The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DANIEL BRONSON, Case No. 1:22-cv-525
Plaintiff,
Barrett, J.
vs. Bowman, M.J.
DANIEL BORCHERT,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a resident of Cincinnati, brings this action against Daniel Borchert, Deputy
Clerk of Court for the Ohio Court of Claims. By separate Order issued this date, plaintiff
has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This
matter is before the Court for a sua sponte review of plaintiff’s complaint to determine
whether the complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief
from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B).
I. Screening Standard
The undersigned takes judicial notice of the fact that Plaintiff was previously
incarcerated in the State of Ohio, and that during his incarceration, he frequently filed
lawsuits that failed to state any claim or were otherwise deemed to be frivolous. Based
upon that history, Plaintiff was barred from filing additional lawsuits in forma pauperis
during the remainder of his incarceration absent a showing of “imminent danger of serious
physical injury” under what is commonly known as the “three strikes rule” of section 804(d)
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) of 1995. See, generally 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);
Bronson v. State of Ohio, Case No. 1:21-cv-711 (Doc. 2, Report and Recommendation
noting application of the “three strike” rule to Plaintiff). Now that Plaintiff is no longer
incarcerated, he is not subject to the PLRA’s “three strikes rule.” However, that does not
mean that Plaintiff’s lawsuits will escape all screening. In enacting the original in forma
pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant whose filing fees and court costs
are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain
from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25,
31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such
abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis
complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff
cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams,
490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir.
1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or
when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are
delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at
32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that
are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630
F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A
complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same
token, however, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,
678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs
dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual
allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-
me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading
that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
II. Analysis of Plaintiff’s Complaint
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint contains the following allegations:
Claim #1. (On July 12, 2022 Deputy Clerk Daniel R. Borchert violated Daniel
Bronson’s 14th United States Constitutional Right of Due Process). Daniel
R. Borchert allowed Defendant “Cincinnati State and technical and
community college,” To waste 24 of my calendar day, by letting the
defendant file two (2) investigation reports, inside of the Ohio Court of
Claims.
(Doc. 1 at 6)
Plaintiff also asks “this Court to compensate me $400.000.00 United States Dollars
for the Defendant violating my 14th United States Constitutional Right.” (Doc. 1 at 11).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed. Notably, the claims asserted
against the Clerk of Courts are subject to dismissal because the Clerk of Courts is
entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Immunity afforded to judges “has also been extended
to non-judicial officers performing ‘quasi-judicial’ duties.” Marshall v. Green, 2010 WL
1959514, * 2 (W.D. Ky May 17, 2010) (citing Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir.
1994)); see also Teats v. Johnson, 2012 WL 4481436, * (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2012), (“In
the Sixth Circuit, ‘it is well established that judges and other court officers enjoy absolute
immunity from suit on claims arising out of the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions.’”) (quoting Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988)), report and
recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 4471257 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2012). Thus, “court
officers such as clerks of court” have been found to be entitled to absolute immunity.
Howard v. Ohio State Supreme Court, 2014 WL 3670996, * 4 (S.D. Ohio July 23, 2014)
(citing Foster, 864 F.2d at 417), report and recommendation adopted, 2014 WL 5460572
(S.D. Ohio Oct. 27, 2014).
As such, Defendant Borchert is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity from Plaintiff’s
allegations, and the § 1983 claims against him are dismissed pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B).
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
Accordingly, for these reasons, it is therefore RECOMMENDED this action be
DISMISSED with PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim for relief. It is further
RECOMMENDED that the Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the
foregoing reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation
would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny Plaintiff leave to appeal in forma
pauperis.
s/ Stephanie K. Bowman
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Magistrate Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DANIEL BRONSON, Case No. 1:22-cv-525
Plaintiff,
Barrett, J.
vs. Bowman, M.J.
DANIEL BORCHERT.,
Defendant.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the
portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in
support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within
FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make
objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).