Nixon v. WBH Cincinnati LLC

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MELANISE NIXON,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:22-cv-2481

vs. Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

WBH CINCINNATI LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Melanise Nixon, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of counsel,

brings this action arising from a property dispute. (ECF No. 1-1.) This matter is before the

Undersigned for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and

1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or

any portion of it which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997).

Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED

that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims in their entirety.

I.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1 as part of the

statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).

Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a]

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

1Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on

a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court

holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’”

Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April

1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however,

has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v.

Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591,

594 (6th Cir. 1989)).

Further, when the face of the complaint provides no basis for federal jurisdiction, the

Court may dismiss an action as frivolous and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under both 28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). Williams v. Cincy Urban Apts., No. 1:10-

cv-153, 2010 WL 883846, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Carlock v. Williams, 182

F.3d 916, 1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)).

II.

Plaintiff’s claims appear to arise out of a years-long family property dispute, which

Plaintiff apparently has unsuccessfully litigated in the Franklin County Probate Court. Plaintiff

alleges that she was “defrauded out of [her] inheritance rights” as an heir to her aunt’s estate, and

that she had “made numerous reports of criminal activity that included Elder Abuse” prior to her

aunt’s death. (ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID # 6.) Plaintiff alleges that she was supposed to inherit

an interest in her aunt’s house, but that the Franklin County Probate Court instead transferred the

property to Plaintiff’s aunt’s son Vincent Nixon (who Plaintiff implicitly suggests committed the

alleged elder abuse), notwithstanding Plaintiff’s criminal reports. (See generally id. at PAGEID

## 6-7.) Plaintiff alleges that she attempted to work with Court personnel to “stop the ongoing

fraud,” but she “was not provided the help [she] needed in a timely fashion.” (Id. at PAGEID #

7.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[s]everal Court officials should have notified the Judge of what

was going on and gave [her] excuse after excuse thus allowing the fraud to continue.” (Id.)

Plaintiff seeks to have her “legal rights to the property returned to [her]” and for “a full and

proper accountability for those who facilitated this fraud to go forward.” (Id. at PAGEID # 8.)

III.

The Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has failed to assert any claim with an arguable

basis in law over which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. “‘Federal courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction.’” Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). “The basic statutory grants of federal court

subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for ‘[f]ederal-

question’ jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship jurisdiction.”

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006).

A doctrine known as Rooker-Feldman further limits this Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate

appeals from or collateral attacks on state-court rulings. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263

U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476

(1983). “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine embodies the notion that appellate review of state-court

decisions and the validity of state judicial proceedings is limited to the Supreme Court under 28

U.S.C. § 1257, and thus that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review such matters.” In

re Cook, 551 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 2009). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies to cases

“brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection

of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Ind. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 281 (2005).

“The pertinent question in determining whether a federal district court is precluded under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim is whether the

source of the injury upon which plaintiff bases his federal claim is the state court judgment.” In

re Cook, 551 F.3d at 548 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Applying the foregoing, the Undersigned concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine

operates to bar this Court from exercising jurisdiction over this action. Here, Plaintiff is

attacking a state-court judgment concerning the property rights of Plaintiff’s late aunt’s house.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Franklin County Probate Court improperly transferred the

house to Mr. Nixon. (ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID ## 6-7.) To be clear, the only relief Plaintiff

seeks is to have “[her] legal rights to the property returned to [her].” (ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID

## 6-8.) Put differently, Plaintiff asks this Court to overrule the Franklin County Probate Court

and transfer the underlying property to her.

This Court, however, does not have jurisdiction to review such judgments, let alone

overturn them. Only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review a case litigated

and decided in a state court. See Gotfried v. Med. Planning Servs., 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir.

1998). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a litigant cannot collaterally attack a state court

judgment by filing a civil rights complaint. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416.

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks relief from state court judgments in this Court, those

claims are barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and must be dismissed as a result. Baker

v. Wayne Cnty. Fam. Indep. Agency, 75 F. App'x 501, 503 (6th Cir. 2003) (“In this case, the

essence of [Plaintiff’s] complaint was that the state probate court erred by terminating his

parental and visitation rights. The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents federal courts from

engaging in such collateral review of state court decisions.”).

Even notwithstanding the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Plaintiff has failed to make any

affirmative allegations or state any plausible claims for relief, against any of the named

Defendants. First, for example, a closer look through the exhibits attached to Plaintiff’s

Complaint suggests that Mr. Nixon transferred the property in question to Defendant WBH

Cincinnati LLC (“WBH”), but Plaintiff alleges no wrongdoing by WBH. Likewise, Plaintiff’s

does not affirmatively allege any wrongdoing by Defendant Franklin County Recorder’s Office,

and only alleges in passing that her aunt’s death was recorded in Franklin County – presumably

by the Recorder’s Office. (ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID # 6.) Next, while Plaintiff alleges that

“Court officials” should have “stop[ped] the ongoing fraud,” Plaintiff makes no allegations

against Defendant Franklin County Probate Court.1 (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff makes no mention

1 Even if Plaintiff had included allegations against Defendant Franklin County Probate Court,

such claims would fail because county “courts in Ohio qualify as arms of the state, and therefore

‘are immune from suits brought by citizens of Ohio.’” McConaughy v. Prob. Ct. of Belmont

whatsoever of Defendant Franklin County Office on Aging.2 (Id.) The Complaint therefore fails

to state a claim against any of the Defendants. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (noting that a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.”).

For these reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims in

their entirety.

Cnty., Ohio, No. 2:21-CV-2239, 2021 WL 2650056, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 28, 2021), report and

recommendation adopted sub nom. McConnaughy v. Prob. Ct. of Belmont Cnty., No. 2:21-CV-

2239, 2021 WL 3022986 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2021) (citing Phillips v. City of Cincinnati, No.

1:18-CV-541, 2019 WL 2289277, at *10 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2019) (quoting Lott v. Marietta

Mun. Court, No. 2:13-CV-00377, 2013 WL 6662836, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 17, 2013)

(compiling Sixth Circuit and Southern District of Ohio decisions finding the same)); see also

Mathis v. Netcare Corp., No. 2:12-CV-576, 2012 WL 2884804, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2012)

(County Probate Court entitled to absolute Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit)).

2 To the extent the Court feels compelled to construe Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants

Franklin County Recorder’s Office and/or Franklin County Office of Aging as actually being

asserted against Franklin County, Plaintiff’s claims would still fail. As a rule, local governments

may only be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when the execution of the local government’s policy

or custom inflicts the injury in question. Allah v. Child Support Enf't Agency, No. 1:18 CV 872,

2018 WL 3752244, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 7, 2018) (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); DePiero v. City of Macedonia, 180 F.3d 770, 786 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Here, Plaintiff does not include any legal claims against Franklin County and does not identify a

County policy, ordinance or custom that could be construed to allege a violation of Plaintiff’s

constitutional rights, notwithstanding Plaintiff’s introductory allegations that she “was deprived

of [her] Civil Rights of having equal protection under the law as a person of African American

heritage, veteran status, female and disability status” and that she “also believe[s] that [her]

religious beliefs were also being exploited.” (ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID # 6.) Simply put,

Plaintiff has not established this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction with respect to Franklin

County. Allah, 2018 WL 375224 at *5 (citing Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir.

1999)).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report an\d

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, appellate

review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994

(6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to specify the

issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted)).

/s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers

DATED: September 19, 2022 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE