The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
JERMEAL WHITE, Case No. 1:19-cv-1007
Plaintiff,
Dlott, J.
vs Bowman, M.J.
WARDEN RON ERDOS, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This civil action is now before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 86) and Defendant Corrections Officer Welch’s cross motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 90) and the Plaintiff’s responsive memoranda. (Doc. 91).
I. Background and Facts
Jermeal White, an inmate in the custody of Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction (DRC), alleges that on August 17, 2019, while incarcerated at the Southern
Ohio Correctional Facility (SOCF), Corrections Officer Welch used excessive force
against him. According to the complaint, Defendant Welch “used so much extreme force”
on Plaintiff “for no reason at all.” (Doc. 1, Complaint, PageId# 5). Then, according to
Plaintiff, he “was refused medical attention.” (Id. at PageId# 6). When Plaintiff was “in a
new cell on constant watch after the use of force, the nurse and S.R.T came to [his] cell,
Plaintiff told the nurse his injuries, the nurse just walked off.” (Id.). Plaintiff is seeking a
prison transfer by way of a permanent injunction and compensatory damages in the
amount of $400,000.00 against each defendant jointly and severally. (Id. at PageId# 11).
The incident was captured on video by a planned use of force videographer,
Corrections Officer Cooper, it is thirteen minutes and thirty seconds long. (Doc. 58, Ex.
A; SOCF DCSF4959). In the video, Lieutenant Eaches opens by giving a brief of the
situation to the videographer—detailing that this was a planned use of force to extract
Plaintiff from his cell. (Doc. 58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 00:00-00:31). The extraction
team then introduces themselves and specifies their role in the extraction—Corrections
Officer King, negotiator; Corrections Officer Whitman, shield; Corrections Officer Parish,
upper right; Defendant Welch, upper left; Corrections Officer Davis, lower right;
Corrections Officer Justice, lower left; and Nurse Hart, medical. (Id.,Ex. A; SOCF
DCSF4959 00:31-1:12). Lieutenant Eaches then comes back into the video frame to
describe what is planned for this extraction. (Id., Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 1:12-1:22). The
extraction team then walks to Plaintiff’s cell. (Id., Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 10:22-1:39).
Corrections Officer King, the negotiator, speaks to Plaintiff and asks if he is going to
comply with orders to move cells to which Plaintiff states he will be compliant. (Doc. 58,
Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 1:39- 1:56). Plaintiff is then cuffed by members of the extraction
team. (Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 1:56- 2:56).
Following his removal from his cell, there is a largely unremarkable escort of
Plaintiff to a different cell by the extraction team. (Doc. 58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 2:56-
7:39). Plaintiff is then uncuffed, strip searched, and given different clothing. (Doc. 58, Ex.
A; SOCF DCSF4959 7:39-9:35). Plaintiff is then cuffed and escorted to a third cell. (Doc.
58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 9:35- 11:34). Plaintiff is placed outside of the third cell and
uncuffed while a member of the extraction team searches the third cell. (Doc. 58, Ex. A;
SOCF DCSF4959 11:34-12:34). Nurse Hart then approaches the cell door and asks
Plaintiff if he needs medical attention; Plaintiff denies medical attention. (Doc. 58, Ex. A;
SOCF DCSF4959 13:19-13:25). Lieutenant Eaches concludes the video of the planned
use of force. (Doc. 58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 13:25-13:30).
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment is proper
“if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” A dispute is “genuine” when “the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A court must view the evidence
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The moving party has the
burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party’s case.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the non-moving party cannot
rest on his pleadings, but must present significant probative evidence in support of his
complaint to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. at 248-49. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence to support the non-
moving party’s position will be insufficient; the evidence must be sufficient for a jury to
reasonably find in favor of the nonmoving party. Id. at 252.
B. Applicable Law
As detailed above, Plaintiff asserts that Corrections Officer Welch used excessive
force against him in violation of his rights under the Eight Amendment. The Eighth
Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment protects prison inmates from
the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 434
(6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). An Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim has both a subjective and an objective component.
Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014). The subjective component
focuses on “whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Id.; see also Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992). In making this inquiry, the Court must
consider the need for the use of force; the relationship between that need and the type
and amount of the force used; the threat reasonably perceived by the official; and the
extent of the injury inflicted. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7; Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320
(1986).
On the other hand, the objective component of an Eighth Amendment excessive
force claim requires that a plaintiff’s injury or pain be “sufficiently serious” to offend
“contemporary standards of decency.” Cordell, 759 F.3d at 580; Williams, 631 F.3d at
383. As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, not “every malevolent touch
by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10;
Rafferty v. Trumbull Cty., 915 F.3d 1087, 1094 (6th Cir. 2019). Rather, the Eighth
Amendment protects prisoners only from that conduct which is “repugnant to the
conscience of mankind” and excludes “de minimis uses of physical force.” Wilkins v.
Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37-38 (2010) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10). In addition, this
Court has recognized how the Sixth Circuit gives deference to prison officials using force
in maintaining institutional discipline and security. See, e.g., Anderson v. Lawless, S.D.
Ohio No. 2:17-cv-1057, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 209814, at *17 (Dec. 21, 2017) (citing
Combs, 315 F.3d at 556-57). On occasion, the maintenance of prison security and
discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contacts actionable as
assault under the common law. Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034, 1037 (6th Cir. 1995).
“Because prison officials must make their decisions in haste, under pressure, and
frequently without the luxury of a second chance, we must grant them wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment
are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.”
Combs, 315 F.3d at 557.
C. Defendant Welch is entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to
Plaintiff’s claims under the Eighth Amendment
In his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff claims, inter alia, that while he was
being escorted to another cell, “extreme force was used against Plaintiff for no reason by
Defendant Welch.” (Doc. 86 at 4). Plaintiff further asserts “Defendant Welch applied
extreme force by escorting Plaintiff by his right wrist and right arm, bending and twisting
Plaintiff’s wrist and arm” while Corrections Officer Parish did the same to Plaintiff’s left
arm. (Id. at 5). Specifically, Plaintiff contends Welch and Parish “bent Plaintiff’s arms and
hands all the way up his back” snapping Plaintiff’s right elbow out of place. (Id. at 6).
Plaintiff states he did not cry or complain, because he did not want to make matters worse.
(Id). When asked for medical attention, Plaintiff states he responded affirmatively. (Id. at
7). However, Plaintiff’s contentions are wholly unsupported.
Defendant Welch asserts that there was no use of force in this matter. He further
asserts that the video and declarations demonstrate that Plaintiff White was escorted in
an unremarkable fashion. (Doc. 90, at 11; SOCF DCSF4959). The undersigned agrees.
As noted above, Plaintiff was escorted to a different cell by the extraction team.
(Doc. 58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 2:56-7:39). He is then uncuffed, strip searched, and
given different clothing. (Doc. 58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 7:39-9:35). Following this,
Plaintiff is cuffed and escorted to a third cell. (Doc. 58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 9:35-
11:34). Plaintiff is placed outside of the third cell and uncuffed while a member of the
extraction team searches the third cell. (Doc. 58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 11:34-12:34).
Plaintiff is then placed in the third cell, his hands are uncuffed, and the cuff port is closed
and locked. (Doc. 58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 12:34-13:19). Nurse Hart then approaches
the cell door and asks Plaintiff if he needs medical attention; Plaintiff denies medical
attention. (Doc. 58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 13:19-13:25). Lieutenant Eaches concludes
the video of the planned use of force. (Doc. 58, Ex. A; SOCF DCSF4959 13:25-13:30.
Nothing distinguishes this case from the claims against Defendant Parish, whose
motion for summary judgment was granted by the Court. There is no force used in this
escort. (Doc. 58, Ex. C; U of F Report, p.8, 15). As such, according to Defendants, at no
point during the escort does Plaintiff complain of pain, nor does he ask for medical
attention after he is placed in the third cell. Indeed, when asked by Nurse Hart if he
needed medical attention, Plaintiff denied that he did. (Id.; Ex.C; U of F Report, p.18, 24).
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff failed to establish any
violation of his Eighth Amendment Rights. According, Defendant Welch is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law in this regard.
D. Qualified Immunity
Assuming Plaintiff has met his burden of establishing a violation of his Eighth
Amendment rights, which he has not, Defendant Welch is entitled to qualified immunity.
The purpose of qualified immunity is to provide governmental officials with the ability
“reasonably [to] anticipate when their conduct may give rise to liability for damages.”
Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984). Thus, a governmental official performing
discretionary functions will be entitled to qualified immunity unless his actions violate
“clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S. Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982). A
governmental official is entitled to immunity if the facts alleged do not make out a violation
of a constitutional right, or if the alleged constitutional right was not clearly established at
the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129
S. Ct. 808 (2009). Once a defendant has raised the defense of qualified immunity, the
plaintiff bears the burden of proof to show that the defendant is not entitled to that defense.
See Garretson v. City of Madison Heights, 407 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir. 2005).
Here, as detailed above, there is no evidence that Defendant Welch used
excessive force against Plaintiff. To the contrary, the evidence establishes that Plaintiff
was cuffed and escorted to another cell without incident. As such, Plaintiff has failed to
establish a violation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that
Defendant Welch is immune from Plaintiff's claim against him.
III. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Plaintiff’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 86) be DENIED; Defendant Welch’s cross motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 90) be GRANTED; and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Welch be
TERMINATED and this case be CLOSED.
s/Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
JERMEAL WHITE, Case No. 1:19-cv-1007
Plaintiff,
Dlott, J.
vs Bowman, M.J.
WARDEN RON ERDOS, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).