceedings

nationwide. (Compl. ¶ 18, ECF No. 1.) Ms. O’Shaughnessy is the Clerk of the

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (“FCCCP”). (Id. ¶ 19.) She is responsible

for the administration of court records at FCCCP, among other things. (Id.) In 2011,

she implemented the FCCCP’s electronic filing system. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 44.)

FCCCP uses its electronic filing system to publish the non-confidential civil

complaints it receives. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 4.) The electronic filing system allows the public

and press to view these complaints. (Id. ¶ 4.) According to FCCCP’s Eighth

Amended Administrative E-Filing Order issued in 2021, “[a]ll documents submitted

for e-Filing shall be confidential until accepted by the Clerk.” (ECF No. 1-1.) The

Clerk “accepts” a complaint only after a staff clerk reviews “the data and documents

to ensure their compliance with Court rules, policies and procedures.” (Id.) After the

Clerk accepts the document, it is published. (Id.)

Prior to 2011 and the implementation of the electronic filing system, FCCCP

gave the press access to hard copies of newly filed complaints. (Compl. ¶ 41.) Filers

would bring their complaints to the intake counter at the Clerk’s office; the intake

clerk would stamp the document with the date and time of receipt and place a copy

on a desk for the press to review. (Id. ¶¶ 42, 43.)

In 2021, Courthouse News Service corresponded with FCCCP staff to express

its concern that the electronic filing system delayed publication of new complaints

and proposed a new filing method. (Id. ¶ 23.) FCCCP declined to implement the

suggested changes. (Id. ¶ 27.)

On June 13, 2022, Courthouse News Service filed its Complaint against Ms.

O’Shaughnessy in her official capacity, alleging violations of the First and

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Civil Rights

Act, Title 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, et seq., and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief.

(Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.) Courthouse News Service alleges that FCCCP’s electronic filing

system delays publication thereby restricting the press’s and public’s First

Amendment qualified right to access new complaints. (Id. ¶ 6.) Ms. O’Shaughnessy

moves to dismiss the Complaint arguing that this Court should abstain from

exercising subject matter jurisdiction due to the equity, comity, and federalism

considerations underpinning the Younger abstention doctrine. (Mot. to Dismiss at 3,

citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).

II. ANALYSIS

This case does not involve issues of first impression. Over the last decade,

Courthouse News Service filed numerous lawsuits nearly identical to the instant

case. In those proceedings, it challenged the constitutionality of delayed publication

systems employed by various courts around the country. Oftentimes, the defendants

in those cases filed motions to dismiss on abstention grounds, as Ms.

O’Shaughnessy did in the instant case. Most courts denied the motions to dismiss.

See generally Courthouse News Serv. v. N.M. Admin. Off. of the Cts., No. 21-2135,

2022 WL 17171402 (10th Cir. Nov. 23, 2022); Courthouse News Serv. v. Parikh, No.

1:21-cv-00197, 2022 WL 4368172 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 21, 2022) (Barrett, J.);

Courthouse News Serv. v. Gilmer, 48 F.4th 908 (8th Cir. 2022); Courthouse News

Serv. v. Forman, No. 4:22cv106, 2022 WL 1405907 (N.D. Fla. May 4, 2022);

Courthouse News Serv. v. Omundson, No. 1:21-cv-00305, 2022 WL 1125357 (D.

Idaho Apr. 14, 2022); Courthouse News Serv. v. Price, No. 1:20-cv-1260, 2021 WL

5567748 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 29, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL

6276311 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 15, 2021); Courthouse News Serv. v. Gabel, No. 2:21-cv-

000132, 2021 WL 5416650 (D. Vt. Nov. 19, 2021); Courthouse News Serv. v. N.M.

Admin. Off. of the Cts., 566 F. Supp. 3d 1121 (D.N.M. 2021); Courthouse News Serv.

v. Schaefer, 2 F.4th 318 (4th Cir. 2021); Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 947 F.3d

581 (9th Cir. 2020); Courthouse News Serv. v. Schaeffer, 429 F. Supp. 3d 196 (E.D.

Va. 2019); Courthouse News Serv. v. Tingling, No. 16 Civ. 8742, 2016 WL 8739010

(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2016); Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776 (9th Cir.

2014) (“Planet I”).

Not every court, however, has agreed with the majority approach. The

Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Courthouse News Serv. v. Brown and the

Eastern District of Missouri in Courthouse News Serv. v. Gilmer granted the

defendants’ motions to dismiss reasoning that equity, comity, and federalism

warranted a federal court’s abstention from interpreting state court complaint

publication policies. See generally Brown, 908 F.3d 1063 (7th Cir. 2018); Gilmer, 543

F. Supp. 3d 759 (E.D. Mo. 2021). Despite these holdings, both courts acknowledged

that the cases did not satisfy the specific Younger abstention requirements. Brown,

908 F.3d at 1072 (“The situation here is not a traditional Younger scenario”);

Gilmer, 543 F. Supp. 3d at 768 (“the facts of case do not fit into the four abstention

doctrines”). And since Ms. O’Shaughnessy filed her Motion to Dismiss, the Eighth

Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded Gilmer. See 48 F.4th at 914

(“Gilmer and Lloyd cannot point to any ‘parallel, pending state . . . proceeding,’

much less one that falls within one of Younger’s three categories,” “there is no risk

that a decision in Courthouse News’s favor would interrupt any state-court

proceeding,” “abstention does not apply”). The Court agrees with Courthouse News

Service’s descriptor and considers Brown the “outlier.” (Resp. at 6.)

For the reasons articulated below, the Court is unpersuaded by the Seventh

Circuit’s reasoning in Brown; rather, it finds the majority approach persuasive and

follows suit.

A. The instant case fails to satisfy the Younger abstention

requirements.

Ms. O’Shaughnessy has moved to dismiss Courthouse News Service’s

complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Mot. to Dismiss at

1.) Ms. O’Shaughnessy argues the Court should abstain from hearing the merits of

the case pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine. (Id. at 1, 6.)

“Younger abstention requires a federal court to abstain from granting

injunctive or declaratory relief that would interfere with pending state judicial

proceedings.” O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 643 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Younger,

401 U.S. at 40–41). As the Sixth Circuit explained: “Younger abstention derives

from a desire to prevent federal courts from interfering with the functions of state

criminal prosecutions and to preserve equity and comity.” Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860

F.3d 365, 368 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44).

The Supreme Court extended Younger to civil enforcement actions “akin to a

criminal prosecution,” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592–93, 604 (1975), and to

suits challenging “the core of the administration of a State’s judicial system.”

Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 335 (1977). Younger abstention is limited to these

“three exceptional categories” of cases: (1) “parallel, pending state criminal

proceeding[s]”; (2) “state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions”;

and (3) state civil proceedings that “implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the

orders and judgments of its courts.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69,

72–73 (2013); see also O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 500 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode,

423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976).

Ms. O’Shaughnessy fails to assert which Younger abstention category applies

and how the Younger abstention requirements are met. (See generally Mot. to

Dismiss, Reply.) Rather, she argues that the underlying principles of abstention,

including equity, comity, and federalism, justify this Court’s dismissal of the case;

she relies on Gottfried v. Medical Planning Services, Inc., in which the Sixth Circuit

Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s abstention even though that case did

not fit squarely into abstention requirements. (Mot. to Dismiss at 6–7, citing

Gottfried, 142 F.3d 326 (6th Cir. 1998).) The court’s decision to abstain in Gottfried

turned on facts distinguishable from the instant case.

In Gottfried, the Sixth Circuit applied the Pullman abstention doctrine to

conclude that “a federal court should abstain when a nonparty to a state court

injunction brings a First Amendment challenge to the injunction in federal court

before requesting relief from the state court.” Id. at 332. This case does not involve a

nonparty or a state court injunction. Additionally, Pullman abstention requires that

“the case touches on a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts

ought not enter.” Planet I, 750 F.3d at 783 (citation omitted). First Amendment

claims, such as the one at issue here, almost never satisfy this requirement

“because the guarantee of free expression is always an area of particular federal

concern.” Id. at 784 (citation omitted). The applicable analysis in the instant case is

the Younger abstention doctrine.

This case does not satisfy any of the three Younger abstention categories, and

the Court will not extend the Supreme Court’s carefully-crafted abstention

doctrines to this case. As this Court has already ruled in a virtually identical case:

This case does not involve state criminal prosecutions or civil

enforcement proceedings, thus the first two Younger categories can be

readily dismissed. As for the third category, no “orders” are at issue here.

Plaintiff’s allegations target only the clerical processing of complaints.

Moreover, as shown above, complaint processing is a ministerial,

administrative function, not a practice “uniquely in furtherance of the

state courts’ ability to perform their judicial functions.” Sprint

Commc’ns, 571 U.S. at 73, 134 S. Ct. 584. This case thus presents none

of the “exceptional” Younger categories, and unlike the courts

in Brown and Gilmer, this Court will not invoke “general principles of

federalism, comity, and equity” to force Younger beyond its defined

scope. 908 F.3d at 1071.

Courthouse News Serv. v. Parikh, 2022 WL 4368172, at *4 (quoting Courthouse

News Serv. v. Forman, 2022 WL 1405907, at *10). This reasoning is persuasive and

the Court adopts it in full here.

B. Federal courts have a duty to hear federal questions.

Ms. O’Shaughnessy also argues that state courts are best equipped to

interpret their own rules and should have the first chance to do so. (Mot. to Dismiss

at 6.) She contends that this Court’s ruling on proper state court procedures would

lead to federal oversight and intrusion because many state courts throughout Ohio

employ a delayed publication system. (Id. at 8.) However, these concerns do not

outweigh the duty this Court has to hear federal question cases, particularly in a

case that does not satisfy the Younger abstention requirements. See Planet I, 750

F.3d at 779 (holding that the Younger abstention doctrine does not apply because

the case “presents an important First Amendment question . . . that should be

decided by the federal courts”); Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 688 (6th Cir.

2016) (“In the absence of an ongoing enforcement action, Younger has no role to

play, leaving us with authority, indeed an obligation, to resolve the case.”).

Federal courts have a duty to hear federal questions and “have no more right

to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not

given.” New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350,

358 (1989) (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 404 (1821)). Therefore,

“[f]ederal courts are to treat Younger as a limited carve-out to federal courts’

‘virtually unflagging obligation’ to exercise their jurisdiction.” Hill v. Snyder, 878

F.3d 193, 205 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203

(1988)). Federal courts analyzing an abstention argument are “not to find some

substantial reason for the exercise of federal jurisdiction by the district court;

rather, the task is to ascertain whether there exist ‘exceptional’ circumstances, the

‘clearest of justifications’ that can suffice . . . to justify the surrender of that

jurisdiction.” Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 25–

26 (1983) (emphasis original).

In light of these binding principles, the additional arguments that Ms.

O’Shaughnessy advances do not alter this Court’s duty to hear federal question

cases or the requirements necessary to invoke the Younger abstention doctrine.

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, the Motion (ECF No. 16) is DENIED.

Defendant shall respond to the Motion for Preliminary Injunction (ECF No.

3) within 21 days of the date of this Order. Any reply shall be filed within 10 days of

the response.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sarah D. Morrison

SARAH D. MORRISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE