Brown v. Chambers-Smith

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

MILOUS BROWN,

Plaintiff, : Case No. 2:22-cv-2469

District Judge Michael H. Watson

- vs - Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al.,

Defendants. :

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is pending on Plaintiff’s Objections to the Magistrate

Judge’s Report and Recommendations (the “Report,” ECF No. 9) which recommended on initial

screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A Complaint herein be dismissed without prejudice insofar as it

seeks monetary damages against any Defendant in his or her official capacity or injunctive relief

to enforce any provision of Ohio law against any Defendant. Id. at PageID 205. Plaintiff objected

to that conclusion (Objections, ECF No. ECF No. 31). Defendants have timely responded to those

Objections (ECF No. 34) and District Judge Watson has recommitted the case for reconsideration

in light of the Objections (ECF No. 33).

Plaintiff objects that the Report conflates 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and (b)(2)(Objections,

ECF No. 31). Defendants respond that dismissal is appropriate under either of those statutes

(“Response,” ECF No. 34, PageID 299).

28 U.S.C. § 1915A provides:

(a) Screening.— The court shall review, before docketing, if

feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a

complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity

(b) Grounds for Dismissal.—On review, the court shall identify

cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the

complaint, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

(c) Definition.— As used in this section, the term “prisoner” means

any person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused

of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for,

violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole,

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program.

Plaintiff does not dispute that this case comes within the Prison Litigation Reform Act of

1995 Title VIII of P.L. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321(effective April 26, 1996)(the "PLRA") and thus is

subject to the screening required by § 1915A. The statute provides, at least inferentially, that

screening is to take place sua sponte since it is to occur if feasible before the case is docketed.

That is indeed what happened here: the case was referred to the undersigned on June 29, 2022, as

soon as District Judges Marbley and Watson had decided that it was related to Plaintiff’s prior

case, Case No. 2:19-cv-2425 (ECF No. 5). The undersigned immediately granted Plaintiff leave

to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 6). To execute Congressional intent that 1915A screening

take place before issuance of process is possible, the construction of the Report became the

Magistrate Judge’s next task in this case and the Report was filed July 13, 2022.

Plaintiff did not object to the Report within the time allowed by Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 and Judge

Watson adopted it August 3, 2022 (ECF No. 13). Eventually the dispute over whether Plaintiff

had been properly “served” with the Report was resolved by requiring that Plaintiff’s newly-

appointed counsel be furnished with a copy and a new deadline for objecting was set (ECF No.

28).

Plaintiff objects to the “conflation” of analysis of claims under 1915A(b)(1) and (b)(2). As

Plaintiff concedes, the statute is disjunctive, meaning that claims are to be dismissed if they either

fail to state a claim or seek monetary damages from a party which is immune. But in addition to

those bases for dismissal, every federal court is bound to raise, sua sponte if necessary, limits on

its own jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998).

As stated in the Report, the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution

provides:

The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to

extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted

against one of the United States by Citizens of another State or by

Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.

It has been construed to bar suits against a State by its own citizens. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S.

265, 276 (1986); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974);

Florida Dep't. of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982). The Amendment also bars

actions against state agencies where the State is the real party in interest and the action seeks to

recover money from the state treasury. Estate of Ritter v. University of Michigan, 851 F.2d 846,

848 (6th Cir. 1988); Ford Motor Company v. Dep't. of Treasury of State of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459

(1945); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979).

Is the Eleventh Amendment a jurisdictional bar or does it merely create an immunity? The

Sixth Circuit has held it is a jurisdictional bar which federal courts must raise sua sponte. Fairport

Int'l Exploration, Inc., v. Shipwrecked Vessel Known as the Captain Lawrence, 105 F.3d 1078,

1082 (6th Cir. 1997); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203 (6th Cir. 1996). In Cady v. Arenac

County, 574 F.3d 334 (6th Cir. 2009), the court opined that

The Sixth Circuit has largely followed the "jurisdictional bar"

approach in Edelman by holding that a federal court "can raise the

question of sovereign immunity sua sponte because it implicates

important questions of federal-court jurisdiction and federal-state

comity." S&M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d 500, 507 (6th Cir.

2008) (citation omitted); see also Nair v. Oakland County Cmty.

Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d 469, 474 (6th Cir. 2006) ("Like

subject-matter jurisdiction, a sovereign-immunity defense may be

asserted for the first time on appeal, and it may (and should) be

raised by federal courts on their own initiative." (citations omitted));

Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999) (stating that a

federal court "may sua sponte raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction

because of the applicability of the eleventh amendment" (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted)).

Id. at 344-45. Whether the Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdictional bar or creates an absolute

immunity for state officials in their official capacities, the issue is properly raised sua sponte.

Nothing in federal law creates a barrier to combining jurisdictional and immunity analysis in the

same Report. Plaintiff has cited no authority for the proposition that conflating analysis of those

questions in a 1915A recommendation makes the analysis invalid.

Aside from the “conflating” argument, Plaintiff has made no substantive objections to the

Report. In particular, he does not dispute that a suit for money damages against a state employee

is his official capacity is legally to be construed as a suit against the State and therefore barred by

the Eleventh Amendment. See Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080 (11th Cir. 1996). Nor does he

dispute that the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections is an Ohio state agency for

Eleventh Amendment purposes. See Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist. Court, 628 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2010),

quoting Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 359 (6th Cir. 2005)(en banc), citing Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-

Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 44, 45, 51(1994).

Likewise Plaintiff does not dispute that this Court is barred from enforcing state law by

injunction in a § 1983 case. See Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89

(1984); Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351 (6th Cir. 2005)(en banc); Turker v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. &

Corr., 157 F.3d 453 (6th Cir. 1998); In re: Ohio Execution Protocol Litig. (Gary Otte), 2017 U.S.

App. LEXIS 17436 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2017), affirming In re: Ohio Execution Protocol Litig.

(Tibbetts & Otte), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115583 (S.D. Ohio July 25, 2017)(Merz, M.J.).

Sovereign immunity bars a plaintiff from using state law to enjoin state officials from carrying out

their official responsibilities even when the officials are sued in their individual capacities. In re:

Ohio Execution Protocol Litig. (Gary Otte), 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17436 (6th Cir. Sept. 7, 2017),

citing Williams v. Kentucky, 24 F.3d 1526, 1531, 1543 (6th Cir. 19934).

Conclusion

Having reconsidered the case in light of the Objections, the Magistrate Judge respectfully

recommends that the Complaint be dismissed without prejudice (1) insofar as it seeks monetary

damages against any Defendant in his or her official capacity because the Court is without subject

matter jurisdiction to entertain such a suit under the Eleventh Amendment and (2) insofar as it

seeks injunctive relief to enforce any provision of Ohio law against any Defendant for the same

reason. Procedurally, these recommendations are grounded in Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because suit

to obtain monetary relief against a state official or employee in his or her official capacity or

injunctive relief to enforce state law does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted under

42 US.C. § 1983.

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the

proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report

and Recommendations. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and

shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond

to another party’s objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure

to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. #

November 16, 2022.

s/ Michael R. Merz

United States Magistrate Judge